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ABSTRACT 
STRENGTHENING CONFLUENT EDUCATION THROUGH A PHILOSOPHICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF DIALOGUE: 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE WRITINGS OF 
MARTIN BUBER, HANS-GEORG GADAMER AND KARL JASPERS 
February, 1986 
Roberta B. Heston, A.B., Smith College 
Ed.M., Smith College, Ed.D., University of Massachusetts 
Directed by: Professor Jeffrey W. Eiseman 
This dissertation is a study of the implications 
for education of the concept of dialogue as it is analyzed 
in the philosophical writings of Martin Buber, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer and Karl Jaspers. In Part I of the study, the 
philosophical writings on the concept of dialogue are 
analyzed to provide a set of guidelines for thinking 
about dialogue. The premise on which this work is based 
is that philosophical analysis of the concept of dialogue 
can enhance the effectiveness of confluent education, 
which attempts to integrate affect and cognition in the 
educative process. 
Part II of the dissertation attempts to demonstrate 
that an understanding of dialogue can provide both a 
general philosophical grounding for confluent education 
vi 
and specific implications pertaining to pedagogical 
obligations, teacher-student relationships, content 
selection, and teaching methodology. The premise on 
which this work is based is that education is most 
effective if it is ontologically rooted. From the 
philosophical perspective used in this study, human 
beings self-actualize through and in dialogical relation¬ 
ships. To be ontologically rooted, education must 
include dialogue as a central dynamic. Three pedagogical 
obligations that follow from this perspective are: 
first, education should heighten students" awareness of 
themselves as unique, emergent, self-actualizing persons; 
second, education should enhance students" understanding 
of the human tradition; third, education should enhance 
students" ability to participate in dialogical relation¬ 
ships . 
The teacher-student relationship described models a 
dialogical relationship in an education setting. Content 
selection is discussed from the perspective that content 
is a tool for self-actualization and, as such, should 
help the student understand the human tradition in a 
personally meaningful way. The possibility of implement¬ 
ing a variety of teaching methods from a dialogical 
orientation is discussed. A specifically dialectical- 
dialogical teaching approach predicated on Gadamer s 
philosophical hermeneutics is described. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM 
Introduction 
There are demands from many quarters for a variety 
of education reforms that purportedly would enable our 
society to better address its problems. This linkage of 
educational reform with improving society is a pattern 
that persists, often amid scathing criticisms of whatever 
type of education prevails. Yet, what all visions, 
however diverse, have in common is the hope that educa¬ 
tional reform can serve as a corrective for social ills, 
produce more able individuals and lead to a better 
society. 
The hope persists even in recognition that schools 
reflect as well as influence the society of which they 
are a part and that schools have dual and potentially 
conflicting mandates of socializing for cultural reproduc¬ 
tion and of enhancing the actualization of individual 
potential for cultural production. Generally, the 
conservative and socialization dimensions predominate, 
especially in elementary and secondary schools, and 
educational change tends overall to be incremental. This 
is probably just as well in view of the potential 
1 
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destruction and trauma which can accompany radical 
change. while the cumulative effects of incremental 
change can also be stressful and perhaps even traumatic, 
its incremental nature may permit adjustments and 
corrections that render change more humanly manageable. 
Given the extent and rapidity of change in the twentieth 
century, however, educational change cannot proceed at a 
snail s pace" and cannot be limited to minor 
"tinkerings." 
Charles A. Tesconi, Jr. describes the plight of our 
society: 
[0]urs is a bewildered society . . . the first 
mass society wherein a variety of socially 
convulsing, indeed revolutionary, forces have 
converged simultaneously . . . The industrial 
revolution has changed the world of work and 
relationships among workers. The urban revolution 
has jammed us together, exposing our social sores 
and making them perennially visible; has challeng¬ 
ed parochial and tribal views and relationships; 
and has bestowed upon us an almost impossible 
confusion and variety. The scientific revolution 
has subverted sacred stabilities and trusted 
meanings, provided us with an awesome, frightening 
power and given us more knowledge than we can 
handle, while opening up previously unexplored 
psychological jungles. The technological revolu¬ 
tion has loaded us with chrome, gadgets, and all 
sorts of "plastic" goodies upon which we have 
become extremely dependent . . . The communica¬ 
tions revolution has brought us face to face with 
each other, and with our messes, while allowing 
us, nevertheless, to escape. The youth revolution 
. . . has opened up complex intergenerational 
haunting and guilts . . . The black, brown and 
red revolutions have laid bare cancerous racism 
and challenged a checkered history so long a 
source of nativistic hubris . . . [T]he women s 
revolution has made all of us a little unsure in 
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relationships with the opposite sex. 
This is not an exhaustive list . . . but they 
have all contributed to the making of a mind- 
boggling social environment. [Tesconi, 1975, p. 
xii ] 
One of the few certainties today seems to be 
uncertainty. As individuals we often feel uncertain of 
our ability to confront survival problems and to decrease 
the potential for disaster that seems to be lurking 
before us. We tend to reify our bureaucracies and then 
fear that we are being victimized by them. We resent the 
jargon of specialization that obstructs us in our search 
for understanding; we react with confusion, resentment 
and anger when there seem to be no simple solutions in 
the pervasive complexity of life. We are frustrated by 
disagreements among the "experts" to whom we turn for 
answers. As Barry O'Connell writes: 
Few people, upon reflection, see a benign future 
for our society or for the world. Many have lost 
the will to work for a better future; the rest 
feel baffled by the complexities of our problems 
... We must confront the present, yet we know 
not how. We depend upon the political and 
educational institutions for leadership, yet 
these institutions are themselves in disarray. 
[O'Connell, in Rockerfeller, 1979, p. 59] 
There are today many thoughtful and convincing 
analyses of the roots in our immediate past and present 
of a rapidly approaching future that will require quite 
different human responses from those now valued and 
taught. Books such as Alvin Toffler s Future Shock 
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(1971), Third Wave ( 1980 ) and Learning For Tomorrow ( 1972) 
or George B. Leonard's Education and Ecstasy (1968) or 
John Naisbitt's Megatrends (1982, 1984) stress the need 
for new responses to the above problems. 
The task facing educators is to prepare students to 
live in a future which can only be imagined and guessed 
at; this task takes on new urgency given the immediacy of 
the survival questions confronting us and the discrepancy 
between our technological capabilities and our ethical 
capabilities to deal with questions produced by 
technology. Neither a fearful withdrawal, turtle-like, 
into the shell of old answers nor a blindly hopeful 
attempted conversion of human ethical questions into 
technical questions to be answered by "experts" will 
suffice. Educators must overcome the temptation to seek 
stability through emphasis on socialization for cultural 
reproduction. They must attempt, rather, to facilitate 
development of individual human potential for cultural 
production, not only in a technological sense but also in 
the sense of giving to the individual his/her rights as a 
thoughtful, active decision-maker accepting of responsibi¬ 
lity for creating a world and committed to the attempt to 
do so. 
The question, of course, is how. Since this is a 
human question, there is no technical, one-right-way 
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answer. Tesconi points out that: 
As a pragmatic people, we gravitate towards 
quick, readily available solutions to our 
collective problems, often showing little concern 
for the long-range consequences of such solutions 
or the need to philosophize about them. We are 
inclined to believe . . . that we are more likely 
to better our world through the technological and 
material reconstruction of our environment than 
be changing our philosophy. This technique- 
oriented mentality is too busy keeping track of 
events to ponder them ... In education, as 
elsewhere, then, our actions are unreflective, 
meandering, and perhaps even unromantic. 
[L]ong-range planning and philosophizing 
about the consequences of our actions do not 
square with our action-oriented approach . . . 
[Tesconi, 1975, p. 11] [1] 
Yet, technological and material reconstruction of the 
environment in order to better the world will not 
accomplish the educators' task of restoring to the 
individual faith in his/her ability to decide, act and 
take responsibility for creating a better world. There 
is a very real possibility that it is precisely belief in 
ideological superstructures, such as those related to 
technological and material reconstruction, that has 
played a major role in destroying faith in individual 
potency. 
This concern is expressed in the Radical Humanist 
paradigm of social theory which contends that human 
consciousness is dominated by the ideological superstruc¬ 
tures with which human beings interact and these alienate 
human beings from their true consciousness (Burrell and 
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Morgan, 1979, p. 32). Concern about the problem of 
reification is reflected in the concept of verstehen 
which postulates the subjective meaning of events as the 
key to understanding the social world. Understanding 
social issues requires consideration of ways in which 
individuals attach subjective meaning to situations and 
orient their actions according to their perceptions of 
situations (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, p. 83). In Beyond 
Alienation, Ernest Becker argues that in order to overcome 
the feeling of alienation produced by reification the 
human being must develop "self-reliance," the quality, he 
believes, that is least readily available to individuals: 
The tragedy is simply this: that new meanings can 
only come from the creative depths of the life 
force within each individual; but the individual 
is the last one who believes in his right to 
develop unique meanings. He takes everything he 
needs uncritically from the society at large . . . 
[Becker, 1967, p. 198] 
If educators are to prepare students to live in a 
future that can only be guessed at as human beings with 
potential for cultural production and meaning-creation, 
they must first attempt to enable students to believe in 
and rely on their abilities to attain an expanding degree 
of self-determination and self-actualization in the 
complex social, corporate, psychological, moral, natural, 
and technical environments they perceive as constituting 
their life-world. Students must be assisted to develop 
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their abilities: to better tolerate ambiguity; to perceive 
broadly and abstractly; to think critically and creative¬ 
ly; to reason convergently and divergently; to remain 
flexible; to communicate fluently; to interact supportive- 
ly with others;to make ethical decisions on which they 
have the courage to act; and to be responsive and 
responsible. The educational process for developing 
these abilities must include many opportunities for 
using, and reflecting on experiences of using, these 
abilities. Only then can it assist students' development 
of faith in and reliance on their abilities. This will 
require, as Tesconi suggests, not technological and 
material reconstruction, but rather philosophical 
reconstruction. 
One of the most potentially useful efforts in this 
direction is confluent education, an outgrowth of the 
Ford-Esalen Project at the Esalen Institute in California 
during the late 1960 s (Brown, 1971, pp. 3-25). It is 
derived from the phenomenological existential perspective 
in psychology (variously labelled Humanistic, Personolog- 
ical, Phenomenological, and Existential Psychology) and 
is based on Gestalt theory as articulated in the work of 
Frederick Peris, Abraham Maslow and Carl Rogers. 
In his Preface to Human Teaching for Human Learning^ 
An introduction to Confluent Education, George Isaac 
8 
Brown states: "There is one crucial polarity in the 
process of Western civilization . . . the dehumanizing 
versus the humanizing society" (Brown, 1971, Preface). 
He sees this polarity manifested in all dimensions of 
human life, including education, and articulates the need 
to make education more human. For Brown, the process by 
which the uniqueness and potentiality of individual human 
beings can be transmuted into actuality is an educational 
process. He believes that confluent education 
demonstrates how education can become both more human and 
more productive (Brown, 1971, Preface). 
Brown reasons that since we function as feeling¬ 
thinking beings, there is no intellectual learning 
without feelings and no feelings without mind involvement. 
Accordingly, confluent education is based upon the 
premise that mind and feelings must be integrated in the 
teaching-learning process (see Brown, 1971, pp. 3-4). To 
achieve integration of affect and cognition, confluent 
education relies on basic goals and directions for 
education derived from Gestalt theory and practice: 
1. The student moves from environmental support 
to self-support. 
2. The student differentiates between awareness 
and fantasy. 
3. The student develops and practices differenti¬ 
al thinking skills, [open-ended thinking about 
more than one side of a problem in trying to fin 
solutions, as opposed to right-wrong thinking) 
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4. The student recognizes the difference between 
understanding and explaining — between awareness 
and conceptualization -- and is aware of which 
procedure he is using. 
5. The student constantly works toward wholeness, 
toward Gestalt formation and integrated function¬ 
ing as a whole person, and he recognizes and 
accepts responsibility for all parts of himself 
and for all of his actions. [Bogad, in Brown, 
1975, p. 191] 
Analysis of the concept of confluent education reported 
by Stewart Shapiro lists the following necesary elements: 
1. Participation (P). There is consent, power¬ 
sharing, negotiation, and joint responsibility by 
co-participants. It is essentially nonauthorita¬ 
rian and nonunilateral. 
2. Interpenetration (I). There is interaction, 
interpenetration, and integration of thinking, 
feelings, and action. 
3. Relevance (R). The subject matter is closely 
related to the basic needs, life, and meanings of 
the participants. 
4. Self (S). The self is a legitimate object of 
learning. 
5. Goals (G). The social goal, or purpose, is 
to develop the whole person within a humane 
society. [Shapiro, in Brown, 1975, p. 119] 
The methods used in confluent education emphasize 
intrapersonal exploration to help the student get in 
touch" with what s/he is feeling "here and now" as a 
crucial part of the learning process. Frequently, 
affective techniques include a variety of exercises to 
sensitize students to their present feelings (for a 
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description of a variety of such exercises see Brown, 
1971; Schutz, 1968). These are used both as a preliminary 
step and as a central part of integrating cognition and 
affect in subject matter teaching-learning. Learning 
about the self is perceived as an inherent dimension of 
confluent education in all subject matter areas: 
Most of the content of curriculum in our 
classrooms originally had its source in human 
experience. When that live experience was 
transmuted into what was hoped would be a more 
efficient ordering of the curriculum, its vitality 
was usually lost. . . . 
. . . educators, by compressing and organizing 
knowledge in all areas of the curriculum, have 
created in the classroom what Paul Tillich has 
called the fatal pedagogical error -- "To throw 
answers like stones at the heads of those who 
have not yet asked the questions." [Brown, 1971, 
pp. 15-16] 
Confluent education seeks to humanize education by 
restoring the relation of the curriculum to the individu¬ 
al, encouraging the asking of questions, placing the 
individual (affectively and cognitively) at the heart of 
the educative process, and making classrooms "live" 
classrooms in which students are enthusiastically and 
authentically involved in taking as much responsibility 
as possible for their learning (see Brown, 1975, pp. 1-2 
for a description of the difference between "live" and 
"dead" classrooms). Confluent education, then, would 
seem to be a giant step toward humanizing education while 
retaining standards of excellence in content teaching- 
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learning. It offers the possibility of developing in 
individuals both abilities for and faith in their 
abilities for learning, meaning-creation and self- 
actualization. It addresses the position that "Students 
learn what they care about and remember what they under¬ 
stand" (Ericksen, 1984, p. 51). 
The two-part premise of this dissertation is 
(1) that confluent education is an appropriate response 
to the current state of our society and (2) confluent 
education can be rendered more effective by a 
philosophical analysis of the concept of dialogue. 
The Problem 
For all its promise, however, confluent education risks 
losing sight of its goals in its concentration on process. 
By building on a psychological tradition (which has been 
manifested largely in a therapeutic orientation, albeit 
not one restricted to psychopathological therapy) and in 
not penetrating this tradition to its philosophical roots, 
confluent education, it seems to me, overlooks some 
possibilities for both maintaining sight of its goals and 
enriching its practice. These failures may have 
contributed to the curtailment of expansion of confluent 
education into the mainstream of public education. 
For example, confluent education relies heavily on 
affective and interactive techniques in its efforts to 
help individuals learn to be "self-supporting" or self- 
actualizing; however, its foremost proponent warns that 
being self-supporting is not an end in itself but part of 
the process of moving toward a goal. Brown writes. 
The question to be asked by anyone practicing 
Gestalt therapy or anyone engaged in the Gestalt 
learning process is this: After the individual 
can stand on his own two feet, what then does he 
do? Just stand there? It seems obvious that one 
would next want to move. It further seems 
obvious that one would probably want to move 
toward, as well as away from, and that the 
12 
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direction toward could have at least another 
human being as its goal. This could further 
develop into a movement toward many human beings, 
or perhaps even ultimately toward all manifesta¬ 
tions of life and energy. 
What I propose in no way negates the need for 
individuals to learn to be self-supporting. I 
simply want to point out again that this is not 
an end unto itself -- it is only one part of a 
process. For each one of us there is in this 
process an ultimate goal: The expanding capacity 
for healthy love, experienced in a real universe. 
[Brown, 1975, pp. 95-96] 
Brown refers to Frederick Peris' description of love as 
similar to the concept of Martin Buber's "I-Thou" 
relationship (Brown, 1975, p. 94) -- "a relationship all 
human beings need to help manifest their humanness" 
(Brown, 1971, p. 237). 
If Brown's ultimate goal for confluent education is 
to be approached, practitioners of confluent education 
must understand its philosophical grounding. If affective 
and interactive techniques are to characterize the 
process of confluent education, yet not become ends in 
themselves, confluent educators will have to help students 
reflect on these experiences and integrate them into a 
meaning context related to the ultimate goal of education. 
To do this, confluent educators will, themselves, have to 
understand the "I-Thou" relationship and its defining and 
constituting process, i.e., dialogue. Dialogue can and 
should be a part of the reflection by students and 
teachers on the educational process. Moreover, the 
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central inclusion of dialogue as a dynamic in the educa¬ 
tive process will enable students to practice relating to 
others in the dialogical relationship that Brown cites as 
the ultimate goal of confluent education. Much of what 
is implicit already in the elements of confluent education 
(delineated above by Shapiro) can be made explicit in 
such a way as to enhance the practice of confluent 
education through a thorough examination of the concept 
of dialogue and dialogical relationship. Three examples 
can serve as illustrations of the use of the concept of 
dialogue to explicate implicit dimensions of confluent 
education and prevent its goals from being lost in its 
process. 
First, from its basis in Gestalt, confluent educa¬ 
tion emphasizes the "here and now" in order to make more 
of reality available to a person by helping him/her 
overcome blockages and fantasies that obstruct the 
experience of the reality of the moment and the ability 
to change (Brown, 1971, pp. 11-14; Yeomans, in Brown, 
1975, pp. 132-58). Emphasis on the present should be 
recognized as a part of the process of integrating past, 
present and future in a person's creation of a life; it 
is not an end in itself. The concept of dialogue (as it 
is discussed by Hans-Georg Gadamer) elucidates the 
integration of the present with the tradition of which it 
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is a part so that in the interaction between a person and 
an artifact of the culture (such as a text), tradition 
"speaks" as a "Thou" and new understanding and meaning 
emerge in the process; this new understanding and meaning 
are part of creating the future. 
Second, in illustrative examples of confluent 
education, its practitioners frequently report conversa¬ 
tions with students which reflect its (therapeutic, if 
not clinical) psychological roots (see, for example, 
Hillman, in Brown, 1971, pp. 102-132; Spira, in Brown, 
1975, pp. 184-89). Beverly Galyean (in Brown, 1975, pp. 
206-220) includes a list of questions and expressions she 
describes as emerging from her experience with Gestalt 
and which place responsibility on the individual "to 
elicit personally felt responses." The list includes 
among others: "What's going on now?" "How are you 
feeling now?" "What are the consequences of that choice?" 
"Are you willing to take the risks?" "I will not do it 
for you, because you are your own expert" (Galyean, in 
Brown, 1975, p. 218). These questions and expressions do 
serve the purpose she cites of placing the responsibility 
on the student; however, they do not constitute dialogue. 
Rather, this kind of question tends to dissociate the 
teacher from the student and leaves the student to find 
his/her own meaning. This type of interaction is impor- 
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tant as part of the process of moving students toward the 
ability to participate in dialogical relationships and to 
take responsibility in a context of responsiveness. 
However, if confluent education is to progress toward its 
ultimate goal, these kinds of interactions must be 
recognized as only parts of the process; students (and 
teachers) must reflect on them in relation to that larger 
meaning context. Analysis of the concept of dialogue can 
offer help to confluent educators in understanding and 
keeping in mind the parts-whole and means-ends relations 
here. 
Finally, confluent educators" reliance only on 
Martin Buber's conceptions of dialogue and the dialogical 
relationship offers a truncated version of these interac¬ 
tions. While Buber's work is enormously insightful, its 
appeal for many is limited by Buber's heavy reliance on 
the concept of an immanent God as an omnipresent partici¬ 
pant in all dialogical relationship. For those who 
prefer not to accept this religious dimension, other 
philosophical elucidations of the dialogical relationship 
are needed if it is to be seen as a goal of confluent 
education (especially in public schools). A conception 
of dialogue and the dialogical relationship that does not 
rely on theological premises would provide a more 
acceptable foundation for confluent education in a 
17 
society espousing religious freedom and tolerance, 
separation of church and state and respect for individual 
diversity. 
Confluent education offers excellent potential for 
manifesting a perspective that can put the individual at 
the center of the educative process and that can enhance 
the possibility of developing the individual's sense of 
his/her potential to be an active, thoughtful, responsible 
decision-maker. However, current leaders in the field of 
confluent education overlook opportunities for making 
explicit philosophical dimensions that presently remain 
implicit. In so doing, they miss opportunities for 
enhancing the practice of confluent education and for 
ensuring that its goals are not lost in concentration on 
its practice. 
Significance 
It is important for confluent education to come 
closer to realizing its potential. Confluent education 
offers the possibility of developing in individuals the 
abilities needed to confront the complexities of our 
society. In this respect, confluent educators attempt to 
address the critically important need for people who: 
have both knowledge and understanding; can act both 
independently and interdependently; can think productively 
about technical, procedural and non-technical, ethical 
problems and the relations between them; and can recognize 
and take responsibility for themselves and their actions. 
Confluent educators attempt to help students integrate a 
triadic reality of self, others and world so as to 
maintain individual authenticity, relate to others and 
enact a reality using both reason and feelings, knowledge 
and understanding. They attempt to help students to 
explore bodies of knowledge, develop areas of intersub- 
jective understandings and practice use of methodological 
tools for learning about the historical, social tradition 
which is both determinative of and determined by 
individual human beings. 
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Confluent educators, by attempting to integrate 
affect and cognition in humanizing education, try to 
avoid sacrificing centrality of the individual, personali¬ 
zation of meaning-creation and facilitation of self- 
actualization while simultaneously maintaining emphasis 
on content, reasoning and standards of excellence. 
Confluent educators manifest the recognition that 
learning is something students must do for 
themselves. Teachers must not merely transmit, 
but must involve and engage students in activities 
of discovery and meaning making . . . [Fuhrmann 
and Grasha, 1983, p. 12] 
Moreover, confluent educators, by a persistent emphasis 
on content, reason and excellence, can avoid the most 
common criticism levelled against humanistic orientations 
in education: "that humanistic teaching is 'soft,' that 
there are no standards, and that students are allowed to 
'do their own thing' without regard for excellence" 
(Fuhrmann and Grasha, 1983, p. 94). 
Confluent education offers, I believe, an educative 
approach congruent with the needs of our society. The 
complexity of the problems facing us today will not be 
unravelled by mediocrity. An education that fails to aim 
for excellence concommitantly with involving students in 
a challenge to transmute their potentiality into actuality 
and endowing them with faith in their abilities does both 
students and society a great disservice. Likewise, an 
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education that concentrates too narrowly on developing 
technical skills and knowledge and technical-procedura1 
thinking fails to prepare people with the broad under¬ 
standings, abilities and self-reliance to responsibly 
address both the technical and ethical problems confront¬ 
ing us. As a recent Carnegie publication states: "A 
rounded view of most important problems . . . requires 
moving across lines of specialization; we live with 
specialized competences but with unspecialized 
consciences" (Carnegie, 1977, p. 12). Confluent 
education, if its potential can be realized, offers the 
possibility of developing knowledgeable, understanding 
people who can integrate reason and feelings in practical 
commitments to cultural production and humane interaction 
in all spheres of life. 
Approach to the Problem 
This dissertation will use an interdisciplinary 
approach of examining philosophical literature to make 
explicit dimensions that presently remain implicit in 
conceptions of confluent education. it will use the work 
on dialogue of Martin Buber, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Karl 
Jaspers to analyze the concept as it relates to confluent 
education. The study will explore ways in which under¬ 
standing of the concept of dialogue can help confluent 
educators and others to become more aware of the 
philosophical grounding of confluent education while 
simultaneously considering ways of centrally including 
experiences of dialogue and the dialogical relationship 
in the educative process. It will examine how the 
dialogical relationship can be manifested in interpersonal 
and content interactions in the classroom. It will 
consider a dialogical approach to a variety of traditional 
teaching methods and will suggest a specifically 
dialectical-dialogical method. 
There are many reasons for choosing to use the 
works related to dialogue of Buber, Gadamer and Jaspers. 
In a general sense, their work offers ways of thinking 
21 
22 
about the educational process as an encounter among 
teachers, students and content that is highly congruent 
with confluent education. it is valuable in providing, 
not a system or model, but an elucidation of human 
experience that invites the educator to further thought 
and dialogue. Jaspers and Buber's work includes specific 
writings on education and Gadamer's includes at least 
passing references to pedagogy. Some implications of 
their work for education can be directly cited although 
much more can be inferred. What must always be inferred 
is the usefulness of their work for any particular 
educator in any particular situation. This inheres in 
their understanding of the historicity of human beings 
and the need for meaning, understanding and truth to be 
created in specific situations among participants in that 
situation. 
In a more specific sense, the work of Buber, 
Gadamer and Jaspers can be useful in elucidating 
ontological, epistemological and axiological premises 
which underlie the psychological orientation from which 
confluent education is derived. First, for all their 
differences, Buber, Gadamer and Jaspers in their work 
conceptualize 
dialogue, communication and the I-Thou relation¬ 
ship not as a dimension of the self but as the 
existential and ontological reality in which the 
self comes into being and through which it 
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fulfills and authenticates itself.* [Friedman, 
in Buber, 1965, p. xvii] 
* Cf• The Worlds of Existentialism; A Critical Reader, 
edited and with Introduction and a Conclusion by Maurice 
Friedman (New York: Random House, 1964), Part IV: 
Intersubjectivity and pp. 535-44 of Part VII: Issues and 
Conclusions. 
Second, the epistemological position of these 
thinkers posits that knowledge is perspectival and 
provisional. It is seen as necessary to eliminate the 
dichotomization of the knower and the known inherent in 
objectivist epistemologies (wherein knowledge is posited 
as existing independent of a knower -- see Kavaloski, in 
Kockelmans, 1979, p. 226). The knower and the known are 
perceived as indissolubly related: "objectivity is 
necessarily dependent upon the prior subjectivity of the 
knowing subject" (Kavaloski, in Kockelmans, 1979, p. 228). 
Knowledge is perspectival because a knower is always in a 
specific situation, responding to that situation of which 
the knower is a part and which is part of the knower. 
Since not all aspects of the self or the situation can be 
known, what is "known" is a perspective, a meaning 
dependent on the subjectivity of the knower. The work of 
Buber, Gadamer and Jaspers is reflective of the 
philosophical tradition of practical wisdom (praxis) that 
posits knowing as intertwined with the knower s experienc¬ 
es in specific situations. Writing of Aristotle s 
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understanding of praxis and phronesis, Gadamer states: 
[H]e is concerned with reason and knowledge, not detached 
from a being that is becoming, but determined by it and 
determinative of it" (Gadamer, quoted in Bernstein, 1983, 
p. 38). So, too, are these premises of confluent 
education. 
Third, from this perspective, a person uses reason 
and understandings to make choices and commitments that 
are expressed in actions. Because a person has a realm 
of personal freedom, s/he is responsible. Since actions 
express axiological premises, part of education should 
include reflection on values, relations with others and 
decision-making processes. The integration of affect and 
cognition that confluent educators attempt is fundamental 
to this process. 
Inclusion of Jaspers' work in this study seems 
warranted because of his work in psychology as well as in 
philosophy. His General Psychopathology (1913) was 
seminal in the development of the psychological 
perspective characteristic of contemporary humanistic 
psychology. It is concerned with the content and meaning 
to the individual of his/her experiences and use of 
methods based on faith in the importance of the indivi¬ 
dual 's interpretation of these experiences. While 
considered a classic text in psychiatry, General 
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Psychology is also a philosophical study which explores, 
among other topics, methodological considerations in 
understanding human thinking. it was through publication 
of this work that Jaspers was appointed to the philosophy 
faculty at the University of Heidelburg. Volumes one and 
two of Jaspers' first major philosophical work, the three- 
volume Philosophy (published in German in 1931), are 
central to this study. In volume one, Jaspers elucidates 
a philosophical world orientation and methodology for 
knowing the world that differentiates scientific and 
philosophical knowledge while defending the legitimacy of 
philosophical knowledge in a world of scientism. Volume 
two elucidates a philosophy of human existence in which 
the human being is emergent, active, unique, and self- 
actualizing through dialogical communication. The 
content of volume three has been expanded and reoriented 
in another major work, Von der Wahrheit (About Truth, 
published in German in 1947; translation by Leonard H. 
Ehrlich presently in press). Here Jaspers focuses on the 
unity of being and truth and argues the absolute responsi¬ 
bility of each human being for his or her self- 
actualization. Jaspers' Idea of the University (1959) 
applies his thought to higher education. Jaspers explores 
the role of the university in society, the purposes and 
goals of education, and teacher-student interactions. 
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Inclusion of Martin Buber s work is justifiable in 
three ways. First, he, perhaps more than any other 
philosopher, is generally recognized as having defined 
and developed the concept of dialogue centrally in his 
philosophy. Second, juxtaposition of Jaspers' and 
Buber's understandings of particularities of dialogue 
offers a variety of insights and questions with implica¬ 
tions for use of dialogue in education. Third, Buber, 
too, has written about education and is often cited in 
educational philosophy. Two of Buber's works are central 
to this study. His classic I and Thou presents Buber's 
conception of dialogue and contrasts the dialogical 
"I-Thou" relationship with the "I-It" subject-object 
relationship. Between Man and Man extends and applies 
the ideas of I and Thou, particularly in terms of the 
teacher-student relationship. 
Inclusion of Gadamer's work is not as straightfor¬ 
wardly justifiable. He is rarely included in lists of 
existential philosophers; his work has no recognized 
connection with psychology; and, while dialogue is 
important to his philosophical hermeneutics, he utilizes 
more than elucidates the concept. His inclusion is 
warranted, rather, because of the importance of hermeneu¬ 
tics as the study of the interpretation of meaning and 
because of his development of a phenomenology of language 
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in relation to an ontology of understanding based on 
Heidegger s "hermeneutic of Dasein." For Gadamer, as for 
Heidegger, understanding is being because understanding 
of being is the "existential distinction of Dasein" 
(Gadamer, 1976, p. 49). He holds that: understanding is 
being; understanding is linguistic; language is the 
medium of (human) being. Dialogue is important because 
it is a condition of understanding. Dialogical interac¬ 
tion with works of the past, analogous to interhuman 
dialogue, is the way human beings understand themselves 
as created by and creating a stream of tradition (a 
social context of being human). Human beings understand 
what it is to be human by understanding what has constitu¬ 
ted being human. By applying this understanding in 
their actions, human beings continue the on-going process 
of defining and creating human-ness. Thus, while 
Gadamer's central concern is to elucidate the process of 
understanding and the role of language as a condition of 
understanding, he does this in terms of dialogical 
relation and so becomes congruent with Buber and Jaspers 
(as philosophers of dialogical existentiality). 
Gadamer's work adds an important dimension to a 
dialogical philosophy of education that may not be 
sufficiently emphasized in using only the work of Buber 
and Jaspers. From Buber and Jaspers is derived an 
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emphasis on the importance of dialogical relationship 
(usually between teacher and students and among students, 
although Buber does not restrict his conception of 
dialogue to interhuman dialogue). However, this emphasis 
can be at the expense of contents or subject matter 
(Jaspers is less liable to this than Buber). Use of 
Gadamer's work brings subject matter into education as an 
equal partner with teachers and students in the (educa¬ 
tional) dialogical encounter. His work, when combined 
with that of Buber and Jaspers, offers a possibility for 
resolving the erroneous dichotomy between teaching people 
and teaching subject matter as well as that between 
teaching knowledge for its own sake and for practical 
application. Furthermore, Gadamer's work has the 
potential for offering a dialogical method for teaching 
as well as for relating to others and content. Neither 
Buber's nor Jaspers' work so directly pertains to the 
possibility for use of dialogue as an instructional 
strategy. 
Gadamer's major work. Truth and Method, argues that 
the hermeneutic problem of understanding and interpreting 
meaning is not merely methodological. It presents his 
phenomenology of language as the ontological basis and 
medium of hermeneutics. It explores the reasoning 
process in relation to development of meaning, truth, 
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knowledge, understanding, and, equally important, self- 
actualization through action. Like Jaspers, Gadamer 
juxtaposes scientific and philosophical concepts of 
knowledge and truth and argues for the legitimacy of both 
in their respective spheres. This theme is repeated in 
Reason in the Age of Science which discusses understand¬ 
ing-interpretation-application as a unified process and 
hermeneutics as praxis. 
One of the commonalities among Buber, Gadamer and 
Jaspers is their deep concern about the role of science 
in the modern world. All believe that science has 
important contributions to make; none derides the 
importance of continuing advances in scientific and tech¬ 
nological knowledge. However, all warn of the dangers of 
scientism and emphasize the need for awareness of the 
limitations of science. All fear that science and 
technology are being allowed to dominate in the 
contemporary world, to expand beyond their proper spheres 
and to be given credence in areas that ought not to be 
their province. All contend that scientific and technical 
knowledge is one mode of knowledge, one perspective among 
others, one way of thinking. All warn that excessive 
reliance on scientific and technological expertise often 
has the effect of alienating people from their confidence 
in their rightful, existential role as responsible 
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decision-makers. In surrendering their right to respons¬ 
ible decision-making, human beings demean themselves as 
beings, allow their existential potential to be abrogated 
and curtail or destroy their possibilities for authentic 
existence as individuals and as members of communities 
(rather than collectivities). 
Adir Cohen, for example, describes Buber's warning 
that 
As man increasingly becomes an appendage of the 
machine, he also loses his sense of active 
enterprise and of personal relation to his 
actions and undertakings. ... A threat ... is 
the loss of individuality by the submission of 
the private self in the collective. [Cohen, 
1983, p. 242] 
He adds that Buber believes the survival of humankind 
depends on the revival of dialogue (because every great 
civilization is a culture of dialogue). For this to be 
possible, suspicion toward other people must be overcome 
Buber's vision of the future is harsh indeed: 
"Mutual existential suspicion will become so 
complete that discourse will be silenced and the 
idea will become the absence of idea." (22) 
Existential suspicion deprives us of the belief 
in existence, . . . [Cohen, 1983, p. 243] 
22 Ibid, p. 85. [Martin Buber, "Tekva le-shea 20," 
(Hope for this hour) in Tevda vi-y'ud, vol.2.] 
Cohen cites Buber's concern about fragmentation inherent 
in humankind's being split into partisan ideological 
groups in a world in which belief in a truth by which 
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reality can be measured, tested and judged has been 
subverted by concepts of "utility" and "advantage" "under 
the guise of the good of the party, the state, or the 
government" (Cohen, 1983, p. 242). He continues: 
Man has a profound need to have his existenti¬ 
al identity confirmed by his fellow man. 
Moreover, such confirmation is authentic only 
when it is mutual. When a man exists in a state 
of alienated and mute suspicion he pursues 
confirmation in ways that are condemned to 
failure, for he seeks to discover confirmation in 
himself alone or in the group to which he belongs. 
Self-confirmation is never lasting and creates 
the feeling of utter abandonment. The confirma¬ 
tion of the crowd is illusory; the crowd 
recognizes no man's existence for its own sake, 
but only insofar as his existence can be used to 
advantage and, therefore, offers only false 
confirmation. [Cohen 1983, p. 244] 
Buber believes that the revival of dialogue is a first 
step toward resolving this crisis and that education, 
especially adult education, can reopen the dialogue which 
restores human beings to their rightful place as creative, 
thoughtful, responsible, active beings able to enact a 
world they choose (see Cohen 1983, pp. 241-4). While 
Jaspers and Gadamer articulate their concerns differently, 
they would agree with Buber that dialogue is existentially 
central to human being and that it is being endangered by 
scientism (which is to be distinguished from genuine 
scientific thought that recognizes its domain and its 
1imitations). 
Using Buber's, Gadamer's and Jaspers' writings 
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together demonstrates differences which are thought- 
provoking; however, equally interesting are the 
commonalities which, I think, suggest a pervasiveness of 
certain problems (such as that of the role of science) 
that are or should be addressed in education. Use of the 
work of only one of these thinkers rather than that of 
all three eliminates the synergetic dynamic that emerges 
when their work is studied simultaneously. 
Plan of Procedure 
Following this introductory chapter. Part I of the 
dissertation will focus on analysis of the concept of 
dialogue by reference to the philosophical writings of 
Buber, Gadamer and Jaspers on dialogue and the dialogical 
relationship. Chapter II will illustrate the place of 
Gadamer s work in the hermeneutic tradition and provide 
an overview of the central concepts of Gadamer's 
philosophical hermeneutics. Chapter III will provide a 
comparative analysis of the concept of dialogue in the 
work of Buber, Gadamer and Jaspers. After summarizing 
these philosophical dimensions, guidelines for understand¬ 
ing the concept of dialogue will be delineated. 
Part II of the dissertation will focus on 
implications for education to be derived from analysis of 
the concept of dialogue. Chapter IV will describe a 
dialogical teacher-student relationship. Chapter V will 
consider the role of content and the process of content 
selection. Chapter VI will examine methodological issues 
and will describe a dialectical-dialogical teaching 
method based on Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. 
Chapter VII, the Conclusion, will reconsider the guide- 
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lines developed in Part I from analysis of the concept of 
dialogue in relation to some relevant inferences that can 
be derived from them for educators. 
Assumptions and Delimitations 
A basic assumption of this study is that the 
concept of dialogue can be clarified for use in education 
by reference to philosophical literature. As Walter 
Kaufmann states, "The analysis of confused concepts has 
been one of the central functions of philosophy since 
Socrates" (Kaufmann, in Schacht, 1970, p. xv). Likewise, 
the concept of dialogue has been of concern in philosophy 
since Socrates. 
A second assumption is that the concept of dialogue, 
once adequately clarified, can be of use to educators in 
a number of practical ways related to understanding and 
improving the teaching-learning process. It can also 
contribute to developing agreement on at least one 
relation of education and phenomenological existential 
thought (see Morris and Pai, 1976, pp. 392-94). 
Congruent with these assumptions is belief in the 
usefulness of a hermeneutic approach to the exploration 
of the concept of dialogue. In the attempt to understand, 
interpret and apply the concept, the study will utilize 
the characteristic hermeneutic "back and forth" movement 
-- between particular instances and general context; 
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among psrspectives of various thinkers; between 
disciplines in order to elucidate the concept and 
delineate the problems in one aspect by reference to the 
others. 
While it is generally appropriate at this point to 
define terminology to be used in a study, the nature of 
this study suggests a different procedure. Since a major 
purpose of the study is concept analysis, definition of 
many terms will emerge in the course of the study as 
literature is analyzed. 
The dissertation will be a conceptual one and will 
not include an experimental component. Rather, it will 
review literature in dialogical and hermeneutic philosophy 
and in education to analyze the concept of dialogue and 
its relevance for confluent educators. The conceptual 
analysis may serve as a basis for experimental research 
by its attempt to elucidate the concept of dialogue so 
that systematic attempts at both generalizing and 
restricting the concept can be undertaken and so that 
basic issues related to the concept can be perceived more 
clearly. 
The dissertation is further limited in that it 
examines only one hermeneutic orientation and considers 
it primarily in relation to only concept, dialogue. It 
is necessary to be selective and the work of the three 
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philosophers to be used here seems to be representative 
of some of the best efforts to analyze dialogue and 
thinking. However, there remain others whose work could 
contribute and their exclusion is somewhat arbitrary. A 
major limitation of the study is its focus on elucidating 
the concept of dialogue without undertaking a critical 
analysis of the philosophical positions it uses. The 
positions and philosophers referred to here are criticized 
by philosophers holding other positions and much of this 
criticism warrants consideration. However, it is beyond 
the scope of this study to enter that deeply into the 
realm of philosophy and only a few of these criticisms 
will be mentioned. 
Likewise, the dissertation centers on only one 
educational orientation, confluent education. While 
there are other and conflicting educational approaches, 
this dissertation accepts confluent education as offering 
excellent potential for providing the kind of education 
necessary in our society today. The study is limited as 
well primarily to teaching in higher education although 
most of its findings generalize to teaching at other 
levels (as the literature on confluent education 
illustrates). Although dialogue is discussed primarily 
in relation to confluent education, there is no intent 
implied to exclude its use from other educational 
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orientations. 
The study addresses only a small number of issues 
that might directly or tangentially be raised in relation 
to applications of dialogue in education. It does not 
examine implications of dialogue for administrative, 
management or policy issues in education beyond the 
classroom level. It does not seriously question the 
present structure of education as a system. There is no 
doubt that these can be questioned and the concept of 
dialogue could have relevance. It would also be interest¬ 
ing to study dialogue in relation to developmental 
psychological literature, especially the work of Jean 
Piaget, Erik Erikson and Lawrence Kohlberg. It seems 
likely that Carol Gilligan's work on possible sex 
differences in world orientation would relate to study of 
acceptance of confluent education and a dialogical 
orientation. The literature on preferred learning and 
teaching styles offers fruitful possibilities for explora¬ 
tion of uses of dialogue beyond what can be considered 
here. However, these issues are beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. 
Finally, this study does not seriously question 
self-actualization as a legitimate goal of education. It 
must be understood, however, that self-actualization as 
it is used here is a multi-dimensional concept. In its 
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basic sense, self-actualization is understood to include 
both cognitive and affective dimensions of human develop¬ 
ment. The premise that human beings are thinking and 
feeling, cognitive and affective, beings is accepted. On 
this premise is predicated the acceptance of the goal of 
confluent educators, i.e., to integrate affect and 
cognition in the educative process. Ontologically rooted 
education requires such an integration. An education 
that emphasizes either affect or cognition at the expense 
of the other cannot be considered to be ontologically 
grounded. Nor can it be considered an adequate education 
for people who must face the complex social, technical 
and ethical issues of our society. Such people need both 
a thorough basis of skills and knowledge and an ethical 
sense in regard to the application of such skills and 
knowledge. In espousing the necessity for educating 
people as free, unique, responsive, responsible, emergent, 
self-actualizing people, able to make and act on 
existential commitments, there is no intent to suggest 
that such people should not have standards of excellence, 
ability to reason logically and substantial bodies of 
knowledge about which to reason. On the contrary, the 
essence of confluent education for self-actualization is 
integration of all these dimensions of humanness. 
Endnotes 
1. Underlined words in all quotations are italicized in 
the source text unless otherwise noted. 
2. Support for the integration of affect and cognition 
espoused by confluent educators can be found not only in 
the contemporary philosophical work analyzed in this 
dissertation, but also in the work of classical 
philosophers. A recent dissertation by Mohammad Zaimaran 
(1985) analyzes Platonic and Aristotelian thought and 
demonstrates that this work does not support emphasis in 
education on cognition at the expense of affective 
development (as is claimed by the essentialist tradition 
of educational philosophy). Zaimaran analyzes the 
philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, Rumi, and Mulla Sadra 
in relation to the contemporary models of human develop¬ 
ment of Piaget and Kohlberg and demonstrates the 
corresponding perceptions of the interdependence of 
cognitive and affective development. The congruity 
between Zaimaran's findings and the positions analyzed 
here of Buber, Gadamer and Jaspers is not surprising. 
Buber, and more particularly, Gadamer and Jaspers are 
thoroughly cognizant of the work of Plato and Aristotle 
and acknowledge its influence on their own work. The 
philosophical grounding for confluent education to be 
found in the work of these modern philosophers relates the 
grounding of confluent education to classical philosophy 
as well. 
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CHAPTER II 
GADAMERIAN HERMENEUTICS 
Overview of Hermeneutics 
Hermeneutics can be defined generally as the study 
of understanding and of the interpretation of meaning. 
It is concerned with understanding and interpreting as 
processes and as means of elucidating products of the 
human mind. The term "hermeneutics" is derived from the 
Greek hermeneuein, to interpret. The term was associated 
in Greek mythology with the god Hermes, messenger of the 
Gods and inventor of speech and language, whose function 
was "transmuting what is beyond human understanding into 
a form that human intelligence can grasp" (Palmer, 1969, 
p.13 ) . David Couzens Hoy states that in mythology the 
messages of Hermes were not always explicit and that his 
appearance itself could be the message (of approaching 
death). He notes that Socrates indicates in the Cratylus 
that, because words can conceal as well as reveal, Hermes 
could be considered a thief, liar or contriver as well as 
a messenger (Hoy, 1978, p.l). Josef Bleicher suggests 
that as Hermes transmitted the messages of the gods he 
not only announced verbatim but also interpreted the 
messages. As interpretation, hermeneutics can be seen as 
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having two tasks: ascertaining the exact meaning-content 
of a communication and discovering the instructions 
contained in symbolic forms (Bleicher, 1980, p. 11). 
According to Richard E. Palmer, hermeneutics had 
three directions of meaning in ancient usage: 1) to 
express aloud in words, to say; 2) to explain, as in 
explaining a subject; 3) to translate, as from a foreign 
language (Palmer, 1969, pp. 13-14). He adds: 
in all three cases, something foreign, strange, 
separated in time, space, or experience is made 
familiar, present, comprehensible; something 
requiring representation, explanation, or 
translation is somehow "brought to understanding" 
-- is "interpreted." [Palmer, 1969, p. 14] 
Palmer's analysis of these directions of meaning (Palmer, 
1969, pp. 12-32) is useful in understanding the develop¬ 
ment of hermeneutics since all three are present with 
varying emphases in modern theories of hermeneutics. 
To express or to say, the first usage, involves 
bringing meaning into words and implies a performative 
dimension. The second usage, to explain, is both implied 
in and extends the first usage; in order to "say" 
something, to read aloud or to recite, the speaker must 
have some prior, preliminary understanding of that which 
is to be communicated to an audience in the speaker s 
interpretation or explanation. The basis of interpreta 
tion, then, lies in the way the interpreter "turns 
toward," experiences or approaches, that which is to be 
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interpreted. This initial "preunderstanding" influences 
the choice of the mode of expression used in the 
subsequent interpretation. it influences as well choice 
of the particular analytical tools or methods to be used 
in explication (since these are chosen on the basis of 
what is understood to be the fundamental task involved in 
understanding that which is to be interpreted) (see 
Palmer, 1969, pp. 21-24). Thus, analysis is derived from 
a preliminary preunderstanding and explanation; it occurs 
within a context of preexistent meanings and intentions 
(a "horizon"). 
The third ancient usage, to translate, is discussed 
by Palmer in terms of mediation. The translator mediates 
between two "world views," the one in which the work 
exists and the one into which the work is being brought. 
Translation, for Palmer, is not merely a mechanical 
matter because language contains an "overarching 
interpretation" of the world and this cultural experience 
is part of what the translator is trying to convey (see 
Palmer, 1969, pp. 27-30). 
All of these usages are included in modern theories 
of hermeneutics. To some extent, the differences among 
hermeneuticists ” perceptions of the hermeneutic problem 
or task derive from varying emphases on the relative 
importance of "saying," "explaining" and 'translating. 
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The development of modern hermeneutics is described by 
different theorists in terms of different classifications 
and terminologies. 
Palmer identifies six modern (post-sixteenth 
century) "definitions" of hermeneutics, all of which, he 
contends, still exist in some form. In Palmer's defini¬ 
tions, chronologically ordered, hermeneutics is understood 
as : 
1) Biblical exegesis (circa 1650, associated 
with J. C. Dannhauer); 
2) Philological method (eighteenth century, 
associated with the development of Rationalism, 
classical philology, and both the "grammatical" 
and "historical" schools of Biblical exegesis); 
3) The science of linguistic understanding (late 
eighteenth century, associated transitionally 
with Friederich Ast and Friederich August Wolf, 
and more particularly with Friederich 
Schleiermacher); 
4) The methodological foundation for the "human 
sciences" (Geisteswissenschaften), disciplines 
focused on understanding expressions of human 
life in art, actions, and writings (nineteenth 
century, associated with Wilhelm Dilthey); 
5) The phenomenology of Dasein and of existential 
understanding (twentieth century, associated with 
Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer); 
6) System of interpretation: recovery of meaning 
versus iconoclasm (twentieth century, associated 
with Paul Ricoeur). [see Palmer, 1969, pp. 33-45] 
Palmer argues that, while all six positions still exist, 
a clear polarization has developed. The followers of 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey (such as Emilio Betti, Eric D 
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Hirsch, Wolfhart Pannenberg) see hermeneutics as a 
general body of methodological principles that underlie 
interpretation. The followers of Heidegger (including 
Gadamer, Rudolf Bultmann, Gerhard Ebeling, Ernst Fuchs) 
see hermeneutics as a "philosophical exploration of the 
character and requisite conditions for all understanding" 
(Palmer, 1969, p. 46). For Palmer, then, modern hermeneu¬ 
tics tends to focus either on the methodological approach¬ 
es to be used in interpretation or on the ontological 
questions concerning interpretation and understanding as 
such. 
Josef Bleicher identifies three "strands" in 
contemporary hermeneutics: hermeneutical theory (associat¬ 
ed with Betti); hermeneutic philosophy (associated with 
Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer); and critical hermeneutics 
(associated with Jurgen Habermas, Karl-Otto Apel) (see 
Bleicher, 1980, pp. 11-26). As Bleicher describes it, 
hermeneutical theory, derived from the tradition of 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey, attempts to develop a basis 
for the scientific investigation of meaning using 
verstehen as the methodology for the human sciences 
(Geisteswissenschaften) . Its objective is to develop a 
set of methodological principles that can yield 
"relatively objective" knowledge. Use of such principles, 
it is contended, would prevent misunderstanding by the 
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interpreter s intuitively or empathetically "re-thinking" 
or re-experiencing" what an author originally felt or 
intended in creating a work and then transposing this 
original meaning into contemporary understanding (see 
Bleicher, 1980, pp. 1-2; 27-50). The essential dynamic 
involved is subject-object, with the interpreter being 
the "subject" and the author's life, intention and work 
being the "object." 
Hermeneutic philosophy rejects this attempt to 
develop a scientific basis for investigating meaning and 
this "subject-object" mode of cognition. Hermeneutic 
philosophy grows out of Heidegger's existential ontology 
and Gadamer's extension of these ideas. It emphasizes a 
"subject-subject" mode of cognition wherein the interpret¬ 
er and the work being interpreted are linked within a 
context of tradition in a dialogical-dialectical relation¬ 
ship. The focus of hermeneutic philosophy is not so much 
methodological development as explication of the ontology 
of human Being (Dasein) as existing understandingly. A 
central tenet of hermeneutic philosophy is that the 
interpreter, standing in a tradition which links the 
interpreter and that to be interpreted, has a preunder¬ 
standing of that which is to be interpreted. This 
preunderstanding comes from Dasein s "Being-in-the-worId 
with other beings and entities (such as a work of art or 
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literature). Understanding is akin to communication 
between two "subjects" (interpreter and tradition speaking 
through the work to be interpreted), two entities in the 
world. Understanding happens as an event between them 
rather than, as in hermeneutical theory, as the under¬ 
standing developed by a subject about an object (Bleicher, 
1980, pp. 2-3; 97-127). 
Bleicher's third "strand," critical hermeneutics, 
emphasizes the extra-1inguistic factors that are a part 
of the context of human expression and the understanding 
of these expressions. This strand is rooted in Marxism 
and the critical theory of the Frankfort School; although 
Bleicher does not discuss "materialist hermeneutics" in 
detail, he includes it in this strand. Critical hermeneu- 
ticists believe that social structures, and especially 
ideologies, distort communication and understanding. 
Theirs is an activist position, focused on combining an 
objective methodology with an effort to develop practical¬ 
ly relevant knowledge in order to reduce distortion in 
contemporary life (see Bleicher, 1980, pp. 3-4; 143-80). 
Bleicher also refers to the phenomenological 
hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur. He sees Ricoeur s work as 
not a clearly separable "strand," but rather as an 
attempt to integrate the other three "strands" into a 
broader framework (see Bleicher, 1980, pp. 215-35). 
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Roy J. Howard argues that contemporary theories of 
hermeneutics are distinguished by their roots in two 
different sources. One source is linguistics from which 
has evolved "structuralism" or "structural hermeneutics"; 
the other source is the philosophical traditions of Hegel 
and Marx, of phenomenology and of linguistic analysis 
(Howard, 1982, p. xiv). Howard analyzes three hermeneutic 
theories derived from this latter source. "Analytic 
hermeneutics" is derived from linguistic analysis and 
emphasizes "formal or logicist ways of elucidating the 
problems of intersubjective understanding" (Howard, 1982, 
p. 38). The seminal work is that of Ludwig Wittgenstein 
and the representative works discussed by Howard are 
those of Georg Henrik von Wright and Peter Winch (see 
Howard, 1982, pp. 35-85). "Psychosocial hermeneutics" 
(which Bleicher identifies as "critical hermeneutics") is 
derived from the traditions of Hegel and Marx. The 
representative work discussed is that of Jurgen Habermas 
(see Howard, 1982, pp. 86-119). "Ontological hermeneu¬ 
tics" (Bleicher's "hermeneutic philosophy") is derived 
from phenomenology, particularly that of Heidegger. The 
representative work discussed is that of Gadamer (see 
Howard, 1982, pp. 120-60). Howard states that his 
analysis is not intended to be an exhaustive overview of 
contemporary hermeneutics. He is interested in highlight¬ 
ing the difference between "analytic" and "Continental" 
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orientations to hermeneutics: 
At the risk of over-simplifying excessively 
the differences in analytic and Continental 
styles of philosophy, one could say that the 
analytic philosophers ask about the necessary 
logical, and the Continental ones about the 
necessary ontological, conditions for the object 
under discussion . . . [Howard, 1982, p. 37] 
While these "classifications" of modern or contem¬ 
porary hermeneutics overlap considerably, there are also 
differences. Palmer's "modern" (i.e., post-sixteenth 
century) hermeneutics necessarily includes categories not 
dealt with by Bleicher or Howard in their "contemporary" 
(i.e., twentieth century) hermeneutics. However, Palmer 
does not include a category equivalent to Bleicher's 
"critical hermeneutics" and Howard's "psychosocial 
hermeneutics." Although Palmer's sixth category includes 
the work of Paul Ricoeur, Palmer does not emphasize the 
work of Habermas or Apel. Bleicher, on the other hand, 
does not see Ricoeur's work as a separate "strand" nor as 
part of "critical hermeneutics," but rather as an attempt 
to both bring the other "strands" into relief and to 
integrate them into a broader framework (Bleicher, 1980, 
p. 4). Howard's categories of "Psychosocial" and 
"Ontological" hermeneutics can be misleading if perceived 
as too rigidly separate. While their emphases are quite 
different, Howard perhaps understates the Hegelian 
influence, noted by Palmer (see Palmer, 1969, pp. 165-66) 
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and Bleicher (see Bleicher, 1980, pp. 111-13), on the 
work of Gadamer (used by Howard as representative of the 
"Ontological" tradition) while recognizing this influence 
on the "Psychosocial" tradition. Gadamer's hermeneutics 
is not developed in the same way as Hegel's philosophy; 
however, it is clear that Hegel's work influenced the 
work of Gadamer (discussed in a later section). 
Although any scheme of classification of hermeneu¬ 
tics may be incomplete, misleading, or over-simplified, 
some knowledge of various schemes is useful. They do 
illustrate that hermeneutics is not a univocal perspective 
and they highlight broad differences among hermeneuti- 
cists. The diversity within hermeneutics illustrates the 
potential or present relatedness of hermeneutics in 
general to many academic disciplines (including, at 
least, all of the traditional humanities and social 
sciences, linguistics, communication theory, psychology, 
and education). The inherent interdisciplinarity of 
hermeneutics also becomes apparent. The various schemes 
of classification also, to some extent, help to alleviate 
some confusion about the terminology used in hermeneutic 
philosophy. [1] 
Hermeneutics as elucidated by Hans-Georg Gadamer 
will be used in this dissertation. Gadamer s work is 
identified by Bleicher as "hermeneutic philosophy," by 
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Howard as "Ontological hermeneutics," and by Palmer as 
phenomenology of Dasein and of existential understand¬ 
ing." Since Gadamer s work is essentially an extension 
of Heidegger s philosophy, in the next section of this 
chapter Gadamer's hermeneutics will be related to 
Heidegger's "hermeneutic of Dasein" and differentiated 
from the work of Husserl, Schleiermacher and Dilthey. 
This entails describing Gadamer's conception of the 
historicality of understanding as "fusion of horizons" 
within a tradition containing both the interpreter and 
the work to be interpreted. Then Gadamer's discussion of 
understanding in terms of his use of two analogies, 
dialogue and playing a game, will be explored. In the 
final section of this chapter, philosophical hermeneutics 
will be discussed in terms of four elements emphasized in 
Gadamer's work: the dialectical, the linguistic, the 
speculative, and the universal. These will be considered 
in terms of a dialogical dimension. In Chapter III, 
Gadamer's work will be compared with that of Martin Buber 
and Karl Jaspers with respect to their usage of the 
concept of dialogue. 
Gadamer and Heideqqerian Legacy 
In his hermeneutics, Hans-Georg Gadamer develops an 
ontology of understanding rooted in the work of Martin 
Heidegger. Gadamer saw Heidegger's idea of the ontologi¬ 
cal significance of understanding as a major turning 
point in hermeneutics; his own work proceeds from 
Heidegger's "hermeneutic of Dasein" (see Linge, in 
Gadamer, 197 6, pp. xlvi-xlvii). Gadamer writes: 
Even in Being and Time the real question is not 
in what way being can be understood but in what 
way understanding is being, for the understanding 
of being represents the existential distinction 
of Dasein. [Gadamer, 1976, p. 49] 
The task of philosophical hermeneutics becomes, for 
Gadamer, an ontological (rather than methodological) one 
of attempting to elucidate the fundamental relations and 
conditions that underlie the event of understanding. 
For Gadamer, as for Heidegger, the human being is 
always Being-in-the-world; the human being always "stands 
in the stream of tradition" and human understanding is 
rooted in human historicity. Gadamer rejects the belief 
of earlier thinkers such as Husserl, Schleiermacher and 
Dilthey that it is possible to find a methodology that 
would yield "objectively valid knowledge" (see Gadamer, 
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^ ^ 6 , PP • 153 234). He argues that Heidegger * s work 
shows that all understanding is self-understanding and 
that traditional hermeneutics "incorrectly limited the 
horizon within which understanding belongs" (Gadamer, 
1975, p. 231) : 
[ T]he coordination of all knowing activity with 
what is known is not based on the fact that they 
are essentially the same but draws its 
significance from the particular nature of the 
mode of being that is common to both of them. . . 
Correspondence is not a condition of the original 
meaning of historical interest because the cnoice 
of theme and inquiry is subject to extra-scienti¬ 
fic, subjective motivations . . . but because 
correspondence with tradition is as original and 
essential a part of the historical finiteness of 
There-being as is its projectedness towards 
future possibilities of itself. Heidegger was 
right to insist that what he called "Thrownness" 
belongs together with that which is projected.162 
Thus there is no understanding or interpretation 
in which the totality of this existential struc¬ 
ture does not function, even if the intention of 
the knower is simply to read "what is there" and 
to discover from his sources "how it really 
was . "163 
162 Being and Time, pp. 181, 192 et passim 
163 o. Vossler has shown, in Rankes historisches Problem, 
that this phrase of Ranke s is not as naive as it sounds, 
but is directed against the 'superior attitude" of a 
moralistic school of history-writing. 
On this basis, Gadamer rejects as impossible any notion 
of "objective," "subjectless" understanding. He 
continues, writing of Heidegger s work: 
The problem of hermeneutics gains a universal 
framework, even a new dimension, through his 
54 
transcendental interpretation of understanding. 
The correspondence between the interpreter and 
his object, . . . acquires a significance that is 
concretely demonstrable, and it is the task of 
hermeneutics to demonstrate it. That the struc¬ 
ture of There-being is thrown projection, that 
There-being is, in realisation of its own being, 
understanding, must also be true of the act of 
understanding within the human sciences. The 
general structure of understanding acquires 
its concrete form in historical understanding, in 
that the commitments of custom and tradition and 
the corresponding potentialities of one's own 
future become effective in understanding itself. 
There-being that projects itself in relation to 
its own potentiality-for-being has always "been." 
This is the meaning of the existential of 
"thrownness." The main point of the hermeneutics 
of facticity and its contrast with the transcen¬ 
dental constitution research of Husserl's 
phenomenology was that no freely chosen relation 
towards one's own being can go back beyond the 
facticity of this being. Everything that makes 
possible and limits the project of There-being 
precedes it, absolutely. This existential 
structure of There-being must find its expression 
in the understanding of historical tradition as 
well . . . [Gadamer, 1975, p. 234] 
For Gadamer, then, Husserl's attempt to find 
"objective" knowledge is an erroneous approach to under¬ 
standing. He sees as impossible to derive "objective" 
knowledge through Husserl's "phenomenological reduction," 
the "bracketing" of the knower's presuppositions in order 
to heighten openness to the object presenting itself to 
the knower's intentional consciousness. He rejects as 
well Schleiermacher's effort to elucidate and prevent 
misunderstanding of an historical text by attempting to 
reconstruct, "re-think" or "re-experience" the author's 
creative productive process with the aim of understanding 
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the author "better than he understood himself" (see 
Gadamer, 1975, pp. 162-73; 1976, pp. 107-129 and 130-81). 
Deliberate interpretation is, for Gadamer, rooted 
in Dasein s historicity. Its basis is a prereflective 
understanding of Being from within the concrete situation 
of the interpreter (including the relation of that 
situation to past and future). This situationality 
governs interpretation; there is no presuppositionless or 
"prejudiceless" interpretation: "for while the interpreter 
may free himself from this or that situation, he cannot 
free himself from his own facticity ..." (Linge, in 
Gadamer, 1976, p. xlvii). So, for Gadamer, Husserl's 
expectation of finding a "scientific" method that would 
make possible "objectively valid" interpretation cannot 
be fulfilled; it involves "bracketing" of the presupposi¬ 
tions that Gadamer contends inhere in the relationality 
of the person (subject, human being) to the world of 
objects. For Gadamer, human understanding occurs from 
within human historicity and situationality and always 
involves presuppositions. 
Gadamer elaborates the implications of the rooted¬ 
ness of human being in historicity in "The Universality 
of the Hermeneutical Problem" (Gadamer, 1976, pp. 3-17) 
and in Truth and Method (Gadamer, 1975, pp. 235-53). He 
formulates Heidegger's insight about the productivity of 
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the hermeneutical circle: "it is not so much our judgments 
as it is our prejudices that constitute our being" 
(Gadamer, 1976, p. 9). For Gadamer, the negative connota¬ 
tion of "prejudice" must be overcome. Because of human 
being-in-the-worId, prejudices 
constitute the initial directedness of our whole 
ability to experience. Prejudices are the biases 
of our openness to the world. They are simply 
conditions whereby we experience something — 
whereby what we encounter says something to us. 
[Gadamer, 1976, p. 9] 
Understanding and interpretation, then, begin from the 
basis of a preunderstanding inherent in the human being's 
"turning towards" objects from within the context of his 
or her being-in-the-world. The person is "addressed" by 
the object as the person "stands" in his or her own 
particular situation, which is constitutively involved in 
the process of understanding that which presents itself. 
Linge writes: 
Thus Gadamer takes the knower's boundness to his 
present horizons and the temporal gulf separating 
him from his object to be the productive ground 
of all understanding rather than negative factors 
or impediments to be overcome. Our prejudices do 
not cut us off from the past, but initially open 
it up to us. They are the positive enabling 
condition of historical understanding commensurate 
with human finitude. [Linge, in Gadamer, 1976, 
pp. xiv-xv] 
Likewise, understanding and interpretation are, 
for Heidegger and Gadamer, predicated on a "fore¬ 
structure"; a person attempting to understand a text 
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approaches the text on the basis of a "fore-project," a 
set of expectations about the meaning of the text. 
However, in hermeneutic interpretation this "fore-project" 
and the "fore-meanings" that initially arise from the 
text are constantly revised as further meaning emerges in 
the continuing interaction between the text and the 
interpreter. New "fore-projects" constantly replace 
earlier ones as understanding is created in the relation 
of the text and the interpreter (see Gadamer, 1975, p. 
236). Richard Bernstein notes: 
prejudgments and prejudices have a threefold 
character: they are handed down to us through 
tradition; they are constitutive of what we are 
now (and are in the process of becoming); and 
they are anticipatory -- always open to future 
testing and transformation. [Bernstein, 1983, 
pp. 140-41] 
The essential task for the interpreter, according 
to Gadamer, is to keep the text itself at the center of 
attention so as to discard "fore-meanings" which are not 
confirmed by the text and to retain only those meanings 
which are confirmed by the text. Gadamer explains that 
in understanding what a person or text says, the inter¬ 
preter must remain open to the meaning being presented. 
However, this "openness" always involves an interactive 
meaning-creating relationship between the text and the 
interpreter; it is not openness in the sense of recepti¬ 
vity to some supposed "objective" meaning that inheres m 
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the text (see Gadamer, 1975, pp. 236-38). Referring to 
this openness and the hermeneutical task, Gadamer argues 
that the hermeneutical task "becomes automatically a 
questioning of things and is always in part determined by 
this" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 238). For him, it is this fact 
that gives hermeneutical work a firm basis; when a person 
is trying to understand a text, the person is prepared 
for the text to "tell" him or her something. The 
hermeneutically-trained mind is sensitive to both the 
text's quality of newness and to the "fore-meanings" and 
prejudices the interpreter is bringing to the hermeneu¬ 
tical task. This sensitivity to one's own biases allows 
the text to present itself in its newness and assert its 
truth against the interpreter's "fore-meanings" (see 
Gadamer, 1975, p. 238). 
In the interaction, understanding and meaning are 
created. Gadamer explains this process of hermeneutic 
understanding as involving a "fusion of horizons" 
accomplished dialogically and dialectically. For Gadamer, 
not only the interpreter, but also the text (or analogue) 
to be understood exists within the context of tradition. 
Like the interpreter, the text stands within a 
"horizon."[2] Gadamer explains his concept of horizon: 
Every finite present has its limitations. We 
define the concept of "situation" by saying that 
it represents a standpoint that limits the 
possibility of vision. Hence an essential part 
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of the concept of situation is the concept of 
"horizon." The horizon is the range of vision 
that includes everything that can be seen from a 
particular vantage point. [Gadamer, 1975, p. 269] 
It is important to recognize that, while horizons are 
limited and finite, they are essentially open, fluid and 
changing. The human being's viewpoint is never completely 
bound to one standpoint and, thus, is never really closed 
(Gadamer, 1975, p. 271). When an interpreter "places" 
him or herself in the horizon of a text, the interpreter 
is not leaving his or her horizon (which is ontologically 
impossible) nor entering an alien world. The horizon of 
the work is connected with the interpreter's own horizon 
by an overarching "world horizon" that embraces them 
both, but from which each, in its particularity, can be 
differentiated (Gadamer, 1975, p. 271). The particular 
horizons of the work and of the interpreter can be 
"fused" temporarily because of the existence of both in 
world or within the overarching "world horizon." 
The past, the tradition of which the present is a 
part, helps to shape the fluid, changing horizon of the 
present. The horizon of the present interpreter, then, 
is constantly being formed. Part of this formation is 
the testing of prejudices through encounters with the 
past as it is manifested in particular works. Although 
the horizon of the present may be thought of as isolated, 
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it exists, in fact, in tension with past horizons 
(Gadamer, 1975, p. 273). Bringing out this tension 
between the horizon of the interpreter and that of the 
text is part of the hermeneutic task: 
The projecting of the historical horizon, 
then, is only a phase in the process of under¬ 
standing, and does not become solidified into the 
self-alienation of a past consciousness, but is 
overtaken by our own present horizon of under¬ 
standing. In the process of understanding there 
takes place a real fusing of horizons, which 
means that as the historical horizon is projected, 
it is simultaneously removed. [Gadamer, 1975, p. 
273 ] 
This act of fusion is what Gadamer calls "the task of 
effective-historical consciousness" and what he sees as 
the central problem of hermeneutics, i.e., "the problem 
of application that exists in all understanding" (Gadamer, 
1975, p. 274). 
Understanding, interpretation and application are 
one unified process for Gadamer. He predicates this 
conviction on Heidegger's conception of Dasein as existing 
In a relation of concerned involvement with entities in 
the world. Dasein exists thinkingly in the mode of 
relatedness described by Heidegger as "circumspective, 
i.e., which attends to the "readiness-to-hand" of entities 
in terms of their usefulness or serviceability. The 
contingent projectedness toward that which will be 
of these entities is, for produced through the use 
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Dasein, an element of application that inheres in the 
process of understanding and interpretation (see 
Heidegger, 1962, pp. 95-102 and 114-22). Heidegger 
writes that the Being of entities that are "ready-to-hand" 
always entails involvement; letting something "be" 
entails "letting something be involved." This involvement 
always relates to the Being of Dasein. The Being of 
Dasein is the "towards which" or "for-the-sake-of-which" 
in which an entity that is ready-to-hand is involved. 
Heidegger writes: 
Ontically, "letting something be involved" 
signifies that within our factical concern we let 
something ready-to-hand be so-and-so as it is 
already and in order that it be such . . . 
letting something "be" does not mean that we must 
first bring it into its Being and produce it; it 
means rather that something which is already an 
"entity" must be discovered in its readiness-to- 
hand, and that we must thus let the entity which 
has this Being be encountered. [Heidegger, 1962, 
p. 117] 
Speaking of the act of understanding (Verstehen) and the 
relationship of "signifying," Heidegger explains that, in 
the relationship of Dasein to entities which are "ready- 
to-hand," "Dasein gives itself beforehand its Being-in- 
the-world as something to be understood" (Heidegger, 
1962, p. 120). Heidegger emphasizes: 
Dasein, in its familiarity with significance, is 
the ontical condition for the possibility of 
discovering entities which are encountered in a 
world with involvement (readiness-to-hand) as 
their kind of Being, and which can thus make 
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themselves known as they are in themselves. 
[this entire quotation is italicized in the text; 
Heidegger, 1962, p. 120] 
When Gadamer writes of understanding, interpreting 
and application as one unified process, he is predicating 
this conception on Heidegger's ontology of Dasein. A 
text, then, is an entity that is encountered with involve¬ 
ment, "readiness-to-hand." In this kind of encounter the 
text can make itself known as it is in itself to the 
particular interpreter. This being known "in itself" 
occurs in a relationship (between the interpreter and the 
text) that entails application, i.e., a usefulness or 
serviceability "for us" that constitutes the text as 
"ready-to-hand" rather than as merely "present-at-hand." 
The usefulness, serviceability or applicability of a text 
emerges in the "fusion of horizons" when the interpreter 
lets the text be involved as "ready-to-hand" in an 
encounter in which it can make itself known. This 
encounter simultaneously enlarges and enriches the 
horizon of the interpreter so that the interpreter learns 
and comes to a better understanding of him or herself. 
Bernstein explains: 
[W]hat we seek to achieve is a "fusion of 
horizons," a fusion whereby our own horizon is 
enlarged and enriched. Gadamer s main point 
becomes even sharper when we realize that for him 
the medium of all human horizons is linguistic, 
and that the language that we speak (or that 
rather speaks through us) is essentially open to 
understanding alien horizons. It is through the 
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fusion of horizons that we risk and test our 
prejudices. In this sense, learning from other 
fprms of life and horizons is at the very same 
time coming to an understanding of ourselves. 
[Bernstein, 1983, pp. 143-44] 
In the interpretation-understanding-application process, 
then, the interpreter seeks to achieve the enlargement and 
enrichment of his or her horizon and a better understand¬ 
ing of him or herself. 
Since interpretation-understanding-application 
always occurs in the world, in the context of concerned 
involvement in situation, it always entails historicality 
(of the interpreter's horizon, the text's horizon and the 
overarching horizon of tradition in which both the text 
and the interpreter stand). Palmer lists several conse¬ 
quences of Gadamer's conception of the historicality of 
understanding that differentiate his philosophical 
hermeneutics from other theories of hermeneutics (see 
also Palmer, 1969, pp. 181-93): 
1. The issue of prejudgment -- The meaning of a 
work from the past cannot be understood solely in 
terms of itself, but rather is defined by the 
"questions put to it from the present" which are 
"ordered by the way we project ourselves in 
understanding into the future" (Palmer, 1969, p. 
182). Thus there is never one absolute "right" 
meaning of a work, but only meaning "for us. 
[Palmer, 1969, p. 184] 
2. The concept of temporal distance The past 
and present exist in a tension and hermeneutics 
occurs in the "between," between strangeness and 
familiarity, between what was historically 
intended and the tradition in which the interpret¬ 
er stands. Only with temporal distance can the 
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true "historical significance" of a text emerge 
and address the present. [Palmer, 1969, pp. 184- 
85] 
3. Understanding the author of a text -- To 
understand the text, not the author, is the task 
of hermeneutics. [Palmer, 1969, p. 185] 
4. Reconstruction of the past -- Integration, 
not reconstruction, is the key to understanding. 
[Palmer, 1969, p. 186] 
5. The significance of application -- Application 
involves relating the meaning of the past to the 
present; understanding always includes application 
because the temporal distance between past and 
present is bridged and the "alienation of meaning 
which has befallen the text" is overcome in the 
fusion of horizons. [Palmer,1969, p. 188] 
For Gadamer, then, understanding is always relation¬ 
al. It occurs in a relation between past and present, 
between interpreter and text (or analogue), and it is 
this relational process that his work explores. In order 
to understand Gadamer's conception of understanding and 
the centrality in his thought of language as the medium 
of understanding, it is necessary to remember the relation 
of his work to Heidegger's. 
For Heidegger and Gadamer, language, history, and 
being are all not only interrelated but interfus¬ 
ed, so that the linguisticality of being is at 
the same time its ontology -- its "coming into 
being" — and the medium of its historicality. 
Coming into being is a happening in and of 
history and is governed by the dynamics of 
historicality; it is a language event. [Palmer, 
1969, p. 177] 
Thus Gadamer writes: 
The role that the mystery of language plays 
in Heidegger's later thought is sufficient 
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indication that his concentration on the histori¬ 
city of self-understanding banished not only the 
concept of consciousness from its central 
position, but also the concept of selfhood as 
such. For what is more unconscious and "selfless" 
than that mysterious realm of language in which 
we stand and which allows what is to come to 
expression, so that being "is temporalized" (sich 
zeitigt)? . . . Understanding too cannot be 
grasped as a simple activity of the consciousness 
that understands, but is itself a mode of the 
event of being. To put it in purely formal 
terms, the primacy that language and understanding 
have in Heidegger's thought indicates the priority 
of the "relation" over against its relational 
members -- the I who understands and that which is 
understood. . . . Just as the relation between the 
speaker and what is spoken points to a dynamic 
process that does not have a firm basis in either 
member of the relation, so the relation between 
the understanding and what is understood has a 
priority over its relational terms. [Gadamer, 
1976, p. 50] 
Gadamer uses two analogies to elucidate the process 
of understanding: dialogue and the phenomenology of 
playing a game (see Gadamer, 1976, pp. 44-58 and 59-68; 
also Gadamer, 1975, pp. 91-119 and 321-51). Both, for 
him, illustrate the relation between understanding and 
that which is understood. [These analogies will be 
discussed in the next section of this chapter.] 
It ought not to be inferred that Gadamer uncritical¬ 
ly accepts all of Heideggerian philosophy. For example, 
as Frederick G. Lawrence notes, Gadamer does not accept 
the apocalyptic strain in Heidegger and does not see 
Western history in terms of a story of decline nor of 
progress (see Lawrence, in Gadamer, 1981, PP* xvi xx) 
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Rather, Gadamer expands on Heidegger's "hermeneutics of 
facticity, his analysis of the finitude of Dasein" as 
opening 
the possibility of a straightforward and explicit 
acknowledgment of hermeneutic consciousness, the 
realization that there is no such thing as a 
privileged standpoint, . . . and no pure positions 
in which we need not be critically aware of 
possible limitations. [Lawrence, in Gadamer, 
1981, p. xviii] 
Gadamer also notes the ambivalence of Heidegger towards 
Hegel and states that his own philosophical hermeneutics 
tried to carry forward Heidegger's turn away from Dasein's 
"transcendental account of himself" in a return to 
Platonic dialectic rather than in Heidegger's direction 
of the poetic mythos of Holderlin (see Gadamer, 1981, pp. 
55-63). Gadamer writes, "So I have sought to reacknow¬ 
ledge, against Heidegger, that beginning (Anfang) in 
Plato and also in Hegel . . . , which Heidegger's destruc¬ 
tion of metaphysics was calling into question" (Gadamer, 
1981, p. 61). In writing about the relation of his work 
to Heidegger's, Gadamer discusses the relation of 
Heidegger's to Hegel's work and notes: 
It is true that Heidegger at that time [circa 
1936] no longer trusted the notion of hermeneutics 
to keep his thinking free from the consequences of 
a transcendental theory of consciousness, just as 
he tried mightily to overcome the language of 
metaphysics by means of a special half-poetic 
language. ■*■ 0 But to me, it seemed, fell precisely 
the task of speaking on behalf of the happening 
that resides in understanding and of the overcom¬ 
ing of modern subjectivism in an analysis of the 
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hermeneutic experience that has become reflective¬ 
ly aware of itself. [Gadamer, 1981, p. 43] 
On Heidegger's later avoidance of the concept of 
hermeneutics, see Unterwegs zur Sprache, pp. 98, 120 ff. 
English translation: On the Way to Language, ed. Peter D. 
Hertz (New York: Haprer and Row, 1974). 
Gadamer must be seen as predicating his work on 
Heidegger's and as extending Heidegger's thought; however, 
he is by no means an uncritical disciple. It seems to be 
in his differences from Heidegger and in his heritage 
from Plato and Hegel that Gadamer moves in the direction 
of Jaspers' thought. Gadamer's perception of his task as 
that of attempting to elucidate the event of understanding 
and to analyze "the hermeneutic experience that has 
become reflectively aware of itself" necessarily involves 
the stepping back from the concreteness of thinking to 
reflect on thinking; this is characteristic of Jaspers' 
philosophy and is an inauthentic mode for Heidegger.[3] 
So, while Gadamer agrees with the Heideggerian 
conception of Dasein's existing understandingly in 
concernful involvement in the world and suggests that its 
"coming into being" is by virtue of its linguisticality, 
for him thinking-involvement in the Heideggerian sense 
with its utilitarian orientation is not the only mode of 
existing thinkingly. The reflective mode can inhere, for 
Gadamer, in the hermeneutic experience. In this respect, 
Gadamer seems to agree that distancing, transcending and 
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reflecting on involvement and thinking are legitimate or 
authentic modes as they are for Jaspers. In fact, they 
may inhere in the "fusion of horizons" that, for Gadamer, 
is the event of understanding, if this "fusing" is 
understood as being akin to the dialogical communicative 
moments of the "I-Thou" relationship described by Jaspers 
and Buber (this will be discussed further in a later 
section). Support for this interpretation can be found in 
Gadamer's use of the analogies of dialogue and playing a 
game as ways of elucidating the process of understanding. 
The Analogy of Dialogue 
For Gadamer, the analogy of dialogue illuminates 
the process of understanding and the fusion of horizons 
of the interpreter and that which is to be interpreted in 
the "hermeneutical conversation." He states: 
The hermeneutical experience is concerned 
with what has been transmitted in tradition. . . 
But tradition is not simply a process that we 
learn to know and be in command of through 
experience; it is a language, i.e., it expresses 
itself like a "Thou". A "Thou" is not an object, 
but stands in a relationship with us. [Gadamer, 
1975, p. 321] [4] 
He points out that it would not be correct to think of 
this as meaning that what is experienced in tradition is 
the meaning of a person who is a "Thou." Rather, 
"tradition is a genuine partner in communication with 
which we have fellowship as does the 'I' with a Thou 
(Gadamer, 1975, p. 321). Tradition is the "Thou" in a 
particular manifestation as a text, work of art, etc., 
and it is tradition in this expressive manifestation that 
is the partner in dialogue. 
The relationship experienced of the "Thou" must be 
of a particular kind (Gadamer, 1975, p. 321). Gadamer 
describes typologies of three kinds of "I-Thou" relation- 
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ships, only the third of which is, for him, the authentic 
hermeneutic relationship (Gadamer, 1975, pp. 321-25). 
Palmer labels these: 1) Thou as object within a field; 
2) Thou as reflexive projection; and 3) Thou as tradition 
speaking (Palmer, 1969, pp. 191-92). 
Of "Thou as object within a field," Gadamer writes: 
There is a kind of experience of the "Thou" 
that seeks to discover things that are typical in 
the behavior of one's fellow men and is able to 
make predictions concerning another person on the 
basis of experience. We call this a knowledge of 
human nature. We understand the other person in 
the same way that we understand any other typical 
event in our experiential field, i.e., he is 
predictable. His behavior is as much a means to 
our end as any other means. [Gadamer, 1975, pp. 
321-22] 
The other is an object whose behavior can be calculated 
and who can be used as a tool or means of achieving one's 
own goals. 
In terms of the hermeneutical problem, this form of 
"I-Thou" relationship makes tradition (and that which is 
to be interpreted) an object which the interpreter 
believes can be confronted in a detached, non-subjective 
way. Gadamer equates this with a naive faith in method 
and in objectivity that characterizes the attempt of the 
social sciences to imitate the methodology of the natural 
sciences (Gadamer, 1975, p. 322). 
The second mode of experiencing the Thou, as 
"reflexive projection," acknowledges the other as a 
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person; however, it still objectifies him or her because 
the other is related to as "understood" or "known." The 
"I" claims to understand the other better than the other 
understands him or herself, thereby stripping the other 
of subjectivity (by turning the other into an "object" 
that has been "mastered" by the "I"). There is no 
equivalence in this relationship; the other is not 
recognized as (equivalent) unique self-being. In the 
perception of him or herself as superior (by virtue of 
"knowing" or "understanding" the other better than the 
other does), the "I" takes away from the other "all 
justification of his own claims" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 323). 
As Palmer expresses it, the relation then becomes one 
"between the I and a reflexively constituted Thou" 
(Palmer, 1969, p. 192). The other has no claim on the 
"I"; the "I" need not listen to what the other is express¬ 
ing because the "I" believes him or herself to already 
understand it and, moreover, to understand it better than 
the other. No dialogue inheres in this situation; 
rather, the "I" can embark on a monologue of explanation 
of what the "Thou" intends (with no genuine "harkening" 
to what the other is expressing). 
In terms of hermeneutics, Gadamer finds this 
relationship to be characteristic of the "historical 
consciousness" described by Schleiermacher and Dilthey. 
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He argues that the interpreter, by claiming to transcend 
his or her own historicality in completely knowing the 
other, is involved in a false dialectic which is actually 
seeking "mastery" of the past (see Gadamer, 1975, p. 
323). He writes: 
A person who reflects himself out of a living 
relationship to tradition destroys the true 
meaning of this tradition . . . Historical 
consciousness in seeking to understand tradition 
must not rely on the critical method with which 
it approaches its sources, as if this preserved 
it from mixing in its own judgments and 
prejudices. It must, in fact, take account of 
its own historicality. To stand within a 
tradition does not limit the freedom of knowledge 
but makes it possible. [Gadamer, 1975, p. 324] 
The third type of "I-Thou" relationship, "Thou as 
tradition speaking," in which historical consciousness 
takes account of its own historicality, is the one that, 
for Gadamer, grounds the genuine hermeneutic experience. 
In this relationship, the "Thou" is experienced as a 
"Thou" whose "claim" is not overlooked but is listened to 
in openness (Gadamer, 1975, p. 324). This "I-Thou" 
relationship is characterized by the openness of the "I" 
to the other and by "letting something be said" by the 
other. "It is the kind of openness that wills to hear 
rather than to master, is willing to be modified by the 
other" (Palmer, 1969, p. 193) [5] 
This type of hermeneutical relationship, which 
Gadamer describes as "the openness to tradition possessed 
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by effective-historical consciousness" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 
324), is the foundation for Gadamer's philosophical 
hermeneutics. [6] Gadamer writes, "I must allow the 
validity of the claim made by tradition, not in the sense 
of simply acknowledging the past in its otherness, but in 
such a way that it has something to say to me" (Gadamer, 
1975, p. 324). He points out that the experience of the 
"Thou" shows how "something standing over against me 
asserts its own rights and requires absolute recognition; 
and in that very process is 'understood"" (Gadamer, 1975, 
p. xxiii). However, he also emphasizes that it is not 
the "Thou" that is being understood, but what the "Thou" 
is saying. 
It is important to understand this distinction 
between understanding the "Thou" and understanding what 
the "Thou" is saying. This is a major difference between 
Gadamer "s hermeneutics and the "psychologizing" he 
criticizes in Schleiermacher and Dilthey. More important¬ 
ly, it is essential to Gadamer's conception of understand¬ 
ing as "an event over which the interpreting subject does 
not ultimately preside" (Linge, in Gadamer, 1976, p. xi). 
Understanding is an event in which meaning asserts itself 
through the relation occuring between the interpreter and 
that which is to be interpreted. Of this conception of 
understanding and what is being understood, Gadamer 
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writes: 
[ T]o understand means primarily for two people to 
understand one another. Understanding is 
primarily agreement or harmony with another 
person. Men generally understand each other 
directly, i.e., they are in dialogue until they 
reach agreement. Understanding, then, is always 
understanding about something. Understanding 
each other means understanding each other on a 
topic or the like. From language we learn that 
the topic is not some random self-contained 
object of discussion, independently of which the 
process of mutual understanding proceeds, but 
rather is the path and goal of mutual understand¬ 
ing itself. [Gadamer, 1975, p. 158] 
In analyzing language as the medium of hermeneutic 
experience, Gadamer again uses dialogue to illustrate his 
thought: 
A conversation is a process of two people 
understanding each other. Thus it is character¬ 
istic of every true conversation that each opens 
himself to the other person, truly accepts his 
point of view as worthy of consideration and gets 
inside the other to such an extent that he 
understands not a particular individual, but what 
he says. The thing that has to be grasped is the 
objective rightness or otherwise of his opinion, 
so that they can agree with each other on the 
subject. Thus one does not relate the other's 
opinion to him, but to one's own views. . . . 
All this, which characterises the situation 
of two people understanding each other in 
conversation, has its hermeneutical application 
where we are concerned with the understanding of 
texts. [Gadamer, 1975, p. 347] 
Gadamer qualifies this relation of hermeneutics to 
dialogue in two ways: first, by emphasizing that the 
partners in dialogue are the interpreter and tradition 
speaking in a particular manifestation in a text or 
analogue; second, by indicating that in the hermeneutic 
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situation, one partner (tradition speaking as a text or 
analogue) is expressed only through the other partner, 
the interpreter (Gadamer, 1975, p. 349). Hermeneutics is 
like dialogue or real conversation in that it is the 
common subject matter that "unites" or "connects" the two 
partners (Gadamer, 1975, p. 349). Palmer explains: 
The text has a specific content of meaning apart 
from all connection with a person saying it. Nor 
should the terms "I" and "Thou" lead us to think 
in basically person-to-person terms, for the 
saying power resides not in the person saying it 
but in what is said . . . The text must be 
allowed to speak, the reader being open to it as 
a subject in its own right rather than as an 
object. [Palmer, 1969, p. 197] 
Understanding, then, is an event that happens like 
a dialogue or conversation in which meaning is created 
between two partners who, engaged in an "I-Thou" relation¬ 
ship, discuss a subject matter. Each partner listens to 
the other's expression and expresses him or herself 
openly. The two create meaning between them in their 
mutual listening and speaking about a subject matter. 
Understanding can also be seen as analogous to playing a 
game, and this will be discussed in the next section. 
The Analogy of Play 
The second analogy Gadamer uses to explain under¬ 
standing is that of playing a game. He believes dialogue 
illustrates a commonality between the structure of 
playing and of understanding. This commonality shows in 
his contention that in dialogue the partners are "carried 
along further by the dialogue" and that it is the "law of 
the subject matter which is at issue" and "which elicits 
statement and counter-statement and in the end plays them 
into each other" (Gadamer, 1976, p. 66). In dialogue and 
in playing a game, as in understanding, the interpreting 
subject and his or her partner are not the presiding 
subjects. Dialogue, play and understanding operate 
according to their own laws. Gadamer writes of under¬ 
standing as involving a moment of "loss of self" (Gadamer, 
1976, p. 51) and it is this aspect of understanding that 
he illuminates in terms of playing and of the structure 
of a game (although this aspect is evident in his 
discussion of dialogue as well). [7] 
For Gadamer, play must be distinguished from the 
subjective attitudes of the players because, he argues, 
play does not allow the player to behave toward it as if 
76 
77 
it were an object. Rather, it "fulfills its purpose only 
if the player loses himself in his play" (Gadamer, 1975, 
p. 92). The "mode of being" of play as such is important 
[8] arguing that play has its own essence apart 
from the subjective consciousness of the player, Gadamer 
turns around the idea that players are the subjects of 
play. Rather, he argues, play presents itself through 
the players (Gadamer, 1975, p. 92). He contends that 
analysis of common usages of the word "play" indicate 
that what is essential in the definition of play is 
movement, not who or what performs the movement. [9] 
Play, in this sense, is its own subject (Gadamer, 1975, 
p. 93) and happens "by itself" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 94); in 
the game the players are being played. 
Gadamer indicates that in the game there is a 
freedom of decision that, because it is "endangered and 
irrevocably limited," is risky and, therefore, attractive 
to the player (Gadamer, 1975, p. 95). 
This suggests a general characteristic of the 
way in which the nature of play is reflected in 
an attitude of play; all playing is a being- 
played. The attraction of a game, the fascination 
it exerts, consists percisely in the fact that 
the game tends to master the players. . . . 
Whoever "tries" is in fact the one who is tried. 
[Gadamer, 1975, p. 95] 
The player, then, while having an attitude toward play, 
is not the subject of play once he or she enters into 
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play, but is embraced in the movement that is play. The 
player does not stand outside play and relate to play as 
an object, but is drawn into and dominated by the event 
and relation that is the game. 
[T]he real experience of the game consists in the 
fact that something that obeys its own set of 
laws gains ascendancy in the game. . . . The back 
and forth movement of the game has a peculiar 
freedom and bouyancy that determines the 
consciousness of the player. It goes on 
automatically . . . Whatever is brought into play 
or comes into play no longer depends on itself 
but is dominated by the relation . . . [The 
player] conforms to the game or subjects himself 
to it, that is, he relinquishes the autonomy of 
his own will. . . . The game is not so much the 
subjective attitude of the two men confronting 
each other as it is the formation of the movement 
as such, which as in an unconscious teleology, 
subordinates the attitude of the individuals to 
itself. . . . [N]either partner alone constitutes 
the real determining factor; rather, it is the 
unified form of movement as a whole that unifies 
the fluid activity of both. We can formulate 
this idea as a theoretical generalization by 
saying that the individual self, including his 
activity and his understanding of himself, is 
taken up into a higher determination that is the 
really decisive factor. [Gadamer, 1976, pp. 53- 
54] 
In hermeneutic interpretation, for Gadamer, the 
interpreter and that which is to be interpreted stand in 
a relationship analogous to this playing relation that 
dominates both. Understanding is not confrontation nor 
empathetic engagement between the subjectivities of the 
interpreter and of the author (or creator) of the text 
(or work). Rather, understanding is an ontic relation in 
and that which is to be interpreted 
which the interpreter 
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are engaged. It is an event in which they participate, 
through which meaning comes into being. Thus Gadamer, in 
his conclusion to Truth and Method, writes: 
Someone who understands is always already drawn 
into an event through which meaning asserts 
itself. So it is well grounded for us to use the 
same concept of play for the hermeneutical 
phenomenon as for the experience of the beautiful. 
When we understand a text, what is meaningful in 
it charms us just as the beautiful charms us. It 
has asserted itself and charmed us before we can 
come to ourselves and be in a position to test 
the claim to meaning that it makes. What we 
encounter in the experience of the beautiful and 
in understanding the meaning of tradition has 
effectively something about it of the truth of 
play. In understanding we are drawn into an 
event and arrive, as it were, too late, if we 
want to know what we ought to believe. [Gadamer, 
1975, p. 446] 
It is possible to see here why hermeneutical methodology 
is not a major issue for Gadamer. Understanding is 
relational and the relation is not controlled by the 
interpreter but is an event in which the interpreter and 
that which is to be interpreted participate; therefore, 
methodological emphasis "gets in the way" of understand¬ 
ing. Method is a means of controlling and what is 
required of the interpreter is not controlling (an 
object) but being drawn into and participating in an 
event. Certainly skills can be practiced and used; 
however, just as the player who "stands outside" play and 
tries to control it (rather than surrendering to the 
movement that is play) is a "spoilsport" who prevents the 
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occurrence of play, so the interpreter who attempts to 
remain "outside" and control the relationship that is 
understanding would, for Gadamer, prevent the occurence 
of real understanding. Understanding involves something 
different from utilizing tools to examine an object 
(which, as in science, can yield knowledge, but not 
necessarily understanding). 
Hannah Arendt's use of Kant's distinction between 
reason and intellect is useful in illuminating Gadamer's 
thought (Arendt, 1978, Thinking, pp. 13-16). Reason 
relates to thinking, comprehension, conceptualizing, and 
meaning; intellect relates to knowing, cognition, percep¬ 
tion or apprehension, and truth or verities (Arendt, 
1978, Thinking, pp. 13-16 and 57-65). Knowledge has to 
do with factual certainty, predictability, potential for 
control, deduction of laws, and creation of theory (see 
Luban, 1983, pp. 224-31; Arendt, 1987, Thinking, pp. 53- 
65). Meaning, which, for Arendt, is the product of 
thinking and reason, not intellect, is quite different. 
It is meaning which, for Gadamer, expresses itself 
through understanding, interpretation and application. 
Arendt's use of "knowledge" here relates more to Gadamer's 
first form of "I-Thou" relationship, which concerns 
itself with "Thou as object within a field" and discovery 
of knowledge about human nature (see above) and with his 
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second form, "Thou as reflexive projection." Arendt's 
"meaning," with its concern for particularity and its 
eschewing of control or manipulation, is closer to 
Gadamer's "genuine" "I-Thou" relationship. Knowledge can 
be produced by methodology (and science); however, 
meaning asserts itself in relation (not controlled 
manipulation and experimentation). Moreover, for Gadamer, 
(knowledge-producing) analysis is itself rooted in 
preunderstanding (see above). It is the preunderstanding 
that occurs in a person's "turning toward" that which is 
to be interpreted, i.e., standing in relation to it in 
the stream of tradition, that gives rise to a choice of 
methodology to be used. Methodology, then, follows from 
relation, which is prior to it and constitutes the 
preunderstanding on which methodological choice is based. 
The use of methodology to produce knowledge is not, for 
Gadamer, an end in itself; it is subsumed in the relation 
in which meaning expresses itself and understanding 
occurs, just as the use of skills by a player is part of, 
but not the whole of, playing, being "in the game." 
The use of methodology, analogously, is part of being in 
the process of understanding in which meaning presents 
itself as the game presents itself in the playing of the 
players. 
For Gadamer, methodology can lead to a knowledge of 
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things but not an understanding of the nature of things, 
which is primary if, as he contends, Being exists 
understandingly. Methodology and technology (and the 
knowledge they produce) must serve, not dominate, 
understanding. Their product must not be misunderstood 
as being The Truth, which both Gadamer and Heidegger 
(among others, including Buber and Jaspers) believe has 
come to be the erroneous assumption of the modern era. 
Language, not methodology, is, for Gadamer, the medium of 
understanding. This will be discussed in the next 
section. 
Recapitulation of Previous Sections 
Before moving to discussion of the dialectical, 
linguistic, speculative, and universal dimensions in 
Gadamer s work, it is useful to briefly recapitulate the 
first four sections of this chapter. Hermeneutics is 
concerned with understanding and interpreting as processes 
of elucidating the meaning of products of the human mind, 
particularly literary and artistic works. Hermeneuticists 
emphasize different dimensions of this process of finding 
meaning, usually either the methodological principles 
that underlie interpretation or the philosophical 
dimensions of the process of understanding. The work of 
Hans-Georg Gadamer is in the latter category and explores 
the phenomenon of understanding from the ontological 
stance that human being exists understandingly. 
The work of Plato, Hegel and Heidegger greatly 
influenced Gadamer; however, he has not uncritically 
accepted their work but has used it as a basis from which 
to develop his own thought. Gadamer sees interpretation, 
understanding and application as one unified process 
rooted in the historicality of the human being existing 
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in concerned involvement in the world. He contends that 
interpretation always involves: preunderstanding and 
prejudgment; an attempt to explore the tension between 
the interpreter's world or "horizon" and that of the work 
to be interpreted; a focus on the meaning of the work to 
be interpreted rather than on its author or creator; an 
effort to integrate or "fuse" the horizons of the 
interpreter (present) and of the work to be interpreted 
(past); and a dimension of application by which the 
alienation of meaning that has befallen the work is 
overcome. For Gadamer, understanding is relational and 
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the relation has priority over its members. Understanding 
is an event in which interpreter and work to be interpret¬ 
ed participate in such a way that out of the relation 
between them understanding comes into being. This is 
possible because both the interpreter and the work stand 
in an "overarching horizon" of tradition. Tradition is a 
kind of language, for Gadamer, and exists like a "Thou," 
in relation to the interpreter, not as an object for the 
interpreter. It is tradition (in manifestation as a 
work that "speaks"; meaning asserts itself in the encount¬ 
er between the interpreter and tradition speaking in a 
work. 
Gadamer uses two analogies to elucidate the process 
of understanding-interpretation-application: dialogue and 
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playing a game. Both analogies illuminate Gadamer's 
conception of understanding as an event (more particular¬ 
ly, as will be discussed later, a language event) in 
the interpreter and the work to be interpreted 
participate but over which they do not ultimately preside. 
Understanding involves an element of loss of self, of 
surrender of self to a "back and forth" movement that is 
like the movement of dialogue and play. This back and 
forth movement constitutes the "hermeneutic circle," the 
fusion of horizons in which the interpreter moves "back 
and forth": between his or her preunderstandings and 
prejudices and the meaning emerging as s/he is addressed 
by the text; between his or her questions to the text and 
its assertions and questions to the interpreter. It is 
in the relation of the interpreter and the work as 
participants in this movement and event of understanding 
that meaning asserts itself "between" them. Meaning does 
not lie in either partner, but comes into being between 
them. 
The interpreter who attempts to stand outside the 
relation and to treat the work as an object rather than 
as a partner prevents the event of understanding. The 
player who stands outside the movement of play and 
attempts to control or dominate it prevents the occurrence 
of play. Likewise, the person who stands back from or 
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outside of dialogue and attempts to control or dominate 
it prevents the occurence of dialogue (by subverting it 
into monologue, perhaps disguised as dialogue). 
Analogously, the interpreter who stands outside of the 
event of understanding and attempts to dominate or 
control it prevents the occurence of understanding. In 
Gadamer's terms, understanding-interpretation-application 
occurs only when the interpreter, as effective-historical 
consciousness open to tradition, engages in an "I-Thou" 
relationship with tradition speaking in a work and lets 
something be said to him. 
Gadamer juxtaposes this relationality (inherent in 
playing and dialogue) as the necessary condition of 
understanding with the hermeneutical orientation that 
emphasizes methodology. He contends that methodological 
orientation objectifies the work to be interpreted and, 
thus, prevents meaning from asserting itself and precludes 
the possibility of understanding. From this perspective, 
he argues that while methodology (and science) can yield 
valuable knowledge and verities, it must not fail to 
acknowledge its limitations, i.e., that it cannot produce 
"Truth" and cannot ultimately answer questions of central 
concern to humanity throughout history and today. 
Rather, methodology can yield only a perspective, "valid' 
from within its theoretical standpoint, but not absolute. 
Interpretation as Linguistic, Dialectical. 
Speculative, and Universal 
Linguistic 
Gadamer refers to all interpretation as "essentially 
linguistic and it is important to understand what he 
means by this. For him, language is the medium through 
which meaning asserts itself and understanding comes into 
being. If human being exists understandingly and language 
is the medium of understanding, then human being exists 
linguistically. Thus Linge writes that Gadamer's 
principle contribution to hermeneutics lies in his effort 
to shift the focus from methodological aspects to clarifi¬ 
cation of understanding as a language event that is by 
nature episodic and trans-subjective (Linge, in Gadamer, 
1976, p. xxviii). [10] These features become apparent 
when hermeneutics unfolds as phenomenology of 
language. . . . [Ljanguage is the medium in which 
past and present actually interpenetrate. 
Understanding is an essentially linguistic 
process; indeed, these two -- language and the 
understanding of transmitted meaning -- are not 
two processes, but are affirmed by Gadamer as one 
and the same. [Linge, in Gadamer, 1976, p. 
xxviii] 
For Heidegger, human being exists understandingly in 
concernful involvement in the world with a "doing" or 
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utilitarian orientation. For Gadamer, human being exists 
understandingly with an inherent "saying" or interpretive 
orientation, which is prior to and grounds utilitarianism 
or any other secondary orientation because understanding 
is linguistic. 
Gadamer identifies three features as essential to 
language. First is the "essential self-forgetfulness" of 
language. It follows that the "real being" of language 
consists in what is said in it; for Gadamer, this consti¬ 
tutes "the common world in which we live and to which 
belongs the tradition in which we stand" (Gadamer, 1976, 
pp. 64-65). Second is the "I-lessness" of language. To 
speak means to speak to someone; speaking, therefore, 
belongs not to the "sphere of the I" but to the "sphere 
of the We" (Gadamer, 1976, p. 65). [11] The third 
essential feature of language is its universality. 
Language is infinite, "all-encompassing": 
There is nothing that is fundamentally excluded 
from being said, to the extent that our act of 
meaning intends it. Our capacity for saying 
keeps pace untiringly with the universality of 
reason. Hence every dialogue also has an inner 
infinity . . . One breaks it off, either because 
it seems that enough has been said or because 
there is no more to say. But every such break 
has an intrinsic relation to the resumption of 
the dialogue. [Gadamer, 1976, p. 67] 
In connection with the demonstration of the universality 
of language, Gadamer concludes that language is the real 
medium of human being 
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if we only see it in the realm that it alone 
fills out, the realm of human being-together, the 
realm of common agreement — a realm as indispens¬ 
able to human life as the air we breathe. As 
Aristotle said, man is truly the being who has 
language. For we should let everything human be 
spoken to us. [Gadamer, 1976, p. 68] 
Inherent in the linguistic nature of interpretation, 
then, are: a "self-forgetful" common language that does 
not function as a tool but, rather, coincides with the 
act of understanding; a "We-ness" of "speaking to"; a 
universality that is all-encompassing and infinite in 
potential. Language -- as living, self-forgetful communi¬ 
cation -- is the universal medium of understanding, of 
disclosing a subject-matter (what is said in language). 
Gadamer rejects the "sign" theory of language (see 
Palmer, 1969, pp. 201-5). Language does not point at 
things, moving "from subjectivity through the sign tool 
to the designated thing ..." (Palmer, 1969, p. 205). 
Rather, it moves in the opposite direction, "words are 
not something that belong to man, but to the situation" 
(Palmer, 1969, p. 203). In the concept of language as 
the medium of understanding lies a kind of 'objectivism 
for Gadamer. What is brought to words is a subject- 
matter being disclosed in a certain way, in which the 
words used already belong to the situation; language is 
"made to fit the world, and therefore it is ordered to 
the world rather than to our subjectivity" (Palmer, 1969, 
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p. 205). Thus, Palmer writes that Gadamer s hermeneutics 
seem to suggest a new kind of objectivity (Sachlichkeit) 
because "what is disclosed constitutes not a projection 
of subjectivity but something which acts on our under¬ 
standing in presenting itself" (Palmer, 1969, p. 212). 
For Gadamer, language and world are both 
"transpersonal matters." "World is more aptly seen as 
between persons. It is the shared understanding between 
persons, and is the medium of understanding; and what 
makes it possible is language" (Palmer, 1969, p. 206). 
World, then, becomes interpersonal and transactive rather 
than either subjective or objective in the traditional 
sense. It is not "my" world or "the" world, but "our" 
world, i.e., the shared understanding reached between us 
that is constituted by language (which encompasses us). 
Human beings exist in language; they are "in" or belong 
to language as they are "in" and belong to world and 
tradition. It is this "belongingness" to world, language 
and tradition that is the foundation of Gadamer's herme¬ 
neutic interpretation. It makes possible the fusion of 
horizons that is understanding (see Palmer, 1969, pp. 206- 
9). This also provides the "objectivity" of interpreta¬ 
tion and understanding; they are language events and 
language belongs to situations, not to human subjects. 
Language speaks through the interpreter and the work, but 
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it belongs to situation, to world. Thus, interpretation, 
although there can be many interpretations of the same 
entity by the same or different interpreters, is not 
completely relativized, according to philosophical 
hermeneutics. 
Gadamer contends that the primary meaning of the 
Aristotelian logos is language rather than reason or 
thought because language is the medium of reason and 
thought. 
To men alone is the logos given . . . , so that 
they can make manifest to each other what is 
useful and harmful, and therefore also what is 
right and wrong. . . . [T]he distinguishing 
feature of man ... is his superiority over what 
is actually present, his sense of future. 
[Gadamer, 1976, p. 59] 
Language makes possible this sense of the future because 
it is the medium and manifestation of thought and reason. 
Gadamer believes that the superiority of classical 
metaphysics lies in its transcendence of the duality of 
subject (and will) and object (and being-in-the-worId) by 
"conceiving their preexistent correspondence with each 
other" (Gadamer, 1976, p. 74). He finds this 
correspondence in language (see Gadamer, 1975, pp. 366- 
414; also Gadamer, 1976, pp. 69-81). He describes a 
"hermeneutical universe" 
that is characterized by the mode of operation 
and the reality of language that transcends all 
individual consciousness.^ The mediation of 
finite and infinite that is appropriate to us as 
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finite beings lies in language -- in the 
linguistic character of our experience in the 
world. . . . its own operation is never limited, 
and yet is not a progressive approximation of 
intended meaning. There is rather a constant 
representation of this meaning in every one of 
its steps. . . . 
. . . Our finite experience of the correspondence 
between words and things thus indicates something 
like what metaphysics once taught as the original 
harmony of all things . . . This fact seems to me 
to be guaranteed not in "the nature of things," 
which confronts other opinions and demands 
attention, but rather in "the language of things," 
which wants to be heard in the way in which things 
bring themselves to expression in language. 
[Gadamer, 1976, pp. 80-81] 
"3 In addition to WM [Wahrheit und methode: Grundzuge 
einer Philosophischen Hermeneutik. Tubingen: Mohr, 1960], 
cf. "The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem." 
Dialectic 
Understanding is essentially linguistic and 
relational. Hermeneutic interpretation is disclosure and 
is rooted in awareness that something is not known or is 
not as it was assumed to be. Experience of the alienness 
of the other produces the hermeneutic effort. [12] 
Hermeneutics begins in a question and attempts to overcome 
the alienation of meaning that has arisen. Hermeneutic 
interpretation is dialectical as well as dialogical 
because questioning is inherent in the experiencing of 
something as "other" and in the knowledge of not knowing 
325). [13] Gadamer describes (Gadamer, 1975, p 
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dialectic as the "art of questioning and of seeking 
truth": "The art of questioning is that of being able to 
go on asking questions, i.e., the art of thinking. it is 
called 'dialectic, for it is the art of conducting a 
real conversation" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 330). 
Gadamer points out that questions have sense, 
i.e., a direction in which a meaningful answer can be 
given. A question is open in that its answer is not known 
(if it is a genuine question); however, its openness is 
not boundless. Rather, it exists within a horizon that 
limits it by implying directions in which a meaningful 
answer can be given (Gadamer, 1975, pp. 326-27). Asking 
a question "implies the explicit establishing of presup¬ 
positions, in terms of which can be seen what still 
remains open" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 327). Questioning is 
disclosure, "laying open," of that which the questioner 
seeks to know; however, the questioner must "be conducted 
by the object to which the partners in conversation are 
directed" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 330). Gadamer also 
emphasizes that dialectic consists in seeking to bring 
out the strength, not the weakness, of that which is said 
by thinking that refers to the object of conversation 
(Gadamer, 1975, p. 331). 
In hermeneutic interpretation, the partners in 
dialogue or conversation are the interpreter and tradition 
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manifested in a text or work, the object by which the 
conversation is directed. Disclosure and dialectical 
questioning in hermeneutics have to do with an encounter 
with heritage or tradition. The encounter must involve 
the genuine "I-Thou" relation previously described. 
Palmer explains: 
What Gadamer means by an I-Thou relation to 
heritage is that in a text the heritage addresses 
and makes a claim on the reader, not as something 
with which he has nothing in common but in 
mutuality. The text must be allowed to speak, 
the reader being open to it as a subject in its 
own right rather than as an object. [Palmer, 
1969, p. 197] 
In the dialectical question-answer structure of the 
dialogue, questions are addressed to the text by the 
reader and to the reader by the text in a "back and 
forth" movement. The text (or analogue) is thus brought 
out of its "alienation" as a "fixed form" and into a 
living relationship with the present (see Palmer, 1969, 
pp. 199-200). 
Gadamer writes that "interpretation always involves 
a relation to the question that is asked of the interpret 
er. To understand a text means to understand this 
question" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 333). This occurs by 
"achieving the hermeneutical horizon" that is "the 
horizon of the question within which the sense of the 
text is determined" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 333). The text, 
itself, is an assertion, an answer to a question raised 
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by the subject-matter. The interpreter must "go behind" 
what is said in the text and discover the question to 
which it is an answer. Because the text is only one of 
an array of possible (meaningful) answers that are 
included in the horizon of the question, the interpreter 
inevitably goes beyond what is said in the text. Gadamer 
demonstrates here that hermeneutics, of necessity, always 
involves more than reconstruction: 
We cannot avoid thinking about that which was 
unquestioningly accepted, and hence not thought 
about, by an author, and bringing it into the 
openness of the question. This is not to open 
the door to arbitrariness in interpretation, but 
to reveal what always takes place. The under¬ 
standing of the word of the tradition always 
requires that the reconstructed question be set 
within the openness of its questionableness, 
i.e., that it merge with the question that 
tradition is for us. [Gadamer, 1975, p. 337] 
It is this regaining of the "concepts of an historical 
past in such a way that they also include our own 
comprehension of them" that constitutes the fusion of 
horizons (Gadamer, 1975, p. 337). 
Interpretation and understanding, then, always 
involve a productive process and application: the 
interpreter builds on the "excess of meaning" in the 
text, exceeds the author's intentions, and seeks to 
understand the meaning of the text as it addresses the 
interpreter in his/her own horizon (see Linge, in Gadamer, 
1976, p. xxv). However, while there is no right or final 
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interpretation of a text, nor is interpretation arbitrary: 
[T]he hermeneutical experience always includes 
the fact that the text to be understood speaks 
into a situation that is determined by previous 
opinions. This is not a regretable distortion 
. . . , but the condition of possibility, which 
we have characterised as the hermeneutical 
situation. Only because between the text and its 
interpreter there is no automatic accord can a 
hermeneutical experience make us share in the 
text. Only because a text must be brought out of 
its alienness and become assimilated is there 
anything for the man who is seeking to understand 
it to say. Only because the text calls for it 
does interpretation take place, and only in the 
way called for. The apparently thetic beginning 
of interpretation is, in fact, a response and, 
like every response, the sense of an interpreta¬ 
tion is determined by the question asked. Thus 
the dialectic of question and answer always 
precedes the dialectic of interpretation. It is 
what determines understanding as an event. 
[Gadamer, 1975, p. 429] [14] 
The text or work, as an assertion and answer to a 
question, has an excess of meaning on which the interpret¬ 
er must build in looking beyond the text to the horizon 
of the question to which the text is an answer. The 
openness and questionableness of the question are part of 
tradition which is itself a question. Whatever is said 
carries within itself and is related to what is unsaid. 
Thus Gadamer writes of interpretation as dialectical: 
[T]here is in the hermeneutical experience 
something that resembles a dialectic, an activity 
of the thing itself that, unlike the methodology 
of modern science, is a passivity, an understan 
ing, an event. 
The hermeneutical experience also has its 
logical consequence: that of uninterrupted 
listening. ... A person who is trying to 
understand a text has to keep something at a 
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distance, namely everything that suggests itself, 
on the basis of his own prejudices, as the 
meaning expected, as soon as it is rejected by 
the sense of the text itself. . . . The unfolding 
of the totality of meaning towards which under¬ 
standing is directed, forces us to make 
conjectures and to take them back again. The 
self-cancellation of the interpretation makes it 
possible for the thing itself -- the meaning of 
the text -- to assert itself. The movement of 
the interpretation is not dialectical primarily 
because the one-sidedness of every statement can 
be balanced by another side -- this is, . . . , a 
secondary phenomenon in interpretation -- but 
because the word that interpretatively encounters 
the meaning of the text expresses the whole of 
this meaning to be represented within it in a 
finite way. [Gadamer, 1975, pp. 422-23] 
In its dialectical nature, interpretation and understand¬ 
ing are both speculative and universal. 
Speculativity and universality 
For Gadamer, language and, therefore, understanding 
are essentially, intrinsically speculativity and therein 
lies their universality (see Gadamer, 1975, pp. 414-31). 
The speculativity arises from the dialectical, parts- 
whole relation of what is said to the totality of meaning 
in language that allows an infinity of meaning to be 
represented finitely in what is said: "All human speaking 
is finite in such a way that there is within it an 
infinity of meaning to be elaborated and interpreted 
(Gadamer, 1975, p. 416). 
To understand Gadamer's conception of speculativity, 
it is useful to consider how he utilizes Hegel s concept 
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and differentiates his own from it. Gadamer discusses 
Hegel's usage of the word "speculative" to refer to a 
mirror relation in which reflection inheres. Speculativi- 
ty is the antithesis of dogmatism because it involves a 
reflection on what appears, not as unambiguous or fixed, 
but as a mirroring of the thing itself (Gadamer, 1975, p. 
423). Gadamer points out that Hegel initially makes a 
distinction between the speculative and the dialectical: 
"The dialectical is the expression of the speculative, 
the representation of what is actually contained in the 
speculative, and to this extent it is the 'truly' specula¬ 
tive" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 425). However, he contends that 
for Hegel this distinction cancels itself out in terms of 
the concept of absolute knowledge. Gadamer indicates 
that his own thought parts company with the concept of 
speculative dialogue in (Plato and) Hegel because their 
dialectic depends on "subordinating language to the 
'statement'" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 425). 
Gadamer argues that language is inherently specula¬ 
tive as the "realisation of meaning" because of the 
orientation of the finite possibilities of what is said 
as representing and pointing toward the infinite, i.e., 
what is unsaid, the totality of meaning (Gadamer, 1975, 
p. 426). Gadamer's understanding of the speculativity of 
language can be seen in his writing that: 
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To say what one means, . . . make oneself 
understood, means to hold what is said together 
nftononmi=f^nitY 2f what is not said in the unity 
of one meaning and to ensure that it be understood 
in this way. . . . Someone speaks speculatively 
when his words do not reflect beings, but express 
a relation to the whole of being. [Gadamer, 
1975, p. 426] 
In expressing a relation to being, the speaker is, 
for Gadamer, manifesting the existential distinction of 
human Dasein, i.e., being understandingly, in the sense 
that language is the medium through which meaning asserts 
itself and understanding comes into being. Language is 
intrinsically speculative because of its nature as 
"mediation" between the finite and the infinite. Like¬ 
wise, interpretation, because of its essentially 
linguistic nature, is speculative. 
Both language and interpretation have a universal 
aspect in their speculativity. Gadamer argues that: 
Being that can be understood is language. The 
hermeneutical phenomenon here draws into its own 
universality the nature of what is understood, by 
determining it in a universal sense as language, 
and its own relation to beings as interpretation. 
• • • 
. . . That which can be understood is 
language. This means that it is of such a nature 
that of itself it offers itself to be understood. 
[Gadamer, 1975, p. 432] 
Gadamer explains that what he means by the phrase "Being 
that can be understood is language" is that the 
"principle" of hermeneutics means that human beings 
should try to understand everything that can be understood 
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(Gadamer, 1976, p. 31). He contends that as things 
present themselves the interpreter engages dialectically 
and dialogically with them; in this process both their 
fundamental speculativity and universality and that of 
hermeneutic interpretation become apparent. Palmer 
states; 
Speculativity lies ... in the nature of all 
beings one encounters; everything, insofar as it 
tries to make itself "understood," divides itself 
from itself, the said from the unsaid, the past 
from the present; self-preservation and becoming 
understood are . . . universal. This is the 
speculativity which Gadamer sees as a universal 
characteristic of being itself; . . . Speculativi¬ 
ty, if deeply understood, is not only the key to 
understanding Gadamer's hermeneutics but the true 
ground of his claims for its universality. 
[Palmer, 1969, p. 214] 
Hermeneutics becomes, according to Palmer, the "ontology 
and phenomenology of understanding" which is Dasein"s way 
of being in the world (Palmer, 1969, p. 215). Thus, 
Palmer sees Gadamer's work as an extension of Heidegger s 
theory of understanding, ontology and critique of modern 
humanist subjectivism and technology (Palmer, 1969, p. 
216). He believes that Gadamer has, without radical 
contradiction of Heidegger, evolved a hermeneutics that 
is language-centered, ontological, dialectical, and 
speculative (Palmer, 1969, p. 216). In this extension, 
Palmer sees a tendency toward a "rapprochment" with Hegel 
that, for him, represents an improvement on Heidegger s 
hermeneutic of Dasein by offering the possibility of 
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conceiving understanding as a more dynamic interaction 
than is the case in Heidegger's work (see Palmer, 1969, 
pp. 215-17). This more active dynamic is evident through¬ 
out Gadamer s work as, for example, when Gadamer writes 
of the universality of the hermeneutic problem: 
[T]he simultaneous building up of our own world 
in language still persists whenever we want to 
say something to each other. The result is the 
actual relationship of men to each other. Each 
is at first a kind of linguistic circle, and 
these linguistic circles come into contact with 
each other, merging more and more. Language 
occurs once again, in vocabulary and grammar as 
always, and never without the inner infinity of 
the dialogue that is in progress between every 
speaker and his partner. This is the fundamental 
dimension of hermeneutics. Genuine speaking, 
which has something to say and hence does not 
give prearranged signals, but rather seeks words 
through which one reaches the other person, is 
the universal task . . . [Gadamer, 1976, p. 17] 
To summarize, then, Gadamer's philosophical herme¬ 
neutics is linguistic, dialectical, speculative, and 
universal (as well as historical). These elements inhere 
in the hermeneutic of Dasein in which being is understand¬ 
ing and being that can be understood is language. 
Because language and, therefore, understanding point to 
the relation of the finite (that which is said) to the 
infinite (that which is unsaid and the totality of 
meaning), hermeneutic interpretation is speculative and 
universal. For this reason and because the relationship 
of the understanding to that which is understood involves 
questioning, interpretation is dialectical. Since these 
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elements or aspects of interpretation are also aspects of 
dialogue, Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics could also 
be called dialogical hermeneutics. 
The historicality, 1inguisticality, dialecticality, 
speculativity, and universality found in Gadamer's 
thought can also be seen in the work of Martin Buber and 
Karl Jaspers. A comparison of Gadamer's with Buber's and 
Jaspers' conceptions of dialogue will be the focus of 
Chapter III. The intention is not to minimize the 
differences among these philosophers but, rather, to 
consider what areas of similarity among them might 
suggest ways of more fully understanding dialogue qua 
dialogue. 
Endnotes 
1. For example, Bleicher uses "hermeneutical" and 
"hermeneutic" to differentiate between the more 
methodological and the more philosophical conceptions of 
hermeneutics and "historical" and "historic" to 
distinguish between the respective relationships to 
history of hermeneutical theory and hermeneutic 
philosophy. His glossary clarifies other terminological 
distinctions as they relate to differing usages of 
concepts in hermeneutics (see Bleicher, 1980, pp. 265- 
71). However, further epistemological analysis is needed 
since even such commonly used terms as "hermeneutic 
problem" and "hermeneutic circle" have different 
connotations for different hermeneuticists. 
2. Gadamer accepts and builds on Husserl's concept of 
horizon: 
A horizon is not a rigid frontier, but something 
that moves with one and invites one to advance 
further. Thus horizon intentionality, which 
constitutes the unity of the flow of experience, 
is paralleled by an equally comprehensive horizon 
intentionality on the objective side. For 
everything that is given as existent is given in 
terms of the world and hence brings the world 
horizon with it. [Gadamer, 1975, p. 217] 
3. Although Gadamer is familiar with Jaspers' work, he 
does not refer to Jaspers' work on communication or his 
elucidation of the "I-Thou" relationship. F. H. Heinemann 
writes of the centrality of the place of communication in 
Jaspers' thought: 
Only the problem of communication is new. It 
leads to the central thesis that the individual 
for himself cannot become man; cut off from 
others he sinks into neurotic dispair; only in 
communication with them can he become himself. 
[Heinemann, 1958, p. 63] 
Considering 
relationshi 
might be ex 
butions in 
the centrality of communication and dialogica 
p in Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, it 
pected that he would refer to Jaspers contri 
these areas. This apparent omission might be 
1 
103 
104 
explained by Gadamer's perception of the work of Hegel 
and Plato as seminal to his own work: "To be sure, what 
so formed my thinking was a personalized, dialogical 
Hegel behind whom there always stood the daily, thoughtful 
intercourse with the Platonic dialogues" (Gadamer, 1981, 
p. 44). He adds, 
[T]here emerged all at once and behind all 
methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften and all 
epistemology the unity of dialogue and dialectic 
that related Hegel and Plato to one another in a 
surprising manner, and this set the hermeneutic 
experience free. [Gadamer, 1981, p. 47] 
Gadamer also refers to the impact of Aristotle's ideas as 
he was introduced to them by Heidegger. Heidegger's work 
is also seminal as discussed previously. Yet, Gadamer's 
conception of dialogue is similar in many ways to those of 
Jaspers and Buber There is no reference to Buber's work 
in Reason in the Age of Science, Truth and Method, nor 
Philosophical Hermeneutics except in the Translator's 
Introduction to Reason in the Age of Science. There, in 
response to a comment by Leo Strauss that Gadamer's Truth 
and Method does not see the radicalization and universali¬ 
zation of hermeneutics as contemporary with "the approach 
of the world-night or the Untergang des Abendlands," 
Lawrence quotes Gadamer's reply of April 5, 1961, to 
Strauss: 
Where I otherwise appeal to Heidegger -- in this 
I attempt to think of "understanding" as an 
"event" -- is turned, however, in an entirely 
different direction. My point of departure is 
not the complete forgetfulness of being, the 
"night of being", but rather -- I say this 
against Heidegger as well as against Buber the 
unreality of such an assertion. [Lawrence, in 
Gadamer, 1981, p. xvii] 
Lawrence comments that here Gadamer seems to link Buber s 
thesis of the eclipse of God (Gottesfinsternin) with 
Heidegger's apocalyptic strain (see Lawrence, in Gadamer, 
1981, pp. xvii-xix). 
4 Original text usage of "ie" has been amended to the 
more standard usage of "i.e.," in all quotations from 
Gadamer (1975). 
5. Hoy indicates that Gadamer is consciously drawing on 
Hegel's analysis of the master-slave relationship in 
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describing the possible "I-Thou" relationships. Of the 
T^°u" relationship, Hoy states: "[l]t neither 
n?v,theK°ther person as an object nor tries to master 
^How0t^Q7QbY su®p<fndin<? hls right to meaningful statement" (Hoy, 1978, p. 63). 
6* "Wirkungsgeschicht1iche Bewusstsein" is variously 
translated. Palmer translates it as "historically 
operative consciousness" or "authentically historical 
consciousness" (Palmer, 1969, p. 191). For Hoy, it means 
the consciousness of standing within a still operant 
history" (Hoy, 1978, p. 63). Bleicherdef ines 
wirkungsgeschichte" as "effective history," "on-going 
mediation of past and present which encompasses subject 
and object and in which tradition asserts itself as a 
continuing impulse and influence" (Bleicher, 1980, p. 
266); "wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein" means 
"recognition of the past as the determinant of 
consciousness, that is, that 'Being is more than 
consciousness'" (Bleicher, 1980, p. 266). The phrase 
that is used in the Crossroad translation of Truth and 
Method (1975) is "effective-historical consciousness" and 
that translation is used in this study. 
7. Gadamer first analyzes play in connection with 
aesthetics and the being of a work of art (see Gadamer, 
1975, pp. 91-150). 
8. Gadamer is familiar with the work of Johan Huizinga 
and refers to Huizinga's Homo Ludens. While Gadamer does 
not utilize Huizinga's conception of play in its entirety, 
his thoughts are frequently congruent with Huizinga's. 
For example, they seem to concur on the idea of a moment 
of self-loss discussed by Gadamer. Huizinga states, "Any 
game can at any time wholly run away with the players" 
(Huizinga, 1950, p. 8) and writes of play as "absorbing 
the player intensely and utterly" (Huizinga, 1950, p. 
13). For Huizinga, the play activity is central to the 
mode of being human and he relates it to law, philosophy, 
myth, poetry, and the plastic and performative arts 
(although Huizinga's conception of the relation of play 
to the arts is quite different from Gadamer's analysis of 
the arts in relation to the movement of play -- see 
Huizinga, 1950, pp. 165-67 and Gadamer, 1975, pp. 91- 
150). Huizinga emphasizes the sacramental nature of play 
and sees it as inherent in all forms of ritual; Gadamer 
does not include this dimension. 
9. Gadamer differs from Huizinga in this emphasis on the 
element of movement as central to play. Huizinga includes 
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the aspect of movement but it is not the primary component 
of his definition of play (see Huizinga, 1950, pp. 28-45). 
10. Linge explains that emphasis on discussion of 
techniques and methods assumes understanding to be "a 
deliberate product of self-conscious reflection" whereas 
Gadamer shows that understanding 
is episodic in the sense that every particular 
"act" of understanding is a moment in the life of 
tradition itself, of which interpreter and text 
are subordinate parts. It is trans-subjective in 
that what takes place in understanding is a 
mediation and transformation of past and present 
that transcends the knower's manipulative control. 
[Linge, in Gadamer, 1976, p. xxviii] 
11. It is interesting to note that since speaking 
belongs in the "sphere of We" and Gadamer writes of 
thinking as a kind of inner speech, Gadamer is using an 
idea equivalent to Plato's concept of the "two-in-one." 
In this concept, the thinking activity divides the person 
who appears as a unity in the world of appearances into a 
kind of duality; in thinking "I am both the one who asks 
and the one who answers" (Arendt, Thinking, 1978, p. 
185). Thinking is dialectical and its criterion is not 
"truth" but agreement, consistency with oneself. There 
is an ethical or moral dimension inherent here. When I 
am out-of-agreement with myself (or, in Jaspers' words, 
when "I am in default of myself" -- quoted in Arendt, 
Thinking, 1978, p. 185), I become my own adversary. This 
is not a position in which any thinking person wants to 
be. If a person wishes to stay in agreement with him or 
herself, s/he must act and speak (appear in the world) in 
such a way that the two-in-one remain in harmony. Arendt 
states that the self's 
criterion for action will not be the usual rules, 
recognized by multitudes and agreed upon by 
society, but whether I shall be able to live with 
myself in peace when the time has come to think 
about my deeds and words. Conscience is the 
anticipation of the fellow who awaits you if and 
when you come home. [Arendt, Thinking, 1978, p. 
191] 
See also Arendt, Thinking in Life of the Mind, 1978, pp. 
167-93; her discussion of hypocrisy and evil in On 
Revolution, 1965, pp. 98-109; and her Postscript to 
Eichmann in Jerusalem, 1964, pp. 280-98 where she 
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discusses thoughtlessness and the banality of evil. 
12. This is congruent with Husserl's contention that only 
when a person experiences doubt about the correctness of 
his or her opinion or perception does the person 
acknowledge the otherness of the object and differentiate 
his or her image of the object from the object itself 
(see Gadamer, 1976, pp. 131-32). Palmer explains that 
Gadamer is influenced here by Hegel's conception of 
experience, a product of the encounter of consciousness 
with an object," that has as its basis a relation to 
negativity: "experience is first of all experience of 
not-ness -- something is not as we had assumed" (Palmer, 
1969, p. 195). In experiencing the object differently 
the person is changed. 
13. Indeed, Palmer sees this as a major dimension of 
Gadamer's work: 
The direction of thought on the hermeneutical 
problem is to a great extent implicit in 
Heidegger. What is new is the speculative and 
dialectical -- one might say the Hegelian -- 
emphasis and the fully developed exposition of 
Heideggerian ontology for aesthetics and text 
interpretation (Palmer, 1969, p. 166). 
14. Understanding can, perhaps, be described as 
epigenetic (although not with the implication of a 
linearly progressive accumulation of total or ideal 
meaning). From each hermeneutical fusion of horizons 
some new meaning emerges that becomes part of the 
tradition in which it and each following interpretation 
stand. This conception is expressed in Gadamer's 
statements that every dialogue brings something new into 
being (Gadamer, 1976, p. 58) and: 
[T]o understand a text always means to apply it 
to ourselves and to know that, even if it must 
always be understood in different ways, it is 
always the same text presenting itself to us in 
these different ways. That the claim to truth of 
every interpretation is not in the least 
relativised is seen from the fact that all 
interpretation is essentially linguistic. 
[Gadamer, 1975, p. 359] 
CHAPTER III 
DIALOGUE IN THE WORK OF BUBER, GADAMER AND JASPERS 
Characteristics of the Dialogical "I-Thou" Relationship 
For Jaspers and Buber, dialogical communication in 
the "I-Thou" relationship is "the existential and 
ontological reality in which the self comes into being 
and through which it fulfills and authenticates itself" 
(Friedman, in Buber, 1965, p. xvii). In dialogue, a 
particular kind of relationship is required between the 
"I" and the "Thou." Jaspers writes of the "Thou" as a 
"communicating fellow man who, like myself, is to me not 
an object but a free being" (Jaspers, 1970, p. 11). The 
"Thou" is an other to be engaged with in a relationship 
of respect, acceptance and love. In Jaspers terms, the 
other is an historic self and an Existenz, a being 
choosing and becoming a person through communication. 
The other is unique and significant as is the "I and is 
to be approached in his/her authenticity as another 
Existenz. 
Buber also emphasizes the particular relation of 
the "I" and "Thou" in dialogical communication. Each 
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partner relates with his or her entire self-being to the 
other as a unique singularity. However, Buber does not 
restrict the dialogical relationship to human participants 
but, rather, extends dialogue to include all entities in 
the world as possible dialogical partners. He defines 
three "spheres" in which the "I-Thou" relationship 
arises: life with nature, life with men, and life with 
spiritual beings (Buber, 1970, pp. 56-57). Additionally, 
he includes the possibility of relating dialogically with 
objects of civilization and culture, works of art (includ¬ 
ing music, drama, literature, and poetry) (Cohen, 1983, 
pp. 203-228). This is possible because of Buber's belief 
in a personal, immanent deity, an eternal "Thou," such 
that all aspects of creation, in their reflection of the 
deity, can address each other: 
In every sphere, through everything that 
becomes present to us, we gaze toward the train 
(7) of the eternal You; in each we perceive a 
breath of it;(®) in every You we address the 
eternal You, in every sphere according to its 
manner. [Buber, 1970, p. 57] 
"T- Saum means hem or edge, but this is surely an allusion 
to Isaiah 6:1. 
8 Wehen: literally, blowing (of a breeze or wind), 
wafting. 
In another context, he writes: 
No kind of appearance or event is fundamentally 
excluded from the series of the things through 
which from time to time something is said to me. 
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Nothing can refuse to be the vessel for the Word 
The limits of the possibility of dialogue are the 
limits of awareness. [Buber, 1965, p. 10] 
Jaspers, while he does not deny an immanent deity, 
denies direct communication with a deity: "If I consort 
with God directly, how can another individual be of 
absolute import to me? God as a 'Thou' I consort with is 
a means of self-seclusion . . . (Ehrlich, 1975, p. 97). 
Buber repudiates Jaspers primarily on the basis that, as 
Ehrlich explains, "The primacy of the dialogical denies 
the other a basis for dialogue if he does not enter it 
with the concession of recognizing God's address in the 
meeting with the fellow creature" (Ehrlich, 1975, p. 
89). [1] 
Gadamer does not limit dialogue and the "I-Thou" 
relationship to human beings. He is careful to indicate 
that his conception of dialogue should be thought of in 
terms of a relation between human beings only as an 
analogy to elucidate the relation of the person 
(interpreter, effective-historical consciousness) to 
tradition and language and, hence, to understanding (see 
Gadamer, 1975, p. 321; Palmer, 1969, p. 197; Hoy, 1978, 
pp. 61-64). Gadamer writes: 
Understanding is not to be thought of so much as 
an action of one's subjectivity, but as the 
placing of oneself within a process of tradition, 
in which past and present are constantly fused. 
[Gadamer, 1975, p. 258] 
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In much of his writing, the members participating in the 
dialogical relation are the interpreter and what is said 
by that which is to be interpreted. It is tradition and 
language that "speak" like a "Thou": "tradition is the 
genuine partner in communication, with whom we have a 
fellowship as does the 'I ' with the 'Thou'" (Gadamer, 
1975, p. 321) . Gadamer does not use the categorical 
spheres that Buber does; if his conception were categoriz¬ 
ed, it might be called "life with works through which 
tradition speaks" or "life with tradition as manifested 
in cultural artifacts." 
If Gadamer is more like Buber than Jaspers in 
extending the concept of dialogue to include non-human 
participants, he is unlike Buber in not relying on a 
conception of an immanent, personal deity as the grounding 
for dialogue. For Gadamer, the possibility of dialogue 
is grounded in tradition and language. It is really 
tradition, in a particular manifestation in what a text 
says to a specific interpreter that is the "Thou." The 
"fusion of horizons" that is understanding can occur only 
because the interpreter and the text are in tradition and 
in language; understanding is a language event and the 
form of the language event is dialogue. 
Buber might repudiate Gadamer on the same grounds as 
he does Jaspers unless Gadamer's conception of tradition 
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could be construed as a manifestation of deity. There is 
little in Gadamer's work to support such an interpreta¬ 
tion. Only in Gadamer's conception of Bildung (see 
Gadamer, 1975, pp. 10-19) might some possibilities in 
this direction be found. "Bildung" is distinguished from 
"Kultur"; Gadamer quotes Wilhelm von Humboldt in this 
connection: 
" if in our language we say Bildung, we 
mean something both higher and more inward, 
namely the attitude of mind which, from the 
knowledge and the feeling of the total 
intellectual and moral endeavor, flows harmonious¬ 
ly into sensibility and character". (14) Bildung 
here no longer means "culture", i.e., the develop¬ 
ment of capacities or talents. The rise of the 
word Bildung calls rather on the ancient mystical 
tradition, according to which man carries in his 
soul the image of God after whom he is fashioned 
and must cultivate it in himself. [Gadamer, 
1975, pp. 11-12] 
14 Wilhelm von Humboldt, Gesammelte Schriften, Acadamie- 
ed, vi,1, p. 30 
Gadamer initially uses the Hegelian concept of Bildung 
(see Gadamer, 1975, pp. 13-15; Schacht, 1970, pp. 38-72). 
He writes: 
That is what, following Hegel, we emphasized as 
the general characteristics of Bildung, to keep 
oneself open to what is other, to other, more 
universal points of view. It embraces a general 
sense of proportion and distance in relation to 
itself, and hence is capable of being raised 
above itself to universality. To distance 
oneself from oneself and from one's private 
purposes means to looks at these in the way that 
others see them. This universality is by no 
means a universality of concept or of the 
understanding. [Gadamer, 1975, p. 17] 
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However, when discussing Hegel's conception of Bildunq, 
Gadamer notes: 
But we may recognise that Bildung is an 
element of spirit without being tied to Hegel's 
philosophy of absolute spirit, just as the 
insight into the historicity of consciousness is 
not tied to his philosophy of world history. 
[Gadamer, 1975, p. 15] 
Buber writes of Bildung in the context of adult 
education. Cohen indicates that Bildung embraces two 
meanings: one referring to knowledge, learning and the 
acquisition of information; the other referring to 
"formation" in the sense of "giving shape to" and "endow¬ 
ing with spiritual character" (Cohen, 1983, p. 230). He 
indicates that, for Buber, education requires the 
simultaneous realization of both meanings (Cohen, 1983, 
p. 230). Cohen understands Buber as including in Bildung 
the element of spirit to which Gadamer refers. Yet this 
element of spirit would be preeminent, for Buber, given 
his concept of an immanent deity, while, for Gadamer, 
there inheres no necessary element of absolute spirit, 
mind or deity. 
Gadamer, then, can be seen as like Buber in 
understanding dialogue and the "I-Thou" relationship as 
not restricted to human beings. However, he is like 
Jaspers in not including an immanent deity as fundamental 
to dialogue and the "I-Thou" relationship. In Gadamer, 
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the possibility of the "I-Thou" relationship shifts from 
the immanence of a deity to the ontology of Dasein. 
Buber and Jaspers are in agreement that "I-Thou" 
communication requires total openness and candor, trust, 
and willingness to risk oneself. Jaspers describes 
dialogue as "a struggle in which both combatants dare to 
show themselves without reserve and to allow themselves 
to be thrown into question" (Jaspers, 1970, p. 60). 
Buber writes: "The basic word I-You can only be spoken 
with one's whole being" (Buber, 1970, p. 62). Buber 
distinguishes between the person who lives a life of 
"orientation" and the person who lives a life of 
"realization" (see Cohen, 1983, pp. 203-5): 
The man who leads a life of realization perpetual¬ 
ly risks everything. His truth is not fixed, nor 
does it exist statically, but is emergent. 
Orientating man desires security, needs to know 
his goal; he wants the guidance of general truth 
and requires stable laws that will not betray 
him. Realizing man, on the other hand, lives the 
truth that he creates from the depths of his 
inwardness. [Cohen, 1983, p. 205] 
A person lives the life of realization or "self- 
realization" in living dialogically. 
In Gadamer, elements of similarity are again 
present, primarily in terms of "openness" and "risk." 
Throughout his work, Gadamer characterizes dialogue as 
requiring openness. This is illustrated, for example, in 
usage of Bildung and in his statements that "All that is 
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asked is that we remain open to the meaning of the other 
person or the text" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 238) and "The 
essence of the question is the opening up, and keeping 
open, of possibilities" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 266). For 
Gadamer, too, the interpreter must allow himself or 
herself to be "thrown into question." When writing of 
the preunderstanding in which interpretation begins, 
Gadamer refers to the necessity of constantly revising 
fore-projects and fore-meanings (see Gadamer, 1975, pp. 
236-38; also his discussion of prejudice in Gadamer, 
1975, pp. 241-53; and his discussion of temporal distance 
in Gadamer, 1975, pp. 258-67). In describing the role of 
prejudices, Gadamer writes, "In fact our own prejudice is 
properly brought into play through its being at risk" 
(Gadamer, 1975, p. 266). Gadamer's analogy of the game 
includes the element of danger and risk which are part of 
the inherent freedom of playing: "[T]he game itself is a 
risk for the player . . . The attraction of the game, 
which it exercises on the player, lies in this risk" 
(Gadamer, 1975, p. 95). Elements of bringing the self 
into question are also involved in the concept of "fusion 
of horizons" (see Gadamer, 1975, pp. 269-74; Bernstein, 
1983, pp. 143-44). Gadamer emphasizes being "thrown into 
question" in his espousal of the Socratic dialectic and 
the doctrine of ignorance as they are modelled in the 
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Platonic dialogues (see Gadamer, 1975, pp. 325-33; also 
discussed below). 
There are major differences in Jaspers' and Buber's 
characterizations of the "basic movement" of dialogue. 
Jaspers characterizes existential communication as a 
loving struggle," which suggests an active, wrestling 
kind of movement. Ehrlich describes Jaspers' communica¬ 
tion as "essentially active, searching penetration" 
(Ehrlich, 1975, p. 78). Jaspers speaks of "toughness" 
and "rules for battle" (Jaspers, 1970, p. 60). However, 
Jaspers' "rules" and his exposition of the "loving 
struggle" make it clear that he is not referring to an 
adversarial proceeding. He writes of an "incomparable 
solidarity" that makes the loving struggle a mutual 
venture, "a match in which both jointly win or lose" 
(Jaspers, 1970, p. 60). The "battle" is a "combative 
quest," a mutual battle toward truth. Jaspers emphasizes 
that there must be no "calculating reserve" and no 
attempt to defeat the other. Both combatants must fight 
on a level of complete equality and must address every 
explicit or implicit question raised. No holds are 
barred (except as "transient safeguards"), yet the battle 
"thrives only in total nonviolence, if each will make 
his powers as available to the other as they are to 
himself . . ." (Jaspers, 1970, p. 213). 
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Buber, on the other hand, includes a greater 
dimension of passivity or receptiveness in his 
characterization of dialogue. He writes: 
The basic movement of the life of dialogue is 
the turning towards the other. ... if you look 
at someone and address him You turn to him, of 
course with the body, but also in the requisite 
measure with the soul, in that You direct your 
attention to him. . . . in this way, that out of 
the incomprehensibility of what lies to hand this 
one person steps forth and becomes a presence. 
[Buber, 1965, p. 22] 
Buber s conception of dialogue is both active and passive 
or receptive. The "Thou" reaches out, opens itself and 
comes toward the "I"; the "I" turns toward the "Thou" and 
attends. Buber explains: 
The You encounters me by grace -- it cannot 
be found by seeking. But that I speak the basic 
word to it is a deed of my whole being, is my 
essential deed. . . . 
The You encounters me. But I enter into a 
direct relationship to it. 
Thus the relationship is election and elect¬ 
ing, passive and active at once: An action of the 
whole being must approach passivity, for it does 
away with all partial actions and thus with any 
sense of action, which always depends on limited 
exertions. [Buber, 1970, p. 62] 
In some respects this is suggestive to me of the smooth¬ 
ness, gracefulness and reciprocity of a dance step. 
Buber's "turning toward" and attending seem to reflect 
Kierkegaard's idea that "The eternal . . . aims from 
above at the existing individual, who by existing is in 
process of movement ..." (quoted in Thilly and Wood, 
1975, p. 584). The "Thou," for Buber, also seems to 
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"take aim" at the "I," who, "turning towards" and 
attending, "knows" the "Thou." "For Buber's ontology of 
the God-relatedness of I and Thou, the gift of meeting 
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the particular Thou is a manifestation of the grace of 
the eternal Thou" (Ehrlich, 1975, p. 78). 
The qualitative differences in the images used by 
Buber and Jaspers are dramatic: Jaspers' descriptions 
suggest the physicalness of blood, sweat and tears, while 
Buber's suggest the spiritualness of ethereal mingling, a 
gentle touching of souls. This imagic difference 
clarifies the very real conceptial differences. "Jaspers' 
communication is essentially a struggle for truth in 
time. Buber's dialogue is essentially the recognition of 
God through communion with his creatures" (Ehrlich, 1975, 
p. 78). 
Yet Buber includes an element of struggle and 
activity in his understanding of the life of dialogue. 
Buber's philosophy, like Jaspers', calls on a human being 
"to determine the course of his existence and make his 
choice" but does not tell a person what that course or 
choice should be because these must be defined by the 
person in living (dialogical) relationships (Cohen, 1983, 
p. 156). These dialogical relationships do, for Buber, 
reflect the "I-Thou" relationship with God; however, 
Cohen explains that for Buber: 
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God speaks to man through the available reality 
summoned by Him to appear to man as man makes his 
way in the world; and man, in his turn, answers 
by the actions which he carries out upon this 
available reality. [Cohen, 1983, p. 159] 
Buber is thoroughly existentialist in his belief that 
human beings are free and responsible and must act. It 
is up to them to enact self-realization, realization of 
the "Thou" in dialogue, and realization of the "We" in 
community. Buber is too fully cognizant of the historical 
struggle of the Jewish people to suggest that this task 
is an easy one. So while dialogue qua dialogue may not 
be characterized as a "struggle," as is the case for 
Jaspers, the life of dialogue involves "struggle" for 
authenticity and enactment of a dialogic world. 
Gadamer's conception of dialogue combines both a 
passive or receptive and an active element. This is 
expressed in Lingers comment, "The universal task of 
hermeneutical reflection ... is to hearken to and bring 
into language the possibilities that are suggested but 
remain unspoken in what tradition speaks to us" (Linge, 
in Gadamer, 1976, p. lv). The interpreter both "hearkens" 
and "brings into language," the hearkening being, perhaps, 
the more passive. The receptive element seems to be 
slightly more predominant than the active in Gadamer s 
work. For example, there is his understanding that 
"conducting" a conversation implies being led more than 
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leading so that "falling into conversation" becomes the 
more accurately descriptive idiom (Gadamer, 1975, p. 
345). Gadamer specifically refers to passivity: 
[T]here is in the hermeneutical experience 
something that resembles a dialectic, an activity 
of the thing itself that, unlike the methodology 
of modern science, is a passivity, an understand¬ 
ing, an event. [Gadamer, 1975, p. 422] 
In this respect he is congruent with Buber's description 
of dialogue as an action of the whole being which 
approaches passivity. Also, in his analogy of playing a 
game, Gadamer emphasizes the element of "being played," 
of the players' being dominated by the game which plays 
itself through them (Gadamer, 1975, pp. 91-96; Gadamer, 
1976, pp. 53-55). This conception is derived from the 
primacy of language and understanding and the priority 
of the relation over the relational members (see Gadamer, 
1976, p. 50); it is Being which expresses itself through 
beings as it is language which speaks (itself) through 
the speakers. 
However, the element of activity and, to a lesser 
extent "struggle," can also be found. In the genuine "I- 
Thou" relationship, characterized as "Thou as tradition 
speaking," the "I," in openness, "wills to hear rather 
than to master, is willing to be modified by the other" 
(Palmer, 1969, p. 193); the "I" does will. Gadamer also 
writes that, "We, who are attempting to understand, must 
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ourselves make [the text] speak" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 340). 
The interpreter makes the text speak by asking a question 
and expecting an answer. In Gadamer's description of the 
universality of the hermeneutical problem (Gadamer, 1976, 
p. 17), there is a tone of active reaching out, 
persistence, a wanting to say something to the other, and 
the seeking of words through which to reach the other in 
an increasing "merging" of the "linguistic circles" that 
each is. Herein lies another "dialectical" aspect of 
dialogue: a person is active or expressive in trying to 
communicate with the other, yet also passive or receptive 
in anticipating and waiting to be addressed and in 
listening with his/her whole being to what is presenting 
itself. The analogy of the game offers an insight: 
within the game, in playing (or being played), the player 
brings to bear what skills s/he can; likewise, when the 
person stands in tradition and in dialogue, the person 
must bring to bear what skills s/he has to further, but 
not to dominate or control, the dialogue and the fusion 
of horizons that is understanding. In this respect, 
elements of both Jaspers' "struggle" and Buber's "being 
encountered" are involved. 
The "Locus" of Communication 
The "locus" of dialogical communication is another 
aspect which is portrayed somewhat differently in Buber's, 
Gadamer s and Jaspers' work. Buber locates the dialogue 
in what Friedman calls the "seemingly evanescent sphere 
of the 'between' as ontological reality" (Friedman, in 
Buber, 1965, p. xv). Actual communication happens 
somehow between beings, not entirely in them. Buber 
writes: 
Whoever stands in relation, participates in 
an actuality; that is, in a being that is neither 
merely a part of him nor merely outside him. All 
actuality is an activity in which I participate 
without being able to appropriate it. Where 
there is no participation, there is no actuality. 
• • • 
. . . This is the realm of subjectivity in 
which the I apprehends simultaneously its 
association and its detachment. [Buber, 1970, p. 
113] 
In another place he comments: "We do not find meaning 
lying in things nor do we put it into things, but between 
us and things it can happen" (Buber, 1965, p. 36). In 
discussing Buber's conception of art, for example, Cohen 
states: 
Buber tells us that art is not a subjective 
activity taking place within the soul of its 
maker, but the outcome, rather, of encounter with 
the phenomenon, . . . [A]rt is entirely the 
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relation between the essence of humanity and the 
essence of things, and ... it constitutes that 
very dialogic middle region taking on the guise 
of image. [Cohen, 1983, p. 212] 
Cohen also describes Buber's sphere of the between as: 
Buber s designation for the common ground which is 
shared by two human beings who exist in relation 
with one another, and which extends beyond the 
domains of individuality of each. He regards this 
sphere to be the primary category of human 
reality, even though it can never be made wholly 
manifest and is realized only in varying degrees. 
The mere establishment alone of the concept of 
"intermediacy" will not -- in Buber's view -- gain 
us any advantage unless we also refrain from 
situating the relation of man with man either in 
the soul of man or in the world at large, but 
situate it in fact and actually between them.(9) 
[Cohen, 19 83, p. 8 3] 
9 On this subject, see: Ronald Gregor Smith, "Martin 
Buber's View of the Interhuman," The Jewish Journal of 
Sociology,8 (London: 1966): 64-80. 
Moreover, Buber is consistent in maintaining the separate¬ 
ness that is part of the coming together in the "I-Thou" 
dialogue. The participants experience the other, but do 
not submerge or lose themselves. Friedman elaborates: 
To say that "all real living is meeting" is not 
to say that one leaves one's ground in order to 
meet the other or that one lets oneself get 
swallowed up in the crowd and trades in one's 
individuality for a social role. . . . [T]he 
I-Thou relationship "teaches us to meet others 
and to hold our ground when we meet them." This 
means that experiencing the other side . . . goes 
hand in hand with remaining on one's own side of 
the relationship. [Friedman, in Buber, 1965, pp. 
xv-xvi] 
Perhaps a common ground for Jaspers and Buber in 
124 
terms of the locus of communication can be expressed in 
"touch." Buber uses this word frequently; he suggests 
that the "Thou" reaches out and touches the "I" as the 
deity touches both. The touching is between the "I" and 
the "Thou," at the point where they come together. If 
one imagines two people physically reaching out to touch 
hands and imagines the touching, one can perhaps visualize 
this point of coming into contact of the two while each 
clearly remains a distinct and separate, identifiable 
being. Jaspers uses the image of the link; if one were 
to imagine two people linking arms in order to force 
their way ahead against a hard wind, perhaps one could 
visualize the touching and overlap of two people who 
remain separate, identifiable beings but are linked 
together in a common struggle. The vernacular "in 
touch," as in "Keep in touch" or "I'll be in touch," if 
denuded of its casual connotation, might express the 
locus of communication. 
Jaspers certainly is in agreement with Buber s 
emphasis on the participants in communication remaining 
separate beings (even though he does not emphasize a 
"between"). He writes: "Communication always takes place 
between two people who join but remain two, who come to 
each other out of solitude and yet know solitude only 
because they are communicating" (Jaspers, 1970, p. 56). 
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He also writes: 
When I come to myself there are two things that 
lie in this communication: my being I, and my 
being with another. if i am not independently 
myself as well, standing on my own, I shall be 
completely lost in the other; our communication 
will void me and itself at the same time. 
Conversely, when I begin to isolate myself, I 
impoverish and empty my communication. in the 
extreme case of its absolute rupture I stop being 
myself, having evaporated into point-like 
emptiness. [Jaspers, 1970, p. 56] 
For both Jaspers and Buber, then, the "I" is 
preserved even in unreserved communication. However, 
both also suggest a transcending in communication that 
fleetingly involves a unity at the same time it maintains 
separateness. This can be explained in Buber by the 
presence of God as the eternal "Thou" in the communication 
between the "I" and a particular "Thou." "Dialogue is a 
meeting of man with fellow creature . . . and through 
this meeting a meeting with God, a meeting which is the 
fulfillment of Being in the fleeting of the moment" 
(Ehrlich, 1975, p. 78). Jaspers writes: 
Existenz is realized only in communication, 
and this occurs in situations that change with 
the passage of time. The silent accord, the 
timeless union, the peace of intimate comprehen¬ 
sion between Existenz and Existenz -- these are 
mere vanishing moments of a loving struggle 
caused by the obscurity of current situations. 
[Jaspers, 1970, p. 212] 
For Jaspers, it seems as if Existenz in communication can 
at least briefly achieve unity with another Existenz; 
however, this unity in existence, if occuring at all, is 
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only momentarily found in the solidarity of the struggle 
for self-being. 
I and Thou, divided in existence, are one in 
transcendence. There they neither meet nor miss 
each other; but here they stand in the evolving 
communicative struggle that manifests and confirms 
them . . . [Jaspers, 1970, p. 65] 
"In temporal existence communication is the love-filled 
motion that seems aimed at unity but would have to cease 
in its attainment" (Jaspers, 1970, p. 66). 
Gadamer's conception of the dialogue, like Buber's, 
emphasizes a "between" and is congruent with both Buber's 
and Jaspers' in its emphasis on the preservation of the 
separateness of the partners even in unreserved communica¬ 
tion. The "between" is most evident in Gadamer's under¬ 
standing of temporal distance in terms of the hermeneutic 
circle (see Gadamer, 1975, pp. 258-67). Gadamer describes 
understanding as occuring in a tension between past (the 
horizon in tradition out of which the work to be 
interpreted transmits meaning) and present (the 
interpreter's own historic situation within tradition). 
The "between" is emphasized also in his description of 
the "place" where hermeneutics is based: 
There is a polarity of familiarity and strangeness 
on which hermeneutic work is based . . . Here too 
there is a tension. The place between strangeness 
and familiarity that a transmitted text has for 
us is that intermediate place between being an 
historically intended separate object and being 
part of a tradition. The true home of hermeneu¬ 
tics is in this intermediate area. [Gadamer, 
1975, pp. 262-63] 
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There is an inevitable historical distance between an 
interpreter and an author or work and this temporal 
distance is, for Gadamer, an enabling dimension. He 
states that because of Heidegger^s work: 
Time is no longer primarily a gulf to be 
bridged, because it separates, but it is actually 
the supportive ground of process in which the 
present is rooted. ... in fact the important 
thing is to recognise the distance in time as a 
positive and productive possibility of understand¬ 
ing. [Gadamer, 1975, p. 264] 
Later he adds that temporal distance "lets the true 
meaning of the object emerge fully" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 
265). When speaking of language, Gadamer also uses a 
"between": "Language is the middle ground in which 
understanding and agreement concerning the object takes 
place between two people" (Gadamer, 1975, pp. 345-46). 
Understanding is a language event which occurs between 
two speakers, or an interpreter and text. Gadamer also 
writes : 
what is transmitted emerges newly into existence 
just as it presents itself. It is not being-in- 
itself that is increasingly revealed . . . but, as 
in genuine conversation, something emerges that is 
contained in neither of the partners by himself. 
[Gadamer, 1975, p. 419] 
It is evident that for Gadamer, as well as for 
Jaspers and Buber, the partners in dialogue retain their 
separateness even while they are engaged in dialogue. 
This is most evident in Gadamer's concept of horizons and 
the fusion of horizons. Both the interpreter s own 
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horizon and that of the work to be interpreted are 
preserved, although they are temporarily fused in 
understanding. Linge writes: 
[T]he knower's own present situation is already 
constitutively involved in any process of under¬ 
standing. Thus Gadamer takes the knower's 
boundness to his present horizons and the temporal 
gulf separating him from his object to be the 
productive ground of all understanding. [Linge, 
in Gadamer, 1976, xiv] 
The interpreter does not leave his or her ground or 
"horizon" and enter into that of the other nor does the 
interpreter automatically or uncritically accept the 
"truth" of the other. Rather, the coming together is 
akin to Buber's "I-Thou" encounter of which Cohen writes 
that the dialogue does not require agreement but estab¬ 
lishment of mutuality between the partners in which each 
is then existentially confirmed as a self (Cohen, 1983, 
p. 86 ) . 
For Gadamer, in the dialogical hermeneutic encounter 
between text and interpreter, the interpreter "risks" his 
or her prejudices and fore-meanings. The risk occurs not 
in "giving in" to the other, but in an attempt to find a 
truth, to allow meaning to express itself. The text is 
also "at risk" in the sense that its meaning or truth 
will be reinterpreted in every time; again, however, this 
is not to destroy the text but to allow new meaning to 
emerge (which is already potentially intended by the text 
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in its excess of meaning). The encounter is between 
interpreter and text with the objective of bringing new 
meaning into being; this is analogous to the way new 
understanding is brought into being in a dialogue as the 
partners attempt to reach agreement about a topic. In 
this sense, Gadamer's conception is akin to Jaspers' 
"struggle for truth in time" and Buber's "life of realiza¬ 
tion." Gadamer's discussions of authority also make 
clear his emphasis on a person's relying on reason, not 
simply submitting to what the other says (Gadamer, 1976, 
pp. 26-43; Gadamer, 1975, pp. 240-58). 
Exclusivity 
From the difference in Buber's and Jaspers' under¬ 
standing of the "Thou" and from their different 
characterizations of the communicative or dialogical 
relationship, stems another diference. While they are in 
apparent agreement about the exclusiveness of an "I-Thou" 
relationship at any given moment, Jaspers is necessarily 
less inclusive than Buber. He writes: 
It may seem as though everyone could claim to 
communicate with everyone else. But just as it 
is my fault if I deny myself to another's will to 
communicate, my entrance into real communication 
results in the exclusion of other possibilities. 
I cannot reach all men. 
Moreover, I destroy communication by my very 
pursuit of it with the largest possible number. 
[Jaspers, 1970, p. 55] 
Ehrlich reminds, "Man realizes truth, and thereby himself, 
under the conditions of his temporality and his temporal 
limitation" (Ehrlich, 1975, p. 81). The dialogical 
relationship, for Jaspers, involves an intense struggle 
and the finite human being cannot endure this intense 
involvement with many people. The number of I Thou 
relationships must be limited also because, while varying 
in intensity from moment to moment, this relationship is 
often of long duration. Historical limitations are 
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involved in both the dimensions of intensity and duration, 
and this is one of the aspects of what Jaspers defines as 
the boundary situation of the historicity of all existence 
(Jaspers, 1970, pp. 218-22). The finiteness that neces¬ 
sitates selectivity makes guilt a boundary situation as 
well; guilt is unavoidable since it attaches to sins of 
omission as well as to sins of commission. The agony of 
this limitation is apparent in Jaspers' words: 
If I exist as possible Existenz, what makes a 
real Existenz of me is the One. To seize the One 
means to spurn other possibilities, even though 
tacitly and, in the sense of rational morality, 
guiltlessly. But the other possibilities are 
human; their Existenz is as possible as mine. 
. . . I have to choose between diversity and 
interchangeability on the one hand, and the One 
on the other. The consequence of choosing plenty 
is that everything is nothing, and the consequence 
of choosing the One is a betrayal of something 
else, . . . [Jaspers, 1970, p. 216] 
There can be no resolution for Jaspers. All a person can 
do is to accept responsibility, take on unavoidable 
guilt, and try to avoid what guilt one can. 
Buber is not confronted with a necessity for 
exclusiveness because of his different conception of the 
dialogical relationship. It may be a one-to-one encount¬ 
er and must be entered into with one s whole being; 
however, it is not necessarily of long duration and it is 
not of the degree of intensity involved in Jaspers 
"struggle." Buber refers to this issue in a paradox: He 
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who can be unreserved with each passer-by has no substance 
to lose; but he who cannot stand in direct relation to 
each one who meets him has a fulness [sic] which is 
futile" (Buber, 1965, p. 21). He also states that 
exclusiveness repeatedly comes into being (Buber, 1970, p. 
66). This lack of need for exclusiveness is partly 
because Buber's dialogue "consists in fervid harkening, in 
prayerful response, and in loving responsibility for those 
who cannot hear" (Ehrlich, 1975, p. 78). This "fervid 
harkening and responsiveness can occur many times with 
the same "Thou" as well as a limited number of times with 
many others. For Buber, then, the person need not eschew 
multiple dialogical encounters. 
Buber, in fact, consistently emphasizes inclusive¬ 
ness. He stresses that inclusiveness is not empathy: 
Empathy -- Buber tells us -- means a man's 
getting out of his own skin, so to speak, and 
entering by means of his feelings into the 
dynamic structure and essence of an object; in 
the process he comes to understand the object's 
form by the perception he has of his own muscular 
structure. Empathy is therefore an act of self- 
annulment and self-omission. Inclusiveness, by 
contrast, is an extension of the self: it is the 
fulfillment of the situation in which we partake; 
the simultaneous perception of the two poles of 
the experience; the complete presence in a shared 
reality. [Cohen, 1983, p. 39] 
This distinction between inclusiveness and empathy also 
suggests that Buber's understanding of the dialogical 
relationship between the present generation and (objects 
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of) the tradition of which they are a part would be 
similar to Gadamer s (as opposed to those of Dilthey and 
Schleiermacher). Evidence of both this similarity and of 
Buber s concern with inclusiveness lies in his conception 
of the Jewish people as. a "community of memory" (Cohen, 
1983, p. 135). Buber's "memory" is essentially equivalent 
to Gadamer s "language community" or "tradition." it is 
not "empathy" but shared participation that constitutes 
an ontological relation (see Cohen, 1983, p. 135). Here 
there is a relational emphasis; the present generation 
stands in relation to the past, in the "stream" of 
tradition, as part of a tradition which is both existent 
and emergent and which includes all its members. 
The issue of exclusivity is not an issue for 
Gadamer. An inclusion relationship is evident in his 
understanding of the hermeneutic parts-whole relation, of 
tradition, and of his concern with the "I-Thou" relation¬ 
ship as it relates to tradition. The guilt that, for 
Jaspers, is inherent in the necessity for exclusion 
of many possibilities for dialogue is not a problem for 
Gadamer. If Gadamer's conception of dialogue relates to 
exclusivity in any important way, it would be more 
congruous with Buber's stance. A person can respond 
wholly to what is said by a work repeatedly, just as a 
person can so relate at different times to different 
works . 
Duration 
The question of duration actually involves two 
dimensions: the duration of the "I-Thou" relationship and 
the duration of existential dialogical communication. 
Underlying both is the conception of time held by Buber, 
Gadamer and Jaspers. 
Jaspers and Buber agree that the "I-Thou" relation¬ 
ship may be of long duration. They also agree that 
existential communication, transcending dialogical 
closeness, cannot be sustained for long periods and is 
analogous to a momentary movement which achieves 
continuity as part of the enduring relational process. 
This might be illustrated metaphorically in terms of 
waves in the ocean: part of the ocean water, they rise to 
a peak; then the swell recedes; a trough appears; then a 
new wave begins to rise. The ocean and the flowing are 
unceasing; but the wave rises, then recedes, to be 
followed by a new wave constituted out of the same 
substantive whole. This can be considered at three 
levels. First, it can be seen in the individual's 
experience of dialogical closeness with one "Thou in the 
course of an enduring "I-Thou" relationship and, for 
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Buber, in the individual's relationship with God. 
Second, it is seen in the individual's experience of 
dialogical closeness with more than one "Thou" during the 
course of a life lived dialogically. Third, it can be 
seen in terms of a dialogical world or "hermeneutic 
universe" in which temporality and timelessness are 
united. 
When Buber writes of the twofold attitude of the 
human being (perceiving and encountering), he offers some 
clues about the transiency of communication. A person 
perceives an ordered, objective world, which is somewhat 
reliable and about which it is possible to understand. 
The person also perceives signs of a world order, a world 
that appears unreliable, which is the present and with 
which the person stands in reciprocal relation. Buber 
states that the person cannot live in pure present; life 
must be arranged in the past, in the world of "It." 
However, he warns "whoever lives only with that is not 
human" (Buber, 1970, p. 85). He expresses the transiency 
of the dialogical encounter which always becomes "subdued" 
into the past: 
This ... is the sublime melancholy of our 
lot that every You must become an It in our 
world. However exclusively present it may have 
been in the direct relationship . . . the You 
becomes an object . . . Genuine contemplation, 
never lasts long; . . . even love cannot persist 
in direct relation; it endures, but only the 
alternation of actuality and latency. [Buber, 
1970, pp. 68-69] 
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However, there is a consistency or continuity of 
existential moments in a life of dialogue: 
[A] situation of which we have become aware is 
never finished with, but we subdue it into the 
substance of a lived life. Only then, true to 
the moment, do we experience a life that is 
something other than a sum of moments. [Buber, 
1965, p. 17] 
Although Buber describes the transiency of 
dialogical encounters as the "sublime melancholy," it may 
also be understood in a positive way. First, the termina¬ 
tion of one encounter opens space for another. Second, 
the "termination" is not final; that which has been a 
"Thou" can re-emerge as such since, for Buber, "a 
situation of which we have become aware is never finish¬ 
ed." Third, when a "Thou" or "situation" has been 
"subdued" into the past, it becomes part of a continuity, 
a "life that is something other than a sum of moments." 
Jaspers' expression of the dialogical moment within 
the enduring "I-Thou" relationship is similar to Buber's 
understanding. In writing of the limited duration of 
moments of existential closeness, Jaspers cautions that 
any attempt to hold onto them destroys their truth: 
[I]n time there is absolute communication only as 
a moment's certainty. It becomes untrue as an 
objective result that is held fast, and it 
remains true as fidelity arising from the moment. 
What will be essential and true of it is that 
which is the least stable, with no other phenomen- 
ality than of becoming and of disappearance. 
[Jaspers, 1970, p. 63] 
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For Jaspers, there is a necessity, which is related to 
his understanding of the processual becoming of possible 
Existenz, for the transiency of moments existing within 
an "I-Thou" relationship: 
Between men it is precisely in essentials 
that truth cannot be hit upon at one stroke, 
. . . Man and his world do not mature instanta¬ 
neously but acquire themselves through a sequence 
of situations. [Jaspers, 1970, p. 63] 
For Jaspers, communication is historic; it occurs 
in situations and responds to particulars. It is, 
therefore, definitionally temporally restricted and 
cannot be continuous in existence as may be the "I-Thou" 
relationship within which it occurs. However, the very 
historicity of dialogical communication provides duration 
and continuity because, for Jaspers, historicity is a 
unity of time and eternity. 
The moment as the identity of temporality and 
timelessness is the factual moment deepened to 
present eternity. . . . 
. . . What counts, ... is that the moment 
prove itself as the historic phenomenon of 
Existenz, by belonging to a phenomenal continuity. 
The moment proper, ... is both culmination and 
articulation of the existential process. . . . 
This is where the historicity of phenomenal 
Existenz becomes clear: . . . Its phenomenon is 
not the single moment but the historic succession 
of interrelated moments. In each of those the 
interrelation is felt: . . . [Jaspers, 1970, p. 
Ill] 
Gadamer's work is again congruent with Buber s and 
Jaspers'. He agrees that dialogical encounters are of 
limited duration and that what is true remains true as the 
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fidelity arising from the moment. This is evident, for 
example, in Gadamer's beliefs that: tradition is a 
language that expresses itself like a "Thou" in a 
relationship between dialogical partners; language 
belongs to the situation; and each time must interpret 
works in terms of its present (see Gadamer, 1975, pp. 
232, 321, 337, 359, 429; Linge, in Gadamer, 1976, pp. 
xlvii, xix): 
Every age has to understand a transmitted text in 
its own way, for the text is part of the whole of 
the tradition in which the age takes an objective 
interest and in which it seeks to understand 
itself. The real meaning of a text, as it speaks 
to the interpreter, does not depend on the 
contingencies of the author and whom he originally 
wrote for. It is certainly not identical with 
them, for it is always partly determined also by 
the historical situation of the interpreter and 
hence by the totality of the objective course of 
history, [Gadamer, 1975, p. 263] 
Thus Gadamer states, "It is enough to say that we under¬ 
stand in a different way, if we understand at all" 
(Gadamer, 1975, p. 264). This process does not relativize 
the meaning of a work, for Gadamer; rather, it relates to 
the essential historicality, speculativity and linguistic- 
ality of language and understanding. 
Gadamer is also congruent in finding continuity as 
well as transiency of dialogical moments. Past, present 
and future are perceived as interrelated or united in the 
Being of beings. This is the foundation of Gadamer's 
of effective-historical consciousness, of "living 
concept 
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tradition, and of the possibility of a fusion of horizons. 
Gadamer s idea of tradition and of the human being 
standing in tradition is congruent with Jaspers' 
conception of historicity as a unity of time and timeless¬ 
ness . 
Gadamer s references to Jaspers' conception of 
boundary situations relate to this point. When Gadamer 
explicates effective-historical consciousness as "primari¬ 
ly consciousness of the hermeneutical situation" (Gadamer, 
1975, p. 268), he explains in words that are congruent 
with Jaspers' thought on the boundary situations of 
historicity and on the perspectival nature of knowledge: 
The very idea of a situation means that we are 
not standing outside it and hence are unable to 
have any objective knowledge of it. (200) We are 
always within the situation, and to throw light 
on it is a task that is never entirely completed. 
This is true also of the hermeneutic situation, 
i.e., the situation in which we find ourselves 
with regard to the tradition that we are trying 
to understand. The illumination of this situation 
-- effective-historical reflection -- can never 
be completely achieved, but this is not due to a 
lack in the reflection, but lies in the essence 
of the historical being which is ours. To exist 
historically means that knowledge of oneself can 
never be complete. [Gadamer, 1975, p. 269] 
200 The structure of the concept of situation has been 
illuminated by K. Jaspers (Die geistige Situation der 
Zeit) and Erich Rothacker 
l. e • f 
For Gadamer, as for Buber, the specific "Thou 
the particular mainfestation of tradition speaking 
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through the meaning arising in a particular hermeneutic 
encounter — becomes an "it." However, tradition remains 
a "Thou" to effective-historical consciousness in an 
enduring "I-Thou" relationship. It is a consistency and 
continuity of existential moments within tradition that, 
for Gadamer, constitutes the horizon of a work and of an 
interpreter and makes possible the fusion of horizons. In 
the mutability of horizons inheres the possibility for 
many encounters with a particular work during which new 
meanings can emerge — between the same interpreter and 
work as well as between a diversity of interpreters and 
the same or a different work. Thus, the "excess of 
meaning" of works exists without lessening and the 
potential for further emergence of meaning is retained. 
A kind of processual emphasis is inherent here that is 
congruous with both Jaspers and Buber. Gadamer states 
that "Through every dialogue something different comes to 
be" (Gadamer, 1976, p. 58). From each hermeneutical 
fusion of horizons new meaning emerges that becomes a 
part of the (emergent) tradition in which it and later 
interpretations stand. However, this maintaining of the 
openness of possible meaning is not to be understood as a 
linear accumulation or a progressive approximation of a 
"total" meaning (Gadamer, 1976, pp. 80-81). 
There is an interesting affinity, in terms of the 
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issue of accumulation and non-accumulation, between 
Gadamer 's conceptions of horizons and the merging of 
horizons and Buber's differentiation and definition of 
civilization and culture (see Cohen, 1983, pp. 217-19). 
For Buber, civilization is collective and cumulative 
while culture is a creative, one-time, non-cumulative 
occurrence. In dialogically relating with objects of the 
past, the human being creates culture, according to 
Buber. Equivalently, for Gadamer, in dialogically 
relating to works of the past by merging his or her 
horizon with that of the work, the human being allows 
tradition to speak and, in so doing, enriches, expands 
and enacts a personal horizon and the horizon of the 
present age. 
There is also similarity between Buber's and 
Gadamer's thought in terms of dialogical relationship 
between a person and a work of the past and in terms of 
their understanding of aesthetics. Cohen s explanation 
of Buber's thought here could also have been written of 
Gadamer's thought: 
Buber believes that cognition of a work of art is 
nothinq other than the encounter between the 
viewer, hearer, or reader with the art object. 
The work of art, Buber asserts, longs to be 
completed in the spectator's soul. The encounter 
with art is not one in which the work of art 
offers itself whole for passive reception but is 
an active encounter in which the spectator or 
auditor commits himself to finish what is left 
unsaid by the work of art, to reply to the 
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questions posed by it, to enact a relationship 
with it -- in brief, to engage in dialogue. 
[Cohen, 1983, p. 221] 
Although Cohen s discussion does not specifically include 
the spectator s or auditor's asking questions of the 
work, this inheres in Buber's conception of dialogue as 
reciprocal relation, as involving mutuality, and as an 
event between the "I" and the "Thou." Buber specifically 
states, for example, that each period in history has had 
to come to terms with the Bible (Cohen, 1983, p. 146). 
Nor should use of the word "finish" suggest a terminal, 
correct understanding or interpretation because, for 
Buber as for Gadamer, dialogue is on-going and involves a 
relation between unique partners in their singularity. 
Cohen points out that Buber expresses "deep anxiety" 
about formalism in which art is made into an exclusive 
property of a particular partisan group and also states 
that Buber, therefore, rejects analytic criticism of 
works of art (Cohen, 1983, p. 221). Buber prefers 
syntheticism, which integrates the encounter of a 
work of art with the whole complex of universal 
human experience, binds the person experiencing a 
work of art with the ages, opens him to the 
active perception of art, and binds the moment of 
his experience and enjoyment of art to history. 
[Cohen, 1983, p. 222] 
Like Gadamer, Buber rejects attempts to separate form 
from content and from "consummating consciousness" 
(Cohen, 1983, pp. 219-23) in the synthetic encounter 
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by which the scope of significant relations continuously 
expands and whose core of the union of form and consummat¬ 
ing intelligence is increasingly enlarged" (Cohen, 1983, 
p. 220). 
To summarize, while there are differences in 
specifics, there is similarity among Jaspers, Buber and 
Gadamer on the issues of duration of the "I-Thou" 
relationship and of existential dialogical communication. 
The "I-Thou" relationship may be of long duration; 
however, existential dialogical communication exists as 
fleeting moments. For all three, however, there is 
consistency and continuity of these moments which lies in 
their understanding of timelessness -- of integration of 
past, present and future -- in any particular moment and 
of the historicity of existence. This is particularly 
illustrated in Buber's and Gadamer's work on the possibi¬ 
lity of dialogical relationship with works of the past. 
Content 
The historicity of communication is, for Jaspers, 
also reflected in its content. He is very specific on 
this point: 
In the world . . . Existenz cannot directly 
meet another Existenz. They meet only in 
substantial media. To beat as one, two hearts 
need the realities of action and expression, for 
real communication is not a lucid, unresisting 
bliss without space or time; it is the movement 
of self-being in the substance of reality. . . . 
It is by sharing in mundane ideas, in tasks and 
purposes, that communication soars. [Jaspers, 
1970, pp. 61-62] 
Jaspers is clearly in disagreement with Buber on this 
point. Jaspers warns against taking direct contact for 
genuine communication if the contact is lacking in 
mundane content. Existential communication must have 
mundane contents and these contents must be taken serious¬ 
ly because without them there could be no real communica¬ 
tion and thus no existential self-becoming. 
Buber takes another view entirely. For him, 
dialogue is something distinct from its contents, a view 
that Jaspers disapprovingly refers to as "lucid, unresist¬ 
ing bliss without space or time." In speaking of the 
highest moments of dialogue, Buber says, "It is completed 
outside contents, even the most personal, which are or can 
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be communicated" (Buber, 1965, p. 4). Buber refers to 
three kinds of dialogue, only one of which is "genuine." 
First, there is genuine dialogue "where each of the 
participants really has in mind the other or others in 
their present and particular being and turns to them 
with the intention of establishing a living mutual 
relation . . ." (Buber, 1965, p. 19). Second, there is 
technical dialogue that is concerned only with objective 
understanding. Third, there is monologue that is 
"disguised" as dialogue (Buber, 1965, p. 19). Dialogue 
is also referred to as a kind of living: "He who is 
living the life of dialogue receives in the ordinary 
course of the hours something that is said and feels 
himself approached for an answer" (Buber, 1965, p. 20). 
Buber's dialogue is in some respects broader than Jaspers 
communication; it can occur among more than two 
participants and its contents can be spiritual or mundane 
The emphasis for Buber is on the act of relating, 
not the contents of the act. This is because, I think, 
of the immanence of a personal God in Buber's dialogical 
relationship. It is the relating, not the contents, that 
is "holy." It is in this respect that Buber repudiated 
Jaspers. Ehrlich explains, "[F]or Buber philosophy which 
is not beholden to a religious actuality, to 'an 
experience of faith', is an absurdity and leads a bastard 
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existence" (Ehrlich, 1975, p. 86). Because Jaspers' 
philosophy and communication do not involve a personal, 
immanent God, Buber rejects them. Jaspers' conception of 
communication as occuring between two human beings about 
mundane contents does not necessarily constitute genuine 
dialogue for Buber. 
Jaspers, in turn, rejects Buber: "Buber appeared to 
Jaspers to bear himself like a prophet" (Ehrlich, 1975, 
p. 95). Jaspers perceives Buber's dialogue as character¬ 
ized by the "tender mood of a universal bonding" that is 
not his notion of communicative association (see Jaspers, 
Ehrlich manuscript, pp. 84-85). He also sees Buber's 
work as based on "original certitude." [2] 
In defense of Buber, it is true that Buber, too, 
repudiates some forms of certitude. Cohen states that, 
"He repudiates all certitude that does not derive from 
the sincerity of personal consciousness" (Cohen, 1983, p. 
58). Buber contends that a person cannot rely on himself 
alone nor on established value systems, including tradi¬ 
tional religions, to provide means of making choices. 
Thus he argues against traditional practices of religious 
education, according to Cohen, as "an imposition of the 
yoke of dogma" (Cohen, 1983, p. 128). The values on the 
basis of which a person chooses must, for Buber, derive 
from the person's relationship to the "Absolute Thou": 
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Even when the individual has acquired a criterion 
derived from religious tradition, such a criterion 
must return to the hearth of the essential truth 
of his personal relationship to the absolute, 
there to be reforged in order to achieve authentic 
validity. (9) [Buber, quoted in Cohen, 1983, p. 
58 ] 
9 Buber, "Likui ha-or ha-elohi," p. 299 
Choice depends on authentic being and, for Buber, this 
inheres in both the person's dialogical relationship to 
God and to other human beings, which is also a meeting 
with God since every "I-Thou" encounter reflects the 
eternal "I-Thou" relationship. Buber's existentialism is 
evident; the person must choose in every situation. 
While the person chooses autonomously, if the person is 
living dialogically, the person must choose dialogically, 
i.e., in such a way that the choice confirms the authentic 
existence of fellow human beings as "Thou." The person 
is fully responsible for trying to grasp the truth of the 
situation and to choose and act in accordance with the 
responsiveness which is part of dialogical relationship. 
It is important, too, that Buber was critical of 
mysticism and rejected it as well as philosophy that 
disregards the existential situation. For Buber, the 
religious encounter with God is not isolated from life 
among human beings but takes place by way of life: 
The world is no illusion from which a man must 
turn away in order to attain true reality, but is 
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tangible reality between God and man by which 
mutuality is proclaimed. . . . The world is God's 
creating Word to man, and man responds to the 
Word by his works. it is destined to be redeemed 
by the meeting of the deed of God and the deed of 
man. (2) [Buber, qouted in Cohen, 1983, p. 114] 
2 Martin Buber, Des Baal-Schem-Tow Unterweisung im 
Umgang mit Gott [The Baal-Shem-Tov's Teachings about God] 
(Hellerau: Jakob Hegner, 1927), p. 127 
Cohen states, "Buber maintained that life becomes real in 
the degree that men meet in dialogical I-Thou encounter 
and engage in discourse with the world, and that it is 
this relation which opens man's path to God" (Cohen, 
1983, p. 114). In fact, it is Buber's understanding of 
the importance of the dialogical existence that is 
reflected in his emphasis that a religious person's 
involvement with God does not exempt the person from 
involvement in existence but, rather, must be actualized 
in the world (see Cohen, 1983, pp. 113-32): "Buber 
emphasized repeatedly that whoever speaks to God without 
speaking to man misdirects his words" (Cohen, 1983, p. 
118). Herein lies a rationale for Buber's espousal of 
Hasidic doctrine which he perceives as seeking to 
eradicate distinctions between the sacred and the profane 
in the doctrine of the redemption of divine "sparks" and 
the "hallowing" of secular actions (see Cohen, 1983, pp. 
153-76). 
It is probably fair to say, then, that in terms of 
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its practical manifestations in a person's existence, 
Buber s philosophy would produce a kind of living that is 
congruent with Jaspers' conception of authentic self- 
actualizing. Both emphasize the need for responsiveness 
to the existential situation, responsibility for actions 
chosen, and awareness of others as "Thou." The difference 
lies primarily in whether personal authenticity is based 
on faith in relationship with God and the reflecting of 
that relationship among human beings (Buber) or faith in 
the possibility of "truth in its oneness" in the 
multiplicity of existence (Jaspers). 
Gadamer's work has congruences with both Buber's 
and Jaspers' with respect to content, definition of 
dialogue and the respective roles of reason and faith. 
This is surprising in light of the vehement disagreement 
between Jaspers and Buber on these issues. At first 
glance, Gadamer seems highly similar to Jaspers, particu¬ 
larly in their emphasis on "mundane contents" of 
dialogical communication. 
Gadamer is consistently clear that dialogue, 
agreement and understanding are about some topic; it is 
finding the meaning or truth of a subject matter that is 
the concern in dialogue (see, for exmple, Gadamer, 1975, 
pp. 158, 347; Gadamer, 1976, p. 66). When writing of the 
dialectical question-answer movement, he emphasizes being 
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conducted by the object to which the partners in conver¬ 
sation are directed" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 330). He also 
emphasizes the importance of thinking that constantly 
refers to the object of conversation (Gadamer, 1975, p. 
331). The "object" by and to which the hermeneutical 
dialogue is directed is heritage or tradition (see 
Palmer, 1969, p. 197). Gadamer even understands words as 
belonging to the situation, to the subject matter that is 
being discussed and disclosed through their use, rather 
than to the speakers (Palmer, 1969, p. 203). Gadamer 
uses language that is reminiscent of Jaspers when, 
arguing against Schleiermacher's conception of understand¬ 
ing the author of a text, he writes: 
[W]e are moving in a dimension of meaning that is 
intelligible in itself and as such offers no 
reason for going back to the subjectivity of the 
author. It is the task of hermeneutics to 
clarify this miracle of understanding, which is 
not a mysterious communion of souls, but a 
sharing of a common meaning. . . . 
. . . [T]he goal of all communication and 
understanding is agreement concerning the object. 
Hence the task of hermeneutics has always been to 
establish agreement where it had failed to come 
about or been disturbed in some way. [emphasis 
added; Gadamer, 1975, p. 260] 
Gadamer, like Jaspers, definitely does not see the 
communicative association as the "tender mood of a 
universal bonding." 
Yet, for all Gadamer agrees with Jaspers in reject¬ 
ing Buber's conception of dialogue as "completed outside 
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contents" (Buber, 1965, p. 4), Gadamer, like Buber, 
emphasizes the act of relating. Following Heidegger, 
Gadamer gives the relation priority over the relational 
members. Hoy points out: 
. . . Gadamer's theory presupposes Heidegger's 
analysis of Dasein as being-already-in-the-world. 
In hermeneutic experience what is being analyzed 
is the act of communication, and the participants 
exist in a world of previously shared meanings; 
that is to say, they share a language. [Hoy, 
1978, p. 62] 
Through this shared language (tradition), meaning or 
truth of a subject matter can emerge between the 
interpreter and the text. It is because of the priority 
of the act of relating that Buber deemphasizes the 
contents of dialogue. For Buber, the "grounding" of 
dialogue is the deity and the dialogical communion, not 
the contents of communication, is akin to a religious 
experience. There is in Gadamer a similar element 
although he never relates dialogical communication to a 
religious conception of a deity. This element in Gadamer 
seems to be part of his heritage from both Heidegger and 
Hegel. [While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation 
to attempt a theological analysis, it seems apparent that 
in Dasein and Bildung religious elements can be inferred.] 
Gadamer's reliance on Heidegger's ontology of Dasein 
necessarily includes the concept of World or Being which, 
for Heidegger, while not directly related to a deity, 
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seems to "function" similarly to a deity. "Being" is 
manifest in beings and beings have their existence in 
Being as, for religious persons, God is manifest in 
creation (including human beings) and human beings have 
their existence in God. In von Humboldt's definition of 
Bildunq (Gadamer, 1975, pp. 11-12), reference is made to 
the ancient tradition of man as carrying in his soul the 
image of God that is to be cultivated in the self. 
Gadamer admittedly follows Hegel's explication of Bildunq 
although he qualifies his appropriation of this concept 
by noting that Hegel's "absolute spirit" need not be 
included (he does not definitely exclude it). Gadamer 
seems to skirt the religious issue, perhaps because, as 
he thought true of Jaspers, he wants to avoid the 
"irrational" or "non-rational." Gadamer thus emphasizes 
tradition, language, history, and effective-historical 
consciousness. By religious persons, however, these 
(perhaps suprarational conceptions) could be interpreted 
as having a religious dimension as manifestations of a 
deity (as in Buber's Hasidism), although Gadamer does not 
so interpret them. 
This is not to suggest that relation is unimportant 
for Jaspers; however, it does not have priority over its 
members as is the case for Buber and Gadamer. For 
Jaspers, rather, each partner in dialogue is of absolute 
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importance; it is the "I" and the "Thou" who are struggl¬ 
ing together, each for his or her truth of self-being, 
each to become possible Existenz. The individual and the 
individual s self-actualizing are central for Jaspers. 
The ultimate concern, on the other hand, for Buber, is 
the relationship with God and, for Gadamer, the (hermeneu¬ 
tical) interpretive relationship that allows tradition to 
speak and meaning to emerge. 
A more direct point of similarity between Gadamer 
and Buber inheres in their definition of the possible "I- 
Thou" relationships. Gadamer's genuine or authentic "I- 
Thou" relationship ("Thou" as tradition speaking) involves 
essentially the same dynamics of openness to, turning 
toward, harkening, and respect for the particularity of 
the "Thou" as Buber's "genuine" dialogue (see Gadamer, 
1975 , pp. 324-25; Buber, 1965, p. 19). Gadamer's first 
"i-Thou" relationship ("Thou" as object within a field), 
which Gadamer sees as equivalent to "naive faith in 
method and in the objectivity that can be obtained 
through it," involves essentially what Buber calls 
"technical dialogue," "which is prompted solely by the 
need of objective understanding" (Buber, 1965, p. 19; 
Gadamer, 1975. pp. 321-22). Gadamer's second "I-Thou" 
relationship ("Thou" as reflexive projection) acknowledges 
the "Thou" as a person but objectifies the person by 
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denying his/her rightful claim to meaningful self- 
expression (as exemplified, for Gadamer, in the educative 
relationship, charitable and authoritative welfare work -- 
see Gadamer, 1975, pp. 322-23). This is equivalent to 
Buber's "monologue disguised as dialogue" in which two 
people speak "each with himself," disregarding the other 
as a person (in debate), confirming his own self-reliance 
(in conversation), absolutizing and legitimizing himself 
while relativizing and rendering questionable the other 
(in a "friendly" chat), or enjoying and glorifying his 
own being and experience (in a "lovers' talk) (see Buber, 
1965, pp. 19-20). 
Jaspers elucidates "deficient communication" 
(Jaspers, 1970, pp. 66-73), "ruptures of communication" 
(Jaspers, 1970, pp. 73-82) and "communicative situations" 
(Jaspers, 1970, pp. 82-93). However, he does not categor¬ 
ize or classify different "I-Thou" relationships. 
Jaspers delineates three "objectified modes of communica¬ 
tion" (primitive community, factual purposiveness and 
rationality, and substantial spirit as determined by 
ideas) and the limits of each (Jaspers, 1970, pp. 48-51). 
He then describes the sense of "shortcoming" the person 
experiences in "unexistential communication," which 
serves as a "sting" arousing the person for existential 
communication (Jaspers, 1970, pp. 51-53). Existential 
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communication is described in a way congruent with 
Buber s and Gadamer s genuine dialogue: 
In communication that affects me, the other is 
this one only. Uniqueness is the phenomenon of 
this being. Existential communication ... is 
flatly singular. It occurs between two selves 
which are nothing else, are not representative, 
and are therefore not interchangeable. In this 
communication, which is absolutely historic and 
unrecognizable from outside, lies the assurance 
of selfhood. It is the one way by which a self 
is for a self, in mutual creation. [Jaspers, 
1970, p. 54] 
Jaspers' exclusion as existential communication of "thou 
as object" and as "reflexive projection" can also be 
inferred from his statement about the genuine sense of 
historicity: "Its fundamental attitude is not just to 
recognize those with whom I enter into communication but 
to be concerned with them" (Jaspers, 1970, p. 128). In 
Jaspers' work, then, there can be found numerous descrip¬ 
tions of genuine dialogical or existential communication 
(for example, Jaspers, 1970, pp. 59-61) and extensive 
analysis of the communicative act and association. No 
categorical analysis of possible "I-Thou" relationships 
appears as in Buber and Gadamer, perhaps because, for 
Jaspers, there is only one "I-Thou" relationship (always 
unique to the partners), all others being non-genuine, 
non-dialogical or "I-It." 
Briefly, then, Gadamer can be seen to be consistent 
with Jaspers in his emphasis on mundane contents of 
156 
dialogue in opposition to Buber's completion of dialogue 
outside contents. Yet Gadamer, like Buber, emphasizes 
the priority of a relational aspect of dialogue over the 
particular members. For Gadamer, this relation lies in 
the content of dialogue, that is, in the meaning that 
emerges between interpreter and a text as tradition 
speaking; for Buber, the relation that underlies the 
dialogue is between the person and an immanent, personal 
deity. Buber and Gadamer are congruent in their agreement 
as to what characterizes genuine dialogical relationship 
(with which Jaspers would agree although he does not 
"categorize" possible "I-Thou" relationships as do Buber 
and Gadamer) 
Faiths; Reason, Language, Deity 
The philosophies of Buber, Gadamer and Jaspers can 
all be said to involve "faith," but a different "faith" 
for each. Jaspers emphasizes reason; Buber emphasizes 
relation with a deity; Gadamer emphasizes the centrality 
of language. However, even here there exists the possibi¬ 
lity of finding some commonalities among the three 
thinkers. 
Jaspers grounds dialogical communication in historic 
existence and reason, yet also sees it as aimed toward 
transcendence. Reason is motivated toward effecting 
unity in Transcendence although, in existence, 
multiplicity and disunity are pervasive. Reason is 
described in terms of "wanting" -- wanting "to bring to 
being," "to give tongue," "to prevent the metaphysical 
breach, the tearing apart of Being itself and of the true 
unity" (Jaspers, Ehrlich manuscript, p. 86). It is also 
described as the "primal source of order," as remaining 
"patient, constant and infinite," and as having the 
fundamental attitude of "universal living-with" (Jaspers, 
Ehrlich manuscript, p. 86). Jaspers uses "hearing" to 
illuminate reason: 
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Reason is hearing, but it is the unlimited 
hearing of all that is and can be. it hears what 
is a specific hearing; and it also especially 
hears that which is inaudible, what seemingly 
refuses to communicate but becomes audible 
through reason. [Jaspers, Ehrlich manuscript, 
pp. 86-87] [3] 
Jaspers' emphasis on reason's making audible that 
which seems to refuse to communicate is congruous with 
several of Gadamer's beliefs: first, that interpretation 
requires making the text speak; second, that the need for 
interpretation lies in the "breaches of intersubjectivity" 
where meaning has been confused or lost and must be 
brought again into being; and, third, that the start of 
the question-answer dialectic lies in a negativity. 
There is also tonal similarity with Gadamer in Jaspers' 
statement that reason is "the openness of letting things 
matter" (Jaspers, Ehrlich manuscript, p. 87). This is 
like the openness (of effective-historical consciousness) 
that Gadamer sees as letting tradition speak, letting a 
work make a meaningful claim (see Gadamer, 1975, pp. 321- 
25) . 
Further describing reason, Jaspers writes: 
[r]eason is the total wi11 to communication. It 
wants to turn toward everything that is capable 
of expression, toward everything that is, in 
order to preserve it. . 
It wants to make authentic communication 
possible, and hence seeks to realize the honesty; 
whose attributes are unlimited openness and 
probing, as well as a sense of justice that.wants 
all that arises from primal sources to attain its 
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own validity, though also to let it founder 
"^S imits. [Jaspers, Ehrlich manuscript, 
Reason does not simply hear. it is an active force or 
drive, for Jaspers, so that it is capable "not only of 
being affected, but sets into motion everything it 
encounters" (Jaspers, Ehrlich manuscript, p. 87). Reason 
stirs things up, so to speak, and in so doing is an 
enabling force that allows everything that is to express 
itself. Jaspers writes: 
Because it questions and gives tongue, it produces 
unrest which makes it impossible to rest satisfied 
with a knowledge, a fact, a being-such, a being 
which is not all Being. Hence, reason enables 
all primal sources to unfold, to open up, to give 
tongue, to stand in relation, to become pure. 
[Jaspers, Ehrlich manuscript, pp. 87-88] 
There is in Jaspers' elucidation of reason a dual 
tone: reason is described as both "the primal source of 
order," "patient, constant and infinite" (Jaspers, 
Ehrlich manuscript, p. 86) and as restless, expressive of 
constant dissatisfaction, ceaseless striving, impelling, 
prodding, and urging (Jaspers, Ehrlich manuscript, pp. 87- 
89). Jaspers states that "Even though reason does not 
bring forth anything through its own agency, it is 
precisely reason . . . to awaken fully each mode of the 
Encompassing ..." (Jaspers, Ehrlich manuscript, p. 88). 
Reason seems to be "active" in awakening in the person the 
impulse to question, to overcome all disunity and 
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multiplicity, to make connections and in permitting the 
unity of Being to express itself. Thus Jaspers can state 
that "The will to unity emerges as the fundamental trait 
of reason" (Jaspers, Ehrlich manuscript, p. 91). For him, 
reason 
cannot be satisfied in a unity of intellect, not 
in a spiritual unity as such but only in the 
unity which, beyond all premature and partial 
unity, is that unity in which nothing is lost but 
all is preserved . . . the One which comprehends 
all. This One, though at an unattainable 
distance, is present to us through reason as the 
propelling force which overcomes all schism. 
[Jaspers, Ehrlich manuscript, p. 91] 
Gadamer would probably not disagree in most respects 
with Jaspers' elucidation of reason; however, while not 
refuting Jaspers' conception of reason, Gadamer's work 
emphasizes that there is a prior question, that of 
understanding and language. [4] In his Forward to the 
second edition of Truth and Method, Gadamer states that 
the question of how understanding is possible is "a 
question which precedes any action of understanding on 
the part of subjectivity ..." (Gadamer, 1975, p. 
xviii). He affirms his belief that Heidegger's analysis 
of Dasein has shown that "understanding is not just one 
of the various possible behaviors of the subject, but the 
mode of being of there-being itself" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 
xviii). 
Language, for Gadamer is the form in which all 
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understanding occurs; it is the medium of understanding. 
Central to all his work is the unity of thought, under¬ 
standing and language (see Gadamer, 1975, pp. 357-66). 
He states: "Our enquiry has been guided by the basic idea 
that language is a central point where 'I ' and world meet 
or, rather, mainfest their original unity" (Gadamer, 
1975, p. 431). Understanding, interpretation and reason¬ 
ing all presuppose language, even when that which is to 
be interpreted, understood or reasoned about is not 
itself linguistic in the traditional sense of being 
written or spoken in language (e.g., a work of art); 
language is fundamentally prior. Thus Gadamer makes such 
statements as: "in the way in which the understanding 
comes about . . . lies the coming-into-language of the 
thing itself" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 341); "Language is the 
language of reason itself" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 363); and 
"man's relation to the world is absolutely and 
fundamentally linguistic in nature, and hence 
intelligible" (Gadamer, 1975, pp. 432-33). 
It is in this sense that Gadamer argues that the 
Greek logos is really language rather than reason (see 
Gadamer, 1976, pp. 59-68). It is by virtue of language 
that human beings can communicate and can have common 
concepts necessary to all aspects of living with others: 
We can only think in a language, and just this 
residing of our thinking in language is the 
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profound enigma that language presents to thought. 
Language is not one of the means by which 
consciousness is mediated with the world. . . . 
Rather, in all our knowledge of ourselves and in 
all knowledge of the world, we are always already 
encompassed by the language that is our own. 
[Gadamer, 1976, p. 62] 
Gadamer also states: 
The phenomenon of understanding, then, shows 
the universality of human linguisticality as a 
limitless medium that carries everything within 
it -- not only the "culture" that has been handed 
down to us through language, but absolutely 
everything -- because everything (in the world 
and out of it) is included in the realm of 
"understandings" and understandability in which 
we move. [Gadamer, 1976, p. 25] 
Gadamer might be seen as standing in a somewhat 
similar relation to Jaspers as to Heidegger. His 
phenomenology of language offers the possibility of 
expanding their work by dealing with the resultant 
questions such as how Being exists understandingly, how 
Existenz reasons, and how primal sources or Being unfold 
and become manifest in existence. Gadamer's thesis is 
that all of these are essentially linguistic. They are, 
for the human being, language events and linguisticality 
is both the medium of understanding and the medium of 
human being. Language and understanding of transmitted 
meaning are essentially one process, that process being 
the uniquely definitive existential characteristic of 
human being (and the fundament of human freedom and 
possible self-becoming). For Gadamer, it is language that i l s lf- i ). 
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provides the grounding for overcoming the duality of 
subject and object and for conceiving of their 
correspondence. it is language that "opens the world" 
and makes possible shared understanding between and among 
people. it is language that opens the door to self¬ 
understanding. it does so by mediating the fusion of 
horizons in which a person's prejudices and presupposi¬ 
tions are thrown into question so as to allow new meanings 
and understandings to emerge. It is language that 
provides a kind of firm ground or objectivity for under¬ 
standing because language resides in situations, not in 
the interpreting subject. 
Jaspers and Gadamer stand in a curious relation in 
that, in some cases, what Jaspers writes of reason, 
Gadamer could write of language. For Gadamer, language 
mediates the finite and the infinite, as, for Jaspers, 
reason does. For Gadamer, language is speculative and, 
because of its linguistic nature, so is understanding; 
the speculativity is universal and fundamental to the 
nature of all entities. In their speculativity lies part 
of the reason for the perspectival nature of understanding 
and knowledge. For Jaspers, reason is speculative in 
nature and knowledge is perspectival (see Jaspers, Ehrlich 
manuscript, pp. 83-95, 551-96). 
Gadamer, rather than rejecting of refuting Jaspers, 
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emphasizes that language is the medium in which reasoning 
and understanding are possible. It is reason that, for 
Jaspers, "wills," "seeks," "produces unrest"; it is, for 
Gadamer, language that (in Jaspers' words about reason) 
"enables all primal sources to unfold" and "serves as the 
bond among all modes of the Encompassing." For Jaspers, 
reason is characteristic of human being; for Gadamer, 
"being that can be understood is language" and being is 
"of such a nature that of itself it offers itself to be 
understood" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 432). Thus, Gadamer 
writes that "reality happens precisely within language" 
(Gadamer, 1976, p. 35). Of Jaspers' elucidation of 
reason as "the total will to communication," Gadamer 
could point out that language is prior, i.e., communica¬ 
tion is existentially possible because of language. He 
could even argue that if willing is conceived as a mental 
action related to thought and "all thought is a speaking 
to oneself" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 382), then language is 
prior also to the acts of willing and thinking. [5] 
However, while Gadamer and Jaspers are not in total 
opposition, Jaspers would probably argue against Gadamer s 
expansion of the concept of communication and his tendency 
toward absolutization of language in much the same way he 
argues against Fritz Kaufmann (see Schilpp, 1957, pp. 785- 
89; also discussed further below). [6] 
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It is difficult to assess Buber's thought on 
language because it is so intertwined with his religious 
thought. In some respects, it seems akin to Gadamer's 
conception of language as the medium or expression of 
Being, in which case Gadamer's work on language does not 
preclude much of Buber's work. Yet in other respects, 
language, for Buber, seems to be more a symbol or 
manifestation of the relationship of God to humanity. 
If Buber is understood as conceiving dialogue as occuring 
in language (at least part of the time), then Gadamer's 
work on language may relate to Buber's thought as it does 
to Jaspers'. Yet, Buber is clearly emphasizing the 
relational dimension in his writings on dialogue; relation 
with the deity has priority over partners, content and 
medium in interhuman dialogue and in dialogue between 
human beings and aspects of the existent world -- this 
Gadamer would reject. 
Buber refers more to "speech" than to language and 
he relates speech to the sphere of the "We" (as Gadamer 
so relates language). Cohen states, "The lifegiving 
principle of the We is speech, the shared discourse that 
begins in the exchange of the spoken word" (Cohen, 1983, 
p. 62). Of the "We," Cohen writes; 
This We comes into being whenever a man reveals 
himselT to his fellows in such a way that he is 
perceived as he really is -- whenever a man 
transmits to his fellow man his own particular 
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experience in such a way that it penetrates the 
core of the other's experience of the world and 
consummates the other inwardly. [Cohen, 1983, 
pp. 62-63] 
Speech, shared discourse, makes possible the "We" sphere 
and Buber expresses concern that in the contemporary 
world the "We" is being replaced by the collectivity and 
speech as shared discourse is being lost. [7] Buber 
warns: 
In our own age . . . when the true meaning of all 
speech is hemmed in by fraud and deceit, when the 
first intention of the eye's glance is choked by 
suspicion, everything vitally depends on our 
recovering the purity of language and the 
innocence of the experience of We. (26) [Buber, 
in Cohen, 1983, p. 63] 
T6 Ibid., p. 174. [Mordekai-Martin Buber, Raui le-yelekh 
akhar ha-meshutaf (Dedicated to him who would pursue the 
communal), in Pnei adam] 
For Buber, the sphere of "We" is community, not 
collectivity; the community is a fellowship in which 
relationships have authenticity, immediacy and commitment 
to mutual personal responsibility (see Cohen 1983, pp. 70 
73, 82-93). [8] In such community, speech is living 
utterance, shared discourse, genuine dialogue -- as 
opposed to technical dialogue or monologue disguised as 
dialogue. In writing of the essential fact of human 
existence as lying in human beings' existing with other 
human beings, in the ontological "between," Buber states 
The pre-eminent and clearest distinction of man's 
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universe resides, first and foremost, in the fact 
that within it there takes place something 
between one being and his fellow being which in 
all of nature has no parallel. Language is 
nothing else but a symbol and an instrument in 
man s hands and all the achievements of the 
spirit were stirred into existence and brought 
into the world by his hand. Man is made man by 
himself. (38) [Buber, quoted in Cohen, 1983, p. 
83 ] 
38 Ibid., p. 56. [Buber, "Tvat ha-ruah re-ha-metsiyut ha- 
historit" (The Claim of the spirit and historical 
reality"), in Teuda ve-yiud 2. 
Here Buber's conception of language differs from Gadamer's 
if Buber is understood to mean that language is literally 
a symbol and instrument. Gadamer rejects the "sign" 
theory of language and the concept of language as an 
instrument of man; rather, he finds language to be the 
encompassing medium of Being (and human being) and finds 
it inhering in situations. Language, for Gadamer, speaks 
itself through human beings. Yet Buber is akin to 
Gadamer and Jaspers, here, in emphasizing existential 
enacting -- it is by man's "hand" that world is enacted, 
that man "makes" himself what he existentially is. Thus 
language "in man's hands" seems to refer to more than 
simply a tool. It is more like an enabling or enactive 
medium through which, in the relation between human 
beings, world comes into being. Buber is clear that the 
dialogical situation can only be "grasped from what 
exists between and transcends" human individuals. 
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Dialogue arises between the "I" and the "Thou" but it 
enacts and is enacted in the sphere of the "We," the 
animating principle" of which is speech (Cohen, 1983, p. 
84). Perhaps, then, it can be said that Buber's "speech," 
at least in terms of the "We," community and dialogue, is 
equivalent to an existential principle which transcends 
individuals and exists between them but is also "in" and 
"of" them. 
However, the issue remains confused by the 
centrality of the religious in Buber's work. While 
speech and the "We" can be discussed in terms of the 
interhuman world of dialogical community, for Buber all 
aspects of existential "I-Thou" relationships reflect the 
"I-Thou" relationship between humanity and God. 
"Linguisticality" appears to be more than what is normally 
encompassed definitionally in that term. In explaining 
Buber's biblical humanism Cohen illustrates this problem. 
On the one hand, for Buber, "language -- indeed the whole 
linguistic complex of word, formations, connections 
between sentences, and the rhythmic flow of sounds -- is 
determined by the way in which man is described in 
antiquity" (Cohen, 1983, p. 137). On the other hand, 
"Buber's preoccupation with biblical humanism stems from 
his desire to extract from the language of the bible the 
raw material out of which the human personality is 
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formed" (Cohen, 1983, p. 137). is language "determined 
by the way in which man is described" or can the "raw 
material out of which the human personality is formed" be 
extracted from language (of the Bible)? Cohen tells the 
reader only that in biblical humanism "language is a 
reciprocal event, geared to the open rather than to the 
self-contained personality and aimed at relation rather 
than form" (Cohen 1983, p. 137). However, if language is 
"event" and is, moreover, a "reciprocal event," it does 
not appear to be "determined by the way man is described" 
although it may contain "the raw material out of which 
human personality is formed." This "raw material" would 
seem to exist in the "reciprocal event," the occurrence 
between human beings (and between human beings, entities 
and God) that is Buber's dialogical relation (and this 
"raw material" need not necessarily be restricted to the 
language of the Bible). Cohen indicates Buber's conten¬ 
tion that God speaks to humanity unceasingly "through the 
medium of events of the physical world, the concrete 
signs of His colloquy with man" (Cohen, 1983, p. 139). 
Is language an event in the physical world? It would 
seem to be that and more, for Buber. 
The dialogical relationship is sacred, for Buber, 
and it is this understanding which he sees as the pre¬ 
eminent contribution of Judaism to humanity: 
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God as speaker, creation as speech: the call into 
the void and the response of things at the very 
moment of their emergence, the language of 
creation in the life of each created thing, the 
life of each man as the one who asks and answers 
it is in order to proclaim this that Israel 
came into the world. it taught, it revealed: the 
true God is the God who can be called, for it is 
to this end that He calls upon his creatures. 
(11) [Buber, qouted in Cohen, 1983, p. 159] 
11 Martin Buber, Be fardes ha-hasidut [In the Hasidic 
orchard] (Jerusalem and Tel Aviv: Mosad Bialik and Devir, 
1963), p. 10. 
There is ambiguity here: creation can be understood as an 
act of speech by God as speaker and creation can also be 
understood as being speech, of God as speaker. Part of 
this ambiguity lies in the question of whether creation 
is seen as a one-time action or as an on-going, emergent 
action. Cohen states: 
Buber argues that the significance of an exclusive 
and one-time creation of human existence is not a 
creation for the sake of existence itself, but 
for the fulfillment of the purpose of being -- a 
purpose whose particular manifestations are 
realized under an infinite variety of giuses.(12) 
[Cohen, 1983, p. 59] 
12 Mordekai-Martin Buber, "Tmunot shel tov va-rah" 
[Images of good and evil], in Pnei adam, p. 37. 
However, this revelation of the "purpose of being" is on¬ 
going and is manifested in the world in God s relationship 
to human beings and their relationship to Him, "an 
encounter in which man takes an active part" (Cohen, 
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1983, p. 59). Creation, then, seems to be a one-time act 
of speech but the purpose of creation seems to be revealed 
in on-going emergent action so that creation as an 
emergent existent can be understood as being speech or, 
more accurately, speaking, i.e., continuing revelation or 
disclosure. Herein, for Buber, lies the sacredness of 
dialogue and, it would seem, the sacredness of speech or 
speaking: in all realms these reflect the (purpose of) 
immanent, personal Deity which is the eternal "I-Thou." 
In this respect, then, Buber would seem to be 
congruent with Gadamer's understanding of speech and 
language as a finite pointing to the infinite -- a 
limitless, primordial and transcendent medium. However, 
it is not unlikely that Buber would reject Gadamer's 
conception of the fundamental priority of language to 
human being and to dialogue and understanding. For 
Buber, assignment of such priority could be construed as 
limiting the conception of Deity. Buber is careful to 
avoid such a possibility in his emphasis that "in every 
You we address the eternal You, in every sphere according 
to its manner" (Buber, 1970, p. 57). He also states that 
"The limits of the possibility of dialogue are the limits 
of awareness" (Buber, 1965, p. 10). Use of such terms as 
"reciprocity" and "awareness" suggest a broader conception 
than "language" and this is inherent in Buber's emphasis 
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on relation with Deity. The Deity, omnipotent and thus 
unrestricted in any way, can address a person in a variety 
of ways, including non-1inguistically. All of these 
modes of address would be understandable to the person 
(by virtue not of the person's capabilities, but of the 
Deity's omnipotence). Also, because of the Deity's 
omnipotence, a person can be addressed by and through all 
aspects of creation, including those not endowed in a 
"human" sense with language (see, for example, Buber's 
description of dialogical communication with a tree -- 
Buber, 1970, p. 58). Buber's rationale for the possibili¬ 
ty of dialogue, God's omnipotence, is quite different 
f rom Gadamer's. 
Gadamer accepts the possibility of being addressed 
by non-human entities which have inherent in their nature 
the possibility of expression as "tradition speaking." 
These do not "speak" as a human being does but express 
themselves in terms of their own nature in the "language 
of things." Thus, the "language" of dialogue is construed 
broadly. For Gadamer, it is not the omnipotence of Deity 
that is foundational but the ontology of Being, "being 
which can be understood is language." However, aside 
from the personalizing of deity, Buber s conception of 
God as speaker and creation as speech has some congruity 
with Gadamer's conception of Being as linguistic and 
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reality as existing within language. For Gadamer, 
because of his hermeneutic emphasis, that-through-which- 
tradition-speaks tends to be cultural artifacts and 
products of the human mind. While natural entities may 
communicate (as parts of Being), Gadamer's concern is 
understanding and interpreting non-natural objects, a 
process that is analogous to dialogue. 
It is useful here to consider Jaspers' defense and 
explication of his position on the problem of communica¬ 
tion in his response (in Schilpp, 1957, pp. 785-89) to 
Fritz Kaufmann's essay on communication (in Schilpp, 
1957, pp. 210-95). Jaspers' commentary has application 
to both Buber's and Gadamer's work, although Gadamer's 
thought remains more defensible in light of Jaspers' 
argument than does Buber's. 
Jaspers writes that Kaufmann wants to give communi¬ 
cation a broad, all-encompassing meaning whereas Jaspers, 
himself, restricts communication to communication between 
human beings only. Buber clearly sees communication as 
all-encompassing as Kaufmann does. Gadamer's usage is 
also broader than Jaspers' although it remains narrower 
than Buber's and Kaufmann's. Jaspers states that he 
follows Kaufmann's analyses concerning the harmony 
between man and nature shown in sensation, awareness and 
artistic articulation; however, he accepts these analyses 
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only on condition that the distinction not be lost 
between the language of symbols and communication proper 
(see Jaspers, in Schilpp, 1957, p. 785). For Jaspers, 
"communication proper" happens only between human beings 
in mutual reciprocity, reciprocity that involves a reply. 
Without this reply by the other, communication is one¬ 
sided: "It is only an invention of the vis-a-vis, a mute 
communication" (Jaspers, in Schilpp, 1957, p. 785). 
Jaspers states: "The language of nature, poetry, and art 
can have reality only by analogy to communication proper. 
For there is lacking in all of this the confirmation by 
the other" (Jaspers, in Schilpp, 1957, pp. 785-86). 
Gadamer and Buber would deny this lack of confirmation by 
the other since they both perceive the other as a speaking 
"Thou." 
To this point, Gadamer is not impugned by Jaspers' 
argument since Gadamer in fact uses human communication 
as an analogy for tradition as a "Thou" in literary and 
aesthetic works as they are hermeneutically interpreted. 
Buber's inclusion of all aspects of nature as vessels 
for the word" and his grounding of all communication in 
an "I-Thou" relationship with a deity are more than 
analogies. Therefore, for Jaspers, Buber s work is 
unquestionably as suspect as Kaufmann s. 
Jaspers continues by pointing out that, while both 
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he and Kaufmann speak of "faith in communication," they 
mean something very different and this difference has 
significant consequences. Of the contrast between 
Kaufmann s and his own "faith in communication," Jaspers 
writes: 
In Kaufmann it means anticipating agreement with 
and confidence in the ground of all things which 
for him stop to be mute; whereas, in their 
articulation in poetry and art, measured on 
actual communication, they still remain mute, 
simply because no self is present to answer. In 
my thinking, faith in communication means 
confidence in the possibility of that mode of 
being oneself which is capable of infinite 
revelation in the present, which becomes itself 
only in loving struggle with the other and here 
surrenders its reserve . . . This is a completely 
different meaning of faith in communication. But 
the one meaning does not exclude the other. 
Kaufmann's emphasis upon an ontological meaning 
of communication -- which, as simile, occurs in 
my writings also and was noticed there by Kaufmann 
-- can not, however, be accepted by me as an 
expansion of what I mean. [Jaspers, in Schilpp, 
1957, p. 786] 
Jaspers' criticism of Kaufmann can be extended to 
include Buber's work because in Buber's work also there 
is a kind of "anticipation of agreement with and 
confidence in the ground of all things." For Buber, this 
anticipation of agreement lies in the immanence of the 
deity who speaks through all aspects of creation. 
Gadamer's work again seems to evade criticism here. 
Gadamer is careful to warn against anticipation of 
agreement in his emphasis on: the singularity of communi¬ 
cation; the need for constant revision of fore-meanings 
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and fore projects on the basis of what meaning emerges in 
the hermeneutic interaction; the need to let things speak 
for themselves and to acknowledge their claim; and the 
emphasis on the risking and testing of the interpreter's 
prejudices and presuppositions in the hermeneutic 
encounter. Furthermore, Gadamer at least attempts to 
overcome the "muteness" to which Jaspers refers. Gadamer 
does this in his understanding of literary works as 
answers to questions, answers that pose questions to the 
interpreter and against which the interpreter must 
constantly test his or her answers. For him, literary 
works exist in questionableness just as tradition does; 
they contain inherently in their nature an excess of 
meaning. They are brought out of the alienation of 
meaning which has befallen them into living encounter by 
and with the interpreter and his or her horizon. Nor 
does Gadamer reject Jaspers' belief in the "mode of being 
oneself which is capable of infinite revelation in the 
present, which becomes itself only in loving struggle 
with the other ..." (Jaspers', in Schilpp, 1957, p. 
786). Hermeneutic interpretation and understanding, for 
Gadamer, are always historic and emergent; on-going self- 
discovery always inheres in the struggle to understand 
interpret-apply. This struggle, since it always occurs 
in language (in the sphere of the "We"), always involves 
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communicative struggle with the other. Moreover, language 
itself, for Gadamer, contains in its finiteness a pointing 
toward the infinite. Thus Gadamer seems (although his 
"other" may be a literary or artistic work) to escape many 
of the elements Jaspers rejects in Kaufmann's and, by 
extension, Buber's "faith in communication." 
Jaspers charges that Kaufmann touches only 
incidentally on the question which is the theme of his 
own writings, namely: 
The big question concerning the misuse of the 
language of nature, of poetry, of art, of the 
speculative penetration into Transcendence as 
pseudo-communication, in virtue of which a single 
person or a collective frees itself from the 
genuine, real communication among men . . . 
[Jaspers, in Schilpp, 1957, p. 786] 
Jaspers points out that he does not deny the truth that 
becomes distorted only by misuse, that is, by not placing 
it "under the condition of communicative truth among men 
as individuals in the concrete realization of their 
relation to each other" (Jaspers, in Schilpp, 1957, p. 
787). However, he emphasizes that truth is frequently 
distorted by misuse and this must be avoided. Jaspers 
extends his argument to point out the potential for 
distortion and misuse in a belief that the deity as 
personality approaches human beings. This belief "makes 
God by no means himself a person -- except in the 
corporeal embodiment into realities of the world for such 
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as believe in it" (Jaspers, in Schilpp, 1957, p. 787) and 
this corporeal embodiment does not reply. There is thus 
no test of communicative truth since communication is one¬ 
sided : 
Because real communication takes place only 
between men and rests in the final analysis upon 
faith (a faith which some deny), any other 
communication can be asserted only as a simile, 
inasmuch as it is carried out by us one-sidedly. 
[Jaspers, in Schilpp, 1957, p. 787] 
Here Jaspers' critique extends to Buber, who in fact 
rejects Jaspers' work for its lack of grounding in faith 
and who emphatically grounds his own philosophy in the 
belief that the deity approaches human beings personally 
and immanently in creation. Buber, of course, as discuss¬ 
ed above, would deny Jaspers' contention that the deity 
does not reply. 
Jaspers does not dispute the metaphysical truth of 
such statements as Kaufmann makes in arguing that things 
are unconcealed and liberated by human consciousness 
which brings out their latent meaning: "Their meaning is 
their manifest essence which gets into the meaning of 
words" (Jaspers, in Schilpp, 1957, p. 788). However, 
Jaspers adds: 
I hesitate to strain the symbol of communi 
cation for such relation to things to the point 
that the symbol suddenly stands for reality. In 
that case the meaning of communication itself, 
which goes from self to self and is an historical 
event in constantly possible reciprocity, is 
missed at its very roots. [Jaspers, in Schilpp, 
1957, p. 788] 
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Here is where Jaspers' criticism applies to 
Gadamer s work. For Gadamer, while communication in 
dialogue may remain an analogy, language does come close 
to "standing for" reality, at least for being which can 
be understood. Language, for Gadamer, is not just a 
symbol. Rather, it is an encompassing medium within 
which reality exists. While there seems to be no way to 
fully resolve this difference between Jaspers and Gadamer, 
partial resolution seems to lie in four directions. 
First, a differentiation can be made between communication 
and language. Second, language can be considered as both 
finite and infinite. Third, Jaspers' discussion of the 
intellectual sciences as differentiated from the natural 
sciences may offer grounds for partial resolution. 
Fourth, partial resolution may lie in addressing the 
issue of becoming possible Existenz. 
Jaspers' concern in his reply to Kaufmann is 
primarily to differentiate between the language of 
symbols and "communication proper." He argues that the 
language of nature, poetry and art has reality only by 
way of analogy and that communication proper serves only 
as a simile for the relation to nature and Transcendence 
(as noted above). Jaspers is not discussing the nature 
of language qua language but the nature of communication 
as distinguished from the language of symbols. This is 
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almost a reversal of Gadamer's discussion of communication 
as an analogy for interpretive understanding as it occurs 
in language. However, a ground for reconciliation may 
lie in the fact that neither would dispute the fact that 
communication occurs in language as does thinking. 
Language seems to encompass communication and thinking. 
Philosophizing about communication would, therefore, also 
involve philosophizing about language although it may be 
necessary, as it is in instances of thinking and speaking 
about transcending abstractions, to reason by analogy and 
a hermeneutic "back and forth" movement. This leads to 
the second aspect, consideration of language as both 
finite and infinite. 
Jaspers perceives both language and thought as 
objectifying. For him, the subject and the object of 
thought are one in the same in that thought thinks itself 
and transcending thought (philosophizing) is thought 
taking a self-reflective position. The thinker knows 
that s/he is thinking, how s/he is thinking, and the 
limits of that method of thinking. Therefore, to some 
extent, the thinker can remain free of the determination 
of knowledge because s/he is aware of the perspectival 
nature of the method and can change methods for a 
different "point of view." However, thought is always 
determinative in that at any particular time it is always 
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using a method and is, thus, always perspectival. The 
resultant problem is how to think about that which is 
not, by nature, objectifiable seeing that thinking as 
such is an objectifying activity and uses language which 
is, by its nature, objectifying. For example, speaking 
about Existenz, Being and world is like speaking about 
objects although they cannot be objects (which is why 
Jaspers always emphasizes that he is speaking of possibi¬ 
lities not of penetrable structures of Being). Herein 
lies the hermeneutic circle in Jaspers: the thinking 
person engages in "thinking in circles," changing methods 
and perspectives, using similes and analogies, and always 
coming back (full circle, so to speak) to his/her own 
existing in order to try to cancel out the objectification 
inherent in thinking. 
For Jaspers, talk of Transcendence and Existenz is 
a paradox. The person is talking of what is ineffable; 
no thought or language is adequate to express what a 
person intends to mean when s/he speaks of such matters. 
Thus anything which can be said or thought about Transcen¬ 
dence can have only a symbolic meaning. The symbol will 
always be inadequate and can be only a "cipher," i.e., a 
symbolic way of knowing or speaking indirectly of what 
cannot be known or spoken directly. Here is where, for 
Jaspers, reason as the impulse toward unity comes into 
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play. Thought points to something beyond itself and in 
so doing is transcending; however, thought is always 
determinative and it is reason that seeks to go beyond 
the findings" of thought toward reconciliation of 
contradictions in unities. 
Gadamer deals with this concern by denying that 
language is objectifying, even when used to speak of the 
ineffable. For him, language is always speculative and 
universal because of the dialectical parts-whole relation 
of what is said to the totality of meaning, what is 
unsaid. Language allows an infinity of meaning to be 
represented finitely. As a representation, what is said 
contains an infinity of meaning to be explored, elaborated 
and interpreted (always by a specific individual 
interpreter in his/her singularity within the context of 
his/her truth of self-being in the world). The thinking 
person reflecting on language is always aware of the 
speculativity and universality of language and is always 
aware that what is said exists dialectically with what is 
not said. For Gadamer, then, the danger of language's 
objectifying that which is spoken about is overcome in 
the concurrent awareness that whatever is said is always 
a finite representation of an infinity of possible 
meaning. Gadamer would not disagree with Jaspers that 
reason seeks to transcend this limitation even in the 
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recognition that such a search cannot succeed in any 
total sense. Gadamer's conception of language is broader 
than Jaspers' in that, for Gadamer, all speaking (not 
just speaking about that which is not objectifiable) 
points beyond itself toward the transcendent. 
All language thus becomes what is, for Jaspers, a 
cipher. There is no problem here for Gadamer because, 
like Jaspers, he believes that understanding is perspecti- 
val and that truth is truth in situation. Although being 
that can be understood is language, no claim is made for 
an absolute understanding of being. Rather, language 
includes in itself and points toward the infinite, of 
which it can be only a finite representation (appropriate 
to human beings as finite historic beings discovering and 
creating their self-being). This leads to the third 
consideration. 
Jaspers writes that every limit of which science 
makes a person aware constitutes an opportunity for 
transcending (Jaspers, 1969, p. 171). He argues that 
these limits are bilateral. On the negative side, there 
is matter, "the alien substance impervious to the logos" 
(Jaspers, 1969, p. 171). On the positive side, there is 
freedom. He writes: "The absolute limit of natural 
science is the obscurity of the downright alien; the 
absolute limit of the sciences of the mind is the freedom 
184 
of Existenz as the font of communication" (Jaspers, 1969, 
p. 172). This second limit brings the person to himself 
as Existenz. Existenz has two mutually definable ways of 
coming to itself in cognitive thinking: first, pure world 
orientation which is the genuine modern scientific 
attitude; second, what Gadamer would call "mirroring" the 
world in the Hegelian sense. Jaspers writes of the 
second way: 
In such thinking we turn the world into an image, 
only to make each image disappear again; we turn 
the world into freedom and look upon it as if we 
were communicating with it and receiving answers. 
We illuminate freedom in such thinking, thus 
appealing to possible Existenz; we read the 
ciphers of existence and thereby conjure 
Transcendence. What we achieve is neither cogent 
nor hypothetical, neither plausible nor probable; 
it is the historic fulfillment of an objectivity 
that overcomes itself as it takes shape. The 
course of this thinking is not one of progress 
but of transformation. If done at all, it is 
entirely present, not promising to be perfected 
in the future. [Jaspers, 1969, p. 172] 
Here Jaspers is highly congruent with Gadamer's discussion 
of speculativity and effective-historical consciousness. 
Jaspers also opens the possibility for a rapprochment 
with Gadamer's (if not Buber's or Kaufmann's) conceptions 
of the possibility of communication with non-human 
partners when he writes of turning to world as if we were 
communicating with it and receiving answers. This and 
his reference to reading the ciphers of existence is 
congruent with Gadamer's hermeneutic interpretation. 
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Congruent also are Jaspers' suggestion of this thinking 
as achieving transformation rather than progress and his 
emphasis on the temporality of this thinking that does 
not include a promise of future perfectability. What 
Jaspers seems to be indicating is the kind of thinking 
that, for Gadamer, is a hermeneutic of Dasein. Gadamer's 
interpretation-understanding-application of effective- 
historical consciousness is utterly historic, transcending 
objective or cogent knowledge, and transforming of the 
interpreter or possible Existenz in terms of self- 
discovery simultaneously with discovery about the world 
as possibility. 
This is not to imply that Jaspers, in fact, suggests 
the possibility of a person's communicating with non¬ 
human entities. Rather, he uses an analogy that is 
similar to Gadamer's use of dialogical communication as 
an analogy for hermeneutic interpretation. Jaspers 
writes: 
Yet whereas an abyss of outright incomprehensibi¬ 
lity yawns at the bounds of natural cognition, 
what goes on at the bounds of the intellectual 
sciences and provides them with their impulses is 
communication between Existenz and Existenz. 
[Jaspers, 1969, p. 189] 
Here Jaspers sounds superficially more like Schleiermacher 
and Dilthey than like Gadamer. He refers to communication 
between Existenz and Existenz that is the orientation of 
Dilthey's and Schleiermacher's hermeneutics with its 
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emphasis on empathetic understanding of an author's 
intention and experience in creating a work. it is this 
orientation that Gadamer describes as denying the other's 
claim to subjectivity. Yet Jaspers is, I think, not 
likely to fall into the mode of Dilthey and Schleiermacher 
because, for Jaspers, communication is not objectifying 
but occurs between Existenzen about mundane contents. 
Jaspers' "communication" is congruent with Gadamer's 
genuine "I-Thou" dialogue. Dilthey's and Schleiermacher's 
form of understanding is equivalent to the non-genuine 
dialogue of Gadamer's second mode of experiencing the 
"Thou," as reflexive projection. If, for Jaspers, what 
provides the impulse for the intellectual sciences is 
communication between Existenzen, he is using the same 
conceptual orientation toward dialogue as is used in 
Gadamer's analogy. 
Jaspers also sounds like Gadamer in his statement 
that: 
It is true that throughout the intellectual 
sciences the methods of philology provides the 
basis of cognition. But from the critical 
restoration of genuine evidence, and from the 
writings about the comprehension of what was 
really meant, the way leads to comprehension in 
the idea, and then to an inner adoption and 
transformation in Existenz. While the research 
methods of natural science touch the thing 
itself, as everyone has identical access to it, 
philological methods create only the premise of 
an approach; the thing will show historically to 
our sense of history -- by way of scientific 
cognition, but not as such cognition. The bounds 
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of the cogently demonstrable, which are the 
bounds of philology, will therefore shift with 
the perceptiveness of the understanding subject. 
His own inner potential allows him to know what 
the sources will then make demonstrable for every 
viewer with the same potential. in principle, 
there can be the same objective exactness for 
everyone about purely rational contents, but not 
about philosophical, mythical, religious, or 
ethical ones. To define the type and measure of 
what is here cogent, we must presuppose a 
congruous factual and enunciable knowledge in 
common historicity. [Jaspers, 1969, pp. 214-15] 
Thus Jaspers argues that in the intellectual sciences 
"research proceeds by way of a universal of the mind, a 
mj-n(3 at large" (Jaspers, 1969, p. 215) with the objective 
of comparing and finding the common features. He states: 
Our topic is the flatly historic diversity of 
forgotten things reemerging in the present, and 
of presently effective things being forgotten. 
Intellectual science is the historic motion of 
the unclosed mind aware of its own historicity. 
[Jaspers, 1969, pp. 215-16] 
Gadamer would certainly agree and would add that what 
makes possible the intellectual sciences and their 
research is language. Language allows meaning to emerge, 
constitutes the enquirer's horizon, constitutes the 
horizon of what is to be studied, and constitutes the 
stream of tradition which is the "common historicity." 
This leads to the fourth consideration that underlies all 
the other aspects, the issue of becoming possible 
Existenz. 
For Jaspers, faith in communication is "confidence 
in that mode of being oneself which is capable of infinite 
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revelation in the present ..." (Jaspers, in Schilpp, 
1957, p. 786). For him, the thinking person remains 
aware that truth becomes actualized by its being the 
foundation of a person's becoming a self in existence. 
Becoming a self occurs with others in a mutual struggle 
for truth of self-being. it is the danger that this 
mutual struggle will be sacrificed to the illusion of 
knowing the world as a totality or of on-going harmonious 
communion with an immanent deity that concerns Jaspers: 
The contentment found in a comprehensive glory 
displaces true communication -- from one self to 
another -- from the center of our real Existenz 
and makes it appear as a mere result and as 
something incidental and second-rate. It offers 
the opportunity to run away to God or to nature 
from man, from the neighbor, from the pressing 
task of communication. [Jaspers, in Schilpp, 
1957, p. 789] [9] 
What is at stake here for Jaspers is the person's task of 
actualizing him/herself through communication and the 
struggle for clarification of his/her own truth of self¬ 
being. This struggle takes place using mundane contents, 
cogent knowledge of the world and also ideas. However, 
it transcends both in the need to face the limits of any 
kind of knowledge and to make a leap to existential 
commitment. Jaspers fears that premature belief in 
knowledge of a totality (which is, for him, existentially 
impossible) or a belief in a communion with a deity will 
divert the person from the difficult struggle to self- 
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actualize through shared discourse with other struggling 
human beings. it seems that Jaspers' fear in this regard 
is heightened by two prevalent tendencies: first, to blur 
the boundaries of science (or worse, to disregard the 
fact that there are limits to scientific knowledge); 
second, to "surrender" the self in some sort of mystical 
communion with a deity. 
Jaspers and Gadamer are not in conflict in their 
perception of the person's becoming a self in situation 
in the world. Gadamer points out that through hermeneutic 
interpretation, the interpreter discovers him/herself. 
The interpreter risks and tests his/her prejudices and 
opens new possibilities of being just as the person does 
in genuine "I-Thou" communication. Gadamer emphasizes 
the unification of application, understanding and inter¬ 
pretation as one process. All that is interpreted and 
understood is simultaneously applied and application 
enables interpretation and understanding to occur. 
Gadamer accepts Jaspers' conception of boundary or limit 
situations as realizations or actualizations of what the 
person possibly can be, not as an empirical person but as 
an emergent self. Like Jaspers, Gadamer does not ground 
his thought on the conception of immanent deity in 
communication with human beings and, like Jaspers, 
Gadamer does not claim that world can be understood as 
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totality. Thus Gadamer's work in no way leads to the 
dangers Jaspers articulates in terms of Kaufmann's 
thought on communication (which are applicable to Buber's 
thought as well). 
Thus, while Gadamer's work might be perceived as an 
unwarranted and unacceptable expansion by Jaspers of his 
own work, Gadamer's work remains more congruent with 
Jaspers' thought than does Buber's (or Kaufmann's). In 
the work of all three, an element of faith inheres. 
Gadamer's work can be said to rest on faith in the 
possibility of a person's constantly finding meanings in 
encounters with the living tradition (of which the person 
is a part) that creates present and future possibilities; 
these can be actualized in enacting that living, emergent 
tradition. Jaspers' philosophizing rests on an element 
of faith in a mode of being which includes the possibility 
of Being and truth in unity in the face of historic 
multiplicity and disunity. These forms of "faith" do not 
conflict. However, they differ significantly from and 
conflict with Buber's philosophy in which "faith" refers 
to a religious actuality. Both would, therefore, be 
rejected by Buber as Buber's emphasis on the religious 
actuality would be rejected by Jaspers and Gadamer as an 
unacceptable grounding for their philosophies. 
Summary 
In this chapter, the work of Buber, Gadamer and 
Jaspers on dialogue has been discussed. Both similarities 
and differences have been found although each philosopher 
approaches dialogue from a different perspective. For 
Jaspers, dialogue is the mode of communication between 
two human beings through which each struggles toward his 
truth of self-being. For Buber, dialogue is the communi¬ 
cative mode characterizing the relationship between God 
and humanity; in reflection of that relationship, dialogue 
should characterize communication among human beings and 
all aspects of the world. For Gadamer, dialogue is the 
analogy for the mode of communication between an 
interpreter and a work in which the two relate so that 
their relating allows tradition to speak as a "Thou"; 
understanding and meaning emerge in this process. 
For Jaspers and Buber, dialogue is the way in which 
human beings realize and actualize themselves as authentic 
human persons. Gadamer agrees and refers to dialogue as 
the way in which tradition speaks and meaning comes into 
Being, which, for Gadamer, exists understandingly. All 
three agree that the person must be "fully present" in 
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dialogue and must relate to the other as a unique being, 
a "Thou." They agree that the person, the "I," is not 
lost in the dialogical encounter. Rather, in risking 
prejudices, preconceptions and present state of being, 
the person continues the process of self-discovery and 
self-actualization. The person is "linked with" or "in 
touch with" the other while both retain their individuali¬ 
ty and move toward becoming authentic selves. All also 
agree that this "becoming" process is not completed but, 
rather, is always an emergent. 
A difference appears in Jaspers' view of communica¬ 
tion as occuring only between human beings on a one-to- 
one basis. For Buber, more than two participants may be 
involved and, because all dialogue is a reflection of the 
unending dialogue between God and humanity, the Deity can 
be said to be present in all dialogue. For Gadamer, 
there are essentially two partners speaking in any given 
hermeneutic dialogue, the interpreter and tradition as a 
"Thou." For him, this is analogous to a conversation 
between two people. Another difference is that Jaspers 
delineates dialogue in terms of an encounter between 
human beings. Buber s and Gadamer s use of dialogue is 
not restricted to human partners. Buber's dialogue can 
occur with animals and natural and man-made objects so 
long as the other is related with in its uniqueness. The 
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dialogue with which Gadamer is concerned is the hermeneu¬ 
tic dialogue, analogous to that between human beings, but 
occuring through the dialogical relationship between an 
interpreter and tradition speaking through a product of 
the human mind. 
The dialogical relationship is characterized in 
qualitatively different ways. For Jaspers, it is an 
active, loving struggle, a mutual combative quest for 
truth in existence. For Buber, it is both active and 
passive. It is characterized as a "turning toward," 
paying attention or harkening, and an openness both in 
expressing the self and in receiving what comes from the 
other. For Gadamer, also, it is both active and passive 
in a sense similar to Buber's. The openness and 
reciprocity include within them an active element, a 
willing to make the other speak, to hear what is 
expressed, and to engage in mutual questioning and 
answering. In addition to dialogue, Gadamer uses the 
analogy of playing a game to elucidate his understanding 
of the hermeneutic relationship. 
Jaspers, Buber and Gadamer also differ on the issue 
of inclusion/exclusion in dialogue. Jaspers is least 
inclusive. For him, because of human finitude, a person 
can engage in only a limited number of "I-Thou relation 
ships. The historicity of Existenz is a boundary 
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situation, for Jaspers, that necessitates both exclusivity 
and the guilt inherent in rejection of other possibilities 
for dialogical relationship. Buber emphasizes inclusive¬ 
ness because, for him, dialogical relationship can occur 
repeatedly within human life with many others at different 
times and with more than one other at any given time. 
This is possible because of his belief that every dialogue 
is part of and reflects the eternal dialogue between God 
and humanity. Because the hermeneutic dialogue is his 
concern, Gadamer, too, is less exclusive than Jaspers. 
The hermeneutic dialogue is not between human beings and 
therefore no existential guilt inheres in rejection of 
possibilities for dialogue. Hermeneutic dialogue can be 
entered into with the same work many times and with 
various works at different times. 
There is agreement among Jaspers, Buber and Gadamer 
that while the "I-Thou" relationship may be of long 
duration, existential communication cannot be sustained 
for long periods. For all three, dialogue may be 
terminated at a given point, but contains within itself 
the possibility of resumption. For all three, there is a 
consistency and continuity of moments of dialogue that is 
based on their understanding of the unity of past, 
present and future in any particular moment and in their 
understanding of human historicity. 
The fact of the occurrence of the dialogical 
relationship is more important than its contents, for 
Buber, who believes that dialogue can occur outside 
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contents. Contents of dialogue are important for Jaspers. 
Because dialogue is rooted in historicity, its contents 
are the ideas, purposes and tasks of the (emergent) 
person in the existential world. Jaspers always emphasiz¬ 
es the priority of particular historic human beings in 
the "I-Thou" relationship. Gadamer also emphasizes the 
contents of dialogue. For him, as for Buber, the 
relational aspect of dialogue has priority over the 
particular partners. For Gadamer, the relation lies in 
the contents of dialogue, that is, in the meaning that 
emerges between the interpreter and the work as tradition 
speaking. For Buber, the relationship that grounds 
dialogue and has priority over members and contents is 
the eternal dialogue between humanity and the Deity. 
Gadamer and Buber are similar in their descriptions of 
possible "I-Thou" relationships and in their agreement as 
to what constitutes a genuine dialogue. Jaspers work is 
congruent although he does not categorize possible 
relationships as Buber and Gadamer do. 
The relation of reason to dialogue is not of major 
concern in Buber's work. The spirit of the act of 
communication is what is essential for him. For Jaspers, 
196 
reason is crucial. it is the "total will to communicate" 
and the bond among all modes of Encompassing. Communica¬ 
tion, for Jaspers, rests on, is put into motion by, and 
is characterized (in its concern for truth in time) by 
reason. Gadamer would not disagree with emphasis on the 
importance of reason. However, for him, the prior 
question is that of language and understanding. For 
Gadamer, understanding is the mode of being and language 
is the form in which understanding is possible. Thus, 
language becomes central to his philosophy as reason is 
central for Jaspers and religious relation is central for 
Buber. 
While there are both many affinities and variations 
among them, Jaspers, Buber and Gadamer differ most 
fundamentally in terms of the grounding of dialogue in 
their philosophies. For Buber, the existence of a 
relationship with an immanent Deity is fundamental. 
Faith in the actuality of this religious relationship 
(which is absolutely personal and not to be restricted to 
existing in any particular religious creed) is essential 
for dialogue to occur. Buber thus repudiates Jaspers 
because he believes Jaspers violates the dialogical 
principle in his rejection of God as personality to be 
addressed and responded to as a "Thou" present in every 
act of dialogue. Buber would probably repudiate Gadamer 
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on the same grounds. Jaspers repudiates Buber as being 
too "prophetical," too oriented to faith while being 
insufficiently concerned with reason. He rejects Buber 
as being too dogmatical and offering a philosophy that is 
potentially dangerous in leading people away from the 
real task of existence, i.e., communicative struggle with 
other human beings to find truth of self-being. Gadamer 
does not refer to Buber's work. Jaspers and Gadamer do 
not deny the existence of a Deity, but this is not 
foundational to their philosophic thought or to their 
conceptions of dialogue. Gadamer's "faith" is in the 
possibility of a living tradition in which new meanings 
can constantly be found that create present and future 
possibilities for existing understandingly. Jaspers' 
"faith" is in the possibility of a mode of being a person 
that seeks (the unattainable) unity of Being and truth in 
the face of historic multiplicity and disunity. 
In spite of differences among them, valuable 
insights about dialogue can be derived from their work. 
Examination of the common ground in their work yields a 
set of guidelines that are useful in thinking about 
dialogue. 
Guidelines for Thinking about Dialogue 
The following set of guidelines for thinking about 
dialogue can be derived from the work of Buber, Gadamer 
and Jaspers. These are intended to reflect the affinities 
while not minimizing the differences in their thought. 
Such guidelines can serve as a basis for further thought 
on the topic of dialogue and as a starting point for 
educators' thinking about their philosophies of education 
and their interactions with students and subject matter. 
1. The dialogical process enables a person to progress 
toward becoming an authentic person actualizing potential 
possibilities of being. 
2. Dialogue is the mode of communication that allows 
beings to express themselves in their uniqueness. 
3. As a partner in genuine dialogue, a person opens him 
or herself to what is expressed by the other and in so 
doing receives a truth of the other. 
4. In receiving this truth of the other, a person 
discovers, as well, new truths about him or herself. 
5. In genuine dialogue, the partners relate to each 
other in their respective singularity as unique beings. 
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6. In the dialogical relationship, neither partner 
relates to the other with an attitude of superiority or 
inferiority, dominance or submission. 
7. In dialogical relationship with its moments of 
existential communication, new meanings and understandings 
emerge. 
8. These new meanings and understandings can be sources 
for further dialogue. Every dialogue in its finitude has 
an element of infinity. All that is said relates to all 
that is unsaid; the possibility of resumption of dialogue 
inheres in its rupture or termination. 
9. The contents of dialogue are part of what constitutes 
the dialogical relationship and the relationship is also 
what enables the meanings of the contents to emerge. 
10. A kind of dialogue, analogous with interhuman 
dialogue, is possible with non-human entities if they are 
related to as they express their uniqueness. 
11. In this kind of dialogue, meanings can emerge, 
truths can be expressed, and understandings can happen, 
analogous to this possibility in the process of interhuman 
dialogue. 
12. Because meaning, understanding and truths emerge 
from dialogue and because dialogue occurs between partners 
in their singularity, meanings, understandings and truths 
are perspectival. Neither the self nor the other can 
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ever be fully known because being is emergent and is 
constantly being created in situations. This is true 
also of meaning, understanding and truth. No coercion 
can inhere because truth, meaning and understanding are 
sought as they are personal to each individual. 
13. In dialogue and action, possibilities of being 
emerge and are actualized. In order to enact being and 
self-being, a person must engage dialogically with others 
and act in the world. 
14. Because knowledge, meaning, understanding, and truth 
are perspectival, a person must act on the basis of 
existential commitment. 
15. In dialogue, a person is enabled to choose and act 
responsibly because choices and actions are taken in 
response to the expressed self-being of the other and the 
self. Choices and actions thus contain an existential 
meaning, understanding and truth. In responding and 
taking responsibility, a person self-actualizes as 
authentic self-being, human and humane, in an on-going 
process. 
16. In choosing and acting responsively and responsibly, 
a person acts in the sphere of "We" created in the 
dialogical "I-Thou" encounter. In the "We" sphere, each 
partner is an "I" and a "Thou," an authentic being, never 
a means or member of a collectivity. This is the case 
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because it is through the dialogical encounter and the 
enactment of a "We" sphere that the person self-actualizes 
authentically while mutually impelling the other's self- 
actualization. Together they enact the community which 
is the "We." 
17. As being is emergent, the dialogical relationship 
and the "We" community are emergent, continually being 
enacted in dialogical encounters. They are evanescent in 
their creation as fleeting moments of existential 
communication; however, they are on-going in the 
consistency and continuity of moments that constitute a 
life and relationships in which the resumption of 
dialogical communication inheres as a possibility at 
every moment. 
Endnotes 
1. On the other hand, Cohen points out that 
In considering the nature of such religious 
feeling, Buber goes so far as to argue that even 
a person who actually believes himself to be 
repudiating God, if in doing so he addresses with 
his whole being the Thou in his own life, a Thou 
which will not be diminished by any other Thou, 
also calls on God. [Cohen, 1983, p. 117] 
2. "Prophetic philosophies" like Buber's seem blind to 
Jaspers. He says, "Prophetic metaphysics is able to 
proclaim its contents on the basis of original certitude" 
(Jaspers, quoted in Ehrlich, 1975, p. 96). One senses 
that, for Jaspers, the "tender mood of a universal 
bonding" and anything smacking of "original certitude" 
are perceived as both facile and dogmatic because of 
Jaspers' conviction that reason and faith can, should and 
do work together. As Ehrlich points out, communication 
is, for Jaspers, despite Buber's denial, an "experience 
of faith" -- "faith in the possibility of truth in its 
oneness in the face of historic multiplicity" (Ehrlich, 
1975, p. 94). 
3. In this use of "hearing," Jaspers is similar to 
Gadamer. Gadamer emphasizes "hearing" as opposed to 
"seeing" because the person cannot turn away and not hear 
as the person can turn away and not see (see Gadamer, 
1975, pp. 419-29). 
4. It is necessary here to remember that when Gadamer 
uses the term "understanding" or Jaspers the term 
"reason," they are not restricting themselves to 
"objective" knowledge of particulars such as that derived 
through action of the intellect (as in scientific 
thought). Rather, both refer to the realm of thinking 
and meaning that seeks to transcend (limited) factual 
knowledge and cogent certitude about entities. Reason, 
for Jaspers, and understanding, for Gadamer, are concerne 
with Being in its expression of itself in beings and also 
in its transcendence of beings as factual entities t a 
are, to some extent, verifiably knowable. Gadamer s 
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"understanding" and Jaspers' "reason" both transcend the 
workings of intellect, which are subsumed as modes of 
knowing under "reason" or "understanding." Reason and 
understanding seek connections, wholes or unities as 
pointing toward the existentially unattainable unity 
beyond all questionableness and perspectivity. 
5. This would be the case unless willing and thinking are 
differentiated as they are, for example, in Arendt's 
work. Then willing and thinking would not necessarily 
involve the same characteristics (see Arendt, 1978). 
6. This will be discussed below after considering 
Buber's thought on language. Jaspers' arguments against 
Kaufmann can be directed against Buber and Gadamer, 
although Gadamer's work is more easily defended against 
Jaspers' critique. 
7. In this respect, Buber sounds more like Habermas than 
like Gadamer. Some interesting questions do arise in 
this connection that are outside the scope of this 
dissertation. For example, if the "We" comes into being 
when a person reveals him/herself so that s/he is perceiv¬ 
ed as s/he really is or so that his or her transmission 
of an experience penetrates the other's experience and 
consummates the other, is the "I" actually helpless in 
constituting dialogue and a "We" if the other refuses to 
engage? If so, is there something lacking in the "I," in 
the "Thou," or in the "We"? To which does the existential 
guilt, of which Jaspers writes, adhere? Is a 
communication dialogical if it is intended to be so but 
is not received as such and, hence, the reply, which 
Jaspers insists on, is lacking? If it is the case, as 
Buber fears, that the "We" is being replaced in the 
modern world by the collectivity, can a person be prevent¬ 
ed by others from living dialogically and as possible 
Existenz if it is his or her intention to do so and his 
or her best efforts are directed at doing so? For Buber 
and Gadamer, while these problems exist, they are less 
urgent than for Jaspers because of the possibility of non¬ 
human entities as dialogical partners. Because of 
Jaspers' insistence that dialogue is possible only 
between human beings and that the "I" becomes a self only 
through dialogical relationship, these questions would 
seem to be crucial ones. Today, many responsible, 
thoughtful social critics warn of the dangers of reifica¬ 
tion and of the tendency of bureaucrats and other 
"experts," including scientists, to use language that 
(intentionally or not) prevents communication or distorts 
it into one-way communication. These issues must be 
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addressed in dialogical philosophizing. Buber, Gadamer 
and Jaspers do not seem to sufficiently come to terms 
with these issues. This may impair the usefulness of 
their work. Failure to resolve these issues may lead to 
a more Sartrean view of the other as an obstacle to 
existential freedom and authenticity (with all the non- 
dialogical consequences inherent in such a position). It 
may be that the work of Habermas or Ricoeur can offer 
some directions for consideration, especially if it can 
be coupled with the work of Buber, Gadamer and Jaspers. 
8. For Buber, the necessary conditions for social 
partnership and true community, the sphere of the "We," 
include: mutuality, realization, partnership, land, 
independent labor, communal life, a center, organic 
community, the public, representation and leadership, 
humanity, spirit, and God (see Cohen, 1983, pp. 107-110). 
9. It should, in fairness to Buber, be noted that Buber 
tries to avoid precisely this in his rejection of 
mysticism and his insistence that God addresses human 
being through the events in the world. Buber argues that 
the purpose of existence "has a personal character and 
represents the realization of the intention in an infinite 
variety of shapes and guises" (Cohen, 1983, p. 36). He 
also writes of human existence in terms or its concrete¬ 
ness and situationality (see Cohen, 1983, p. 104). 
However, Jaspers is not reassured on this score. 
PART II 
INTRODUCTION 
The two-part premise of this dissertation is that: 
(1) confluent education is an appropriate response to the 
current state of our society and (2) confluent education 
can be rendered more effective by a philosophical analysis 
of the concept of dialogue. In Part I of the dissertation 
I have related the work of Martin Buber, Hans-Georg 
Gadamer and Karl Jaspers to the phenomenological 
existential and hermeneutic traditions and have 
comparatively analyzed their work on dialogue. The 
conclusion of Part I suggested some guideline for thinking 
about dialogue. 
Part II of the dissertation will consider some 
implications for educators of this analysis of dialogue. 
More specifically, it will attempt to indicate how these 
implications can enhance the practice of confluent 
education. The central assumption on which this section 
is based is that education is most effective if it is 
ontologically rooted. Confluent education is predicat¬ 
ed on the phenomenological existential perspective as is 
the work of Buber, Gadamer and Jaspers; the ontological 
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dimensions of their work are congruent with those of 
confluent educators. 
Six ontological aspects of the work of Buber, 
Gadamer and Jaspers are of particular relevance in 
formulating an understanding of pedagogical obligations 
in education that is ontologically rooted in this 
philosophical perspective. First, human beings are born 
into an existing historical-cultural tradition, a humanly- 
constituted world of other human beings. Second, human 
beings are born with a realm of personal freedom to 
actualize themselves as unique persons. Third, human 
beings actualize themselves through choices, commitments 
and actions for which they are responsible. Fourth, 
because human beings self-actualize through living in a 
social world, they self-actualize in relation to others 
and to the extant and emergent human tradition. Fifth, 
because, human beings exist understandingly and the 
medium of understanding is language, the relation to 
others through which human beings self-actualize is a 
communicative relationship. Sixth, as long as they 
exist, individual human beings and the human tradition 
are emergent. 
The work of Buber, Gadamer and Jaspers describes 
the communicative relationship through which human beings 
self-actualize as dialogical. In dialogical relationship, 
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each person is related to with caring, concernful, 
involved, loving respect as a unique, self-actualizing 
subject, a "Thou." in dialogical relationship, mutual 
self-actualization occurs, a "We" sphere is created and 
community is enacted. While other modes of interaction 
are practiced, for Buber, Gadamer and Jaspers, it is only 
through dialogical relationship that self-actualization 
as an authentic, emergent person is possible. 
Education that is ontologically rooted in this 
perspective entails certain pedagogical obligations, 
three of which have particular congruence with and 
relevance for the practice of confluent education. 
First, education should make each student aware of him or 
herself as a free, choosing, responsible, emergent, self- 
actualizing person. Second, it should help the student 
to know and understand in a personally meaningful way the 
human tradition of which the student is a part. Third, 
it should facilitate the student's engagement in the 
dialogical communication and relationships through and in 
which self-actualization takes place. In Part II of this 
dissertation these obligations will be considered in 
terms of the teacher-student relationship, content 
selection and teaching methods. 
The teacher-student relationship to be described 
models a dialogical relationship in an education setting. 
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Such a relationship is intended to heighten the student's 
ontological self-awareness and to enhance the student's 
ability to interact dialogically. It attempts to preserve 
and expand each participant's realm of personal freedom 
and to demonstrate that this freedom is not simply 
negative freedom from coercion but also positive freedom 
for responsible self-actualization. 
Selection of content will be discussed in terms of 
the obligation to help students understand the human 
tradition in personally meaningful ways. It will be 
argued from the perspective that content is essentially a 
tool for self-actualization. Content should be selected 
on the basis of insights (by the teacher and students) 
into what each student seems to need to enhance self- 
actualization. From this perspective, a variety of 
content can be appropriate because of situational unique¬ 
ness. Further, the broader the array of perspectives 
available in content, the more likely content is to be 
relevant to self-actualization. What is more important 
than specific content per se, beyond basic skills, is the 
kind of interactions with content that students experience 
and learn to initiate. 
It is from this position that teaching methods will 
be considered. It will be argued that teaching methods 
and enhance the possibility of the should preserve 
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dialogical communication and relationships through which 
self-actualization occurs. A variety of methods -- 
including lecture, seminar, laboratory, whole-group 
discussion and small-group interactions -- can be 
implemented with a dialogical orientation. This orienta¬ 
tion will be delineated in terms of a Socratic 
dialectical-dialogical method, which is exemplified in 
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. 
In each chapter of Part II, discussion will be 
related specifically to confluent education. In a 
general sense, the work of Buber, Gadamer and Jaspers 
provides a broad philosophical grounding for confluent 
education. The writings of Buber and Jaspers on education 
offer as well more specific contributions to consideration 
of the teacher-student relationship and content selection. 
Jaspers' work on education also has some relevance in 
terms of methodological implications. However, it is the 
work of Gadamer that is most useful in terms of 
methodological implications. Specific reference to and 
analysis of their work will be included in each chapter. 
Use will also be made of the work of writers who, although 
not confluent educators, write on education from a 
phenomenological existential perspective. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE TEACHER-STUDENT RELATIONSHIP 
Introduction 
One of the pedagogic obligations of ontologically- 
rooted education is to heighten students' awareness of 
themselves as free, choosing, responsible, emergent, self- 
actualizing persons. This conception of personhood 
inheres in the dialogical relationship and is expressed 
in "I-Thou" communication. A teacher-student relationship 
that models dialogical relationship provides a ground for 
students' experiencing and developing ontological self- 
awareness. The work on education of Buber and Jaspers 
offers some insights into the teacher's role in 
constituting dialogical teacher-student relationships. 
Such relationships are congruous with and implicit in the 
writings of confluent educators. 
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Jaspers" Thought 
In The Idea of the University (1959), Jaspers sets 
forth his thoughts on university education. There are 
four aspects of his thought that have relevance to 
consideration of dialogical teacher-student relationship: 
student as community participant; freedom to learn; 
communication; effects of university education. 
In the opening statement of The Idea of the 
University, Jaspers writes: "The university is a community 
of scholars and students engaged in the task of seeking 
truth" (Jaspers, 1959, p. 1). Here Jaspers introduces 
three foundational ideas: the university is a community; 
scholars and students engage together; the common task is 
seeking truth. Inherent in the notion of community is 
the concept of a "We-sphere" as opposed to a collectivity. 
Community is characterized by dialogical relationships, 
which in his philosophical work Jaspers describes as 
pervaded by a mutual, loving struggle for truth of self¬ 
being. Jaspers" dialogue is characterized by mutual 
respect of each participant for each other and a sense of 
equality among participants. As a community of scholars 
and students, the university is made up of people who are 
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struggling together, with respect and concernful involve¬ 
ment and with care for each other's unique personhood. 
Their mutual task is the struggle for truth, i.e., 
existential truth of self-being. Jaspers states this in 
his description of the aim of two of the three 
indissolubly-linked activities of university life 
(research, teaching and creative cultural education, see 
Jaspers, 1959, p. 37): 
Understanding . . . presupposes the 
intellectual maturity not just of the mind but of 
the whole man. It therefore follows that instruc¬ 
tion and research must aim for more than the 
transmission of bare facts and skills. They must 
aim for the formation of the whole man, for 
education in the broadest sense of the term. 
[Jaspers, 1959, p. 3] 
As a participant in the university community, the student 
is involved in the creative culture of the community. 
Jaspers characterizes the ethos of this culture as taking 
the form of scholarly, scientific discipline and 
outlook. [1] 
As a member of the university community, the 
student, like all other members, must have freedom to 
learn. Jaspers is particularly firm on this point and 
reiterates it in many forms. Characteristic is this 
comment that connects freedom with community participa¬ 
tion : 
The university is a school -- but of a very 
special sort. It is intended not merely as a 
place for instruction; rather, the student is to 
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participate actively in research and from this 
experience he is to acquire the intellectual 
discipline and education which will remain with 
him throughout his life. Ideally, the student 
thinks independently, listens critically and is 
responsible to himself. He has the freedom to 
learn. [Jaspers, 1959, p. 1] 
When he writes of teaching and learning at the university, 
Jaspers emphasizes that there can be no external 
compulsion in the search for truth. As the faculty must 
have academic freedom, so also must the students. The 
student is not to be given assignments nor compelled by 
requirements; for Jaspers, these block the "will to know." 
The student is the "becomer" ("possible Existenz") in his 
or her own process of self-actualization as the student 
is a seeker of truth. The student must take responsibi¬ 
lity, choose and act as part of the process of self- 
actualization. Jaspers warns: "As you stifle the 
student's freedom to learn as he sees fit you stifle the 
life of the mind" (Jaspers, 1959, p. 61). He contends 
that "If he is lucky, the individual student makes his 
own way, a way that leads to development and purpose, 
guided only by his personal intuition" (Jaspers, 1959, p. 
40). Jaspers adds that the student will reflect on the 
questions of the direction, order and aims of his or her 
work because the "will to know" implies the will to 
understand clearly what one is doing. These statements 
typify Jaspers' thorough commitment to personal freedom 
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and exemplify his conviction that a person's "true" self 
emerges in the process of struggling with existential 
freedom. Writing of university education, he states: 
University education is a formative process 
aimed at a meaningful freedom. It takes place 
through participation in the university's 
intellectual life. . . . 
. . . [The university's] principle is to 
furnish all tools and offer all possibilities in 
the province of the intellect, to direct the 
individual to the frontiers, to refer the learner 
back to himself for all his decisions, to his own 
sense of responsibility. . . . The university 
demands a ruthless will to know. Since learning 
and personal initiative go hand in hand, the 
university aims for the broadest possible develop¬ 
ment of independence and personal responsibility. 
Within its sphere, it respects no authority other 
than truth in its infinite variety, the truth 
which all are seeking and yet no one can claim to 
possess in final and complete form. [Jaspers, 
1959, pp. 52-53] 
Initially, this perspective may seem harsh to those 
educated to teach in American institutions of higher 
learning; however, it must be remembered that, for 
Jaspers, this total non-interference is part of the 
community life with its mutual respect and caring among 
members. A kind of personal "support" lies in the 
community bond and in the central dynamic of the universi¬ 
ty community, communication. Moreover, assurance of 
personal freedom is necessary to the possibility of self- 
actualization that is fundamental in Jaspers philosophy. 
To put constraints upon a person's freedom would be to 
deny him or her possibilities of self-being. 
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The university community, for Jaspers, is pervasive¬ 
ly characterized by communication. He contends that for 
the work of the university to be accomplished there must 
be thoughtful, on-going communication: "Communication of 
all with all is necessary -- each according to his 
intellectual level" (Jaspers, 1959, p. 37). Here again, 
as in so much of Jaspers" writing, the centrality of 
communication to thinking existence is evident. As part 
of academic freedom, he insists that all ideas and 
viewpoints should be included in the university, providing 
there are reputable scholars to represent them. All 
ideas should be discussed because only in communication 
among thinking people can questions be posed, biases 
reduced, ideas tested and clarified. For Jaspers, the 
creative cultural life of the university requires cross- 
disciplinary and interdisciplinary interpersonal 
communication. [2] The university is obligated to the 
search for truth and Jaspers sees communication as a 
function of the search for truth: "It tests truth by 
testing its effects" (Jaspers, 1959, p. 63). He believes 
that the manner in which communication takes place at the 
university is the responsibility of all members of the 
university and that their conscious reflection on the 
nature of communication can make possible the kind of 
communication that sustains intellectual life (Jaspers, 
1959, p. 64). For Jaspers, it is characteristic of 
people at the university that they exhibit a "will to 
communicate," of which he writes: 
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The will to communicate turns upon everything 
strange and distant, also upon people who would 
like to shut themselves up in a world of private 
beliefs. Those who want to communicate of their 
own accord run the risk of being put to question 
because only when they are questioned to the 
utmost does it become clear whether they are 
heading in the right direction. . . . 
To be permeated by the idea of the university 
is part of a way of life. It is the will to 
search and seek without limitation, to allow 
reason to develop unrestrictedly, to have an open 
mind, to leave nothing unquestioned, to maintain 
truth unconditionally, . . . [Jaspers, 1959, pp. 
67-68] 
Communication, then, is central to university life, as it 
is to personal self-actualization. As a free participant 
in the university community, the student is actively 
involved in the on-going communicative process with both 
faculty and other students. In this communication, 
particularly in dyadic dialogical communication, the 
student is enabled to test ideas, find directions for 
further thought and enact the learning process. 
By participating freely in the university community, 
the student undergoes a kind of formative process. In 
this process, the student develops what Jaspers calls 
"the faculties for scholarly and scientific thinking 
(Jaspers, 1959, p. 45). He writes: 
The decisive factor ... is not the body of fact 
learned, but one's judgment. What matters then 
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is not factual knowledge by itself but the 
ability and initiative to go out and get the 
facts on one s own, to think about them effective¬ 
ly, to know what questions to ask. . . . [T]he 
most important factors . . . remain: an active 
intellect, the ability to grasp problems and pose 
questions, the mastery of method. [Jaspers, 
1959, p. 46] 
The university education develops a kind of attitude or 
mind-set in students. Jaspers describes this by reference 
to the Roman concept of Humanitas: "the listening to 
arguments, understanding, the ability to think along with 
the viewpoint of others, honesty, discipline and 
consistency" (Jaspers, 1959, p. 53; see also Endnote 1, 
Chapter IV). To the extent that the university education 
succeeds in involving the whole person, it enhances the 
person's "proper humanity." However, while education is 
thus education of character or personality, this mind-set 
or "scholarly and scientific" outlook can be only a by¬ 
product arising spontaneously from participation in 
university education. It is acquired as part of the 
process of research, communication and full participation 
in the creative cultural life of the university. 
To summarize, then, Jaspers work on university 
education provides four aspects that pertain to considera¬ 
tion of dialogical teacher-student relationship. First, 
teachers and students are fellow members of a community 
whose common task is the pursuit of truth. As community 
constituting participants in a "We- 
members, they are 
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sphere" that is characterized by freedom, respect and 
dialogical communication. Second, teachers and students 
must have academic freedom. Students should have all 
possible resources to further their learning and should 
be free of hampering assignments and requirements that 
interfere with their "will to know." Third, the central 
dynamic of the learning community is communication, among 
all participants. This communication involves the 
participants' mutually struggling to test and clarify 
ideas, reduce biases and find further direction for 
thought and study. Ehrlich's description of Jaspers' 
understanding of communication offers an important 
reminder: 
Communication is . . . not an activity of 
transmission of truth by those who supposedly 
possess it to those who do not. Rather, it is 
the loving struggle of bringing each other forth, 
of mutually impelling the other's becoming 
himself and his truth. [Ehrlich, 1975, p. 81] 
There is equality of personhood in dialogical communica¬ 
tion. Fourth, the outcome of university education is a 
kind of outlook or mind-set that arises as a spontaneous 
by-product of the educative process. The essence of the 
educative process, then, is not merely transmission of or 
mastery of a body of factual knowledge, but rather 
development of judgment, commitment to reason, 
intellectual integrity, and ability to think. 
It has been demonstrated, I think, that the type of 
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education Jaspers envisions meets the pedagogic obligation 
of heightening students' awareness of themselves as free, 
choosing, responsible, emergent, self-actualizing persons. 
Some implications for the teacher's role in developing 
dialogical teacher-student relationships can be straight¬ 
forwardly inferred. The teacher perceives the students as 
fellow members of a learning community with the right of 
full participation. The teacher preserves and attempts 
to facilitate expansion of the students' academic freedom 
with faith that this freedom will enhance the potential 
expression of the students' "will to know." The teacher 
eschews assignments and requirements and refers the 
student back to his or her own responsibility for learning 
and making decisions. The teacher recognizes the impor¬ 
tance of interpersonal communication as a central dynamic 
of the educative process and encourages and engages in 
thoughtful discussions and dialogue with students. The 
teacher must be available and show willingness to enter 
into communication with students. In this communication, 
the teacher acts as an equal (if senior) partner rather 
than as the dominating member (this will be discussed 
further below in the chapter on method). The teacher 
maintains awareness that the educative process and the 
relationships within the learning community are effective 
dimensions of the student's process of self-actualization 
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as an authentic person. 
While the focus of this dissertation is on higher 
education, much of confluent education occurs at the pre- 
collegiate level. Although Jaspers' writing on education 
refers to university education, Buber's is directed as 
well at the pre-university level. It is, however, 
congruent in many respects with Jaspers' thought and 
supports the hypothesis that much of what Jaspers contends 
can be generalized to education of pre-university 
students. Buber's work offers further insights into the 
nature of a dialogical teacher-student relationship since 
this is the central theme in much of his writing on 
education. 
Buber's Thought 
Like Jaspers' writings on education, Buber's work 
emphasizes the freedom of the student and the importance 
of education's heightening students' ontological self- 
awareness. Buber's work, however, more than Jaspers', 
emphasizes the dialogical teacher-student relationship 
and characterizes more fully its nature. For Buber, the 
essence of education is dialogical relationship. 
Buber defines education as "a selection by man of 
the effective world: it means to give decisive effective 
power to a selection of the world which is concentrated 
and manifested in the educator" (Buber, 1965, p. 89). It 
is in and through the teacher's presence as a human being 
that selected aspects of the world "educate" a student. 
For Buber, the teacher essentially teaches by who she or 
he is as a person: 
[l]f the educator of our day has to act conscious¬ 
ly he must nevertheless do it "as though he did 
not." That raising of the finger, that question¬ 
ing glance, are his genuine doing. Through him 
the selection of the effective world reaches the 
pupil. He fails the recipient when he presents 
this selection to him with a gesture of interfer¬ 
ence. It must be concentrated in him; and doing 
out of concentration has the appearance of rest. 
Interference divides the soul in his care into an 
obedient part and a rebellious part. But a hidden 
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influence proceeding from his integrity has an 
integrating force. [Buber, 1965, p. 90] 
The educator represents both the elements or aspects of 
the world and relationships; both educate the student, 
but Buber says the educator must be to the student as one 
of the elements of the world (Buber, 1965, p. 90). What 
is implied is that the educator as a presence, as an 
element of the world, is there to be approached by the 
student. In so being there, the educator makes available 
a selection of the world to be investigated by the 
student; this selection will influence the student in the 
course of his or her experience relating with it in the 
person of the teacher. 
Buber reinforces this view of the educator by 
emphasizing and analyzing freedom in the educative 
relationship. Buber considers freedom in education in 
terms of a polarity between compulsion and communion: 
Compulsion in education means disunion, it means 
humiliation and rebelliousness. Communion in 
education is just communion, it means being 
opened up and drawn in. Freedom in education is 
the possibility of communion; . . . [Buber, 1965, 
p. 91] [3] 
To enter into communion, a person must be independent; 
however, Buber stresses that 11 independence is a 
footbridge, not a dwelling place" (Buber, 1965, p. 91). 
Freedom is neither the essence nor the goal of education. 
Rather, it is a necessity for enacting communion. [4] 
223 
Freedom allows a person to take personal responsibility, 
which, for Buber, inherently involves the responsiveness 
that is fundamental to communion. [5] Freedom in educa¬ 
tion, then, is freedom for responsibility, responsiveness 
and communion. Education must help the student to 
respond personally to what addresses him or her from the 
world and, thus, live dialogically. 
From this basis, Buber describes the foundational 
relation of education. He calls this relation 
"experiencing the other side." He differentiates this 
"experiencing the other side" from empathy in which a 
person "loses" or "excludes" him or herself from what is 
being experienced. [6] Rather, for Buber, what occurs is 
inclusion: 
It is the extension of one's own concreteness, 
the fulfillment of the actual situation of life, 
the complete presence of the reality in which one 
participates. Its elements are, first, a 
relation, of no matter what kind, between two 
persons, second, an event experienced by them in 
common, in which at least one of them actively 
participates, and, third, the fact that this one 
person, without forfeiting anything of the felt 
reality of his activity, at the same time lives 
through the common event from the standpoint of 
the other. [Buber, 1965, p. 97] 
For Buber, a relationship that is characterized by the 
element of inclusion is a dialogical relationship. 
Buber straightforwardly states that, "The relation 
in education is one of pure dialogue" (Buber, 1965, p. 
He adds that the most "inward achievement" of this 98) . 
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relationship in education is the trust in the world 
experienced by the student because of the teacher: 
"Because this human being exists, meaninglessness . . . 
cannot be the real truth" (Buber, 1965, p. 98). 
However, Buber distinguishes the dialogical 
relationship in education from other types of dialogical 
relationships. [7] The dialogical relationship in 
education creates reality and mutuality between the 
teacher and student; however, while the educative 
dialogical relationship is based on inclusion, it is not 
an inclusion relationship because its essence is a one¬ 
sided experience of inclusion. Only the teacher 
"experiences the other side." Because the educator is 
the medium through which a selection of the world affects 
a student, the educator must constantly attempt to 
experience how the educating is appearing to the student. 
The teacher must try to experience him or herself from 
the student's perspective and feel how his or her 
influence is affecting the student. However, Buber 
directly states that this inclusion cannot be mutual. The 
educator must experience the student's being educated, 
"but the pupil cannot experience the educating of the 
educator. The educator stands at both ends of the common 
situation, the pupil only at one end" (Buber, 1965, p. 
The moment the student is able to experience the 100) . 
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educator s side of the relationship, the educative 
relation is shattered or changed into friendship. 
For Buber, it is critical that the teacher 
continually practice inclusion because there is always the 
danger that the "will to educate" may degenerate into 
arbitrariness such that the teacher may "carry out his 
selection and influence from himself and his idea of the 
pupil, not from the pupil's own reality" (Buber, 1965, p. 
100). [8] In the dialogical inclusion act, the teacher 
attempts to experience what the student is accepting or 
rejecting of what is approaching the student from the 
teacher. From this experience, Buber believes, the 
educator is enabled to select from the world what the 
student needs for self-actualization, draw those aspects 
into him or herself and make them present to the student. 
In learning from time to time what this human 
being needs and does not need at the moment, the 
educator is led to an ever deeper recognition of 
what the human being needs in order to grow. But 
he is also led to the recognition of what he, the 
"educator," is able and what he is unable to give 
of what is needed -- and what he can give now, 
and what not yet. [Buber, 1965, p. 101] 
In this understanding of the dialogical teacher-student 
relationship, Buber's work reflects his awareness that 
education is rooted in the ontological being of the 
student. [9] The student's freedom for self-actualization 
must be preserved even while educative forces influence 
the student. Delicacy, humility and non-intrusiveness 
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should characterize the teacher's choosing and presenting 
to the student aspects of the world. The interaction 
between them is based on the teacher's genuine attempt to 
be led by the student's needs. 
Insight into Buber's understanding that the real 
task of education is development of character helps to 
explain why, for him, the essence of education must be 
the dialogical relationship. He writes: 
Education worthy of the name is essentially 
education of character. For the genuine educator 
does not merely consider individual functions of 
his pupil, as one intending to teach him only to 
know or to be capable of certain definite things; 
but his concern is always the person as a whole, 
both in the actuality in which he lives before 
you now and in his possibilities, what he can 
become. [Buber, 1965, p. 104] 
Buber's perception here is congruent with Jaspers' 
understanding (see above). Writing of the meaning of 
character, Buber states: 
The great character can be conceived neither 
as a system of maxims nor as a system of habits. 
It is peculiar to him to act from the whole of 
his substance. That is, it is peculiar to him to 
react in accordance with the uniqueness of every 
situation which challenges him as an active 
person. [Buber, 1965, p. 113] 
This understanding of character exemplifies what Buber, 
in his philosophical writings, describes as living 
dialogically. For Buber, there is always something new, 
particular and unique in every situation in life. This 
uniqueness is often overlooked in emphasis on similarity. 
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However, Buber contends that it is precisely the unique¬ 
ness of a situation that must be responded to and address¬ 
ed; this cannot be adequately done on the basis of maxims 
or codes of behavior. He states: 
It demands of you a reaction which cannot be 
prepared beforehand. it demands nothing of what 
is past. It demands presence, responsibility; it 
demands you. I call a great character one who by 
his actions and attitudes satisfies the claim of 
situations out of a deep readiness to respond 
with his whole life, and in such a way that the 
sum of his actions and attitudes expresses at the 
same time the unity of his being in its willing¬ 
ness to accept responsibility. [Buber, 1965. p. 
114] [10] 
In this statement, Buber both presents a model for the 
teacher's relating to the demands of the classroom 
situation and articulates a goal for education. Buber 
believes the goal of "great character" is an appropriate 
one for education because it can positively influence all 
students (not merely the exceptional few who may realize 
great character as part of their being). He believes 
that all students can be assisted to move away from 
collectivity toward self-actualization, personal unity 
and community (Buber, 1965, pp. 115-16). [11] 
The essence of education, then, for Buber, must be 
dialogical relationship because he does not believe that 
character can be taught directly. He writes: 
Only in his whole being, in all his spontaneity 
can the educator truly affect the whole being of 
his pupil. For educating characters you do not 
need a moral genius, but you do need a man who is 
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wholly alive and able to communicate himself 
directly to his fellow beings. His aliveness 
streams out to them and affects them most strongly 
and purely when he has no thought of affecting 
them. [Buber, 1965, p. 105] 
For Buber, the educator wills to influence students and 
is consciously aware that he or she is representing to 
students a selection of the world, particularly a selec¬ 
tion of what is "right" and what "should be." From this 
will and consciousness, the educator gains humility, self- 
awareness, recognition of the need for "experiencing the 
other side," and a determination to base his or her 
educating on what is expressed by the student as the 
student's needs. The teacher also understands that the 
only way she or he can influence students is through 
winning their confidence and trust (Buber, 1965, p. 106) 
and being a model (not by direct teaching or preaching). 
Buber is not specific about how the student's 
confidence and trust are to be won. This seems to be a 
result of the teacher's being fully present, in his or 
her spontaneous authenticity as a human being, and 
"turning toward" or "reaching out delicately" to the 
student. Somehow the teacher's receptivity is communicat¬ 
ed, presumably because of his or her acceptance of, 
responsibility toward and inclusion of the student in the 
dialogical relationship. For Buber, this experiencing of 
the educator by the student gains the student's trust and 
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confidence and makes it possible for the student to 
approach and ask something of the educator. Buber writes 
only: 
Confidence, of course, is not won by the strenuous 
endeavor to win it, but by direct and ingenuous 
participation in the life of the people one is 
dealing with -- in this case the life of one's 
pupils -- and by assuming the responsibility 
which arises from such participation. It is not 
the educational intention but it is the meeting 
which is educationally fruitful. [Buber, 1965, 
p. 107] 
Once the student and the teacher stand in relationship, 
then Buber believes that everything that occurs between 
them, even in the absence of any deliberate intention, 
opens a way for education of character (Buber, 1965, p. 
107). Even conflicts and disagreements can have educa¬ 
tional value if the educator meets the test properly: "Not 
for a moment may he conduct a dialectical manoeuvre 
instead of the real battle for truth" (Buber, 1965, p. 
107) . 
Donald Vandenberg's thought on the educative 
relationship offers insight into how the student s trust 
and confidence are won. It may be a useful supplement to 
Buber's ideas. Vandenberg writes: 
If pedagogy is merely helping the child or pupil 
to become an adult, pedagogical striving depends 
upon the pupil's wanting-to-be-someone-himself 
and the exploration of the world prompted by the 
striving-to-be-independently, for by helping 
under these conditions -- that is, by disclosing 
possibilities in the world that the child is 
exploring — pedagogical striving inserts itself 
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between the child's helplessness and his striving 
to be someone himself. it inserts itself within 
the pupil s project of being and grounds itself. 
. . . The acceptance of such help, then, is the 
ontological ground of pedagogical authority. it 
is when educating has significance for his being. 
. . . [W]hen what is said helps the child, it 
is accepted. [Vandenberg, 1971, p. 67] 
Vandenberg fails to qualify his thought here, as Buber 
does, by perceiving independence as a "footbridge" or 
means to communion although he does relate it to "being 
someone himself." Indeed, he writes that the real aim of 
helping the child is to be able to stop helping by 
increasing the child's independence (Vandenberg, 1971, p. 
67). However, his thought is useful in offering a 
possible insight into how the educator gains the student's 
trust and confidence. His work suggests that the student 
is not only receptive to but is deliberately seeking the 
educator's willingness to enhance the student's potential 
for self-actualization. The educator's communication of 
willingness and ability to help may be what the student is 
primarily attending to. The student may "test" for this 
dimension in his or her initial approaches to the teacher 
and may react to even the slightest responsiveness on the 
teacher's part. 
If this dynamic is in fact a primary dimension of 
the educative relationship, Vandenberg s work mitigates 
one criticism levelled against Buber. Buber s contention 
that the educator avoids interfering and reaches the 
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student out of a concentration of qualities in him or 
herself that "has the appearance of rest" (Buber, 1965, 
p. 90) has been perceived as inadequate to meeting the 
demands of the educational setting today. The Buberian 
educator is said to too passively await the approach of 
the student (see Kneller, 1984, pp. 51 and 63). In 
confluent education, the educator's commitment to efforts 
to integrate affective with cognitive components in 
education would seem to demonstrate immediately to the 
student that the educator is willing and able to 
contribute toward facilitation of the student's project 
of self-actualization. In this respect, the confluent 
educator seems to be at an advantage in establishing the 
dialogical relationship that Buber sees as foundational 
to education. [12] 
Another possibility for considering how the 
student's trust and confidence are won so as to establish 
dialogical relationship is offered by Clinton Collins' 
work (see Collins, in Denton, 1974, pp. 139-55). Using 
Alfred Schutz's phenomenological sociology, Collins 
describes the human being as living in multiple realities, 
the paramount reality being "everyday life." He extends 
Schutz's typification by arguing that the person 
experiences life alternatively from a first person 
a second-person "dialectical" and a 
"phenomenological," 
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third-person "political" perspective (Collins, in Denton, 
1974, pp. 141-42). The first-person perspective is that 
of "inner" reality or "stream of consciousness"; the 
second-person perspective is that of partners in dialogue; 
the third-person perspective is that of the person 
engaged in institutional life and relating to others in 
terms of role expectations (Collins, in Denton, 1974, pp. 
141-42). Collins argues that, although people live in 
alternative realities, the dialogic reality is a 
"temporally primary" reality, the first stage of develop¬ 
ment of a social self and the prototype that the person 
desires in all social relationships (Collins, in Denton, 
1974, p. 144). [13] 
Collins posits the student as "stranger" in school 
because the school has the tacit purpose of socializing 
the child into a world that is different from that of the 
(dialogical) home, into the objective, third-person 
"political" world. The student enters school as a 
stranger and an outsider in relation to the educators 
(the in-group). [14] Unfortunately, many students are 
never able to understand what is expected of them in 
school and think their status as outsiders is the result 
of personal failings or of membership in an "inferior" 
group (Collins, in Denton, 1974, pp. 51-52). Two possible 
results of this failure to understand what is expected can 
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be anti-intellectualism and conformist intellectualism. 
Collins argues that although the school is "political," 
what the student seeks is to create a dialogical relation¬ 
ship with the teacher (because that is the prototypical 
social relationship) (Collins, in Denton, 1974, p. 153). 
Collins contends that the student actively seeks to create 
the conditions for dialogical relationship with the 
teacher and assesses the quality of the educative 
experience largely on the basis of what she or he 
considers to be dialogical relationship with the teacher. 
For this reason, Collins believes, it is advantageous for 
the teacher to maintain the possibility of dialogue with 
each student (Collins, in Denton, 1974, p. 153). In this 
respect, Collins' work seems to have a more utilitarian 
tone than Buber's; however, it is congruent with Buber's 
(and Vandenberg's) in its perspective that students seek 
dialogical relationship with teachers. [15] 
To summarize, then, Buber's conception of the 
teacher-student relationship models the dialogical 
relationship that heightens students' ontological self- 
awareness and facilitates the self-actualization process. 
The relationship is characterized by the teacher s 
selection and presentation of aspects of the world to the 
students. While these act as educative forces on the 
student, they are legitimized by their derivation, 
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through the teacher s act of inclusion, from the student's 
needs. The teacher selects what will be presented to the 
student with care, humility and self-awareness; she or he 
teaches delicately, unobtrusively, by his or her personal 
presence. The essential dynamic is dialogical relating, 
being together. 
Buber s work is somewhat prescriptive in its 
explicit conviction that education is essentially educa¬ 
tion of character and in its description of great 
character. However, for Buber, this understanding is a 
constant expression of the perspective that human beings 
self-actualize in living dialogically. An education that 
facilitates a student's development of character, i.e., 
integrity, responsiveness and authenticity, is an educa¬ 
tion that enables the student to meet the unique demands 
within every situation. Such an education is ontological- 
ly congruent in that it enables a person to live the life 
of dialogue in and through which self-actualization can 
occur. 
Implications for Confluent Education 
Buber's and Jaspers' thought indicates that the 
educative relationship involves participation by whole, 
au^-h®ntic persons and aims at enhancement of participants ' 
process of self-actualization. The teacher teaches by 
the personal authenticity he or she brings into relation¬ 
ships with students. Education through dialogical 
relationship is grounded ontologically in the being of 
students as free, choosing, responsible, emergent, self- 
actualizing persons. Thus, it is meaningful and 
acceptable to students as facilitating their project of 
becoming "whole," "self-expanding," "integrated," or 
"authentic" persons. The teacher-student relationship is 
one of equality of persons rather than involving authori¬ 
tarianism, domination or coercion. It involves mutual 
respect and loving, caring concern for each participant 
as a "Thou." The relationship preserves each person's 
freedom for seeking truth and for self-actualization as a 
person who can live dialogically with others. The 
relationship is founded on and characterized by on-going 
communication that is dialogical in its openness and 
concernful respect for impelling each participant s 
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search for existential truth. Analysis of teacher- 
student relationship offers philosophical grounding for 
the commitment of confluent educators to integrating 
affect and cognition in the educative process through 
open, intimate teacher-student relationships. 
First, integration of affect and cognition is 
definitionally inherent in dialogical relationship since 
it is characterized as both concerned, caring involvement 
and as a struggle for truth. Both feeling and reason 
pervade the dialogical dynamic in its respect for each 
person as unique, emergent subjecticity and its commitment 
to facilitating each person's endeavor to find existential 
truth. In Jaspers' work the integration of affect and 
cognition can be inferred from his perception of dialogue 
as a loving struggle for truth through the medium of 
mundane contents. It can also be inferred from his 
emphasis on research as involving the whole person (not 
just the person as a specialist) and his emphasis on 
research as a primary activity in the university 
community. The university community is pervaded by an 
ethos of "scholarly and scientific" discipline that 
Jaspers characterizes as "proper humanity." The integra¬ 
tion of affect and cognition can also be inferred from 
Buber's conception of the dialogical relationship. He 
sees it as the relationship in which both human 
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authenticity inheres and "genuine" education occurs 
(i.e., education that exceeds transmission of facts and 
skills and influences the behavior of the student as a 
person). In its integration of affect and cognition, the 
dialogical teacher-student relationship serves as a basis 
for their integration in other aspects of education. It 
also enhances the effectiveness of the educative process 
by increasing its meaningfulness and acceptability to 
students. 
Second, analysis of dialogical relationship offers 
an ontological argument for commitment to open, intimate 
teacher-student relationships. The stated goal of 
confluent education is to help individuals become self- 
supporting as part of the process of "expanding the 
capacity for healthy love, experienced in a real universe" 
(see above, p. 13). The meaning of this goal is 
illuminated by demonstrating that it is in dialogical 
relationships that self-actualization occurs and it is 
the self-actualizing person who is able to enact the "I- 
Thou" relationships that are foundational to community. 
The confluent educator, in relating dialogically with 
students, is: 1) modelling the ontologically appropriate 
relationship, 2) facilitating the student's present self- 
actualization, 3) founding present community, and 
the student's development of his or her 4) facilitating 
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potential to become a person capable of living dialogical- 
ly. Authentic living and "I-Thou" relationship cannot be 
taught directly; however, they can be learned by 
experience such as that provided in dialogical teacher- 
student relationships. 
Understanding of the dialogical relationship can be 
useful in helping confluent educators avoid losing sight 
of the goal of confluent education in concentration on 
process, a danger of which Brown warns (see above, pp. 12- 
13). The existence of this danger is illustrated in the 
emphasis in writings of confluent educators on affective 
techniques and exercises derived from therapeutic models 
(see, for example. Brown, 1971 and 1975; Castillo, 1978). 
What can be legitimately inferred from the work of Buber 
is that when students learn, it is more because of the 
relationship than the activities (although these are, of 
course, interrelated). If they learn, it is because they 
respond to their own existential freedom as it is 
recognized and reflected to them by a teacher who is 
authentically responsive to them. Teaching as a personal 
expression of the self is "being" before it is doing 
and "doing" in such a way as to reflect "being. If the 
goal of confluent education is to be realized, the 
process must embody dialogical relationship. If this is 
the case, then the choice of activities flows from the 
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particular relationship in a specific situation. it can 
frs argued that almost any activities can be appropriate 
if they are rooted in and grow out of a dialogical 
relationship, reflect an integration of affect and 
cognition, and are recognized by students as contributing 
to their process of self-actualization (this will be 
discussed further in the chapter on method). 
An additional perspective of relevance for confluent 
educators follows from the position that a teacher 
teaches by his or her personal authenticity that is 
expressed in the teacher-student relationship. The 
teacher must continue to self-actualize authentically as 
a person and as a teaching person or the teacher will lose 
the authenticity that enables him or her to relate 
effectively with students. This understanding reinforces 
the work of Angelo Boy and Gerald Pine (1971), often 
referred to by confluent educators, that stresses the 
importance of the teacher "s being a "self-expanding" 
person. 
Boy's and Pine's conception of the self-expanding 
person is congruent with Buber s idea of great character. 
Life is not perfect for such people, but they 
deal with it, cope with it, confront it, manage 
it, and flow with it -- they do what they should, 
at the time they should do it, by using their 
human intuition — an intuition which is based 
upon a profound self-awareness and sense of their 
presence in the world. [Boy and Pine, 1971, p. 
16] 
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According to Boy and Pine, the self-expanding person is 
enabled to live authentically by engaging in four kinds 
of "therapeutic" experiences -- human, vocational, 
religious, and recreational therapeutic experiences. [16] 
The work of Boy and Pine concretizes the idea of living 
authentically as embracing the concept of living a 
personally satisfying meaning and purpose in relation 
with others. [17] Confluent educators must, if they are 
to succeed in their endeavor to embody a dialogical 
teacher-student relationship, be cognizant of and attend 
to their own needs to be "fully functioning" and self¬ 
expanding persons. This is especially important for 
confluent educators because of the intensity of interper¬ 
sonal dialogical interaction necessary for the integration 
of affect and cognition that characterizes confluent 
education. 
Fourth, this ontological perspective is useful in 
offering grounds for reconciling the apparently conflict¬ 
ing dual mandate of education, to socialize and to 
facilitate individual development. From the perspective 
analyzed here, the individual is both determined by and 
determinative of human cultural tradition. It is in 
relationship with others that the person is enabled to 
self-actualize, to develop his or her potential. Sociali¬ 
zation occurs in learning to understand human tradition in 
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a personally meaningful way so that the individual is 
enabled to use reason in authentically making the existen— 
tial choices and commitments that she or he will enact 
(and that will become constitutively a part of human 
tradition). Socialization is understood as more than the 
inculcation of a code of behavior; rather, it enables the 
person to live dialogically so as to enact community with 
others, which from the perspective used here is the 
ontologically human way of living with others. Under¬ 
standing human tradition in a personally meaningful way 
is an essential part of self-actualizing and is predicated 
on the integration of affect and cognition to which 
confluent educators are committed. This integration is 
facilitated by dialogical teacher-student relationships 
in which it inheres. 
Fifth, dialogical teacher-student relationships 
help students understand existential freedom as more than 
negative freedom. Such relationships exemplify negative 
freedom in that students are free from domination and 
coercion. However, they also exemplify positive freedom, 
freedom for responsibility, responsiveness and mutual 
self-actualization in relationship. Since the mission of 
confluent education is articulated as being to facilitate 
the student's capabilities for both self-support and 
healthy love, it is important that the process of 
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confluent education demonstrate the relation of freedom 
and communion. Dialogical teacher-student relationships 
do so in the teacher's relationships with individual 
students, the relationships the teacher helps students to 
establish with each other, and in the sense of community 
that develops in the group. 
Summary 
Analysis of dialogical relationship offers 
philosophical grounding for commitment to open, intimate 
teacher-student relationships as both grounding and 
exemplifying the integration of affect and cognition in 
the educative process. Integration of affect and cogni¬ 
tion is definitionally inherent in dialogical relation¬ 
ship. Since dialogical relationship and authentic living 
cannot be taught directly and since, from the perspective 
used here, they are ontologically rooted, it is highly 
appropriate that they be modelled in the teacher-student 
relationship. Such modelling facilitates the student's 
self-actualization as a self-supporting person able to 
engage in the healthy, loving relationships with others 
that are foundational for further self-actualization and 
for enactment of community. 
Awareness of the centrality of dialogical relation¬ 
ship to the educative process and understanding what it 
entails can be helpful to confluent educators in emphasiz¬ 
ing the importance of focusing more centrally on relation¬ 
ship than on specific techniques or activities. It also 
emphasizes the importance of educators' continuing to grow 
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as people. it is their authenticity as self-expanding or 
self-actualizing persons that grounds their ability to 
engage in dialogical relationships with students. 
Analysis of dialogical teacher-student relationship 
offers a direction for reconciling the apparent polarity 
of the dual mandate in education to both socialize 
students and to facilitate development of individual 
potential. The dialogical teacher-student relationship 
heightens the effectiveness of the educative process by 
integrating affect and cognition in its basic relationship 
and, thus, facilitating their integration in content 
interaction. Students are better enabled to understand 
content in a personally meaningful way and, therefore, to 
reflect what they have learned in their choices, commit¬ 
ments and actions. Dialogical teacher-student relation¬ 
ship models a conception of personal freedom as positive 
freedom for responsibility, responsiveness and enactment 
of community. It offers the potential for perceiving 
cultural reproduction and cultural production as mutually 
supportive emphases in education. In better understanding 
the human tradition of which he or she is a part, the 
student is enabled to perceive ways of contributing to 
the improvement of that tradition. While the student 
understands him or herself as, to some extent, determined 
by the cultural tradition, the student also understands 
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him or herself as determinative of that tradition. He or 
she can understand him or herself as free for accepting 
the responsibility of attempting to contribute to that 
tradition so as to enhance the quality of life for all. 
Endnotes 
!• "Scientific" is the translation used of Wissenschaft, 
a German term that refers to systematic study in both 
sciences and liberal arts. Describing the "scientific 
and scholarly" ethos, Jaspers writes: 
It is the ability to suspend temporarily one's 
own values for the sake of objective knowledge, 
to set aside bias and special interests for the 
sake of an impartial analysis of data. In doing 
this we not only achieve essentially impartial 
knowledge, but also our personal bias is put in a 
new light. Fanaticism and blindness are elimina¬ 
ted. The very experience of our limitation 
creates the basis for true objectivity. The 
insoluble problems which we confront and which 
point beyond themselves for their solution teach 
us to seek the real answers beyond the data at 
hand. The scientific outlook stands for more 
than specific factual knowledge. It involves the 
transformation of our whole person in accordance 
with reason. [Jaspers, 1959, p. 31] 
The foundation of the scientific outlook is comprised of 
spirit or mind (Geist), human existence and responsive 
reason. These make up the "all-inclusive context of our 
lives": 
Spirit is the potentiality and power of ideas. 
Human existence in its fullest sense signifies 
our serious and unconditional commitment to the 
search for transcendence. Responsive reason is 
the mind open to the intrinsic meaning of things 
. . . Spirit is the power of creative intuition 
. . . human existence is the firm commitment that 
supports our whole intellectual existence . . . 
If it is the function of mind to consider 
only entire contexts and configurations, the 
function of existence to base our lives upon an 
absolute commitment, it is the function of reason 
to keep broadening our horizons. Reason opposes 
isolation; it seeks coherence . . . Reason makes 
us seek the kind of understanding that comes from 
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personal experience. [Jaspers, 1959, pp. 28-29] 
Spirit, personal commitment and responsive reason make a 
person aware of possibilities in life. They are both the 
foundation and goal of a university community; research, 
teaching and university cultural life ideally reflect 
this orientation. 
2. Jaspers writes: 
The university, therefore, should enable scholars 
to enter into direct discussion and exchange with 
fellow scholars and students. According to the 
ideal, this communication must be of the Socratic 
type, posing questions so that men may achieve 
clarity about themselves and about each other. 
An atmosphere of communication based on a communi¬ 
ty of thinking creates the proper conditions for 
scholarly and scientific work, although such work 
is ultimately always solitary. [Jaspers, 1959, 
p. 62 ] 
3. It is interesting to consider this view in relation 
to Donald Vandenberg's three "propositions" of educating: 
helplessness, room for development and the pupil's 
striving to be someone himself (Vandenberg, 1971, p. 67). 
In pedagogy, he argues. 
the child's trust has to be obtained and maintain¬ 
ed as part of the authoritative, co-disclosing, 
coexisting pedagogic relation for education to 
have significance for his being. On the other 
hand, the pupil wants to be someone himself and 
this wanting-to-be-independently has to be kept 
alive, for it is the mainspring of pedagogic 
endeavor: if he is dominated the pupil does not 
explore his world and does not need help, there 
is no co-disclosure of possibilities of being, 
and education is groundless and insignificant. 
[Vandenberg, 1971, p. 70] 
Vandenberg finds the safeguard in "room for disobedience. 
The child has to be free to disobey in order to genuinely 
obey. Freedom must exist in dialectical relation with, 
rather than in opposition to, pedagogic authority 
(Vandenberg, 1971, p. 71). What Vandenberg argues here 
seems to be a concretization of Jaspers emphasis on 
student's need for freedom to experience the will to 
know" and to learn as she or he chooses. It is aiso 
congruent with Buber's contention that compulsion mean 
248 
disunion, humiliation and rebelliousness. Thus the 
pedagogic relationship is authoritative but not'authorita¬ 
rian; it rests on trust rather than domination or compul- 
sion Authority is given by the student on the basis of 
the educator s continually demonstrated ability to 
enhance the student's project of self-actualizing. The 
confluent educator's attempt to integrate affect and 
cognition in education may be particularly effective in 
maintaining the student's willingness to confer authority 
on the teacher. 1 
4. Buber s warning here is congruous with George Brown's 
caution to confluent educators not to lose sight of the 
goal in the process or means of education (see above, dd. 
12-13). ^ 
5. Buber writes: 
In our life and experience we are addressed; by 
thought and speech and action, by producing and 
by influencing we are able to answer . . . [T]he 
blazing up of the response, which occurs time and 
again, to the unexpectedly approaching speech, we 
term responsibility. We practise responsibility 
for that realm of life allotted and entrusted to 
us for which we are able to respond, that is, for 
which we have a relation of deeds which may count 
-- in all our inadequacy -- as a proper response. 
[Buber, 1965, p. 92] 
Buber adds that to the extent that a person can keep a 
traditional bond, law or directive, the person can "lean" 
his or her responsibility on something; however, the 
person is not thereby freed from responsibility. As the 
person becomes more aware of his or her freedom, the 
"leaning on" is increasingly denied and responsibility 
becomes increasingly "personal and solitary" (Buber, 
1965, pp. 92-93). For Buber, the modern world offers 
ever-fewer "bonds" on which a person can "lean" his or 
her responsibility. 
6. Buber's comments on empathy have already been discuss¬ 
ed. His distinction, which is congruent with Jaspers' 
and Gadamer's understanding of the dialogical relation¬ 
ship, is in direct contrast with the work of Boy and 
Pine. This is a contrast confluent educators should 
consider. Boy and Pine state that the self-expanded 
teacher's respect for and effective communication with 
students enable the teacher "directly to experience the 
students (Boy and Pine, 1971, p. 8). For them, this 
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requires the teacher to be "selfless," to immerse him or 
herself in the learner's flow of experience, i.e., to be 
empathetic (Boy and Pine, 1971, pp. 8 — 9) . They define 
empathy as: 
the placing of one human spirit within another so 
that there is emotional congruence between 
teacher and learners. The teacher empathizes 
when he assumes, insofar as he is able, the 
internal frame of reference of the learner, 
perceives the world as the learner perceives it 
and the learner as he is seen by himself, when he 
lays aside all perceptions from the external 
frame of reference while doing so and communicates 
something of his understanding to the learners. 
[Boy and Pine, 1971, p. 9] 
Since much of the writing of Boy and Pine is congruent 
with that of Buber, it is possible that this is an 
instance of their having misinterpreted his thought. In 
any case, this "selfless empathy" is precisely what Buber 
distinguishes from the dialogical relationship (as does 
Jaspers) and what Gadamer argues is categorically 
impossible. 
7. Buber differentiates three types of dialogical 
inclusion. The first "rests on an abstract but mutual 
experience of relationship" in which, for a moment, two 
people mutually "recognize" and "acknowledge" each 
other's full legitimacy as "Thou" (Buber, 1965, p. 99). 
The second is based on this first dialogical relationship 
but is a one-sided experience of inclusion; this is 
characteristic of the educative dialogical relationship 
(Buber, 1965, pp. 99-100). The third is friendship, the 
true concrete and mutual inclusion of one another by two 
people (Buber, 1965, p. 101). 
8. This comment pertains to Buber s distinction between 
the principles of "old" and "new" education. Buber sees 
the educator in the "old" system as representing and 
bearing to the student the traditional values. Ho 
contends that when the authority of the past begins to 
decay, the educator is "thrown back on himself and 
personal inclinations or desires about what education 
should be and who students are. The danger is that at 
this point, rather than embracing the "new" dialogical 
inclusion relationship as the educative principle, the 
educator will be dominated by "Eros," i.e., will obey his 
or her own desires and make choices from personal inclina 
tion (rather than on the basis of what is presenting 
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itself from the students). m this case, the teacher and 
i°n fai1 ?Buber' 1965' PP- 93-95 ). Buber argues 
that education is not choice; the teacher does not choose 
students but receives and accepts them as they 
present themselves. Buber sees this acceptance of "the 
life and particular being of all his pupils" as the 
greatness of the modern educator. He states: 
In education, then, there is a lofty asceti¬ 
cism: an asceticism which rejoices in the world, 
for the sake of the responsibility for a realm of 
life which is entrusted to us for our influence 
but not our interference -- either by the will to 
power or by Eros. [Buber, 1965, p. 95] 
What is demanded of the educator is to be "really 
present": 
In order to be and to remain truly present to the 
child he must have gathered the child^s presence 
into his own store as one of the bearers of his 
communion with the world, one of the focuses of 
his responsibility for the world. [Buber, 1965, 
p. 98] 
9. In "Education" (Buber, 1965, pp. 83-103), Buber 
discusses the being of the student as the presupposition 
of education. He writes of "instincts," i.e., "capacities 
to receive and imagine the world" (Buber, 1965, p. 89), 
that must be met by educative forces. The "originator 
instinct" is the human desire to make things: "what the 
child desires is its own share in this becoming of 
things: it wants to be the subject of this event of 
production" (Buber, 1965, p. 85). Buber perceives the 
originator instinct as autonomous rather than derived and 
directed toward doing rather than having. However, he 
argues that there are two indispensable forms for building 
human life to which the originator instinct does not 
lead: to sharing in an undertaking and to entering into 
mutuality (Buber, 1965, p. 87). What leads to these is 
the "instinct for communion," "the longing for the world 
to become present to us as a person, which goes out to us 
as we to it, which chooses and recognizes us as we do it, 
which is confirmed in us as we in it" (Buber, 1965, p. 
88). Buber perceives this instinct for communion as 
teaching a person to say "Thou." He argues that the 
release of these instincts is the presupposition for 
education. These instincts "stand for" human spontaneity 
and it is this spontaneity that must be met by educative 
educative forces (Buber, 1965, pp. 88-89). The important 
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point for educators is that, while the educative situation 
must allow for expression of this spontaneity, what is 
equally significant are the educative forces that meet 
it. Buber reminds that "The world engenders the person 
in the individual" (Buber, 1965, p. 89). Thus, while the 
presupposition of education is the being of the student, 
the task of the educator is to select and make present 
educative aspects of the world. 
10. He contends that this does not mean that the great 
character does not accept norms, but that a norm becomes 
a command only if it reveals itself in a concrete way in 
a situation (Buber, 1965, p. 114). 
11. Superficially, Buber may seem to be advocating 
education for individualism. However, for him, education 
of character is genuine education for community, which 
transcends both collectivism and individualism. Both 
collectivism and individualism are self-alienating; in 
neither mode can the person live the life of dialogue 
that is, for Buber, the authentic mode of existence. The 
educator's responsibility requires helping the student to 
become and remain aware of the self-alienation resulting 
from living inauthentically. The educator must keep alive 
in the student the desire to escape the pain of self¬ 
alienation that can cause the person to strive for 
authenticity. This spurs the student toward transcendence 
of both collectivism and individualism. The goal of 
education is to enable the student to live in community, 
which is only possible for unified and responsible 
persons. Additionally, Buber's description of the 
response to situations characteristic of great character 
illuminates what he means by being "fully present." 
Thus, it provides further insight into the kind of 
relationship teachers should strive to have with students. 
This understanding of great character also illuminates 
the goal articulated by George Brown for confluent 
education. 
12. The confluent educator's direct invitation of 
affective responses to content, if coupled with adequate 
response to the student's contribution, would reinforce 
the student's tendency toward trust and confidence in the 
teacher. It would reinforce simultaneously the student s 
granting authority to the educator to persist in the 
endeavor to help the student. However, Buber s thought, 
like Vandenberg's, stresses the need for the confluent 
educator not to become only an affective educator. While 
education should be grounded in the student s being and 
founded in relationship, it is the educator s on-going 
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responsibility to present to the student a selection of 
the world that acts as an educative force. 
13. The child, living dialogically with his or her 
parents, develops typical responses in typical situations 
that routinize life and make it predictable. This 
"recipe" knowledge is what the individual uses in most 
interactions outside the primary group of significant 
others and is the substance of relationships experienced 
from the third-person perspective (Collins, in Denton, 
1974, pp. 144-45). Since, however, the initial experience 
of relationship is dialogical, the person always includes 
in his or her typifications of others that they are 
conscious human subjects like him or herself. The other 
is familiar, but also radically other in not being fully 
understandable (Collins, in Denton, 1974, pp. 145-46). 
This otherness in institutional life becomes a threat to 
the person's sense of institutional cohesiveness, so the 
person holds apart to some extent from total involvement 
in the institution. The institution becomes reified 
(apart from people's lives) (Collins, in Denton, 1974, p. 
146). Jaspers, particularly, would question this idea of 
the other as radically other because the other is not 
totally understandable since he contends that the person 
can never know even him or herself as a totality. The 
"otherness" of the other would lie rather in the other's 
subjecticity as "possible Existenz," as a self-actualizing 
rather than as a simply empirical being; in this, the 
other is like the self, unknowable. 
14. Collins cites the observation of Berger and Luckman 
that "outsiders have to be kept out by means such that 
the legitimacy of the institution is not questioned by 
those excluded" (quoted by Collins, in Denton, 1974, p. 
149). This is done by techniques of intimidation, 
mystification, status symbols, etc. The child wants to 
be in the "in-group" in education but will retain the 
status of "stranger" throughout his or her schooling 
according to Collins. The "positive" side of this 
situation is, for him, that: 
Since the cultural pattern of the school consti¬ 
tutes a problematic situation for the child, in 
contrast to life in the home, it forces him to 
become objective in his understanding of the 
culture of the school . . . [H]e learns the 
limits of "thinking as usual." [Collins, in 
Denton, 1974, p. 151] 
15. However, Collins, like Jaspers, sees dialogue as 
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being restricted to two partners at any given time. Thus, 
for him, as for Jaspers, it is questionable whether 
genuine dialogue can be a central dynamic of classroom 
interaction. This issue will be considered in the 
chapter on method. 
16. Human and vocational therapeutic experiences are 
characterized by caring, concerned involvement through 
which the person finds and expresses meaning. Religious 
therapeutic experiences are spiritual experiences in 
which the person reflects on the meaning of life. 
Through these ontological reflections a person develops 
respect for him or herself and for humankind such that 
the person is led to "expand toward" others. For Boy and 
Pine, the term "religious" does not refer only to 
experiences related to traditional theistic affiliations; 
their "religious" experiences can be secular as well. 
"Spiritual" would be a more descriptive term since what 
is essentially involved, for them, are ontological 
meditations that lead a person to "identify with" human¬ 
kind and develop a respect for human beingness of the 
past, present and future. This sense of being a part of 
the stream of humanness influences the person's behavior 
so that it comes to reflect a sense of the dignity and 
worth of each human life (see Boy and Pine, 1971, pp. 67- 
83). This is akin to Lawrence Kohlberg's universalistic 
person and Abraham Maslow's self-actualized person. In 
some respects, the "religious" therapeutic experience is 
congruent with Buber's concept of the dialogical life. 
Although Buber insists that the human being is addressed 
by Deity, he deliberately does not confine this Deity-as- 
Thou to the deity defined within any particular theistic 
tradition. For him, the person is addressed and responds 
within the world in all aspects of existence. However, 
Buber's notion is clearly religious while Boy and Pine 
can be interpreted more accurately, I think, as referring 
to spirituality since the essence of their thought 
pertains to a sense of communion with humanity. This is 
congruent with the concept of Geist in Jaspers and 
Gadamer's work and with Gadamer's sense of Bildung. 
Recreational therapeutic experiences are also discussed 
by Boy and Pine as self-expanding and as possessing human 
and spiritual dimensions; "they afford the person the 
therapeutic advantage of gathering the loose ends of 
himself as he engages in something that is essentially 
selfish" (Boy and Pine, 1971, p. 83). 
17. An interesting aspect that is beyond consideration 
in this dissertation is the implication, contrary to 
Maslow's hierarchy of needs, that possibly the need for 
living authentically, i.e., meaningfully and purposefully, 
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does not occur only after "lower order" needs are met. 
Rather, it may be that, as Victor Frankl contends in 
Man s Search for Meaning (1959), this is an existential 
characteristic that prevails as a foundational, primordial 
distinction of humanness even in conditions of extreme 
deprivation. 
CHAPTER V 
CONTENT 
Introduction 
The central question to be considered in this 
chapter is what content is appropriate if education is to 
meet the pedagogical obligation to help students to 
understand the human tradition in personally meaningful 
ways. The function of content is argued to be to 
facilitate the student's self-actualization as a person 
able to engage in dialogical relationships and community. 
As a tool for self-actualization, content must be selected 
on the basis of insights (by teachers and students) into 
what each student needs for enhancement of the self- 
actualization process. The position will be explored 
that the content of education can be almost anything 
because a wide variety of content can contribute to the 
student's understanding of human tradition and process of 
self-actualization. It will be argued, additionally, 
that a balanced selection of content is necessary in 
order for education to be consistently related to praxis 
and Bildung. 
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Gadamer's Thought 
Bildunq 
In attempting to consider the pedagogic obligations 
involved in ontologically-rooted education, one of the 
most useful aspects of Gadamer's work is his elucidation 
of Bildung. Gadamer accepts Herder's definition of 
Bildung as "reaching up to humanity" (see also above, pp. 
112-13). As self-formation or cultivation, Bildung "is 
intimately associated with the idea of culture and 
designates primarily the properly human way of developing 
one's natural talents and capacities" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 
11). However, the concept of Bildung transcends that of 
cultivation of given talents and involves a different 
means-ends relationship. Cultivation of talents is a 
means and as a means loses its function once the end is 
achieved. [1] In Bildung everything by and through which 
the person is formed is absorbed, becomes part of the 
person and is preserved (not absorbed like a means that 
can be forgotten once its end has been fulfilled). 
This can be understood in terms of Alfred North 
Whitehead's statement that, "The function of a University 
is to enable you to shed details in favor of principles" 
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(Whitehead, 1929, p. 26). whitehead is saying that once 
a person has learned particulars they can be forgotten or 
transcended in the understanding of how to apply 
principles that remains with the person. Harry S. Broudy 
makes a similar distinction. Broudy writes of the 
replicative and applicative uses of learning which are 
"species of knowing that, knowing how, and knowing why" 
that are explicitly retained and used (Broudy, 1981, p. 
136). He couples these with two uses of learning that 
are more akin to Bildung, the associative and interpretive 
uses . 
Associatively, one stocks concepts and images to 
build the many layers of meaning by which life is 
felt, understood, and evaluated. . . . 
Along with the associative uses of schooling 
go the interpretive ones. . . . The contexts in 
which life has to be lived, in which problems 
have to be construed, and in which truth has to 
be evaluated and commitment made are supplied by 
the conceptual systems and modes of inquiry of 
the disciplines. The disciplines studied 
explicitly in school become resources used 
tacitly in life; their details are forgotten, 
leaving frames or lenses or stencils of interpre¬ 
tation, both of fact and value. Perspective and 
context are the functional residues of general 
education. We understand with them, even though 
we are not attending to them. [Broudy, 1981, pp. 
136-37] [2] 
What Whitehead and Broudy, as well as Gadamer, are 
utilizing is the Aristotelian concept of praxis. There 
is a distinction in Aristotelian thought among episteme, 
scientific knowledge, techne, technical knowledge that is 
particular and related to particular ends, and phronesis, 
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moral or ethical knowledge (see Zaimaran, 1985, pp. 117- 
27). Phronesis, unlike techne, cannot be taught directly 
nor can it be forgotten; it invloves a sense of right 
living and an ability to reflect on perspectives and 
their implementation in specific situations. Both 
phronesis and techne relate to praxis, practical wisdom, 
which has both technical competence and moral wisdom as 
its functions. As Zaimaran points out, "techne has as 
its objective the production of a particular material 
thing, an end outside itself. Moral wisdom (phronesis) 
. . . has as its objective the determination of appropri¬ 
ate means for achieving moral ends" (Zaimaran, 1985, p. 
120) . 
When Gadamer refers to Bildung as transcending 
cultivation of given talents in forming oneself, he is 
referring to Bildung as encompassing, like praxis, both 
techne and phronesis. He, like Hegel, connects the idea 
of Bildung with that of Geist (mind or spirit): 
Man is characterised by the break with the 
immediate and the natural that the intellectual, 
rational side of his nature demands of him. . . . 
It is the universal nature of human Bildung to 
constitute itself as a universal intellectual 
being. [Gadamer, 1975, p. 13] 
The human being needs Bildung for self-formation as a 
rational, intellectual being. This requires overcoming 
particularity and distancing the self from the immediacy 
of desire, personal needs and selfish interests (but 
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always being able to relate also to the particularity of 
the specific situation). This is necessary for the 
person to exist understandingly as an active interpreter 
of the world and as a meaning-creator. Bildung as 
universality includes both practical and theoretical 
aspects of human rationality; it is most essentially a 
kind of attitudinal self-formation akin to what Jaspers 
writes of as the "scientific" outlook and to what (to a 
lesser degree) Buber includes in "great character." 
Writing of theoretical Bildung, Gadamer states that 
it "consists in learning to allow what is different from 
oneself and to find universal viewpoints from which one 
can grasp the thing . . ."in its objective existence 
without selfish interest (Gadamer, 1975, p. 14). Yet, 
this "grasping" always refers to the self as well as to 
the different other. Theoretical Bildung is a continua¬ 
tion or part of the process of Bildung, of which Gadamer 
writes ; 
To seek one's own in the alien, to become at home 
in it, is the basic movement of spirit, whose 
being is only return to itself from what is 
other. . . . Every single individual that raises 
himself out of his natural being to the spiritual 
finds in the language, customs and institutions 
of his people a pre-given body of material which, 
as in learning to speak, he has to make his own. 
Thus every individual is always engaged in the 
process of Bildung and in getting beyond his 
naturalness, inasmuch as the world into which he 
is growing is one that is humanly constituted 
through language and custom. • • • 
[l]t is not alienation as such, but tne 
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return to oneself, which presumes a prior aliena¬ 
tion, that constitutes the essence of Bildung. 
Bildung is not only, however, the process which 
produces the historical raising of the mind to 
the universal, but it is at the same time the 
element within which the educated man (Gebildete) 
moves. [Gadamer, 1975, p. 15] 
It is here that the relation of Gadamer's thought 
to the Aristotelian concept of praxis is evident. The 
educated person's consciousness is like a sense that is 
open to and grasps distinction in all that presents 
itself. His or her knowledge, like phronesis, mediates 
the particular and the universal. It is directed toward 
the concrete situation and simultaneously grasps circum¬ 
stances in their infinite variety. The person exhibits, 
in addition to technical and "scientific" knowledge, a 
kind of ethical "know how," a sense of the "right" and 
the "general good" that is manifested in choices, commit¬ 
ments and actions. This ethical sense is not a "fixed 
applicable yardstick" or code of conduct but an ability 
to mediate between the immediate situation and the 
universal, as viewpoints of possible others (Gadamer, 
1975, pp. 17-18). [3] 
The "proper" education, then, is the education that 
facilitates Bildung and praxis. Education helps the 
person move beyond "naturalness" to being able to live as 
a member of community in a humanly-constituted world in 
which she or he self-actualizes as an authentic person. 
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Consensus on this point can be discovered in analysis of 
the work of existential, phenomenological and confluent 
educators as well as in the work of Buber, Gadamer and 
Jaspers. The educative process must transcend 
transmission of facts, skills and theories to helping 
students relate these to the circumstances of their 
lives. Relating what is learned to living is not limited 
to application of technical or scientific knowledge; 
rather, it involves integrating or absorbing into the 
self what is learned as part of the self-actualization 
process. The "end" of existing community is not an 
arbitrarily chosen one, but is, rather, the expression of 
what it is to be human. As such, the "goal" of education 
can never be finally achieved. As Gadamer writes of 
Bildung, "the result of Bildung is not achieved in the 
manner of a technical construction, but grows out of the 
inner process of formation and cultivation and therefore 
remains in a constant state of further continued Bildung" 
(Gadamer, 1975, p. 12). Bildung, because it "results" in 
further Bildung, cannot be a "goal" except, as Gadamer 
notes, in the "reflective thematic of the educator" 
(Gadamer, 1975, p. 12); thus, too, the "goal" of confluent 
education. 
From this understanding of Bildung, it follows that 
the content of education should be selected so as to help 
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the student know and understand as related to his or her 
self-actualization the cultural tradition that is consti¬ 
tutive of and constituted by each human being. [4] if 
understood in the sense of Bildunq elucidated by Gadamer, 
the educative process and content have as their objectives 
enhancing the student s process of "overcoming natural¬ 
ness" in becoming part of the humanly-constituted world. 
In broad educational terminology, this is akin to the 
process of socialization or acculturation. However, 
these concepts are qualified by emphasis in this 
philosophical perspective on the person as free, choosing, 
responsible, and self-actualizing. Thus, the educative 
process and content cannot legitimately be perceived in 
terms of inculcation of a set of facts, skills and codes 
of behavior. The person is not to be trained or condi¬ 
tioned, but rather is to be assisted to self-actualize as 
a unique, emergent individual. The self-formation 
concept includes both personal authenticity as a free 
meaning-creator and ethical decision-maker and potential 
for intimate relationships with others. Therefore, 
content centers on understanding the constitutive cultural 
tradition in a personal sense as both formative and 
liberating. The person is freed by being enabled to be 
with others; authentic being with others requires that 
the person be able to express him or herself as a growing, 
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authentic person in dialogical relationships. [5] 
Vandenberg s explanation of the phenomenological 
existential concepts of "landscape" and "geography" and 
the relation between them is illuminative of this dynamic 
in education. He defines landscape as: "The world that 
the child lives in immediate relationship with when he is 
living directly into the world before he distances 
himself from the world through learning the names of 
things ..." (Vandenberg, 1971, p. 84). Of geography, 
he states: 
Insofar as schooling deals with logically 
ordered materials, it attempts to establish 
geography, the common world in which private 
landscapes become ordered and intersubjectively 
available. In and of itself, this has nothing to 
do with the individual person living into his own 
world and the worlding of his world. [Vandenberg, 
1971, p. 85] 
What is the "primordial" concern and problem of education 
is to ensure that "geography" is related to "landscape" 
because the "authentically human world lies 'between' 
landscape and geography" (Vandenberg, 1971, p. 87). This 
is precisely the concern of confluent educators in their 
attempt to integrate affect and cognition. If a conscious 
and sustained effort is not made by educators to relate 
landscape to geography, the student may be alienated from 
him or herself, the educative process and/or possibilities 
of self-being. For Vandenberg, teaching-learning of 
content, if it involves the originality and creativity of 
the student, lets the student unite landscape and 
geography. 
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Greene s consideration of George Herbert Mead's 
distinction between the "I" and "Me" is useful in under¬ 
standing the ontological basis of the "landscape- 
geography" relation: 
The "Me" refers to the cultural experience that 
has been internalized, to previous history, and 
to the matrix in which actions are carried on. 
. . . The "I" is responsible for present choices, 
which are made against a background of past 
occurrence, that which constitutes the "Me." 
[Greene, 1978, p. 36] 
The "Me" can be thought of as the past and present person 
whom one has become, equivalent to Jaspers' "empirical 
self," including the prereflective sedimentation of 
presuppositions and prejudices constitutive of 
"landscape." The "Me" is foundational to the futurizing 
"I" (Jaspers' "possible Existenz"), the self-actualizing 
person. The "I" becomes an "I" in the union of 
"landscape" and "geography" as self-actualizing occurs in 
the intersubjective world (Vandenberg s "human" world 
between "landscape" and "geography"). In a sense, the 
"Me" is the learner who is before the teacher, while the 
"I" is that learner "becoming" his or her future possibi¬ 
lities. Greene states: 
It is always tempting to identify oneself as what 
one has been or done . . . The alternative is to 
continually create or recreate the self through 
the agency of the "I." To do this requires a 
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considerable ability to look reflectively and 
critically at the "Me," to select future projects, 
and to gear actively into the world. it requirs 
as well an ability to recognize openings in one's 
life situations, openings that permit some kind 
of action or transcendence, that allow one to go 
beyond what one has been. [Greene, 1978, p. 36] 
Education predicated on dialogical relationship and using 
dialogical methods to integrate affect and cognition 
facilitates the learner's ability to reflect critically 
on whom she or he has been and to recognize possibilities 
for becoming. It facilitates the self-understanding that 
opens the learner to possibilities for self-transcendence 
and that helps the learner reflect on the congruence of 
possibilities with his or her developing sense of whom, 
as an authentic person, he or she would like to become. 
In this respect, there is reinforcement of the student's 
present existence as both an empirical self and as a 
free, choosing, responsible, emergent self. 
Content, from this viewpoint, must mediate between 
the prereflective, personal realm and the broader inter- 
subjective realm and between the present being and future 
being of the student. While to a great extent this topic 
involves methodological issues that will be addressed in 
the next chapter, there are inferences to be made about 
content selection. As noted in Chapter IV, the teacher 
must select content in relation to the being of the 
student in terms of the student's present actuality and 
future self-actualizing. 
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Additional Implications 
On the basis of Gadamer s work it can be argued 
that a wide range of content is appropriate for education. 
Because the person always stands in the stream of human 
tradition and because the person's understanding is 
rooted in human historicity, for Gadamer, all understand¬ 
ing is a kind of self-understanding related to the self- 
actualization process. 
For Gadamer, the person exists in concernful 
involvement in the world. The person exists thinkingly, 
understandingly and as a learning being. By virtue of 
being-in-the-worId, the person has a prereflective 
understanding from within his or her particular situation. 
Deliberate or reflective understanding is attempted when 
the person realizes that there is a discrepancy between 
what was thought to be true and what appears to be 
presenting itself from the world. Gadamer explains this 
as attempting to enrich and enlarge one's standpoint by 
achieving a "fusion of horizons," i.e., by attempting to 
better understand one's present existence by seeing it in 
relation to other standpoints. 
From this it follows that any aspect of the person's 
existence, of the existence of others and of the human 
tradition can be a source of questions and a basis for 
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attempting to achieve further understanding. Content of 
education can, thus, be considered to include potentially 
a wide variety of subject matter. If Bildung and praxis 
are to be aims of education, some effort should be made 
to balance curricula so that content includes material 
contributing to development of episteme, techne and 
phronesis. It can also be concluded that one role of 
content is to heighten a person's awareness of what he or 
she does not know and of discrepancies between what was 
thought and what now seems to be appearing. In this 
respect, content can be selected with the objective of 
stimulating conscious, reflective effort at interpreta¬ 
tion, creation of meaning and development of greater 
understanding. The broader the content of education, the 
greater its potential for arousing the "will to know." 
Breadth of content can enhance the student's self- 
actualization as a rational, intellectual, learning 
person. It can also increase potential for greater 
ultimate possibilities for self-actualization. This is 
particularly the case if content is taught so that the 
student perceives its relation to his or her life (as is 
the intention in confluent education). 
Gadamer's writing refers primarily to understanding 
texts and analogues of the past in order to better under¬ 
stand one's present situation and actualize one's future 
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being. [6] One implication for content selection that 
seems to follow is that content should be primarily 
materials from the past. However, it can, I think, be 
argued (as does Kneller, 1984, pp. 81, 97-98) that this 
is not the case. If any "alien" standpoint can be a 
source for learning, then "otherness" or "alienness" is 
the necessary element of "productive" distance rather 
than specifically and only temporal distance. Texts 
could equally well be selected for their temporal or 
cultural distance or, more generally, for their manifesta¬ 
tion of a perspective other than that of the student. 
Indeed, in a multicultural society and in an increasingly 
interdependent world, it would seem to be of crucial 
importance to attempt to understand other contemporary 
standpoints that differ from one's own. This in no way 
minimizes the importance of understanding the past and 
its relation to the present; however, it seems to me that 
a major purpose of doing so is to better understand the 
self in relation to others. This reasoning follows quite 
directly from a dialogical philosophical emphasis in 
which both the process and the goal of self-actualizing 
are intimately related to interaction with others as 
"Thou." A person's effort to understand his or her own 
standpoint (in relation to those of others) is facilitated 
by understanding in terms of both past and present since 
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the present contains within itself past-present-future. 
Therefore, it does not seem unwarranted to extend 
Gadamer s thought in terms of this implication for 
content selection. 
One can also argue that if a major objective in 
education is to enhance the student's present understand¬ 
ing and to increase the student's perceived options for 
future self-actualizing, then any curriculum should 
include a variety of perspectives and methods of inquiry 
so as to manifest a diversity of possible standpoints. 
In practical terms, one implication for higher education 
would be to reduce to some extent the narrow specializa¬ 
tion and homogeneity of some undergraduate majors so as 
to either provide more electives or to specify a variety 
of courses within or outside the major that offer 
perspectives other than those predominating in the major. 
The typical approach of requiring students to take a 
"Core" curriculum in addition to the major may serve this 
purpose. However, an additional effort to diversify the 
major itself can enhance the effectiveness of the Core. 
Provision of more elective options and (dialogical) 
advisement in terms of selecting electives for the 
purpose of broadening a student's perspective can also be 
useful. Likewise, providing more interdisciplinary and 
cross-disciplinary course and program options is helpful. 
Jaspers and Gadamer on Sciences and Philosophy 
Analysis of Jaspers' work also provides support for 
a broad interpretation of the content of education and 
for perception of content as a tool for self- 
actualization. Jaspers' acceptance of broadly inclusive 
content can be inferred from his insistence that there are 
many modes of knowing, all of which are prespectival. 
Since, for Jaspers, both the individual person and the 
world are always more than can be known of them, it is 
reasonable to conclude that he would agree that identify¬ 
ing oneself with a unidimensional view would be to limit 
possibilities for self-actualization. Jaspers espouses 
the use of many modes of knowing, recognizing the limita¬ 
tions of each, to begin to approach truth. He describes 
the content of education as "whatever exists in the 
world" (Jaspers, 1959, p. 43). [7] 
Jaspers, for the most part, refers to content 
domains in relation to the learner. He describes the 
impact of the study of sciences and humanities in terms 
of their influence on the student's development of a 
cultural perspective. His work reflects a slight predis 
position towards the "humanism" of the liberal arts, 
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which he describes as the study of the spirit of humankind 
in books and works (in this he is congruent with Gadamer). 
He juxtaposes this with the "realism" of the natural 
sciences as the study of the observation of and experimen¬ 
tation on natural phenomena: 
The liberal arts are valuable educationally 
because they allow a realization of the substance 
of the human past, a participation in tradition, 
a knowledge of the breadth of human possibilities. 
. . . The educational value of the natural 
sciences lies in the training for exact observa¬ 
tion. The subject matter itself has educational 
value to a far lesser degree than that of the 
liberal arts. In physics and chemistry the 
results are relatively unimportant whereas the 
method through which they are obtained has 
educational value. The natural scientist who 
knows nothing except results has an essentially 
dead and meaningless knowledge. He is abetting a 
distortion of science into dogma and authority. 
[Jaspers, 1959, p. 33] 
Study of both liberal arts and sciences is deemed valuable 
by Jaspers although he notes that an educative ideal in 
which they are joined "for their mutual enlightenment" 
has not so far been realized (Jaspers, 1959, p. 33). 
Jaspers' writings are typically oriented to elucida¬ 
tion of the boundaries of content domains, particularly 
sciences, and the relationships among the content domains, 
especially between the sciences and philosophy. In his 
emphasis on the perspectival nature of knowledge, Jaspers 
contends that the scope of truth is greater than what can 
be known "scientifically," i.e., through systematic 
study. The aim of instruction is "formation of the whole 
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person" and his apparent predisposition toward study of 
the liberal arts may relate to his perception of the 
liberal arts as study of the spirit of humankind. 
It can also be legitimately inferred that this 
apparent predisposition to study of liberal arts reflects 
Jaspers' concern about the prevalence of "scientism" in 
the modern age. Many of his writings emphasize the need 
for "genuine" science, i.e., science that recognizes its 
limits (e.g., Jaspers, 1959, pp. 7-27; Jaspers, 1953). 
For him, one contribution of philosophy, as it exists in 
relationship with the sciences, is to investigate the 
boundaries of science and the realm of truth that exists 
outside these boundaries. Study of philosophy and other 
liberal arts can increase awareness of the limits of 
science and of the need for human beings to attempt to 
transcend these limits (as "whole" persons dedicated to 
the pursuit of truth). It is especially important, for 
Jaspers, that in an age of "scientism" awareness of the 
limits of science be made as evident as possible. In 
this way it is possible to address and correct the 
erroneousness of accepting technical and technological 
means as offering adequate potential solutions to human 
problems. For Jaspers, it is essential to restore to the 
individual a sense of potency as a decision-maker (belief 
in one's rights and abilities to decide as a human being 
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instead of abrogating decision-making to "experts" is one 
of the casualties Jaspers sees in an age of "scientism"). 
Jaspers explores the question of the limits of 
science extensively. For him, science is concerned with 
Particularities in the world and relations among them; 
philosophy is concerned with the meaning of Being and 
world as totality and unity (see, for example, Jaspers, 
1969, pp. 120-73). Science can know objects in the world 
and "laws" about the world, but it cannot know world as 
totality; while neither can philosophy know unity and 
totality, it takes up at the limits where science can go 
no further and points toward unity, totality and transcen¬ 
dence. For Jaspers, science and philosophy are insepar¬ 
able and exist in a "fruitful tension." Philosophy 
serves science by separating the essential from the 
nonessential, providing the impulse and goal for science 
and causing science without being science (see Jaspers, 
1969, p. 161). Science, however, in today's world 
provides the fundament of philosophy that it cannot 
ignore. Science provides compelling knowledge, cogent 
knowledge about the world and objects within it and it is 
in the world that human beings have to actualize their 
possibilities and aspirations. Science provides one kind 
of knowledge, one set of orientations to the world, one 
source of truth among many on the basis of which human 
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beings make choices and act. However, since human 
existence is oriented not only toward factual existence 
but also toward Transcendence, the human being needs, in 
addition to science, philosophical awareness and concern 
about human being and Being of the world that science 
cannot provide. James Collins explains: 
Jaspers has a favorite formula for bringing 
out the natural distinction and dependence of 
philosophy and science. Although scientific 
knowledge is universally valid, it is also 
relative to some determinate sphere of 
objectivity; conversely, philosophical awareness 
is absolute in its origin but relative in its 
objective expression in thought. Scientific 
knowledge is not absolute, since it does not 
convey the total meaning of being and does not 
fill our lives with an unconditional value . . . 
On the other hand, philosophical awareness is not 
universally valid and coercive knowledge, since 
it does not belong intrinsically to the sphere of 
knowledge. [Collins, in Schilpp, 1957, p. 134] 
In a, for him, remarkably succinct statement, Jaspers 
writes: "Scientific knowledge is objective knowledge, 
which aims at the object itself. Philosophizing is a 
process which transcends the objective in, always 
objective, thinking" (Jaspers, in Schilpp, 1957, p. 790). 
It seems to me that Gadamer is very much in sympathy 
with what he perceives to be Jaspers" philosophical task 
(of mediating the self-limitation of science). He shares 
Jaspers' interest in questions of being and knowing, the 
importance of reason, the distinction and relation 
between science and philosophy, the significance of being 
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in situation, and the wariness of scientism and 
technology. Indeed, the opening paragraph of Gadamer's 
Reason in the Age of Science could have been written by 
Jaspers: 
It is evident that what we call philosophy is not 
science in the same way as the so-called positive 
sciences are. It is not the case that philosophy 
has a positive datum alongside the standard 
research areas of the other sciences to be 
investigated by it alone, for philosophy has to 
do with the whole. But this whole is not merely, 
as is true of any other whole, the whole comprised 
of all its parts. As the whole, it is an idea 
that transcends every finite possibility of 
knowledge, and so it is nothing we could know in 
a scientific way. Yet it still makes good sense 
to speak about the scientific character of 
philosophy. [Gadamer, 1981, p. 1] 
Gadamer develops his theme by arguing that philosophy can 
be called scientific because of its proximity to the 
sciences (which separates it from any world view that is 
based strictly on subjective evidence), its concern with 
the foundational concepts that determine the objective 
fields of the sciences, and its concern with "giving of 
accounts" (Rechenschaftsgabe) (Gadamer, 1981, pp. 1-2).[8] 
For Gadamer, concerns about "scientism" and the 
limits of science lead to the topic of language. He 
considers whether there is, in a Hegelian sense, a 
community of language, the solidarity of which cannot be 
investigated by science, and asks, "Is it ultimately 
significant that science not only does not think . . . 
but also does not really speak a language in the proper 
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sense?" (Gadamer, 1981, p. 3). [9] Gadamer contends that 
with the thematization of language as belonging 
"indissolubly to the human life world," there opens the 
possibility of a new orientation toward the whole in 
language, not as a tool or specifically human capability, 
but as the medium in which human beings live. [10] 
Gadamer holds that it is "methodically suitable" to 
look at the relationship of philosophy and science. To 
do so involves examining the whole course of Western 
history from the beginnings of science in the ancient 
world to the present, which he perceives as transformed 
on the basis of science into a "single huge business" 
(Gadamer, 1981, pp. 5-6). Like Jaspers, Gadamer emphasiz 
es reason's need for unity but he also emphasizes the 
conflict of reason with the "self-awareness" of science. 
Like Jaspers, he believes it is essential for science to 
understand itself with awareness of its limitations. [11] 
Gadamer cites Hegel as the modern philosopher who 
led to the re-construing of the Greek understanding of 
rationality and of theory (theoria). Originally theoria 
meant participation and sharing in an event; the Greek 
concept of rationality of being was not rationality as a 
property of human self-consciousness but of being itself 
of which human rationality is a part (see Gadamer, 1981, 
pp. 16-18). This suggests to Gadamer a new way of moving 
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toward self-understanding, "the way of complete self¬ 
donation to what is outside in which the seeker neverthe¬ 
less finds himself" (Gadamer, 1981, p. 18). It shows the 
proper relation of philosophy and science to be a dialect¬ 
ical one to be understood in a positive sense as well as 
in polarity (Gadamer, 1981, p. 18). 
Both Jaspers and Gadamer, then, are concerned about 
defining the limitations of science and exploring the 
relation of science and philosophy. They agree that 
science and philosophy are complementary. From this, it 
can be argued that not only would Gadamer and Jaspers 
support the need for broadly inclusive content in educa¬ 
tion, but also that they would acknowledge the advantages 
of joining the liberal arts, especially philosophy, and 
the sciences in curricula. This would increase the 
potential for students' recognizing that all modes of 
knowing can contribute to the search for truth, that 
each mode has its limitations and that each mode is 
perspectival. At the least, an important implication for 
higher education is that students should be encouraged to 
balance work in the sciences with work in philosophy and 
vice versa. A balanced selection of content from a 
variety of disciplines can enhance the potential for 
education to serve as a formative tool for self- 
actualization; [12] therefore, as noted previously, at 
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least on the undergraduate level specialization should be 
complemented with diversified general education. 
Buber's Thought 
Although Buber writes little about content per se, 
the assertion that a broad array of content is appropriate 
is also consistent with his work. He recommends an 
education 
that is aware of the age and directed toward it, 
the education that leads man to a lived connection 
with his world and enables him to ascend from 
there to faithfulness, to standing the test, to 
authenticating, to responsibility, to decision, 
to realization. [Buber, quoted in Nash et al., 
1965, p. 383] 
* 
He also writes of education: 
Basically it includes everything. But what is 
taken from it at any particular time is not 
determined by any universal principles; what is 
decisive here is our present situation. It alone 
furnishes the criterion for selection: what the 
man who shall there withstand this situation -- 
what our growing generation needs in order to 
withstand it -- that and nothing else is the 
educative material of our hour. Here the univers¬ 
al and the particular properly unite and mix. 
[Buber, quoted in Nash et al., 1965, pp. 382-83] 
It can be seen in both these statements that Buber 
is concerned that education not foster intellectualism 
isolated from life. As discussed previously, for Buber, 
the content selection process is rooted in the teacher- 
student relationship. Content is selected on the basis 
of insights into the student s needs as these become 
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apparent in the dialogical relationship. Content should 
facilitate the student's self-actualization as a person 
able to engage in community. This is inherent in the two- 
way dynamic of dialogical education: the teacher selects 
from the world what she or he will attempt to make 
present to the student and, concurrently, the student 
selects what he or she needs of what is presented in 
light of his or her situation in the world. 
Breadth of content provides the student with a 
fuller range of possibilities for selection and provides 
the teacher with a greater likelihood of offering what a 
student will accept. Thus, Buber's work is not 
restrictive in terms of the content of education, except 
that it should be related to life. 
Implications about Content in Relation tc 
Confluent Education 
The implication about content that can be drawn 
most directly from the work of Buber, Gadamer and Jaspers 
is that the content of education can include almost 
anything because content is essentially a tool for self- 
actualization. Whatever contributes to self-actualization 
is personally meaningful to students and a vast array of 
content can be taught so that its meaningfulness becomes 
evident to students. This perspective is highly congruent 
with that of confluent eductors. Another implication is 
that the content of a curriculum should be balanced and 
inclusive of both liberal arts and sciences. 
One qualification to this inclusiveness lies in 
Buber's emphasis that content should be based on perceived 
needs of the students. Buber's thought is congruent with 
but extended by the work of Weinstein and Fantini (1970). 
Weinstein and Fantini identify four causes of irrelevance 
in education: failure to match teaching to learning 
styles; use of materials poorly related to the learner s 
experiences; use of materials that ignore the learner's 
feelings; and use of content that ignores the learner's 
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concerns (Weinstein and Fantini, 1970, pp. 21-22). For 
Buber, these failures would be founded in and a manifesta¬ 
tion of failure in relationship, particularly in the act 
of dialogical inclusion. Buber would see the potential 
remedy lying in improving the relationship between 
teacher and students. Confluent educators would focus on 
an attempt to better integrate affect and cognition in 
content selection and implementation; this focus does not 
weaken Buber's position because dialogical teacher- 
student relationship provides grounds for better under¬ 
standing the students and, thus, knowing better how to 
integrate affect and cognition (as well as already doing 
so in the relationship itself). 
Like Buber, Weinstein and Fantini contend that 
content should be student-centered and based on students' 
needs. Their work adds to Buber's by stressing the 
distinction between "needs" and "interests" that Weinstein 
and Fantini believe has typically been lost in affective 
or student-centered education (Weinstein and Fantini, 
1970, pp. 36-37). They argue that focus on student 
interests is often at the expense of focus on student 
needs. An interest-based curriculum reflects present 
rather than potential future interests and, in addressing 
articulated interests, overlooks concerns, which are 
often not stated. Interests tend to be more transitory 
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and superficially reflective of feelings than are concerns 
and concerns are typically more anxiety-laden. Thus, 
while interests may provide clues about student concerns, 
to address student needs a curriculum must be based on 
concerns as well as interests. 
On this basis, Weinstein and Fantini propose a 
three-tier curriculum model that includes: an information 
and skills base; emphasis on individual creativity and 
exploration of interests; and group inquiry focused on 
common learner concerns, societal issues and problems 
(Weinstein and Fantini, 1970, pp. 29-65). Affect and 
cognition are to be integrated at all levels. They 
identify three areas of concern common to all students: 
concerns about self-image, connectedness with others and 
society at large, and control over one's own life 
(Weinstein and Fantini, 1970, p. 39). 
While the work of Weinstein and Fantini is 
complementary to that of Buber in exploring what is meant 
by "student needs," Buber's work offers warning against a 
potential danger in their work. In identifying certain 
concerns as common to all students and in using them to 
prescribe a particular curriculum model, Weinstein and 
Fantini risk falling into the trap of objectifying 
students. Since their work is often cited by confluent 
educators, it is important that they recognize and be 
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wary of this problem. in Buber's work (and Gadamer's) 
lies the important reminder that students must not be 
objectified; it is in thinking to know the person better 
than he or she knows him or herself that one destroys the 
person's claim to subjecticity and destroys the possibili¬ 
ty of dialogical relationship. If the potential of 
confluent education is to be realized, confluent educators 
must endeavor to scrupulously avoid over-reliance on 
generalizations about commonalities among students. They 
must attempt to derive content from their perceptions, in 
a particular situation, of what each student is expressing 
about his or her needs. Buber's work offers a strong 
argument that such perceptions inhere in dialogical 
relationship with students not in theorizing about them. 
A Problem; Use of Research Data 
and Theories 
A related issue that arises here is whether basing 
content selection on a teacher s perceptions of students 
needs precludes the use of research data and developmental 
theories. If such data and theories objectify the student, 
then they destroy the possibility of genuine dialogical 
relationship. Given the philosophical grounding of the 
perspective reflected in confluent education, the use of 
such materials may not be legitimate. [13] 
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Vandenberg, for example, from a phenomenological 
existential perspective, specifically states: 
Insofar as the teacher makes theoretical explana¬ 
tions of the pupil's behavior, she fails to 
understand the meaning of his words and actions 
because the particulars are lost by being subsumed 
within a general case. Insofar as the teacher 
then grasps a cross section of the pupil's being, 
what he is at a given moment, she cannot see him 
in his futuring, in his temporality, that is, as 
who he is becoming in his projection of being, 
and she cannot understand him. [Vandenberg, 
1971, p. 7] 
Jaspers contends that the person is always more than can 
be known of him or her. Buber and Gadamer argue that to 
claim to understand a person is to destroy that person's 
claim to subjecticity and to destroy the possibility of 
dialogue. In its logical, philosophical consistency, 
this position seems unavoidable and suggests that 
theoretical material, research data and generalizations 
of any sort cannot be used without at best obfuscating 
(and at worst destroying) teacher-student relationship 
(and, thus, eradicating the possibility of discovering 
the students' needs on which content selection should be 
based). There are, however, three propositions within 
this philosophical orientation that suggest that research 
data and theoretical prototypes may be used in carefully 
restricted ways. 
First, a central tenet of this orientation is that 
all knowledge is perspectival and that there are many 
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modes of knowing, if all modes of knowing are perspectival 
and yet also useful in reasoning, making existential 
choices, commitments and decisions, it seems to follow 
that what knowledge a person has should be used as part of 
moving toward greater knowledge and understanding. it can 
be argued that what knowledge a teacher has can be used IF 
the teacher acknowledges it as perspectival and constantly 
subject to revision based on experience of what a particu¬ 
lar student does in a particular situation that is always 
unique. 
Second, while the human being is always a subject, 
the human being is also the subject who objectifies the 
self while knowing that the self exceeds objectification. 
With this awareness, a teacher understands the necessity 
for transcending objectification in order to progress 
toward further understanding of the student as a unique 
individual. Research and theoretical perspectives can 
have a transitory usefulness if the teacher sustains an 
awareness of the need to go beyond them to being "fully 
present" as an authentic person in the teaching-learning 
encounter (so as to be open to each student s self- 
expression). The teacher would then use theoretical 
knowledge only in terms of its congruity with understand¬ 
ing that is derived from or confirmed by personal 
relationship with a student. Theoretical knowledge can, 
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thus, be perceived as potentially useful in developing 
the dialogical relationship as long as (and to the extent 
to which) knowledge is recognized as tentative. 
Third, the human being is a meaning-creator who 
exists interpretively in the world on the basis of both 
prereflective suppositions and specific knowledges, 
truths and reflective understandings about the 
intersubjective world. From this premise, it can be 
argued that the teacher must be aware that his or her 
presuppositions are constitutive of his or her understand¬ 
ing of a student. It is essential to attempt to become 
aware of one's own presuppositions and to maintain the 
dialogical openness that can provide corrective insights 
to reduce the potentially distorting effect of biases and 
presuppositions. If the teacher consciously attempts to 
relate dialogically with the student, to experience the 
student's side of the educative relationship and process, 
then corrective insights will reduce the impact of 
presuppositions based on theoretical perspectives or 
anything else (although presuppositions can never be 
totally "bracketed" or eliminated). 
It seems possible, then, if these kinds of qualifi¬ 
cations to their use are applied, to use research data 
and theoretical perspectives. However, it is essential 
that these be recognized as being only tools to assist 
the teacher. They must be used tentatively and not be 
allowed to obscure the dialogical relationship. [14] 
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Content from Traditional Disciplines 
The work of Jaspers and Gadamer, like that of 
Buber, reinforces the importance of not objectifying the 
learner and of incorporating in education a broad array 
of content as a tool for self-actualization. However, 
one of the most important contributions their work offers 
for realizing the potential of confluent education lies 
in an apparently opposite direction. Their work 
emphasizes traditional content. While apparently 
contradictory, this emphasis is in fact complementary. 
There is a real danger that confluent educators, in their 
legitimate concern for bringing affect more centrally 
into the educative process and for selecting content in 
terms of students" needs, may too greatly devalue the 
contribution of traditional disciplines. Emphasis on 
affective dimensions is an integral part of confluent 
education; however, these must be integrated with 
cognition, not included at the expense of cognition as it 
pertains to the content of the disciplines. 
Even given the subjectivist perspective that 
meaning resides first in the meaning-bestowing subject 
and that knowledge does not reside external to the knower 
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(elaborated in Chapter VI), the work of Gadamer and 
Jaspers stresses that traditional content can and should 
taught. This content can be taught in such a way as 
to integrate affect and cognition, landscape and 
geography, and so as to restore to the learner his or her 
role as a meaning-bestowing subject. 
In Gadamer s understanding of Bildung and in his 
emphasis on the historicity of the person, lies an 
argument for inclusion of the traditional disciplines. 
Teaching content in a personally meaningful way inheres 
in the hermeneutic perspective of the interpretive act as 
more than reconstruction. Rather, it is creative. What 
is essential are the attitude brought to the interaction 
with content and the use of hermeneutic methods in the 
interaction (this will be discussed further in Chapter 
VI). Because, for Gadamer, language is the medium of 
understanding and because language is dialogical, 
dialectical, speculative, and universalistic, no content 
(because of its linguisticality) is ever unrelated to the 
interpreting subject who interacts with it. The 
interpreter and the content interact so that meaning 
emerges between them. The interpreter brings all of him 
or herself (affect and cognition, landscape and geography) 
to the content interaction. What occurs is creative, 
i.e., construction of understanding and meaning in 
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relation to the learner's present existence and that of 
the subject matter. The learner always learns about him 
or herself in the hermeneutic process of learning about a 
text or analogue; therefore, perception of the self as a 
legitimate "object of learning" inheres in the dialogical 
hermeneutic dynamic. Content of the traditional 
disciplines reflects the human tradition by and within 
which the person self-actualizes. 
Like Gadamer's, Jaspers' work also offers a 
perspective on how the content of the traditional 
disciplines can be included so that it is directly 
related to the learner. His emphasis on the perspectival 
nature of knowledge throws responsibility back on the 
learner for understanding, interpreting, deciding about, 
and applying knowledge. In Jaspers' thought, as in 
Gadamer's, it is the learner's responsibility to pose 
questions, to reflect on content in relation to existence, 
and to persist in seeking existential truth. Truth does 
not exist in isolation from the learner but in the 
learner's understanding of subject matter in relation to 
existence. By research in the disciplines, the student 
develops the attitude of reason toward all aspects of 
life. This "reason" is more than method; it is the 
integration of affect and cognition, intuition and 
intellect, that enables the person to choose and act on 
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the basis of reason and existential commitment. The 
contents of dialogue are mundane contents and these 
mundane contents can be the content of traditional 
disciplines as well as anything else. 
There is one further benefit of emphasis on the 
inclusion of the content of the liberal arts and sciences 
as well as material directly reflective of students' 
present interests and concerns and societal problems. 
Although I know of no instances occuring in confluent 
education, a potential danger of emphasis on a student's 
self-actualization process is the temptation to over¬ 
emphasize the vocational aspect of self-actualization. 
It will be important, if the potential of confluent 
education is to be realized, for confluent educators to 
resist contemporary pressures to stress professional 
preparation at the expense of breadth in the curriculum. 
Jaspers, like many educators, recognizes the importance 
of education as preparation for professional work; 
however, he argues cogently that the best preparation for 
vocational life, as for all other aspects of life, is the 
education that enables a person to develop as a fully 
human, authentic person (see, for example, Jaspers, 1959, 
pp. 45-47). Support for this position lies as well in 
Gadamer's understanding of Bildung and praxis as including 
both moral wisdom and technical competence. This is not 
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to argue that specifically vocational content should not 
be included in curricula. Rather, it is to emphasize 
that the aim of education should be broader than techne, 
episteme, or phronesis. The educator should neither 
disregard nor over-emphasize any one aspect of education 
at the expense of any other aspect. Rather, there should 
be a balance maintained among all aspects such that 
praxis and Bildung remain the over-riding aims of the 
educative process. 
Thinking Skills 
Extensive consideration of research on teaching 
thinking skills is beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
However, thinking skills can be considered to be a 
legitimate content area and one that should be explicitly 
addressed in confluent education. 
Richard W. Paul (1984) differentiates two 
conceptions of critical thinking that have evolved in 
recent research literature. First, there is the model of 
thinking skills as discrete, micro-logical skills, 
extrinsic to character. These skills pertain to 
"technical" or monological reason within one frame of 
reference. They can be taught directly as procedural 
operations (e.g., understanding and distinguishing 
premises, assumptions, inferences, conclusions, evidence, 
questions-at-issue, etc.). Second, there is the model of 
thinking skills as integrated, macro-logical skills, 
intrinsic to character and to insight into and some 
command of one s cognitive and affective processes. 
These pertain to "emancipatory reason," i.e., development 
of a more free, rational and autonomous mind that can 
think dialogically and dialectically within opposing 
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frames of reference. in this perspective, thinking uses 
micro-logical skills; however, it transcends these 
procedural operations to development of principles of 
thinking critically and reciprocally using contradictory 
standpoints to clarify and elucidate issues and to reach 
a reasoned judgment or "verdict" (Paul, 1984, pp. 5-14). 
This second conception of thinking skills is congruent 
with a dialogical orientation and confluent education. 
It is thinking skills in this broad sense that should be 
taught as a content in confluent education. 
Paul argues that there is a fundamental difference 
between "technical" problems, solutions to which are 
"typically determined by one self-consistent close- 
textured system of ideas and procedures," i.e., technical 
thinking, and "non-technical" problems such as those in 
the personal and social realms (Paul, 1984, p. 5). He 
contends that, to this point, schools have focused their 
efforts on technical problems and thinking and have 
"illicitly reduced real-world problems to them or have 
tacitly inculcated into students the prefabricated 
'apodictic answers" of the dominant social majority or 
some favored minority" (Paul, 1984, p. 6). He believes 
that education must be expanded to include emphasis on 
dialogical-dialectical thinking and thinking skills as 
integrated, macro-logical skills appropriate for 
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confronting non-technical problems. 
Support for Paul's contention that education has 
focused primarily on "technical" thinking skills can be 
found in the classificatory scheme and examples of 
programs for teaching thinking skills described by 
Richard S. Nickerson, David Perkins and Edward Smith (see 
Nickerson, 1984, pp. 29-34). Research and programs that 
are classified as concerned with "technical" reason are 
characterized by emphasis on thinking skills as step-by- 
step procedures. Almost all of the typifications and 
programs Nickerson cites in his overview primarily 
emphasize discrete, micro-logical skills and technical 
thinking. He states that he knows of no program that 
focuses exclusively on teaching metacognitive skills and 
of only one program that emphasizes macro-logical skills 
and "thinking about thinking." That program is the 
Philosophy for Children program developed at Montclair 
State College (Lipman, Sharp and Oscanyon, 1980). 
Matthew Lipman, an originator of the Philosophy for 
Children program, points out that one of the traditional 
definitions of philosophy is that it is "thinking that 
devotes itself to the improvement of thinking" (italicized 
in text, Lipman, 1984, p. 51). Lipman describes 
philosophy as an instructional method as consisting of 
cooperative, self-correcting intellectual inquiry. Such 
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a philosophical method of instruction makes schooling 
"genuinely reflective" by motivating students to "talk to 
each other in a disciplined manner about substantive 
matters and to think objectively about their own thinking" 
(Lipman, 1984, p. 52). He contends that through 
"disciplined dialogue a community of inquiry begins to 
develop in the classroom" (Lipman, 1984, p. 52). Lipman 
sees "basic" skills such as reading, writing, speaking, 
listening, and computation as "complex and sophisticated 
megaskills"; reasoning is not one of these skills, but 
is, rather, foundational and fundamental to their develop¬ 
ment (Lipman, 1984, p. 53). He concludes: 
Philosophy is dialogical; to engage in 
philosophical dialogue puts a premium on higher 
order thinking skills, simply in order to come to 
grips with the logical, epistemological, ethical 
or aesthetic aspects of the problems under 
discussion. [Lipman, 1984, p. 56] 
Reflecting on critical thinking in secondary 
schools, John Bareli (1983) also articulates a position 
congruent with that of confluent education and advocacy 
of the use of dialogical interaction in the classroom as 
a means of helping students to improve their critical 
thinking. Bareli emphasizes "combinatory play" with 
ideas as an essential feature and component of reflective 
thinking in producing novel ideas, new perspectives and 
intriguing hypotheses (Bareli, 1983, p. 45). Bareli 
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describes this imaginative thought as transcending 
conventional ways of thinking and acting to "transform 
facts, ideas, and concepts into novel combinations 
to form, manipulate freely, and react emotionally to 
images in the mind" (Bareli, 1983, p. 45). He contends 
that imaginative thought in a very real sense is "the 
foundation of all thinking and the source of all the 
concepts in the subjects we teach in schools" (Bareli, 
1983, p. 45). Yet he finds that such thinking is often 
overlooked or neglected in schools. He argues that 
teachers 
must open the intellectual spaces for exploration 
of thought-provoking problems. We should view 
our students not so often as information consumers 
but more often as thinkers capable of fashioning 
new meanings and examining problems from different 
perspectives. Developing such flexibility of 
perspective over time will challenge students to 
transcend the concrete and obvious approaches to 
problems, thereby fostering their emerging 
abstract thinking capabilities. 
We must create an environment in which 
students feel comfortable sharing their ideas, 
inventions, and personal meanings . . . [Bareli, 
1983, p. 47] 
Bareli emphasizes that listening and sharing thoughts is 
valuable in creating a widening area of shared concerns; 
this can be stimulated by "liberating students' 
imaginative thinking from almost total reliance on the 
authority of the textbook and the recall-comprehension 
questions that predominate" in education (Bareli, 1983, 
p. 48). 
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While the research cited here is by no means 
definitive, it does suggest the legitimacy of emphasizing 
thinking skills as a content of education and their 
enhancement as an important goal of education. The 
conception of thinking skills as integrated, macro- 
logical skills necessary to metacognition is congruent 
with the perspectives of Buber, Gadamer and Jaspers and 
is reflected in the basic goals, directions and elements 
of confluent education. A dialogical orientation in 
teaching offers the opportunity of enhancing the develop¬ 
ment of thinking skills by including their expression in 
interpersonal and content interactions in the classroom. 
The issue of thinking skills as a necessary content of 
education provides a good transition to consideration of 
teaching methodology since at least part of teaching 
thinking skills is done indirectly by constructing 
classroom environments and situations in which thinking 
skills are used in interpersonal and content interactions 
and their use is consciously reflected on by students. 
Summary 
On the basis of the work analyzed in this disserta¬ 
tion, it can be stated that the content of education can 
include almost anything. Content selection is predicated 
on the educator's understanding of what each student 
needs to enhance his or her self-actualization process. 
A balanced array of content should be selected on the 
basis of the student's present as well as future being. 
The educative process has as its central dynamic helping 
the student to increasingly relate his or her 
prereflective understandings of the world to the broader 
intersubjective realm into which he or she is growing. 
Content should facilitate development of the increased 
representational competence and broadened meaning context 
necessary for participation in the human cultural tradi¬ 
tion. Content should be taught in such a way the student 
is aware of its relation to his or her life circumstances 
and self-formation process. In this perspective, teacher, 
students and content are interactively related in the 
educative process and the need is underlined for content 
to be an equal partner in the interaction. This supports 
the commitment of confluent educators to integration of 
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affect and cognition, as opposed to either primarily 
affective or cognitive education. How content can be 
taught so that the student perceives and utilizes it as 
part of self-actualization is the issue addressed in the 
next chapter. 
Endnotes 
1. Gadamer uses the example of the educational content 
of a grammar book; assimilation of its content improves a 
person s linguistic ability but once its content has been 
practiced and assimilated, the usefulness of the book 
ends. 
2. Thus, Broudy states that perhaps the criterion for 
the success of education is the kind of person the 
student becomes rather than some relation between what 
has been studied and what has been accomplished (Broudy, 
1974, p. 18). 
3. Gadamer relates Bildung to Vico's sensus communis, a 
sense of right acquired through living in community and 
determined by the structures and aims of community. He 
writes: 
The most important thing in education is . . . 
the training in the sensus communis, which is not 
nourished on the true, but on the probable. The 
main thing for our purposes is that sensus 
communis here obviously does not mean only that 
general faculty in all men, but the sense that 
founds community. According to Vico, what gives 
the human will its direction is not the abstract 
generality of reason, but the concrete generality 
that represents the community of a group, a 
people, a nation, or the whole human race. Hence 
the development of this sense of the community is 
of prime importance for living. [Gadamer, 1975, 
p. 21 ] 
The individual is formed by living in community and 
simultaneously forms him or herself as a unique self who 
is also founding community in expressing a kind of 
ethical or moral knowledge in choices and actions. 
4. In a multicultural society, "cultural tradition" must 
be defined broadly to include the confluence of several 
traditions that are constitutive of the present. If 
"community" is defined broadly as the human community, 
then the whole spectrum of what it is to be human must be 
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included (representatively). This must be done in terms 
of Bildung, not simply in terms of transmission of facts 
and skills. 
5. The work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty is useful in under¬ 
standing this dynamic. He uses the phenomenological 
method to emphasize being-in-the-worId in active engage¬ 
ment in situation (see Merleau-Ponty, 1962). For him, 
the phenomenology of the "owned body" and of freedom 
converge in the person-as-an-actor directly linked to the 
world through a body that is both subjective and 
objective. The person perceives through the senses, 
which involves action. However, much perception is 
prereflective and this prereflective perception forms the 
"sedimentation" in which all conscious action is rooted 
(see Kneller, 1984, pp. 41-42). This "sedimentation" 
concept explicates the influence of socialization on a 
person and the notion that no one is totally free. In 
order to act authentically, the person must be "in touch" 
with his or her prereflective consciousness and be able 
to reason with awareness of "sedimentation" as a back¬ 
ground. The person, recognizing the formative influences 
in his or her life, can question his or her interpreta¬ 
tions, become aware that knowledge is perspectival and 
find some freedom in some acts (see Ricoeur, 1967, p. 
211; Kneller, 1984, pp. 42-45). 
6. It is based on this perspective that Gadamer 
emphasizes the issue of prejudgment, the concept of 
historical distance, the integration of the past, the 
focus on understanding what the text is saying, and the 
significance of application. Linge writes that, "Gadamer 
takes the knower's boundness to his present horizons and 
the temporal gulf separating him from his object to be 
the productive ground of all understanding . . . (Linge, 
in Gadamer, 1976, pp. xiv-xv). Palmer notes that the 
past and present exist in a tension and that hermeneutic 
interpretation occurs in the "between,1 between strange 
ness and familiarity, between what was historically 
intended and meaning arising from questions put to the 
work from the present. In this respect, it is only with 
temporal distance that the historical significance of a 
work can emerge. 
7. He congruently describes the university as "the 
corporate realization of man's basic determination to 
know" (Jaspers, 1959, p. 2) and univers;ity education as a 
"formative process aiming at meaningful freedom P 
1959, p. 2). 
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8. The congruence in tone between Gadamer and Jaspers is 
almost startling. Gadamer speculates how philosophy can 
be "binding" as is science without being science and uses 
words that are highly reminiscent of Jaspers: 
[0]ne can of course suggest that the mere 
Proliferation of the sciences . . . leaves 
unsatisfied an ultimate need of reason: to be 
able to preserve a unity within the totality of 
what is. Hence the demand for a systematic and 
comprehensive articulation of our knowledge would 
remain the legitimate field of philosophy. But 
just this confidence in philosophy to bring about 
a labor of systematic ordering meets with ever 
greater mistrust. Today humanity seems ready in 
a new way to assume its own limitations and, 
despite the insurmountable particularity of the 
knowledge that science comes to know, to find 
satisfaction in the increasing mastery of nature 
that it owes to that particularity. It even 
takes into account the fact that with the increas¬ 
ing mastery of nature, the domination of human 
beings over human beings . . . becomes even 
greater and threatens freedom from within. A 
result of technology is that it leads to such a 
manipulation of human society, of the formation 
of public opinion, of life conduct of everyone, 
of the disposition of each individual's time 
between job and family, and it takes our breath 
away. [Gadamer, 1981, pp. 2-3] 
Jaspers, writing of the present and future in The Origin 
and Goal of History, discusses science and technology as 
the "sole specifically new and radically different 
element" (Jaspers, 1953, p. 81; see also pp. 81-125). 
After characterizing modern science, Jaspers discusses 
the aberrations and tasks of modern science; he points 
out that genuine science is rare and writes of the need 
for it (Jaspers, 1953, p. 95). He discusses technology 
as the "procedure by which scientific man masters nature 
for the purpose of moulding his existence . . ." (Jaspers, 
1953, p. 98). After defining the nature of technology 
and work, he appraises technology in terms of its remote¬ 
ness and new nearness to nature, the prevalent mis]udgment 
of the limits of technology, and the perception of 
"demonism" of technology (Jaspers, 1953, pp. 112 25). He 
concludes : 
One thing is certain: Technology is in the 
process of transforming man himself, along with 
his whole working existence. Man can no longer 
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extricate himself from the technology to which he 
himself gave birth. it is certain too that 
technology brings not only incalculable opportuni¬ 
ties, but also incalculable perils. Technology 
has become an independent, impetuous force. Man 
has fallen into its clutches without noticing the 
fact or how it happened. [Jaspers, 1953, p. 124] 
The main difference here is that Gadamer, writing nearly 
thirty years later, perceives humankind as aware of the 
domination of life by technology, but still accepting of 
it. 
9. Here Gadamer raises a concern similar to that of 
Hannah Arendt who writes in the Prologue to The Human 
Condition: 
[T]he sciences today have been forced to adopt a 
"language" of mathematical symbols which, though 
it was originally meant only as an abbreviation 
for spoken statements, now contains statements 
that in no way can be translated back into 
speech. The reason why it may be wise to distrust 
the political judgment of scientists qua 
scientists is not primarily their lack of 
"character" . . . but precisely the fact that 
they move in a world where speech has lost its 
power. And whatever men do or know or experience 
can make sense only to the extent that it can be 
spoken about . . . [Arendt, 1958, p. 4] 
10. Gadamer again sounds like Arendt: 
Orientation toward the whole: some such reality 
resides in language but not as one is dealing 
with the monological modes of speech of scientific 
sign systems ... But language as orientation to 
the whole comes into play wherever real conversa¬ 
tion occurs and that means wherever the 
reciprocity of two speakers who have entered into 
conversation circles about the subject matter. 
For everywhere that communication happens, 
language not only is used but is shaped as well. 
[Gadamer, 1981, p. 4] 
11. He states: 
The articulation of the world in which we live 
through language and communicative cooperation is 
neither a completely conventional dimension nor 
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the residue of a perhaps false consciousness; it 
is constitutive of what is and is for the most 
part sure of its legitimacy precisely because it 
has to be assumed by every protest, contradiction, 
and critique. Over against this context, the 
dismantling and reconstructing of everything that 
is which is carried on by modern science 
represents simply a particular domain of expansion 
and mastery, which is limited just to the degree 
that the resistance of what exists to objectifica¬ 
tion cannot be overcome. 
Consequently it cannot be denied that science 
always has and always will come up against a 
claim of comprehension (Begreifens) in the face 
of which it must fail -- and indeed which it 
should forgo. [Gadamer, 1981, pp. 11-12] 
12. As Jaspers writes; 
Spirit [Geist], human existence, and 
responsive reason make up the all-inclusive 
context of our lives. Spirit is the potentiality 
and power of ideas. Human existence in its 
fullest sense signifies our serious and uncondi¬ 
tional commitment to the search for transcendence. 
Responsive reason is the mind open to the 
intrinsic meaning of things. [Jaspers, 1959, p. 
28] 
It is not the particular body of fact learned, but rather 
the development of judgment and Humanitas that are 
important outcomes of education (Jaspers, 1959, p. 46). 
The process of learning should lead in the direction of 
this kind of development. This view is congruent with 
Gadamer's emphasis on Bildung in relation to education. 
13. Educational research and developmental theory can 
be, and have been, challenged from many perspectives 
(including whether the concept of developmental theory is 
fallacious). Developmental theories are referred to here 
only to exemplify a problematic, not to consider their 
relative merits. The developmental theories and much 
research data are claimed to contribute toward answering 
questions about who the learner is and how the learner 
learns with related content implications. The perspective 
discussed in this dissertation seems to suggest that such 
questions can be posed only in terms of a specific 
learner and cannot, in fact, be answered because the 
learner, the teacher and the situation are always changing 
and emerging. 
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14. It should be noted that even Vandenberg, as outspoken 
as he is on the dangers of presuming to "know" the 
student on the basis of theoretical perspectives, does 
not deny the potential usefulness of theoretical and 
research data as long as it is "grounded in the being of 
the students." He utilizes a scheme of "critical events" 
based on the work of Romano Guardini for considering 
education in relation to life-phases and developmental 
values (see Vandenberg, 1971, pp. 43-57). This kind of 
approach may be especially useful because its reference 
is to life events as opposed to characteristics of the 
person. This may reduce the dangers of objectification. 
These "critical events" are seen as part of historicity; 
they are not perceived as determinative in a conditioning 
sense but as events through which each person lives in a 
unique way as self-actualizing being (see Vandenberg, 
1971, pp. 44-45). Such critical events are not traumatic 
but transitional. Although they partly happen to the 
person, they are not determining factors because, when 
they can be considered reflectively, they have already 
happened and have become part of the facticity of personal 
existence (Vandenberg, 1971, pp. 43-57). Like the work 
of Weinstein and Fantini or any other work about students 
or about education, including this dissertation, 
Vandenberg's work only narrowly skirts the danger of 
objectification inherent in all theorizing. Vandenberg's 
work does emphasize, however, the need for a person to 
exist authentically by living each moment of life fully 
as a unique and irreplaceable moment in the 
self-actualization process. His work should be seriously 
considered by confluent educators. 
CHAPTER VI 
METHOD 
Introduction 
The central thematic of this chapter will be the 
pedagogic obligation to preserve and enhance the student's 
ability to engage in the dialogical communication and 
relationships through and in which self-actualization 
takes place. Two preliminary issues must be considered 
briefly before methodological issues are examined. 
First, an overview will be given of the epistemological 
position characteristic of the thinkers discussed in this 
dissertation. Second, the question of how the learner 
learns will be considered in terms of the ontological 
position used in this dissertation. If a person becomes 
an authentically human person through dialogical 
interaction and if the objective of education is to 
facilitate the student's self-actualization as an 
authentic person, then a fundamental dynamic of the 
educative process must be dialogue. The dialogical 
dynamic will be characterized as self-education with 
others. Analysis of Jaspers' thought raises the issue of 
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the dyadic nature of genuine dialogue. Although Jaspers 
does not contend that education should be structured 
dyadically, if genuine dialogue is dyadic then the 
teacher must provide for and encourage dyadic interactions 
as integral to the educative process. As Jaspers does 
not argue for a dyadic structure of education, neither 
does he delineate a dialogical method of instruction. 
Rather, from his work it can be argued that a variety of 
instructional methods can be approached dialogically. In 
this sense, dialogical teaching-learning involves an 
attitudinal orientation or commitment rather than a 
specific method. It is Gadamer's philosophical hermeneu¬ 
tics that offers the possibility of a specifically 
dialogical method. His work will be used to illustrate 
how the Socratic approach that Jaspers advocates for 
university education can be applied as a dialogical 
teaching-learning method. Finally, the issue of teachers 
and students as co-learners and co-creators of meaning 
that is raised by a dialogical method will be considered. 
The work of Buber has little to offer in terms of 
methodological issues. It will be referred to only in 
the first sections of this chapter related to 
epistemological and ontological considerations. 
Epistemology in Relation to Education 
It is important to remember that Buber, Gadamer, 
Jaspers, and other phenomenological existential thinkers 
do not reject the "I" of "I think," but contend that the 
human being must not be identified only with reason and 
intellect. The individual is as well, to use Jaspers' 
terms, a "physical I," a "social I," a "reminiscent I," 
and a subjectivity, "I myself," which encompasses other 
dimensions of the self. The person lives in a world and 
must be able to distinguish among self, others and world; 
however, knowledge is not understood as being the 
"objective," "scientific" kind in which the knower 
functions as a detached observer. 
What is challenged is the dichotomization of 
subject and object characteristic of positivistic epistem¬ 
ology in which "Knowledge in the objective sense is 
knowledge without a knower; it is knowledge without a 
knowing subject" (Karl Popper, quoted in Kockelmans, 
1979, p. 226). In objectivist epistemologies 
knowledge is conceptualized as something residing 
within or between disciplines or fields. That 
is, it is conceptualized as an objective (or 
intersubjectively acceptable) body of information, 
methods, concepts, and theories. [Kavaloski, m 
Kockelmans, 1979, p. 226] 
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Conversely, in existential, phenomenological and modern 
hermeneutic epistemologies, subject (knower) and object 
are placed in an indissoluble relation: "objectivity is 
necessarily dependent upon the prior subjectivity of the 
knowing subject" (Kavaloski, in Kockelmans, 1979, p. 
228). The bonds between subject and object are typically 
explicated as "consciousness of," understanding and 
meaning-creation. James Edie, in his Introduction to 
Pierre Thevenaz's What Is Phenomenology? ( 1962), explains 
that this orientation is neither a science of objects nor 
of subjects, but of experience. It concentrates on "the 
point of contact where being and consciousness meet" and, 
therefore, is a study of "consciousness as intentional" 
and directed towards objects in an "intentionally consti¬ 
tuted world" (Edie, in Thevenaz, 1962, pp. 19-20). Such 
study is, Edie states, transcendental in that it tries to 
"disclose the structures of consciousness as conscious¬ 
ness, of experience as experience" (Edie, in Thevenaz, 
1962, pp. 20). 
Edmund Husserl believed that what the subject is 
conscious of are the appearances of phenomena in his/her 
mind and that these appearances are structured and 
mediated by the mind in terms of the socio-cultural 
concepts to which the person has been acculturated. He 
argued, therefore, that in order to more accurately 
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apprehend phenomena, the person must attempt to reduce 
mediation by "bracketing" the presuppositions so as to 
heighten openness to the phenomena (this is the essence 
of the "phenomenological reduction"). Post-Husserlian 
thinkers, however, emphasize the impossibility of 
"unmediated" or "objective" knowledge of phenomena. [1] 
For example, as noted previously, Gadamer believes that 
only when a person experiences doubt about his or her 
perceptions or opinions does the person differentiate 
between his/her concept of the object and the object 
itself. It is only at this point that the person may 
attempt to use the phenomenological reduction. While 
Gadamer rejects the reduction, he explains that for 
Husserl the purpose of the reduction is so that the 
person can bestow new meaning and being (Gadamer, 1976, 
pp. 107-129 and 130-81). It is at this point, for 
Gadamer, that hermeneutics comes into play as the person 
tries to open him/herself to what is presenting itself 
and to better understand it. On this premise rests 
Gadamer's contention that all interpretation (knowledge 
and understanding) includes the concrete situationality 
the interpreting subject. Linge explains: 
All deliberate interpretation takes place on the 
basis of Dasein's historicity, that is, on the 
basis of a prereflective understanding of being 
from within a concrete situation that has 
intrinsic relation to the interpreter s past and 
of 
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future. . . . There is no presuppositionless, 
"prejudiceless" interpretation, for while the 
interpreter may free himself from this or that 
situation, he cannot free himself from his own 
facticity, . . . [Linge, in Gadamer, 1976, p. 
xlvii] 
This is why Gadamer's work contends that it is necessary 
to overcome the negative connotation of "prejudice" and 
"presuppositions" and recognize that these are enabling 
conditions that are the bases of openness to the world 
(see Gadamer, 1976, pp. 3-17). it is within this context 
of previous experience and understanding that the person 
encounters every situation. 
What the phenomenologist is primarily concerned 
with is consciousness as it thrusts toward the world (see 
Greene, 1973, p. 131). Meaning is found in relating with 
the world, not merely in observing it. The individual 
appropriates into his/her life what is derived from 
encountering the world. "Knowing" is meaningful because 
it involves participating in, engaging in and relating 
with the world; it is created in being-in-the-world. 
The impact of phenomenology on existential thinking 
is exemplified in Jaspers' exposition of the indissolubi¬ 
lity of subject and object: "In world orientation we have 
to recognize that all objectivity depends upon the 
subject" (Jaspers, 1970, p. 298). He writes of the 
unification of subjectivity and objectivity as a trend: 
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My hidden inwardness will not be real for me 
unless it is outwardly objectified; my arbitrary 
will is not decisive until I apply the standards 
of a generally valid ought; a subject's insights 
into the existence of objects requires correct 
judgments; an existence realizes itself in its 
world by its accomplishments . . . Conversely, 
whatever is merely objectively extant will be 
acknowledged by a subject only in adoption, in its 
translation into subjective reality. There is no 
truth for me unless I grasp it, no world but 
the one in which I actively or contemplatively 
move, no idea other than that which becomes a 
moving force within me. [Jaspers, 1970, p. 301] 
From the perspective of the thinkers discussed in 
this dissertation, knowledge is intertwined with living 
in that it is derived from interaction with the world 
and, more importantly, it is part of the person's becoming 
a self. The person must go beyond knowing to using 
knowledge and understandings to make choices and commit¬ 
ments that are expressed in action. All modes of 
knowledge can contribute to the person's choosing, acting 
and becoming a self; 
Since Kierkegaard, existentialists have attempted 
to arouse human beings to take notice of their 
existence, to find out for themselves. They have 
also attempted to make people realize that 
existence precedes thought, that the purpose of 
knowledge is to clarify and to open up a life. 
[Greene, 1973, p. 138] 
All modes of knowledge can enrich the person s "life- 
world" and can contribute to the awareness that underlies 
existential choice. While there is more to choosing and 
acting than using reason, intellect and knowledge, a 
person must use what perspectival knowledge he or she has 
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No form of knowledge is rejected by phenomenological 
existential thinkers; rather, the human being is 
understood to use reason as a bond among all perspectival 
modes of knowing the world. [2] 
In this position, then, there is concern with both 
knowledge derived from intellect and meaning derived from 
reason and being. Knowledge and understanding are 
perspectival. What the human being "knows" is created in 
the indissoluble relation of subject and object in which 
the object presents itself and is grasped in consciousness 
and the subject bestows meaning. What is "known" can be 
said to be an admixture of what is presented to conscious¬ 
ness by the object, the presuppositions that the mind 
uses to structure its apprehending of the object, and the 
meaning bestowed by the subject on the object as this 
meaning emerges in the interaction between them. Reason, 
"unobjectifying understanding," attempts to relate all 
perspectival forms of knowledge into a unified, comprehen¬ 
sive whole (even in recognition that this is not 
possible). 
It can be concluded, then, that a "subjectivist" 
perspective understands knowledge as dependently related 
to human consciousness, such that the person is engaged in 
an on-going process of inquiry and meaning-creation. It 
can be argued, as Vandenberg does, that if the attempt to 
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acquire objective knowledge is actually an attempt to be 
objective, i.e. to be subjectless, this is precisely 
contrary to the conditions of human existence: "No one 
can be objective; he is and will remain a subjecticity; 
subjecticity is the truth . . . [T]o be a perspective on 
the world is inescapable. Man exists a perspective" 
(Vandenberg, 1971, p. 88). [3] 
While Bernstein (1983) contends that it is possible 
to transcend objectivist and relativist or subjectivist 
epistemologies, writers on education tend to differentiate 
between an "objectivist" pedagogy, arising from objecti¬ 
vist epistemology, and a "subjectivist" pedagogy, prefer¬ 
red by the writers used here who represent subjectivist 
epistemological perspectives. For example, Kavaloski 
argues that if knowledge is perceived as lying outside 
the student, then the student is perceived as a 
"receptacle" for knowledge because learning must consist 
of some process of assimilation or internalization 
(Kavaloski, in Kockelmans, 1979, p. 227). Knowledge is 
reified as a "thing-in-itself"; students are perceived as 
consumers or recipients; teachers are seen as managers or 
directors of the "depositing" process and as having 
"privileged access" to the bodies of knowledge to be 
delivered to the students (Kavaloski, in Kockelmans, 
1979, p. 227). [4] Kavaloski labels this "mortuary 
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education" in which knowledge is lifeless, inert, and he 
contends that this form of education 
by denying our essential historical agency 
our capacity as historical subjects to 
collectively transform our social reality -- 
thereby denies us our ontological vocation of 
becoming more fully human. ... [W]ithout even 
realizing the loss, we relinquish our capacity for 
meaningful choice, for collective action, and for 
mutual aid; we are expelled from the orbit of 
historical praxis . . [Kavaloski, in Kockelmans, 
1979, p. 232] 
This is akin to the "banking" concept of education 
criticized by Paulo Freire (Freire, 1970, pp. 57-74) and 
the "dead" classroom criticized by George Brown (Brown, 
1971, pp. 1-2). [5] 
By contrast, a "subjectivist" pedagogy (of which 
confluent education is an example) is centered on the 
"historical agency" of the participants and is intended 
to facilitate students' self-actualization. Knowledge is 
perceived as dependently related to the knowing/learning 
subject and the content of education is understood as a 
tool for self-actualization. Inherent as well is the 
concept that learning and knowledge are related to 
praxis. The student should understand content in a 
personally meaningful way, such that it influences 
behavior. What is learned is to be learned in relation 
to its application in the choosing, making commitments 
and acting that are constitutive of self-actualization as 
317 
an authentic person. Self-actualization lies in the 
individual s free choices, which are always made in a 
context. The broader that context and the greater the 
person s understanding of it, the freer the person will 
be to choose well in terms of authentic self-actualiza¬ 
tion. The content of education, if understood in this 
way, plays an important role. Maxine Greene describes 
what a person can experience in the educative process: 
If he is fortunate, he will build a many-faceted 
stock of knowledge, a multiplicity of constructs 
he can use to order his experience. To the 
degree he does this, his perspectives will 
diversify; and he will find himself living in a 
progressively more meaningful world. 
He should not limit himself to a 
technological view and should not be content with 
a predominantly noncognitive nor intuitive view. 
He is not required to choose himself as a 
predominantly rational man or a sensuous man; an 
objectivist or a subjectivist; an activist or a 
quietist. In a multifarious culture, no single 
scheme or category can be sufficient for organiz¬ 
ing the flux of reality. . . . [T]o identify 
oneself with a one-dimensional view is always to 
deny a part of one's humanity. [Greene, 1973, 
pp. 8-9] 
The work of Buber, Gadamer and Jaspers offers support for 
this position, which expresses the epistemological- 
pedagogical orientation of confluent education. 
The Learner 
The second preliminary question that must be 
considered, albeit briefly, is what ontological aspects 
of the human being pertain to existence as a learner. 
Gadamer contends that being exists understandingly; human 
being primordially involves understanding-interpretation- 
application. From this perspective, learning can be 
understood generally as constitutive of the process of 
human existence; acquisition of whatever is derived from 
formal education is subsumed under this broader under¬ 
standing. In living, the person is continuously learning, 
sometimes prereflectively and sometimes reflectively. 
However, there are also some more specific generalizations 
that can be made from the work of Buber, Gadamer and 
Jaspers. 
First, the learner can be said to learn from 
experiencing and interpreting what is presented to him or 
her by the similarities to and differences from him or 
herself of objects, events and persons. Buber suggests 
that as the infant explores the world in a direct pre¬ 
ref lective (dialogical) way, he or she differentiates him 
or herself from what is not self. Buber first speaks of 
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the existence of the "undifferentiated I" of the natural 
association. He explains this by analogy with the fetus 
and mother in the prenatal period; they exist in a "pure 
natural association, a flowing toward each other, a 
bodily reciprocity; ..." (Buber, 1970, p. 76). From 
this state, the child, after birth, must detach itself to 
enter a personal life. To become an "I," the child must 
first distinguish what is him or herself from what is his 
or her world. While Buber sees the longing for relation¬ 
ship as primal, only after the "I" has been differentiated 
can an "I-Thou" relationship emerge. The innate longing 
for relation can be anticipated in the confrontations of 
the person with the world through which the person 
develops the "consciousness of the constant partner, the 
I-consciousness" (Buber, 1970, p. 80). The detached "I" 
initially becomes a subject in the functional relationship 
with things in the world (including people who are not 
immediately distinguished as subjects rather than 
objects). During this early exploration, the child 
interacts dialogically with the world in letting things 
be themselves and present themselves. However, as this 
process of disclosure increasingly reveals to the child 
what is self and what is other, a greater cleavage arises 
between the child and the other. As the child experiences 
the qualities of the world, gradually an aggregate of 
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qualities that occur in the relating process are 
remembered. As the child repeatedly experiences the 
qualities of an other and recognizes it in its 
specificity, the child increasingly begins to objectify, 
classify or categorize the other. The child increasingly 
interprets what is presenting itself on the basis of 
previous experience. 
Vandenberg adds to this the insight that with the 
onset of language, the child begins to label objects and 
labels further mediate between the child and the other. 
In the earliest stages, naming may involve a sort of 
magical "being of the thing itself"; this would be still 
characteristic of direct dialogical relationship. 
However, as the child matures, the child becomes distanced 
from the other such that the label may represent, not the 
object itself as itself, but a complex of qualities that 
constitute a presupposition about the object. These 
presuppositions become a "sedimentation," still 
prereflective, that represents and constitutes the 
meaning of the object for the child. The child is 
increasingly urged in the direction of representational 
competence because it is through this means that the 
child is enabled to more fully enter the intersubjective 
realm that is characterized by verbal as well as non¬ 
verbal communication. Accordingly, the child increasingly 
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interprets experiences. 
Jaspers, too, describes the emergence of an "I- 
consciousness" and distinguishes among different modes of 
being that are encompassed in the existential "I" (see 
Jaspers, 1970, pp. 26-34). [6] 
The person, then, is always in the process of 
becoming a self in the historicity and facticity of his 
or her situation in the world. Thus, the learner can be 
said to learn and self-actualize concurrently through 
experiencing and interpreting his or her interactions 
with the world. 
Second, the child ascribes to the adult authority 
on the basis of the child's perception that the adult can 
contribute to the child's self-actualization project. 
Vandenberg points out that as the child explores the 
world and increasingly differentiates him or herself from 
it, the child simultaneously becomes aware of the limita¬ 
tions of his or her own powers to understand and control 
the world. The child also becomes aware of the 
discrepancy between his or her desires and powers to 
fulfill them. The child recognizes that adults can help 
him or her to achieve goals. On the basis of this 
potential for helping, the child ascribes authority to 
the adult because, as Vandenberg expresses it, the words 
and actions of adults help to disclose possibilities in 
322 
the world that contribute to the child's successful 
exploration of the world (Vandenberg, 1971, pp. 66-71). 
The child expresses his or her being as a learner by 
choosing to learn and by giving authority to others to 
help him or her to learn. The child enlists adults in 
helping him or her learn to become independent, to self- 
actualize with decreasing need for assistance. It is 
this view that is implicit in Buber's understanding of 
the student s approach to a trusted teacher; the teacher's 
credibility as a potentially helpful person gives him or 
her authority, not the teacher's power to coerce. 
A third generalization that can be made is that the 
learner learns actively. This activity may or may not be 
directly observable. What is primarily occuring is the 
person's active engagement with the world, which may or 
may not be accompanied by overt physical or linguistic 
behavior. It is productive and creative in the Gadamerian 
sense that in its occurrence meaning emerges. 
A fourth generalization that can be stated is that 
in some instances learning occurs through perception of 
and attempt to reduce or resolve a discrepancy, 
discontinuity or incongruence. It is to this that 
Gadamer refers when he describes the foundation of 
interpretive being as negativity, i.e., awareness of not 
knowing or of something's being other than it was thought 
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to be. The person develops as a rational, intellectual 
being as the person acts to overcome an existent 
alienation of meaning. This kind of learning, unlike pre- 
reflective dialogical interaction, always involves a 
degree of distancing, representing and theorizing that is 
inherent, for Gadamer, in human rationality. 
A fifth generalization is that what is learned in 
any situation is personal. Meaning emerges between the 
person (learner) and that with which he or she interacts. 
What is learned can be congruent with what is learned by 
others and can have intersubjective validity. However, 
what is learned is constructed between the learner and 
that with which he or she interacts and is constituted by 
the unique particularities of the specific situation. 
Thus, what is learned is a personal truth even when it 
is congruent with or derived from others' personal 
"answers" or some realm of intersubjectivity. 
From this perspective, learning is coexistent, 
correlational and contingent with being. It is inherent 
in the "being understandingly" that is a person's self- 
actualization process. The formal education system is 
the institutionalization of this aspect of human being. 
Within the education system, the student ascribes 
credibility to the process, content and teacher on the 
basis of the student's perception or interpretation of 
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their contributing to his or her self-actualization 
process. This conferral of credibility by the student 
may reflect a conscious assessment; however, particularly 
with young students, it is probably more likely to occur 
prereflectively. It is essential for the educator to 
facilitate the student's development of a sense of the 
educational process (and teacher) as credible. This is 
one important basis on which an argument can be made for 
dialogue as a fundamental dynamic of the educative 
process. 
Dialogical Self-Education with Others 
It is because of the necessity for grounding 
education in the being of students and for students to 
perceive education as credible that an argument can be 
made for dialogue as a fundamental dynamic in the educa¬ 
tive process. If a person self-actualizes through and in 
dialogical interaction with others and if the primary 
outcome of the self-actualization and educative processes 
is the ability to live dialogically, then education that 
is dialogical is demonstrably related to self-actualiza¬ 
tion. It should therefore be credible from the student's 
perspective. 
If the person exists authentically as a free, 
choosing, responsible, emergent, self-actualizing person 
in dialogical relationships, then the congruent dynamic 
in education is self-education with others. The educa¬ 
tional situation envisioned here can be described as a 
teaching-learning situation in which teaching and learning 
are coexistent and correlative. Each participant takes 
as much responsibility as possible for his or her own 
participation. Gadamer's metaphor of the game is useful 
in thinking about teaching-learning. 
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The teaching-learning "game" is an interaction that 
the players enact but which transcends each separate 
player. The individual "surrenders" him or herself to 
the "back and forth" movement of the game, yet 
simultaneously retains undiminished his or her individual¬ 
ity. Teaching-learning is dialogical in a Jaspersian 
sense in that the "game" involves a "loving struggle" in 
which the players engage. They bring all their strengths 
and weaknesses into play, not in an adversarial relation¬ 
ship, but in an open, candid, mutual ardent quest. In so 
"playing the game," they make possible the emergence of 
"goals." In the instance of the teaching-learning game, 
these "goals" are truths about the self, others and the 
world. As a participant, each player has equality with 
each other and each is, in a sense, both playing the game 
and playing his or her game. On a team, each player s 
mode of participation, i.e., the position she or he plays 
and the skills used relative to it, is equal to that of 
each other player in making possible the event of the 
game. Each participates fully, to the best of his or her 
ability, as a co-player. It is definitionally constitu¬ 
tive of the game that participants will be doing different 
things, contributing in different ways, but the unique 
participation of each is essential. Without further 
extension, this metaphor illustrates how in the teaching- 
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learning situation each person participates in his or her 
own unique way and makes his or her unique contribution. 
Each sees the situation from a different perspective and 
the meaning of the situation is dependent on his or her 
Par"ticular way of being in the situation. In this sense, 
education is both self-education and dialogical. [7] 
From the view of education as self-education and 
dialogical, it would follow that the most congruent forms 
of education would have an open structure, would be 
individualized and would emphasize individual initiative 
and independent exploration as well as frequent interac¬ 
tion with others. Among present education structures, 
the open classroom and tutorial systems seem to be most 
congruent. Although confluent educators emphasize 
student freedom, much of their illustrative writing 
describes group work organized around a unit theme being 
studied by the entire class. A case can be made that 
group orientation is practical in light of the organiza¬ 
tion of American education. Also, given the objective of 
facilitating students' self-actualization as potential 
community members, it is highly congruent to structure 
classroom interaction in terms of group interaction as a 
learning community. Certainly the confluent educators 
commitment to integration of affect and cognition is well 
documented as is their endeavor to create classroom 
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communities rather than collectivities. Likewise, their 
emphasis on integration of affect and cognition is 
intended to demonstrate to the student the relation of 
educational content to his or her life. Yet, the question 
must be raised whether confluent education is sufficiently 
individualized to demonstrate to the student that he or 
she is a free, choosing, responsible person engaged in 
self-education. It is not evident from the writings of 
confluent educators that this is the case. Nor is it 
evident that as much effort is devoted to enhancing the 
student's potential to function independently intellect¬ 
ually as to his or her ability to exist as an affectively 
"healthy" person. 
As Jaspers points out, intellectual endeavor is 
essentially a solitary occupation although its progress 
and fruits can and should be tested in dialogue and 
discussion. For self-education to occur, at least a 
substantial amount of intensive intellectual effort must 
be predicated on personal selection of subject matter and 
method of learning and on individual perception of 
questions (and consecutive efforts to interpret material 
in terms of these questions). There is nothing contradic¬ 
tory to greater individualization in the nature of 
confluent education. Rather, it would seem to be logical¬ 
ly complementary and an area of improvement to be pursued. 
Implications of the Dyadic Nature 
of Dialogue 
A additional question inheres in the issue of 
education as dialogical. While dialogue does not 
necessarily inhere in open classrooms nor tutorial 
systems, it is highly compatible with both. Dialogue is 
articulated as a central dynamic of confluent education. 
Yet, based on analysis of Jaspers' work, a contradiction 
appears to exist between the typical group orientation of 
confluent education and Jaspers' contention that genuine 
dialogue only occurs dyadically (see, for example, 
Jaspers, 1959, p. 65). In terms of his concept of 
dialogue as dyadic, the possibility of dialogical educa¬ 
tion is greater in both open classrooms and tutorial 
systems than in confluent education as it is presently 
implemented. 
According to Jaspers, what occurs in a group setting 
such as that typically used in confluent education is 
discussion, not dialogue. Accounts of dialogue are 
included in writings by confluent educators (see, for 
example, Galyean, in Brown, 1975, pp. 209-217; Spira, in 
Brown, 1975, pp. 186-89). These are dyadic and occur 
between a teacher and a student. However, if dialogue is 
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to be a central dynamic in confluent education, confluent 
educators must provide many opportunities for dyadic 
interaction -- certainly more than seems to be the case 
presently from their illustrative writings. 
It is necessary to be clear that Jaspers does not 
argue that education must be structured dyadically (nor 
as will be discussed below, does he delineate a specific 
dialogical method). In The Idea of the University, 
Jaspers distinguishes three basic forms of education in 
each of which the teacher and student stand in a different 
relationship (Jaspers, 1959, pp. 50-54). In scholastic 
instruction, the transmission of a traditional body of 
knowledge is the focus. The relationship between teacher 
and students is impersonal (the participants are substitu¬ 
table). In this form of education, no dialogical 
relationship or communication is required. The emphasis 
is on content; the teacher is concerned, so to speak, 
with teaching something, not someone. In apprenticeship, 
the central focus is on the personality of the master- 
teacher. The relationship is a personal one in that the 
student subordinates him or herself in reverence to the 
unique personality of the master. There is no necessity 
of dialogical relationship on the part of the teacher; 
although he or she is a "Thou" to the student, the 
student need not, perhaps cannot, be a "Thou" for the 
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teacher. In Socratic education, the focus is on the 
struggle for realization of self-being in a "contest for 
truth." The relationship is one in which the teacher and 
student mutually engage, as free people of equal status 
taking responsibility in the struggle for truth. The 
dialogical relationship is most congruent with the 
concept of Socratic education and it is this form of 
education that Jaspers advocates for the university. 
While Jaspers does not contend that education must 
be dyadic, it follows from his espousal of Socratic 
education and from his contention that genuine dialogue 
can occur only between two partners, that opportunities 
for dyadic interaction must be present. This is supported 
by Jaspers' discussion of the university as characterized 
by communication, much of which occurs dyadically. Since 
Jaspers views university members as responsible, mature 
adults, there is no need in his work to emphasize the 
teacher's active provision for dyadic interaction beyond 
mention of the teacher's willingness to engage in dialogue 
with individual students. As members of a community of 
scholars and students, students can seek out opportunities 
for dialogue independently. 
However, in the context of confluent education that 
occurs in public schools for pre-university students, the 
need at least initially to take an active teacher may 
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role in structuring opportunities for dyadic interaction. 
It is likely that students will quickly become accustomed 
to this kind of interaction and will then seek it out on 
their own since this is (ontologically) a natural form of 
interaction. [8] 
A teacher can encourage dyadic interaction both 
within and outside the classroom. Within the classroom, 
the group can frequently be sub-divided into dyads for 
dialogue about content. During these periods, the 
teacher can facilitate dialogue with individual pairs by 
observing, listening and, where appropriate, asking 
questions to stimulate on-going dialogue. The teacher 
can engage in dialogue with individual students to help 
them identify and clarify their own questions. In this 
way, the teacher gives students experience and practice 
in dialogue and demonstrates ways of assisting a 
dialogical partner to further thought and clarity. 
Outside the classroom, the teacher can provide time 
for dialogical "tutorial" sessions with each student. 
The teacher can make him or herself available before and 
after school for conversation with individual students. 
This is a time-consuming process probably better suited 
to university and college campuses than to public elemen 
tary and secondary schools. However, what opportunities 
can be provided, even if they are infrequent, will be 
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useful in building more trusting teacher-student relation¬ 
ships, in offering insights pertinent to content selection 
and implementation and in providing to students practice 
in dialogical interactions. Teachers can also encourage 
students to form study dyads. Initially, assignments 
designed to be completed in pairs can motivate formation 
of these dyads and provide practice in dialogical interac¬ 
tion. Once accustomed to studying this way, students 
will be unlikely to require much active encouragement by 
the teacher. The teacher can, however, continue to 
monitor to some extent the progress of these dyads, both 
to reinforce the legitimacy of this studying together 
process and to facilitate on-going maturing of the 
learning interactions. [9] 
One other possibility that can be considered in 
relation to the issue of the dyadic nature of genuine 
dialogue lies in the work of Clinton Collins who, like 
Jaspers, believes that genuine dialogue can only occur 
between two people. Because, for Collins, dialogue is 
restricted to occurrence between two partners at any 
time, it is by nature exclusionary. It excludes others 
"except where it occurs in ritualized form in a group 
setting" (Collins, in Denton, 1974, p. 153). He sees 
dialogue in a ritualized form as being possible in 
classroom settings. In this respect, his work may be of 
use to confluent educators who want to heighten a 
dialogical dynamic in their classrooms. 
Collins argues that in classroom settings what 
occur are not true dialogues but rather "Dionysian 
experiences," and, further, that creation of a "Dionysian 
relationship" among students is one of the most effective 
means of teaching (Collins, in Denton, 1974, p. 153). [10] 
Students in a "Dionysian relationship" are united in a 
"we-feeling" and, for Collins, their sense of being 
strangers in the education setting is reduced without the 
danger inherent in genuine dialogues, which, he believes, 
would fragment the group and produce "political" tensions 
(Collins, in Denton, 1974, p. 154). For Collins, an 
additional benefit of this is that it serves as a model 
for an effective mode of political interaction in any 
setting. 
Collins argues that the loss of "self-individuation" 
in the Dionysian experience is balanced by a concurrent 
"Apollonian outlook" that emphasizes self-understanding: 
Once again, it is the dialogue which is the 
prototype of social experience. In this case it 
is the social self which is created out of the 
elements of the dialogue.* By means of internali 
zed dialogue, the individual stimulates his own 
articulation of purposes and plans, so that his 
stream of consciousness takes on a progressive 
dimension. It is by becoming a significant other 
in dialogue with the student that the teacher 
contributes to the student's self-awareness. 
[Collins, in Denton, 1974, p. 154] 
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* See note 13. [13. See particularly Schutz, The 
Phenomenology of the Social World, G. Walsh and~F7 
Lehnert, trs. (Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern 
University Press, 1967).] 
It is unclear whether Collins refers here to "Dionysian 
relationship" or genuine dialogue; however, in either 
case what is important is the student's perception of the 
teacher as a significant other in the student's internal 
dialogue. Collins justifies his advocacy of the 
"Dionysian experience and relationship" by arguing that 
the most important purpose of education is liberation of 
the individual : 
Liberation occurs when the individual becomes 
aware that the world is many, as well as one. 
His experience as a stranger in school is the 
first step in this direction, providing that his 
awareness is encouraged and not simply frustrated. 
Teachers can facilitate the student's aware¬ 
ness that his life-world consists of the 
interpenetration of multiple realities tied 
together by symbols of his own biography. It is 
the freedom of movement from one level of reality 
to another which enables the individual to avoid 
coercion ... at any single level of reality. 
• • • 
The maximum contribution the school can make to 
the education of the individual is that, once 
having challenged him with the primal experience 
of strangeness upon his induction into the 
political group, it can reverse the perspective 
from the political sphere to that of the subjecti¬ 
vity of the individual. . . . [l]t is important 
to preserve dialogue within the institution, 
since it is in dialogue alone that a person can, 
without threat, be aware of the radical otherness 
of the other. [Collins, in Denton, 1974, p. 154] 
It does not seem to me that Collins work really shares 
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the spirit of Buber's, Gadamer's and Jaspers'. Collins 
seems to fall into the trap of emphasizing liberation of 
the individual at the expense of seeing liberation as a 
means rather than as an end. From the perspective used 
in this dissertation, freedom is freedom for dialogical 
relationship in community. Further, Collins seems to 
over-emphasize the radical otherness of the other and 
approaches a Sartrean view rather than a dialogical 
existential view. His work is included here only to 
offer another possibility for considering dialogue in 
relation to group instruction. It suggests the possibili¬ 
ty of at least a "ritualized" form of dialogue in group 
settings that may be useful as a supplement for, but not 
a replacement of, provision of opportunities for dyadic 
interaction. [11] 
A Dialogical Attitude toward Instruction 
As Jaspers does not argue that education should be 
structured dyadically, neither does he delineate a 
specific dialogical method. When writing of methods, 
Jaspers discusses three general modes of instruction: the 
lecture; laboratories and seminars; and discussion. From 
his work it can be inferred that a variety of methods can 
be used dialogically. In this sense, dialogical teaching¬ 
learning can be understood more as an attitudinal orienta¬ 
tion than as a specific method. This inference is 
supported by reference to Jaspers' comments on the three 
general modes of instruction he included in his work. 
The lecture method, in which the lecturer "allows 
us to take part in his innermost intellectual being" 
(Jaspers, 1959, p. 57), is used to present significant 
information about the lecturer s research in or synthesis 
of a subject area. The lecture can be perceived as a 
sharing of the lecturer's present understandings, which 
are recognized by both the lecturer and listeners as 
perspectival rather than as "final knowledge. These 
provide a ground for further questioning, thought and 
discussion. Kavaloski congruently describes a dialogical 
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view of the lecture as "personal and provisional findings 
that must be actively challenged, interpreted, and 
evaluated by students . . . not the last word on a topic, 
but rather the first word" (Kavaloski, in Kockelmans, 
1979, p. 236). 
Seminars and laboratories, in which "methods are 
mastered through practical contact with materials, 
apparatus and concepts which are studied by concrete 
example" (Jaspers, 1959, p. 58), are used to give students 
direct experiences with content and methodology. Teachers 
and students engage in mutual direct exploration of 
phenomena in the laboratory. Both precision of observa¬ 
tion and reporting of methods and observations can be 
emphasized, as can both the essentially investigatory 
premise and the steps of the scientific method. 
In seminars, teachers and students can dialogically, 
dialectically struggle together to interpret textual 
content. Since from a Gadamerian perspective, the text 
is not static or complete, hermeneutic interpretation 
involves a bringing-into-being of new understandings in 
every encounter between an interpreter and a text. The 
text includes an "excess of meaning": 
For Gadamer, the meaning of the text cannot 
be restricted to the mens auctoris. Tradition 
builds upon the "excess of meaning" that it finds 
in the text, an excess that goes beyond the 
author's intention, explicit or implicit for what 
he creates. (19) . . . Underlying ... is a view 
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of the meaning of the text or the work of art as 
both eliciting and including in itself the 
varying interpretations through which it is 
transmitted, . . . The idea of a self-presenting 
reality overcomes the isolation of the text as an 
object over against its interpretations. . . . 
[It cannot] be regarded as solely dependent on 
its creator or on its present performer or 
interpreter, so that by reference to one of these 
we might get a definitive perception of it "in 
itself." [Linge, in Gadamer, 1976, p. xxv] 
19 Cf., p. 209. Although the mens auctoris provides no 
positive standard for interpretation, it has the important 
negative function of excluding anachronistic interpreta¬ 
tions, etc. Cf. also "Aesthetics and Hermeneutics." 
From this perspective, it is preserving the integrity of 
content to allow it to present itself for students' 
interpretation, to encourage students to actively open 
themselves (dialogically and dialectically) to subject 
matter and to "understand" it in the sense of creative 
interpretation. This is the dynamic that characterizes 
seminars if they are approached with a dialogical orienta¬ 
tion. Thus, like the lecture understood dialogically, 
the text examined in a seminar becomes a "first word," a 
starting point and partner in meaning-creation. It is 
essential that the teacher convey the necessity hermeneu¬ 
tically of constantly checking an interpretation against 
the text (or lecture) in order to revise expectations and 
pre-understandings in light of what is coming from the 
text itself. This is part of practicing hermeneutic 
methodology. The teacher also reminds the students that 
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there are and can be many interpretations of material, 
none of which is definitively "right." in so doing, the 
teacher preserves the questionableness of the question, 
the possibility for discussion and dialogue and the 
essential spirit of the Socratic, dialogical approach. 
The third method Jaspers describes is discussion. 
For him, discussion is differentiated from debate. 
Debate is characterized by use of logic to maintain set 
principles and positions and to achieve victory over an 
opponent; debate is a kind of power-struggle (see Jaspers, 
1959, p. 64). Discussion is for the purpose of laying 
out positions and perspectives without seeking 
conclusions. [12] Discussion is regulated by certain 
rules: 
one must not repeat oneself, nor insist on the 
"correctness" of one's views by repetition. One 
must not seek to have the last word, but be 
content to have one's say and then listen to 
others. [Jaspers, 1959, p. 65] 
Small group discussion can establish the groundwork for 
subsequent, genuine dialogue between two partners. 
Questions of basic importance are brought up in 
small groups, all members of which participate 
actively. This, in turn, will induce some of the 
participants to conclude the discussion alone 
with the teacher in a serious and lively give and 
take. Here student and teacher meet one another 
on the same level, as is the ideal. Together 
they will strive to formulate the problems with 
such clarity and precision as will awaken impulses 
in each by himself to make solid, personal 
contributions later on. [Jaspers, 1959, p. 59 J 
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As previously discussed, for Jaspers, dialogue can occur 
only between two partners. Here, writing about methods 
of instruction, he refers to dialogue between a teacher 
and student; however, ideally this kind of dyadic dialogue 
should be on-going throughout the university. As an 
integral dynamic of the community, it should occur 
between pairs of students or of faculty as well. Nothing 
in Jaspers' work precludes perceiving discussion from a 
dialogical perspective as long as it is remembered that 
discussion (like a lecture, laboratory or seminar) is not 
true dialogue, but rather a basis or starting point for 
dialogue. 
These examples illustrate that a dialogical orienta¬ 
tion can be applied to a variety of teaching methods. 
The approach that Jaspers believes should pervade the 
university is the Socratic concept of education. Of 
Socratic education, he writes: 
[T]he teacher and his student ought to stand on 
the same level. Both are meant to be free. No 
hard and fast educational system exists here, 
rather endless questioning and ultimate ignorance 
in the face of the absolute. Personal responsibi¬ 
lity is carried to its utmost and is nowhere 
alleviated. Education is a "midwifery," in which 
the student is helped to give birth to his 
abilities and powers. He is awakened to an 
awareness of his own capacities, he is not 
compelled from without. What counts is not the 
accident of empirical individuality but our true 
self which emerges in the process of self- 
realization. ... The intimate relationship 
between student and teacher here is not one of 
submission, but of a contest for truth. [Jaspers, 
1959, p. 50] 
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Given his perception of the congruence of dialogical 
education and Socratic education, it is necessary to 
analyze the concept of Socratic education rather 
specifically. [13] Gadamer's hermeneutics is especially 
useful in illustrating a Socratic approach as a method as 
well as an attitudinal orientation. 
Gadamer s Hermeneutics as a Dialogical Method 
Jaspers writes about three general inodes of instruc¬ 
tion but does not delineate a specific dialogical method; 
Buber does not write about methodology per se but rather 
about relationship. Gadamer's work offers an extension 
to that of Buber and Jaspers since his work presents and 
analyzes a method that can be used in a classroom context. 
His philosophical hermeneutics is an essentially 
dialogical method that can be said to be a Socratic 
method as well as being reflective of a Socratic attitudi- 
nal orientation (as is the work of Jaspers). 
In the Platonic dialogues, three analogies for 
Socrates' role as a questioner are used: a gadfly, a 
stingray and a midwife. In each of these images, 
something is done to someone. The gadfly buzzes around 
annoying someone; the stingray stings someone; the 
midwife delivers a woman of a child. The gadfly and 
stingray images express the idea of (the teacher s) 
bringing someone into greater consciousness and attentive 
ness and into more direct, awakened interaction with the 
world. The midwife image is most frequently referred to 
and is mentioned by both Jaspers and Gadamer (Jaspers, 
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1959, p. 50; Gadamer, 1975, p. 331). 
The midwife image presents the image of two people 
struggling together to bring forth new life, existent but 
previously undisclosed and unrevealed. Yet, what is 
delivered, although it exists as a present empirical 
reality, is not fully revealed; rather, what has been 
"born" consists of latent potentialities and possibilities 
to be realized in the future. Thus, the "disclosure" is 
begun but what is to be disclosed remains additional, 
future possibilities. The midwife image is analogous to 
the struggle of a teacher and student to bring forth a 
new idea and new "life of the mind." [14] The educative 
process is in this sense disclosure (alethia), not of 
final answers but of further questions, potentialities 
and possibilities. The dialogical, Socratic, pedagogical 
interaction can be perceived as involving two aspects: 
one, the teacher's attempting to call the student into 
greater awareness and commencement (or resumption) of 
dialogue; two, the teacher s engaging dialogically (in a 
mutual struggle) with the student as a co-inquirer into 
and co-discoverer of possibilities (of meaning). 
Essential to this teaching method is the genuineness 
of the questioning. Referring to the Socratic docta 
iqnorantia, Gadamer emphasizes that it is more difficult 
to ask than to answer questions and that there is a 
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critical distinction between genuine and false discourse 
(Gadamer, 1975, p. 326). Genuine dialogue requires 
questioning to bring into the open the fact that the 
answer is not settled, but rather that the questionable¬ 
ness of any question persists: 
The sense of every question is realised in 
passing through this state of indeterminacy, in 
which it becomes an open question. Every true 
question achieves this openness. If it lacks 
this, then it is basically no more than an 
apparent question. We are familiar with this 
from the pedagogical question, the curious 
difficulty and paradox of which consists in the 
fact that it is a question without a questioner. 
Or from the rhetorical question, which not only 
has no questioner, but no object. [Gadamer, 
1975, p. 327] [15] 
In the Socratic docta iqnorantia, genuine questioning is 
the mode and in attempting to use a Socratic method, the 
teacher must be aware of the need to reveal and maintain 
the openness or questionableness of questions. 
However, Gadamer also states, "There is no such 
thing as a method of learning to ask questions, of 
learning to see what needs to be questioned. ... [T]he 
example of Socrates teaches that the important thing is 
the knowledge that one does not know" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 
329). From this it can be argued that the teacher s 
role is not to provide "final" answers but to ask 
questions and to help students learn to ask questions. 
The student must be helped to seek and discover "answers 
and then to be aware that the "answers" are in themselves 
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also questions. Thus the student is helped to realize 
that he or she does not know. However, this must be done 
cautiously with delicacy so as to convey the legitimacy 
of being a persistent questioner. It is essential that 
the student not conclude that because his or her "answers" 
are questionable they are wrong and the student is 
stupid. Rather, the teacher must convey the message that 
on-going, genuine questioning is the essence of living as 
a learning being, of self-becoming and of human rationali¬ 
ty. This cannot be taught directly but can be exemplified 
in the character and interactions of the teacher. 
Gadamer recognizes the complexity of the issue of 
questioning in his discussion of the art of questioning: 
It is not an art in the sense that the Greeks 
speak of techne, not a craft that can be taught 
and by means of which we would master the 
knowledge of truth. . . . The art of dialectic is 
not the art of being able to win every argument. 
On the contrary, it is possible that someone who 
is practising the art of dialectic, i.e., the art 
of questioning and of seeking truth, comes off 
worse in the argument in the eyes of those 
listening to it. Dialectic, as the art of asking 
questions, proves itself only because the person 
who knows how to ask questions is able to persist 
in his questioning, which involves being able to 
preserve his orientation towards openness. The 
art of questioning is that of being able to go on 
asking questions, i.e., the art of thinking. It 
is called "dialectic," for it is the art of 
conducting a real conversation. [Gadamer, 1975, 
p. 330] 
As the art of conducting a real conversation, the 
dialectic is also dialogical in that it involves the 
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partners in a genuine, mutual struggle for truth. As is 
the case in Gadamer s analogy of the game, partners in 
this dialectical, dialogical conversation are not the 
controlling subjects but are participants in a movement 
that transcends them and to which they surrender them¬ 
selves. Gadamer explains: 
To conduct a conversation means to allow oneself 
to be conducted by the object to which the 
partners in the conversation are directed. It 
requires that one does not try to out-argue the 
other person, but that one really considers the 
weight of the other's opinion. Hence it is the 
art of testing. But the art of testing is the 
art of questioning. For we have seen that to 
question means to lay open, to place in the open. 
As against the solidity of opinions, questioning 
makes the object and all its possibilities fluid. 
. . . Dialectic consists not in trying to discover 
the weakness of what is said, but in bringing out 
its real strength. It is not the art of arguing 
that is able to make a strong case out of a weak 
one, but the art of thinking that is able to 
strengthen what is said by referring to the 
object. 
. . . What emerges in its truth is the logos, 
which is neither mine nor yours and hence so far 
transcends the subjective opinion of the partners 
to the dialogue that even the person leading the 
conversation is always ignorant. [Gadamer, 1975, 
pp. 330-31] 
If an understanding of this dynamic can be conveyed 
to students, the erroneous conclusion on their part that 
they are stupid or that they are not learning anything 
can be avoided. [16] This is probably only possible if 
the teacher-student relationship is characterized by 
openness and trust and if the teacher reveals him or 
herself as a co-inquirer with students. If such is the 
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case, the teacher's credibility as a person and as an 
"authority" give credence to the dynamic of persistent 
questioning (dialectic) and dialogue. 
Gadamer applies his concept of dialectical dialogue 
to the hermeneutic interaction with texts as well as to 
conversation with another person. This is an important 
methodological consideration for teachers and offers a 
possibility of dialogue that is not typically mentioned. 
Here again, Gadamer's hermeneutics complements the 
dialogical approaches of Buber and Jaspers. It suggests 
a method for confluent educators to use in integrating 
affect and cognition in dealing with materials of tradi¬ 
tional disciplines (or any textual material or analogue). 
Gadamer envisions a reader, an interpreter of a 
text, actually engaging in a dialogue with a text. 
Moreover, he perceives this dialogue with a text as being 
more than a metaphor and as being the actual hermeneutic 
event. It is a dialectic in that it is a conversation 
involving question and response in the effort to work out 
meaning. It is a dialogue in that the reader-interpreter 
and the text, as an expression of human tradition, are 
partners in the communication and construction of meaning 
that constitutes the conversation or dialogue. Gadamer 
writes: 
Dialectic as the art of conducting a conversation 
is also the art of seeing things in the unity of 
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an aspect . . . i.e., it is the art of the 
formation of concepts as the working out of the 
common meaning. Precisely this is what 
characterises a dialogue, in contrast with the 
rigid form of the statement that demands to be 
set down in writing: that here language, in the 
process of question and answer, giving and 
taking, talking at cross purposes and seeing each 
other's point, performs that communication of 
meaning which, with respect to the written 
tradition, is the task of hermeneutics. Hence it 
is more than a metaphor, it is a memory of what 
originally was the case, to describe the work of 
hermeneutics as a conversation with the text. 
. . . Thus that which is handed down in literary 
form is brought back out of the alienation in 
which it finds itself and into the living presence 
of conversation, whose fundamental procedure is 
always question and answer. [Gadamer, 1975, p. 
331 ] 
This methodological possibility is an important one 
for all teachers, especially confluent educators. What 
is offered by Gadamer's work is a method that is inherent¬ 
ly an integration of affect and cognition and a method 
that extends the dialogical possibility to interaction 
with educational materials. 
To modern educators the idea of a dialogue or 
conversation with a text is likely to be an alien one. 
However, it need not be. Its possibility can be 
demonstrated, it seems to me, by observing children as 
they interact with media such as television. Many 
children seem to exhibit a highly active, emotional 
engagement with television programs that often involves 
an overt verbal response to what is occunng in the 
program and that is directed toward the characters. 
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For example, seeing a character in danger, a child may 
call, "Look out, behind you!" Responding sympathetically 
to a character's statement, the child may say, "Right, 
you tell him." Even when there is not an overt verbal 
response, a child's non-verbal body language can reflect 
intense involvement that often excludes awareness of any 
stimuli other than the program. This kind of intense 
involvement is paralleled in some readers whose concentra¬ 
tion on a book takes them "into another world" and seems 
to render them oblivious to whatever is going on around 
them. The popularity of the "Create your own adventure" 
type of book illustrates the kind of enjoyable involvement 
some readers find in engaging (dialogically) actively and 
creatively with a book. Another popular passtime, 
"Dungeons and Dragons," also plays on the kind of intense, 
original, creative engagement between the player and the 
textual module. "Dungeons and Dragons" (and similar 
offshoot games) well illustrates the kind of meaning- 
creation that can arise from dialogical interaction 
between an individual player-reader and a text in that in 
any encounter what happens may vary widely and is 
dependent on what occurs between the particular player 
and module. 
While the child's interaction with the television 
largely emotional rather than intellectual, program may be 
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it often includes an intellectual element simultaneously 
or as a result of watching the program. in the reader's 
interaction with a book or a "Dungeon and Dragons" 
module, the interaction is both affective and cognitive. 
The real question is whether this intense, creative 
involvement can be transferred to the educative setting, 
particularly in regard to texts and reading assignments. 
It can sometimes be observed in the use of simulation 
games, exercises and materials in the classroom; likewise, 
it can be seen occasionally in intense classroom 
discussions. However, these situations all involve 
interaction with other people, not only with educational 
materials. The question remains an open one, it seems to 
me, requiring experimental research. However, there 
seems to be at least the possibility of dialogue with a 
text if students can learn to view texts as potential 
conversational partners (rather than as "dead fixed 
entities) to be engaged with in question and answer. 
This would entail at least two things, I think. 
First, the selection of original source materials as 
opposed to standard textbooks would be necessary whenever 
possible. Textbooks tend to be compendiums or syntheses 
of "factual" material and methods or formulae used to 
find "facts." They are difficult to perceive as answers 
to open questions and their attempted comprehensiveness 
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typically masks the questions that lie behind the informa¬ 
tion presented. Such questions as are explicitly included 
in a textbook tend to be pedagogical, rhetorical or 
designed to test a student s recall of material presented. 
In an original source, more typically the author's 
question and attempt to consider it seem to be, if not 
always explicit, at least more readily available to the 
reader. Often the subject matter is more narrowly 
specific and its speculativity is more evident. [17] 
Second, the teacher would have to conduct the class 
in such a way as to demonstrate a dialogical approach in 
his or her own interpretive interaction with educational 
materials. Efforts would have to be made to elicit and 
reinforce students' attempts to experience (and communi¬ 
cate about) a dialogical interaction with educational 
materials. The student must be helped to learn to 
understand sources as answers to questions; he or she 
must be assisted to learn to look for the question behind 
the text and to analyze how an answer to that question is 
set forth. While studying the reason conveyed in that 
answer, however, the student must be helped to recognize 
that this is one possible answer, which is in itself 
questionable. The student must be encouraged to relate 
the educational material to his or her own life circum¬ 
stances and experiences; she or he must be helped to 
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reflect on this relation so as to discover his or her own 
questions to ask of the text. In teaching the student to 
engage in this kind of interpretive interaction, the 
teacher is involving the student in an experience of the 
back and forth hermeneutic movement that is part of the 
"fusion of horizons" that Gadamer discusses. The student 
moves back and forth between the text's questions and 
answers, the questions the student brings to it, the 
answers he or she finds, and the further questions and 
answers that emerge during the interaction. The student 
moves back and forth among the parts of the text and the 
text as a whole, as well as between his or her horizon 
and that of the text. As the student experiences the 
hermeneutic movement and dialogue with the text, new 
meanings arise as the original "conversation" is 
reactivated in the new context. 
Contrary to the examples of the child apparently 
"lost" in a television program or a book, the reader here 
is not lost to him or herself or the present world. 
Rather, the reader is fully present in the fusion of his 
or her horizon with that of the text. Nor does the 
reader engage in a fantasy structure that is essentially 
subjective. Rather, "objectivity" is retained in the 
process of constant reference back to the source material 
that lets the source present itself as it is and to the 
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reader's being that remains part of the interaction. The 
meaning that emerges is not just the reader's "subjective" 
opinion, but is a new meaning that emerges of itself, so 
to speak, in the interaction. The reader, in this sense, 
is led by the text, conducted by the conversation that 
happens between them. 
This interactive dialogical process cannot be 
taught directly; however, it can be modelled by the 
teacher's interactions with educational materials and his 
or her accounts of such experiences. The teacher's 
efforts to help the student experience such interactions 
can help the student to "get the feel" of such encounters 
and so begin to discover how to consciously enact them. 
Sometimes this kind of teaching-learning can be observed 
in classrooms where literature is being taught since some 
literature teachers, who have learned hermeneutic analysis 
as part of their education in literary criticism, use 
this to stimulate students' active engagement with 
literary works. Such teachers are constantly asking 
questions such as: "What does this passage mean to you?" 
"What is this saying to you?" "How does this make you 
feel?" "What question seems to be involved here?" "How 
do you react to the way the question is addressed in the 
book?" "Has anything like this ever happened to you?" 
correlate with the character's?" 
"How does your experience 
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"Do you see another question that could or should be 
asked?" "Can an answer be found in the book?" The 
teacher can also make statements reflecting his or her 
own reading experiences: "As I read this section last 
night, it reminded me of ... I suddenly realized that 
in such a case ... It made me think about ... It 
seemed to me that a real question arises that I hadn't 
thought of before. I need to reread to see what is said 
about ..." The teacher can attempt to elicit similar 
reactions from the students and these reactions can be 
considered in relation to the text. It can be useful to 
sub-divide the group into dyads for some of this sharing 
as well as to refer individual readers back to the book 
for additional independent interaction. 
This possibility of dialogical interactions with 
texts is most easily demonstrable in the study of litera¬ 
ture. There it is often possible to find such examples 
as the various versions of the Antigone to demonstrate 
possible similarities and differences in interpretation 
of material. [18] Using different versions (such as 
Spohocles ' and Anouihl's), the teacher can help students 
engage in comparative hermeneutic analysis that might 
help them to more easily perceive the legitimacy of 
relating "classics" to their own lives and questions and 
of generating new meanings and understandings about both 
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source materials and themselves. This kind of possibility 
also inheres in other disciplines such as philosophy, 
history, the social sciences, the behavioral sciences, 
and the arts (where as in literature it is especially 
easy to demonstrate and where many teachers have learned 
hermeneutic approaches as part of their own education). 
The possibilities may not always be as evident as they 
are in the humanities; however, the likelihood of their 
occurrence can be enhanced by the use of original sources 
as opposed to textbooks (which can supplement but should 
not replace original sources). What the teacher is 
really trying to do is to invite and enable the student 
to join with the teacher in research (as Jaspers under¬ 
stands it), both in dialogue with educational materials 
and with the teacher and other students. This approach 
can also be used to some extent in mathematics [19] and 
the sciences, especially in history and philosophy of 
science courses. 
Science Teaching 
The limits of a dialogical hermeneutic method in 
teaching the sciences and mathematics may be greater than 
in social sciences and humanities. However, the 
scientific method is itself a hermeneutic and this can 
certainly be demonstrated to students. If science is 
taught as research, the student will be more likely to 
experience the kind of dialogical learning envisioned 
here. The repeatedly expressed concerns of Buber, 
Gadamer and Jaspers about the prevalence and dangers of 
"scientism" in the modern world is evidence of their 
belief in the necessity for science to be taught in a way 
that differentiates its technical and non-technical 
dimensions. 
John S. Rigden, a professor of physics at the 
University of Missouri-St. Louis, argues that great 
science, "the advancement of fundamental new insights," 
like great art, is "an intensely human activity that 
brings to the forefront the scientists' subjectivity . . . 
To be unaware of the subjective nature of great science 
is to be ignorant of the dynamics of science" (Rigden, 
1983, pp. 613-14). He describes three characteristics of 
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science: it is empirical, analytical and human. Even its 
empirical character (the concern with observable, 
experimentally verifiable knowledge) is not simply 
mechanical routine. He states: 
[T]he facts of science result from a dynamic 
dialog [sic ] carried on between a scientist and 
nature. This dialog [sic] takes the form of 
experimentation in which specific measurements 
become the questions asked by the scientist, and 
the results of those measurements are the answers 
provided by nature. [Rigden, 1983, p. 614]. 
He describes the analytical character of science as the 
response to empirical data that seeks hidden meanings and 
underlying patterns, proposes explanations to bring 
coherence to data and directs attention to new facts 
(Rigden, 1983, p. 614). The empirical and analytical 
characteristics of science are the dimensions of science 
commonly recognized, accepted and emphasized in science 
teaching. 
Rigden argues that science teaching ignores 
the fact that science is a quest for knowledge and, thus, 
teaches a distorted picture of science. He points out 
that few scientists have read the historical classics in 
their fields and, therefore, do not depart from textbook 
teaching. The result of this is that 
Science students do not catch glimpses of 
scientists as people, nor are they provided with 
the contextual framework in which a creative step 
is taken. The voices of those who adhered to 
competing theoretical viewpoints are forever 
silenced, and, in that deceptive hush, the 
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assumption is encouraged that the evolution of 
scientific thought is smooth and unerring. 
[Rigden, 1983, p. 615] 
This leads to the further common misunderstanding 
that science will solve all of the serious problems of 
the world, such as the energy issue and the global arms 
race, and these problems come to be viewed in a cavalier 
fashion. [20] Rigden points out that what is missing 
from the common view is recognition that science is 
fundamentally a human endeavor. He states: 
Scientific observations themselves do not have 
the objectivity one might imagine. First, 
choices have to be made concerning what is to be 
observed and, more importantlu, what observations 
are to be ignored . . . Second, observations 
themselves are dramatically influenced by the 
preconceived ideas of the scientist. . . . 
. . . [T]he empirical aspect of science is 
affected to some degree by the subjective elements 
implicit in its human character. But it is when 
we turn to the analytical explanations of 
scientists that we can observe their humanity in 
full bloom. Deep emotional commitments and firm 
philosophical values are frequently decisive 
factors in their efforts. Theory-making is 
passionate work; theory-accepting is emotionally 
disrupting. . . . 
A revolutionary structure of thought cannot 
be approached logically, because one cannot build 
upon ideas that will be rendered inadequate by 
the new theory. Revolutionary theories are the 
products of creative insight. [Rigden, 1983, p. 
617 ] 
He concludes by pointing out that while the ultimate goal 
of science is objective truth and its final product would 
be a rational, intellectual creation (void of opinion and 
emotional content), the ultimate goal and final product 
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will not be attained: 
It is the endless quest for this goal that is the 
driving force of science. In that quest, 
divergent views come face to face, emotions come 
to the fore, and conflicting values compete. 
Science i_s the quest, and in the quest the human 
element dominates. [Rigden, 1983, p. 617] 
Rigden's view exemplifies a perspective that is 
congruent with the concept of "genuine" science espoused 
by Buber, Gadamer and Jaspers. From Rigden's work it can 
be argued that teaching of science can and should have a 
hermeneutic orientation. Reading and interpreting the 
classics of science is, for him, a highly legitimate 
dimension of science teaching; emphasis on science as a 
quest is an essential dimension of science teaching. 
Without this emphasis, teaching of science presents a 
distorted view of the nature of science, a misunderstand¬ 
ing that leads to unwarranted complacency about the 
ability of science to solve the grave problems facing 
humanity. Rigden is saying that these problems are not 
simply technical problems to be resolved by technical 
reasoning; their resolution will require dialectical- 
dialogical, creative reasoning and action based on 
existential values and commitment. That, for Rigden, is 
great science. Rigden's perspective clearly supports not 
only the possibility but also the necessity for a 
dialogical hermeneutic approach to teaching science. 
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It seems to me that the key to using this kind of 
dialogical method lies in the teacher s understanding 
(and conveyance to the students of this understanding) of 
two concepts. First, every discipline is a human response 
to questions raised by human beings in their interactions 
with their world and their reflections on these 
interactions. Second, every discipline uses particular 
methods and an accumulation of answers derived by use of 
these methods. These questions, methods and answers are 
constitutive of the human tradition of which the student 
is a part and which she or he is trying to understand as 
part of his or her self-actualization process. In the 
self-actualization process, the student will ask his or 
her own questions and make choices and commitments, based 
on his or her understandings, interpretations and 
applications, that may eventually be expressed in actions 
that further constitute both the student as a person and 
the human tradition. 
Education as an Aesthetic Experience 
Conceptualizing teaching in terms of aesthetic 
experience offers some insights into the dialogical 
hermeneutic process in education. [Use of artistic 
metaphors is congruent in that Gadamer devotes the first 
part of Truth and Method (pp. 5-150) to "The question of 
truth as it emerges in the experience of art."] 
Thomas Barone (1983) sees the "aesthetic experience" 
as equivalent to John Dewey's "educational experience," 
"a growth-inducing experience that grants the capacity 
for having even richer experiences in the future" (Barone, 
1983, p. 22). Barone perceives as attributes of the 
educational/aesthetic experience: "an aesthetic dynamic 
form, buoyant emotional qualities, and a vital tension 
between the experiencer and the experienced" (Barone, 
1983, p. 22). The dynamic form has identifiable phases 
with distinct emotional qualities. The first phase is a 
sense of expectancy; this occurs with the recognition of 
a dilemma or discovery of a problem in which a person is 
interested and produces a sense of commitment to explore 
the problem motivated by a feeling of uneasiness, 
expectancy or suspense (Barone, 1983, p. 23). Barone 
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notes that sharing of performance objectives with students 
at the beginning of a lesson is counter-productive, 
because it can inhibit the sense of expectancy and 
distort the experience to come by pre-directing attention 
toward specific information or skills rather than letting 
meaning emerge in the experience (Barone, 1983, p. 23). 
The second phase of the experience is a "growing elan," a 
building phase characterized by movement toward a resolu¬ 
tion of the problem or dilemma. The resolution is not 
predetermined but emerges as the experience in the 
classroom is interpreted in terms of the students" 
structured patterns of personal meaning. The third phase 
is a "tired satisfaction," a sense of closure often 
accompanied by "wearied elation" (Barone, 1983, p. 23). 
For Barone, emotional qualities are inherent in 
every aspect of experiencing, in the work of the scientist 
no less than in that of the artist; in every aesthetic/ 
educational experience, there are "emotionalized thinking 
and . . . feelings whose substance consists of appreciated 
meanings or ideas" (Dewey, quoted in Barone, 1983, p. 24). 
The aesthetic tension he sees as inherent in aesthetic/ 
educational experiences is described as the "vital 
interaction between the experiencer and her 'material" 
[that] actually consists of a series of doings and 
(Barone, 1983, p. 24). He adds that: undergoings 
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The tussles with one s materials are present here 
also, for in this process the student does not 
merely recognize inert facts or truths, but is 
also stirred into the perception of relationships 
between an existing fund of ideas and new ones 
seeking a place. [Barone, 1983, p. 24] 
The experience is interactive and transactive. Barone 
notes that even the seemingly passive experience of 
listening to a lecture can involve the active construing 
of meaning that Dewey calls "an act of reconstructive 
doing." 
Barone's understanding of the aesthetic/educational 
experience is congruent with Gadamer's understanding of 
the interpretive hermeneutic act. When Barone describes 
teaching as artistic activity, his thought is congruent 
also with aspects of the teacher-student relationship 
implicit in Buber's thought. Barone contends that a good 
teacher promotes educational encounters in several ways. 
First, the teacher is aware of the "accumulated 
interests, capabilities, and mind-sets" of the students 
(Barone, 1983, p. 24). Barone describes this as "empathic 
understanding," an erroneous designation in terms of 
Buber's and Jaspers' conception of what occurs in 
dialogical relationship. However, Barone's meaning seems 
to be congruent since he also refers to this as percep¬ 
tiveness" and "sensitivity" and states, 
person grows in awareness of others much as he 
or she learns about himself or herself -- through 
accumulating and assembling bits and pieces into 
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a coherent pattern -- then using that emerging 
Pattern to interpret the meaning of new actions. 
[Barone, 1983, p. 24] 
Second, the teacher selects and arranges curriculum 
content into "activities with a catalytic potential for 
engaging students in an educational experience," such 
that the "horizons of students are expanded" (Barone, 
1983, p. 25). He notes that although experiences are 
ultimately shaped by the student, all teaching modes are 
guided by the teacher. Third, the teacher teaches 
spontaneously. Teaching is spontaneous as a "true act of 
expression" whenever "teachers transform their behavior 
into a conscious means to an end, imbuing it with meaning" 
(Barone, 1983, p. 25). This understanding is highly 
congruent with Buber's understanding of the teaching act. 
Fourth, teachers involve artistic control in the educa¬ 
tional experience. They do this by designing the educa¬ 
tional experience in such a way as to provoke the students 
to exercise their own artistic control in "carving out 
meaningful experiences" (Barone, 1983, p. 25). The 
experience is transactive, an opportunity for reconstruc¬ 
tion; it is influenced by both the character of the 
phenomena involved and the character of the experiencer. 
The teacher shapes the educational encounter so that it 
can yield such transactive experiences. 
Barone's ideas are useful in illuminating the 
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hermeneutic act in the context of education. They are 
helpful as well in offering insight into just what a 
teacher does when she or he engages dialogically with 
students and curriculum materials so as to enhance the 
possibility of students" having meaningful educational 
experiences. 
Madeleine R. Grumet (1983) also uses an artistic 
metaphor for educational experience. She lists six 
features of aesthetic experience that she finds pertinent 
to teaching: 
1. Participation in aesthetic experience is 
voluntary. 
2. Aesthetic experience is bounded in time and 
space. 
3. Aesthetic experience is not subordinated to 
instrumental purposes. 
4. Aesthetic forms express knowledge about 
feeling. 
5. Aesthetic forms express an implicit 
acquiescence or resistance to social and political 
conventions. 
6. The meaning of aesthetic forms is constituted 
in the dialogue that takes place between the 
artist's work and its audience. [Grumet, 1983, 
p. 31] 
Grumet states that it is the function of art to reorganize 
experience so that it is freshly perceived, engages the 
viewer, interrupts the viewer's customary response, and 
offers new possibilities for understanding (Grumet, 1983, 
p. 31). Likewise, this would be the function of education 
in terms of the students' experience. 
Grumet also emphasizes the need for teachers to 
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create "safe" places where they and students can be 
together without patterns of dominance and subordination 
that typify the relations of professionals to each other 
and to their clients. Grumet makes an important point in 
her statement that: 
Even recent projects, ostensibly developed to 
bring more expressiveness into the classroom, 
like the humanistic education initiatives of the 
late 60s, featured a Rogerian, client-centered, 
self-abnegating facilitation of another's expres¬ 
sion, rather than dialogue that just might be 
abrasive, challenging, revealing, and estranging 
for teacher and student alike. [Grumet, 1983, p. 
36] 
Grumet's thought here is a reminder of Jaspers' perception 
of dialogue as a struggle, albeit a loving one, a tough- 
minded, "no holds barred" struggle for truth of self¬ 
being. It can be, as Grumet states, abrasive, challenging 
and revealing; it can be estranging in destroying 
complacency, preconceptions, presuppositions, and current 
self-understandings as space is created for the emergence 
of new meanings and understandings. Her thought is 
congruent also with Gadamer s understanding of the 
hermeneutic act. The astringency of this perspective is 
a necessary counter to confluent educators tendency to 
rely on Buber's conception of dialogue as a sort of 
blissful communion. It also offers a potentially correc 
tive warning against the over-reliance in confluent 
education on therapeutic models from humanistic, 
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existential psychology. 
Grumet is certainly not suggesting that teachers 
should abuse students nor be hostile towards them in any 
way. In fact, she stresses the necessity for not 
replicating patterns of dominance and subordination or 
professional distance. Her notion is equivalent to 
Jaspers' emphasis that dialogue is a loving struggle, 
based on mutual trust and confidence, and that it is a 
mutual not an adversarial struggle. Grumet emphasizes 
that classrooms should be safe places, which offer the 
privacy that is needed to "create community spaces where 
the forms that express experience are shared" (Grumet, 
1983, p. 36). It is part of the teacher's obligation to 
create such spaces. These are not spaces that sequester 
teachers and students and offer only retreats for support 
of feelings. Rather, they are places where people have a 
sense of togetherness and ownership of the space for the 
purpose of doing important, creative, meaningfully- 
expressive work that will, when it reaches fruition, be 
taken out into the world for all to see. 
Elliot W. Eisner (1983) also uses an aesthetic 
metaphor for considering teaching. He compares teachers 
to orchestra conductors and contends that they need 
"rules of thumb" and educational imagination. Education 
should operate on a scientific basis in terms of 
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interpretation, schematics and heuristics rather than 
prescriptions, rules and algorithms (Eisner, 1983, p. 9). 
He emphasizes that: 
Human beings construe situations, they make sense 
of classrooms, they anticipate the world in which 
they live. What constitutes a stimulus depends 
not simply on what is injected in the classroom 
but what Students take from it. And what various 
students take from the classroom and what they 
make of it differs. It differs because of their 
prior experience, their capabilities, their 
friends, their predispositions, and their 
relationship with the teacher. Because the 
perspectives they bring are multiple, no teacher 
can depend on a script or a pre-structured 
sequence for guarantees about effective teaching. 
[Eisner, 1983, p. 9] 
Eisner adds that what students learn from educational 
encounters increases the differences among them. He also 
argues that the skills of teaching are not discrete 
elements aggregated to form a whole. Rather, skilled 
teaching requires: 
the ability to recognize dynamic patterns, to 
grasp their meaning, and the ingenuity to invent 
ways to respond to them. It requires the ability 
to both lose oneself in the act and at the same 
time maintain a subsidiary awareness of what one 
is doing. [Eisner, 1983, p. 9] 
He states, "What we do as teachers is to orchestrate the 
dialogue moving from one side of the room to the other 
(Eisner, 1983, p. 10). Artistry in teaching occurs, he 
says, when the rules fail and the teacher must "invent 
moves that will advance the situation from one place in a 
student's intellectual biography to another" (Eisner, 
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1983, p. 11). 
What the aesthetic metaphor offers is a way of 
new insight into the hermeneutic act as it occurs 
in education. The students' being as meaning-creators 
enacting new meanings and understandings in interpreting 
the events and materials of education is described. 
Simultaneously described is the teacher's creation of 
teaching-learning situations in such a way as to 
facilitate the students' meaning-creation process. 
Attitudes, philosophical perspectives, beliefs, and 
commitments are involved as well as actions, predicated 
on and enacting these. Educators such as Eisner, Barone 
and Grumet demonstrate understandings of dialogue and 
hermeneutic interpretation that are congruent with the 
understandings of Buber, Gadamer and Jaspers and 
illuminate their applications in the educative context. 
Their emphasis on the aesthetic dimensions of education 
also provides a useful corrective to the predominantly 
scientific and technical perspective manifested in much 
recent educational literature (such as emphases on 
quantitative assessment, establishment of behavioral and 
performance objectives, specification of minimal competen 
cies, behavior modification, micro-logical thinking 
skills, time-on-task, and time spent in classrooms). 
Teachers and Students Learning Together 
One of the most potentially controversial implica¬ 
tions that can be derived from discussion of dialogical 
teacher-student relationships and teaching methodology is 
that teachers and students function as co-learners and co¬ 
creators of meaning. It has been mentioned above, in the 
context of the Socratic docta ignorantia and of the 
teacher's demonstration of dialogical interaction with 
educational materials, that the teacher presents him or 
herself to students as a fellow questioner and learner, 
not as an expert with all or most of the answers. This 
is contrary to a more traditional model of the teacher as 
"dispenser" of knowledge to which he or she has "privileg¬ 
ed access." It is congruent with "subjectivist pedagogy" 
more than with "objectivist pedagogy." However, even in 
the context of "subjectivist pedagogy," an implicit 
assumption of the teacher s "superiority" over students 
often remanis. This inheres, at least implicitly, in 
perception of the teacher as the activating agent, the 
facilitator, the assister in the educative process. In 
confluent education an equivalent perception lies in the 
teacher-therapist role. While this is, to some extent, 
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perhaps unavoidable, a dialogical orientation portrays 
the teacher in a slightly different way. 
The teacher is given credibility and authoritative¬ 
ness by students on the basis of their perception of the 
teacher's authenticity, his or her ability to help open 
possibilities that can contribute to the student's self- 
actualization process, and his or her greater experience 
with subject matter. However, the student has equal 
"authority" as the initiator of his or her own process of 
self-actualization and as a constitutor of personal 
meaning in the educative process. This perspective is 
likely to be a threatening one for some teachers. 
The question is likely to arise as to how co¬ 
learning, co-inquiry and co-creation of meaning in 
dialogical hermeneutic interpretation can be carried on 
between a teacher, who is likely to be a "veteran" in 
subject matter and more experienced in life, and students, 
who are likely to be "novices." This question is a 
difficult one, yet it is fundamental to understanding 
dialogical teaching-learning. If it cannot be resolved 
satisfactorily in the teacher's mind, the teacher will 
not be able to do dialogical teaching. Implications can 
be derived from the work of Buber, Gadamer, Jaspers, and 
phenomenological existential educational philosophers; 
however, the question can really only be "decided" on the 
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of existential commitment. in their work, teachers 
and students are perceived as co-learners, co-inquirers 
and co-creators of meaning in several ways. 
First, as mutually self-actualizing participants in 
the educative process, both teachers and students become 
increasingly self-aware. Each person is learning about 
him or herself in clarifying his or her understanding 
about who he or she presently is. In this learning 
process, the person also becomes more aware of future 
possibilities of whom she or he can become. This self- 
knowledge comes about in relationship with others and 
through their mutual participation in encounters with 
each other and content. The uniqueness of each person 
offers possibilities in any encounter that are not 
present in other encounters of which these particular 
persons are not a part. As each person tests ideas about 
self, others and the world, she or he becomes more aware 
of his or her presuppositions and prejudices as they come 
into play in this particular context. Ideally, in 
learning more about him or herself and his or her presup¬ 
positions and prejudices, the person can increase his or 
her ability for understanding and possibilities for self- 
actualization . 
Second, in the educative process the participants 
are co-learners in learning about others through their 
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interactions with each other. Open and personal relating 
in intimacy and communion enables the participants to 
better understand each other as unique, emergent beings, 
both like and different from themselves. In developing 
this understanding, the participants learn about relation¬ 
ships and, through relating, become more able to engage 
in authentic, dialogical relationships. 
A third supportive insight can be found to overcome 
concern about teachers and students as co-learners in 
Michel Nicola's reminder that, "To a student (and to 
every human being) the most trivial truth that he himself 
discovers is worth more than the deepest wisdom that 
someone else imparts to him" (Nicola, quoted by Kavaloski, 
in Kockelmans, 1979, pp. 238-39). Much depends on the 
teacher's belief that an essential purpose of education 
is for students to learn to seek truth and to develop 
themselves as rational, intellectual beings as part of 
their self-actualization as authentic persons. Dialogical 
co-inquiry helps students to develop their critical and 
analytical abilities and to develop faith in their 
abilities as they practice them in the supportive environ¬ 
ment of the classroom. Dialogical co-inquiry will be 
impossible if the teacher only asks and entertains 
questions to which he or she "knows" the answers. Nicola 
is congruent with Gadamer and Jaspers in the view that 
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the search for answers is more important than the particu¬ 
lar answers themselves and that the process of discussion 
"teaches by stimulating each participant to think, to 
seek and create his own personal truth" (Nicola, quoted 
by Kavaloski, in Kockelmans, 1979, p. 239). [21] 
A fourth way of considering teacher and students as 
co-learners and co-creators of meaning lies in Buber's 
thought. While the teacher selects dimensions of the 
world to present to students and serves as a medium 
through which this selection reaches students, the 
teacher always recognizes that this selection is tentative 
and subordinate to the particular being of each student. 
The teacher, during the teaching-learning dialogue, 
attends to what each student is selecting or rejecting so 
that the teacher can be more aware of each student's 
needs. The teacher, therefore, is viewing subject matter 
in ever-new ways, specifically as it relates to the being 
of each student. The teacher also views subject matter 
in new ways methodologically as she or he tries to find 
ways to better present that subject matter so it is 
more meaningful to a student. In both these respects, 
the teacher continues to learn about the subject matter 
(and the world from which it is selected and the students 
as individuals). The teacher learns what can be taught 
only by each student, i.e., what particular content means 
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as it relates to the being of that student. Thus, 
teacher and students are co-teachers and co-learners as 
meaning emerges in a triadic interaction among teacher, 
students and content. 
This dynamic is concommitant with the dynamic 
interaction of teacher and students as mutually self- 
actualizing, free, choosing, and responsible beings. In 
this regard, the teacher is learning and creating a new 
meaning that differs from that being created or learned 
by each student. Also, as the teacher continues to self- 
actualize, the teacher will be bringing something new of 
him or herself to interactions. This is congruent with 
Gadamer's description of the dialogical hermeneutic 
interaction as such that a person always learns something 
related to personal truth as an existential subject when 
the person and a text come together in a (ever-new, 
changing, unique) situation. The teacher, in living 
authentically, is ever-becoming and, therefore, is 
bringing to each content interaction something new that 
will elicit new meaning. 
However, it cannot be over-emphasized that the 
teacher must continue to grow and self-actualize as an 
authentic person. What authority a teacher can be said 
to possess lies in the fact that reason will show a 
pattern of logic in the teacher s interactions in the 
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educative process. Students will recognize the teacher 
as credible in practicing what he or she preaches if the 
teacher has not stopped questioning, but rather shows in 
his or her reasoning the questionableness of every 
question and the on-going openness of a thinking person. 
Likewise, this credibility will be bestowed by the 
student on the teacher who exemplifies in their personal 
relationship the authenticity and ability to relate 
dialogically that the teacher envisions as a goal (to be 
striven for although never totally accomplished) for the 
student's self-actualization process. 
Communication and Classroom Climate 
While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation 
to delve deeply into research in these areas, support for 
use of dialogically-oriented methods can be found in this 
literature. Much of the work in these areas indicates 
that practices congruent with those of dialogical 
confluent education significantly enhance students" 
interest, involvement and motivation with a resultant 
positive impact on their learning. 
For example, lack of student involvement in the 
classroom has been attributed to: 1) personal unwilling¬ 
ness of teachers to use or accept alternative methods of 
teaching and interacting with students; 2) the type of 
communication climate created in the classroom; and 
3) teacher insensitivity to the group processes that 
operate in classrooms (Fuhrman and Grasha, 1983, pp. 135- 
64). Citing Elizabeth Cohen's ( 1972 ) work showing that 
teachers are most comfortable with classroom processes 
that keep them clearly in charge, it is stated that "One 
outcome of the instructor's controlling so much of the 
class time is that there is little opportunity or 
incentive for students to take more responsibility for 
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their learning" (Fuhrman and Grasha, 1983, p. 141). 
Three factors are cited as influencing the 
communication climate in classrooms: the amount of one¬ 
way versus two-way communication; the instructor's 
"psychological size"; and the physical environment of the 
classroom (Fuhrman and Grasha, 1983, pp. 141-47). 
Writing on the first factor, Fuhrman and Grasha cite 
Harold Leavitt's work which demonstrates that "when 
communication moves from an open, unrestricted dialogue 
to more restrictive one-way patterns, errors increase, 
less work is accomplished, and people are less satisfied 
with their participation" (Fuhrman and Grasha, 1983, p. 
142). While one-way communication tends to predominate, 
its major advantage is that it allows teachers to control 
the amount, pace and flow of information and allows a lot 
of information to be transmitted in a relatively short 
period. Disadvantages include: students' having little 
or no opportunity to respond immediately and directly; 
the need, because of limited feedback, for teachers to 
make unsupported assumptions about listeners skills and 
understanding; students' gaining less of an understanding 
of material and feeling more frustrated; students 
tendency to feel little need to take initiative or 
responsibility (Fuhrman and Grasha, 1983, p. 142). 
Conversely, while two-way communication has the major 
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disadvantage of taking longer for messages to be 
transmitted, it has several advantages. There is 
immediate feedback; teachers' assumptions are tested 
immediately; more independence, initiative and responsibi¬ 
lity occur among students; and there is more interest and 
involvement on the part of students (Fuhrman and Grasha, 
1983, pp. 142-43). Use of two-way communication, includ¬ 
ing dialogue, clearly has the potential for exercising a 
positive effect on teaching-learning. 
Similarly, from research on instructor's 
psychological size, it can be argued that it is advantage¬ 
ous to reduce perceived instructor size. The work of 
Ronald Boyer and Charles Balton shows that "People who 
are perceived as psychologically big have a high potential 
for influencing and controlling other individuals. It 
interferes with an open dialogue ..." (Fuhrman and 
Grasha, 1983, p. 143). The tendency exists for others to 
depend on such people with the result in a classroom 
context of student apathy, lack of initiative and decreas¬ 
ed responsibility, interest and involvement (Fuhrman and 
Grasha, 1983, p. 143). The kind of dialogical relation¬ 
ship between teacher and student described in Chapter IV 
mitigates against this situation as do the conscious use 
of dialogically-oriented methods. It seems logical to 
infer that dialogically-oriented teaching methods can 
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create a positive classroom communication environment 
that will contribute to students' being more interested 
and responsibly involved in the teaching-learning process. 
A recent summary of research on teaching methods 
(McKeachie and Kulik, 1975, cited in Seiler et al., 1984) 
highlights the contrast between the uses and effectiveness 
of a one-way communication method, the lecture, and a two- 
way communication method, discussion. The lecture was 
shown to be a superior method for teaching-learning of 
factual information. The discussion method is superior 
for teaching-learning of comprehension, application, 
synthesis, evaluation of information, improved attitudes, 
and motivation toward learning (Seiler et al., 1984, p. 
133) . 
It is fair to assert that dialogue, like 
discussion, is particularly effective in stimulating 
students to do higher-level thinking (as well as improving 
students' attitudes and motivation toward learning). This 
position is congruent with the position that macro- 
logical thinking skills and dialogical-dialectical 
thinking can be taught most effectively using two-way 
communication methods. 
While discussion, according to Jaspers, is not 
dialogue, its characteristics are similar to many 
characteristics of dialogue. J. T. Dillon (1984) provides 
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an overview of research on questioning and discussion 
that illustrates these similarities. Dillon cites 
Bridges (1979) conception of the necessary and sufficient 
logical conditions for saying that people are engaged in 
discussion: 1) They are putting forward more than one 
point of view upon a subject; 2) they are at least 
disposed to examine and be responsive to the different 
points of view put forward; 3) they have the intention of 
developing their knowledge, understanding and/or judgment 
on the matter (Bridges, cited in Dillon, 1984, pp. 51- 
52). Bridges sees as presuppositions for these 
conditions: 1) reasonableness; 2) peaceableness and 
orderliness; 3) truthfulness; 4) freedom -- no constraint 
on offering sincere opinions; and 5) respect for persons 
(Bridges, cited in Dillon, 1984, p. 52). An additional 
precondition is openness: 1) the matter is open for 
discussion; 2) the discussants are open-minded; 3) the 
discussion is open to all arguments; 4) the discussion is 
open to any person; 5) the time limit is open; 6) the 
learning outcomes are open, not predictable; 7) the 
purposes and practices of the discussion are explicit; 
8) the discussion is open-ended, not required to come to 
a single conclusion (Bridges, cited in Dillon, 1984, p. 
52). These characteristics of discussion are congruent 
with the concept of dialogue in every particular except 
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the (Jaspersian) definitional restriction on dialogue of 
its occunng only between two people at a time. Dillon 
also summarizes research evidence showing that discussion 
is not at all prevalent in classrooms. He contends that 
teachers must be taught techniques for conducting 
discussions and that they must be encouraged to develop 
attitudes, dispositions and commitments to classroom 
discussion (Dillon, 1984, pp. 53-6). 
The work of William J. Seiler et al. (1984) also 
emphasizes the importance of communication in education: 
"Teaching and communication are inseparable. Teachers' 
success with students is to a large extent related to 
their competence and effectiveness as communicators" 
(Seiler et al., 1984, p. 3). Communication is described 
as both interactional and transactional: 
Interaction is the exchanging of messages that 
occurs among people involved in the communication 
process. Transaction carries the concept one 
step further by viewing communication between 
people as a simultaneous sharing event. That is, 
the persons involved in the communication are 
sharing in the encoding (creating) and decoding 
(interpreting) of messages . . . [C]ommunication 
is the exchanging by which we share our reality 
with others. [Seiler et al., 1984, p. 5] 
These descriptive comments are congruent with an emphasis 
on the interactive and transactive nature of dialogue 
found in the work of Buber, Gadamer and Jaspers. 
M. M. Swinton and Ronald E. Bassett (1981) describe 
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competencies needed by teachers for effective communica¬ 
tion. Their profile includes such personal characteris¬ 
tics as: "enthusiasm for the students and the subject 
matter; integrity, honesty, fairness, openmindedness, and 
sincerity combined with a sense of humor; and a positive, 
patient, and realistic attitude toward student efforts 
and personalities" (Swinton and Bassett, 1981, p. 152). 
They also emphasize interpersonal skills and relationships 
including the teacher's being a 
sensitive, empathetic listener who seeks to 
establish an open comfortable, nonthreatening 
constructive rapport with students; who 
demonstrates understanding of the students as 
individuals; and who fosters an atmosphere of 
mutual respect as he or she assists them in 
developing strong self-concepts leading to self- 
awareness and self-confidence. [Swinton and 
Bassett, 1981, p. 152] 
These competencies are consistent with the characteristics 
of dialogue and the commitment involved in a dialogical 
teacher-student relationship. Seiler et al. also report 
on work by Gustave Friedrich that indicates that the 
quality of classroom communication may account for about 
twenty-five percent of what students achieve in the 
classroom (Seiler et al., 1984, p. 15); this underscores 
the importance of teachers ' being good communicators and 
having the personal competencies mentioned by Swinton and 
Bassett. 
The role of communication in establishing an 
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effective learning climate is important. Summarizing 
research on learning climate, Seiler et al. report: 
Evidence shows that effective and ineffective 
schools differ in the climates that they have 
established in a number of characteristics: 
openness vs. defensiveness, confidence vs. fear, 
acceptance vs. rejection, belonging vs. aliena¬ 
tion, trust vs. suspicion, high expectations vs. 
low expectations, order vs. chaos, and control 
vs. frustration. [Seiler et al., 1984, p. 19] 
The congruity of these findings with the learning climate 
preferred in confluent education is demonstrated by the 
thirteen conditions listed by Boy and Pine (1971), whose 
work is frequently cited by confluent educators. They 
contend that learning is facilitated in an atmosphere: 
1. which encourages people to be active 
2. which promotes and facilitates an individual's 
discovery of the personal meaning of ideas 
3. which emphasizes the uniquely personal and 
subjective nature of learning 
4. in which difference is good and desirable 
5. which consistently recognizes people's right 
to make mistakes 
6. which tolerates ambiguity 
7. in which evaluation is a cooperative process, with 
emphasis on self-evaluation 
8. which encourages openness of self rather than 
concealment of self 
9. in which people are encouraged to trust in 
themselves as well as in external sources 
10. in which people feel they are respected 
11. in which people feel that they are accepted 
12. which permits confrontation 
13. in which the teacher demonstrates effectiveness 
by creating conditions by which he or she loses 
the teaching function. [Boy and Pine, 1971, pp. 
114-18] 
These characteristics are consistent with research 
findings on learning climate and with characteristics of 
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dialogical confluent education. They support the use of 
dialogue as a fundamental dynamic in education. 
It is reasonable to conclude that dialogical 
communication is a mode of communication that enhances 
the quality of: teaching; teacher-student relationships; 
learning climate; and student interest, involvement, 
responsibility, motivation, and achievement. Increasing 
the centrality of dialogue as a method and a fundamental 
dynamic in education is likely to increase the effective¬ 
ness of education. 
Summary 
This chapter has explored the pedagogic obligation 
to facilitate the student's engagement in dialogical 
communication and in other relationships through which 
self-actualization occurs. It has approached this 
obligation in terms of methodological considerations. It 
has been argued that the central dynamic of ontologically- 
rooted education should be dialogical. The major 
methodological contribution of Buber's, Gadamer's and 
Jaspers' work to confluent education is to offer a 
variety of ways to think about instructional modes from a 
dialogical orientation. Lecture, seminar, laboratory, 
and discussion sessions can all be approached dialogical- 
ly. Provision of opportunities for dyadic interaction 
facilitates the possibility of dialogical interaction. 
Gadamer's dialogical hermeneutic interaction embodies a 
Socratic method and illustrates how content can be 
understood as a partner with teachers and students in a 
dialogical educational dynamic. It has been argued as 
well that teachers and students can and should be perceiv¬ 
ed as co-learners, co-inquirers and co-creators of 
meaning in dialogical education. 
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These considerations can be useful to confluent 
educators in suggesting ways to supplement the affective 
exercises and techniques that currently predominate in 
writings about methods of integrating affect and cognition 
in confluent education. They can suggest a means of 
improving the practice of confluent education by reducing 
the presently prevalent group orientation and increasing 
dyadic interaction and individualization. Gadamer's work 
actually offers a method of teaching that inherently 
integrates affect and cognition. None of what has been 
analyzed here is contrary to the nature of confluent 
education; much of the analysis simply makes explicit 
presently implicit aspects of practice. However, in this 
greater explicitness there may lie heightened potential 
for a re-exploration that can only enhance the practice 
of confluent education. 
Endnotes 
1. Thevenaz, for example, writes: 
[E]very act of knowledge in fact refers to a 
subject (the transcendental Ego) as to an ultimate 
and primary term which is the origin, the support 
or the foundation of its meaning. 
The reduction leads then simultaneously to 
"the apodictic evidence" of the I (to the cogito, 
to the consciousness of self) and to the world- 
phenomenon intended by this transcendental 
consciousness, and above all to their absolutely 
fundamental and indissoluble conjunction ... It 
is the grasping of self outside of the natural 
world, in an absolutely indubitable evidence, as 
transcendental subjectivity, that is to say as 
the origin of all meaning, as the sense of the 
world. Likewise, to make the world appear as 
phenomenon is to understand that the being of the 
world is no longer its existence or its reality, 
but its meaning, and that this meaning of the 
world resides in the fact that it is a cogitatum 
intended by the cogito. [Thevenaz, 1962, p. 47] 
2. Jaspers, for example, is perfectly clear on the 
importance of reason: 
Some twenty years ago, I spoke of philosophy 
of existence. I added that it was not a new and 
specific philosophy of its own, but the one 
eternal philosophy in which, at a time when it 
had lost itself in objectivity, all stress had to 
be laid on Kierkegaard's basic conception [i.e., 
of truth as subjectivity]. 
To-day I should prefer to call [my] philosophy 
"philosophy of reason," because it now seems to 
be urgent to stress this original characteristic 
of philosophy. Once reason gets lost, everything 
is lost. From the very beginning its task has 
been, . . . , to acquire reason, to restore 
itself to reason, albeit as reason proper. This 
reason submits to the logical necessities of the 
understanding and appropriates its methods and 
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results without succumbing to its limitations. (1) 
1 Jaspers, quoted in Heinemann, 1958, p. 80] 
1 Vernunft und Wedervernunft 
1950), p. 49. Reason and Anti 
(C.S.M., London, 1952) , p. 63. 
in Unserer Zeit (Munchen 
-Reason in Our Time 
f 
Reason proper," for Jaspers, is "unobjectifying under¬ 
standing which views everything in its relation to the 
comprehensive whole" (Heinemann, 1958, p. 80). it 
invoives infinite dialectic. Reason is what prevents the 
individual from being satisfied with one form of knowledge 
and forces recognition of the perspectivity of knowledge 
because the finite human being can never know the compre¬ 
hensive whole and because truth is emergent. 
3. Kavaloski's reference to Husserl's and Habermas' 
perception of knowledge in his explanation of a "subjecti¬ 
vist" perspective is useful in understanding this 
contention. 
[Scientific knowledge of the world exists as 
knowledge only insofar as it is taken on the 
ground of a pregiven meaning-structure . . . 
[T]his meaning-structure is not a product of this 
knowledge itself but rather of the prior meaning- 
bestowing acts of a human subjectivity. This 
meaning-bestowing character of human subjects is 
thus the necessary condition for the possibility 
of knowledge as such. [Kavaloski, in Kockelmans, 
1979, pp. 228-29] 
4. Teachers are understood as active and students as 
reactive. Kavaloski comments: 
Thus the dialectic of learning becomes frozen on 
the ground of the teacher-student contradiction: 
the primary interchange is the mechanical inter¬ 
change between a teacher reified as narrator and 
students reified as objects of narration 
[Kavaloski, in Kockelmans, 1979, p. 231] 
Brown contrasts the "dead" and the "living" classroom 
congruently (see Brown, 1971, pp. 1-2). 
5. Kavaloski also contends that meaningful learning is 
unlikely to occur in such a situation. He quotes Carl 
Rogers: 
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When we put together in one scheme such elements 
as a prescribed curriculum, similar assignments 
for al1 students, lecturing as almost the only 
mode of instruction, standard tests by which all 
students are externally evaluated, and instructor- 
chosen grades as the measures of learning, then 
we can almost guarantee that meaningful learning 
will be at an absolute minimum. [Rogers, quoted 
in Kockelmans, 1979, pp. 229-30] 
Kavaloski's own interest is interdisciplinary education. 
In this his thought correlates with Jaspers' concern for 
"communication of all with all" at universities. 
Kavaloski also argues that any narrow prescription for 
education would be another example of "objectivist 
pedagogy" and espouses instead such approaches as Rogers' 
self-directed learning, Robert Hall's case study approach, 
and Freire's dialogics (see Kavaloski, in Kockelmans, 
1979, pp. 235-40). 
6. Jaspers discusses also three antinomies of self¬ 
being. The first is that a person is in an empirical and 
in an existential sense. A person is empirically, but is 
not yet because the person is still becoming. The second 
is that self-becoming occurs in self-conquest. The 
person must struggle to transform him or herself into a 
freely-willed intrinsic self by transcending the determin- 
acy of the empirical self. The third is self-being in 
the world and before transcendence. The person exists by 
participating in a world, but the person must also 
transcend that world to will him or herself as a "free, 
self-originating self-being" (Jaspers, 1970, pp. 43-46). 
Jaspers concludes: 
An attempt to carry this elucidation of self¬ 
being farther takes us to three points: First, 
self-being will cease in the isolated ego; it 
lies in communication. Second, it will cease as 
a pure, interchangeable intellect; it is only 
here and now, in historic singularity. Third, it 
will cease as the empirical way I am; it requires 
freedom. [Jaspers, 1970, p. 46] 
7. If education is understood as self-education and as 
dialogical, consistency is evident in Buber's emphasis on 
teaching "delicately," almost imperceptibly, and in 
Jaspers' stress on maintaining students freedom to 
experience the "will to know" and to learn as they see 
fit. Gadamer's understanding of meaning as personal is 
also consistent. 
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8. Yet, given the frequent suspicion of cheating when 
two students work together and the frequent instructions 
pertaining to working independently, it is likely that 
for an initial period the teacher must actively encourage 
dyadic interaction. This is necessary to overcome 
previous conditioning and to re-legitimize dyadic interac¬ 
tion in the classroom. 
9. An interesting sidelight is provided by a pilot study 
using a "simulated recall" technique. John Edwards and 
Perc Marland (1984) attempted, by interviewing students 
about their recall of their thinking during lessons to 
discover what mental processes students engage in that 
either facilitate or impede their learning. Their 
subjects were four eleventh-grade biology students 
experiencing three typically teacher-centered lessons. 
Students' thoughts related to: (1) classroom events 
involving the teacher and students; (2) events and topics 
discussed with neighboring students; and (3) the private, 
inner world of each student (Edwards and Marland, 1984, 
p. 63). While Edwards and Marland found that only from 
twenty-five to sixty percent of thinking was lesson- 
related, their intensive interviews suggested that off- 
task periods were important as: relief from intensive 
information processing; means of improving concentration 
and clarity of on-task periods; and a possible means for 
better linking new knowledge to existing knowledge or 
elaborating and enriching material being learned (Edwards 
and Marland, 1984, pp. 63-64). Edwards and Marland cite 
as an outstanding aspect of student information processing 
the major role played by neighboring students even when 
group work was neither required nor encouraged (Edwards 
and Marland, 1984, p. 66). They found that there was 
considerable intraction between students that served a 
variety of purposes, generally facilitating learning. 
They comment: 
Much of this productive, cooperative learning 
was done in spite of the teacher, suggesting that 
the neighbor may be a greatly undervalued educa¬ 
tional resource. This invites consideration of 
such strategies as introducing throughout the 
lesson regular periods of perception sharing and 
negotiating understanding with the neighbor. 
[Edwards and Marland, 1984, p. 76] 
From this pilot study can be inferred that further 
use of simulated recall may yield results that support 
increased use of dyadic dialogue in the teaching-learning 
process. It can also be inferred that use of simulated 
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recall with students in classrooms in which dialogue is a 
fundamental dynamic might provide evidence of its 
effectiveness in facilitating learning. It is interesting 
that Edwards and Marland chose as the site for their 
pilot study biology classes. If dialogical interaction 
can be shown to enhance learning in the sciences, it will 
offer a persuasive argument for extending the use of a 
dialogical orientation towards teaching methods in the 
sciences. 
10. The term "Dionysian" refers to the ancient Greek 
quasi-religious experiences related to the Orphic or 
"mystery" cults. The essential connotation for Collins 
is that of a "We-experience" that, for him, resembles 
dialogue. He sees this "We-experience" as created by "the 
imaginative creation of a fourth-person-as-common- 
outsider" (Collins, in Denton, 1974, p. 153). 
11. I think, however, there can be danger in the posture 
of imaginatively creating a "fourth-person-as-common- 
outsider" because this can lead to over-emphasis of the 
(perhaps unavoidable) exclusivity of dialogue. It seems 
to me to be more productive to implement instead the 
spirit of inclusiveness characteristic of Buber's thought 
and a concept of expanding community. 
12. Jaspers states: 
In a discussion which is meant to serve 
genuine communication there are no set principles 
and standpoints firmly maintained until victory. 
The premises assumed by both parties have yet to 
be discovered. Both parties seek to clarify 
their real meaning. Every principle discovered 
serves as a point of departure for new discussion 
provided that nothing of what has gone before 
remains unclear. Each points out the assumptions 
implicitly made by his partner so that a common 
ground eventually emerges . . . There is no end. 
Nobody wins. [Jaspers, 1959, pp. 64-65] 
13. This is especially necessary since in many instances 
the "Socratic" method seems to be equated with recitation 
sessions in which the teacher asks a "question" to which ^ 
s/he knows the answer and the students respond correctly 
or "incorrectly." Typically, these "questions" are at 
the lower levels of Bloom's taxonomy while the upper 
levels, which are certainly more representative of the 
Platonic Socratic dialogues, are ignored. 
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lh,:rfr?»1Sfanai°9? aPPlicable as well, perhaps, to the 
birth of a text if textual material is considered from 
a Gadamerlan perspective. The text is "born," brought 
forth as an empirical reality; however, the text contains 
within itself possibilities for many future interpreta¬ 
tions and understandings (Gadamer's "excess of meaning"). 
It is, but it is also to be. it carries the ideas and 
hopes of its author, but its latent potentialities will 
be realized only in its interactive existence in the 
world. 
15. Gadamer again emphasizes genuine questioning when, 
writing of hermeneutic interpretation, he states: 
Interpretation does not seek to replace the 
interpreted work. . . . Rather, it remains 
fundamentally accidental. . . . The interpreting 
word always has something accidental about it 
insofar as it is motivated by the hermeneutic 
question, not just for the pedagogical purposes 
to which, in the age of the enlightenment, 
interpretation had been limited, but because 
understanding is always a genuine event. 
[Gadamer, 1975, p. 361] 
16. Gadamer's descriptions of dialectic and dialogue are 
highly congruent with Jaspers' notion of genuine 
dialogical communication. The teacher must make a 
conscientious effort to persist in stressing this under¬ 
standing for all students. However, it is especially 
important that it be communicated to non-traditiona1 
students who are apt to feel more inadequate and self- 
conscious than is perhaps the norm. For a brief, but 
sensitive discussion of this, see Patricia W. Barnes- 
McConnell, in Milton et al., 1978, pp. 77-84. 
17. This difference can be illustrated, for example, by 
comparison of the potential for dialogue of any general 
science or biology textbook with that of Darwin's Voyage 
of the Beagle or any introductory textbook in education 
with Whitehead's Aims of Education or any textbook on 
philosophical problems with Jaspers' Philosophy or 
Gadamer's Truth and Method. 
18. A teacher who is inexperienced with this sort of 
approach can easily find texts to help him or her such as 
George Steiner's Antigones: How the Antigone Legend Has 
Endured in Western Literature, Art, and Thought (1984). 
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19. For example, Janet Eaton describes three strateqies 
or improving teaching and learning in high school 
thpS^nclasses (developed by researchers at 
® Institute for Research on Teaching at Michigan State 
University in collaboration with mathematics teachers). 
First, teachers should increase the quality and quantity 
of communication about mathematics. it was noted that 
when students were asked to engage in dialogue about 
math, to explain their thinking and reasoning, they 
learned more. Communication should be two-way and should 
ocus on conceptual understanding. Second, teachers 
should use the social organization of the classroom to 
facilitate instruction. Using cooperative learning 
strategies increases communication about math, develops 
math language and "loosens up" students for more class 
participation. Third, teachers should teach new topics 
or modify existing ones and assign interesting and 
challenging problems. Here is evidence that even in such 
an apparently "cut and dried" domain as general 
mathematics, dialogue is possible and can enhance 
teaching-learning. [See Eaton, 1985, pp. 91-92] 
20. Rigden's thought here is congruent with Jaspers' and 
Gadamer s (see above, pp. 223-30). It also reinforces 
the thought of Michel Nicola (1976). 
21. Nicola suggests that teachers generally not intervene 
too much in discussion; rather, they can ask questions to 
"nudge" discussion in a particular direction. He suggests 
that if students do reach a conclusion that seems false, 
their subsequent thinking and reading will lead them back 
to rediscuss the point because it will cause them problems 
if it is an important error (misunderstanding). The 
teacher can facilitate this process by careful thematic 
selection of readings (or materials or experiences) and 
judicious questioning. Nicola believes that the teacher 
should be prepared to accept that students will be more 
rather than less confused by discussion, especially if it 
is succeeding in spurring them on to further thinking and 
reflection that are furnishing new ideas and insights. 
For further discussion, see Michel Nicola, "Teaching 
Science from Original Sources by a Discussion Method," 
American Journal of Physics (1976). 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
In Part I of this dissertation, the work on dialogue 
of Martin Buber, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Karl Jaspers was 
^ri^lyzed. From this analysis a set of guidelines about 
dialogue was derived. The premise on which this work was 
based is that philosophical analysis of the concept of 
dialogue could enhance the effectiveness of confluent 
education. Part II of the dissertation attempted to 
demonstrate that an understanding of dialogue can provide 
both a general philosophical grounding for confluent 
education and some specific implications pertaining to 
pedagogical obligations, teacher-student relationships, 
content selection, and teaching methodology. An 
appropriate means of recapitulating this work is to 
reconsider the guidelines developed from analysis of the 
concept of dialogue in relation to some relevant implica¬ 
tions that can be derived from them for educators. 
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Implications 
The dialogical process enables a person to progress 
toward authentically actualizing the potential 
possibilities of his or her self-being. 
If, ontologically, human beings are understood as 
existing as free, choosing, responsible, emergent, self- 
actualizing beings, a legitimate and primary aim of 
education should be to enhance each student's possibili¬ 
ties for self-actualization as an authentic person. If 
self-actualization as an authentic person inheres in 
dialogical communication and relationship, then 
ontologically-rooted education should be organized to 
maximize the potential for occurrence of dialogical 
interactions. If it is participation in the dialogical 
process that impels authentic self-actualization, educa¬ 
tion should be designed to enhance students abilities to 
develop and participate in dialogue and dialogical 
relationships. Since the process of dialogue and 
dialogical relationship can be taught directly only to a 
limited extent, it should be taught indirectly as well. 
A logical vehicle for doing so is the teacher-student 
relationship. Organization of the teaching-learning 
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environment and use of dialogically-oriented instructional 
methods are supplementary vehicles. 
Dialogue is the mode of communication that allows beings 
to express themselves in their uniqueness. 
Communication in education should be fundamentally 
dialogical, i.e., it should encourage participants to be 
authentic and open in expressing themselves. This means 
that educators must eschew depersonalization, standardiza¬ 
tion and treatment of individuals as substitutable 
members of a collectivity. Teacher modelling of 
dialogical communicativemodes is important since dialogue 
can be taught directly only to a limited extent. The 
teacher s attitude in relationships with students can 
demonstrate to individual students that the classroom 
environment is a safe place to engage in dialogue. This 
attitude can set the standard to be held by each member 
of the group in his or her interactions with others. 
As a partner in genuine dialogue, a person opens him or 
herself to what is expressed by the other and in so doing 
receives a truth of the other. 
Therefore, dialogical education should be designed 
to facilitate students' development of receptivity, 
openness and sensitivity. The educational experience 
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should teach students to listen to what others are 
expressing about themselves as they communicate on any 
topic. If this is to occur, educators must encourage 
greater trust, intimacy and communion among participants 
in the educative process. Educators must help students 
to focus on what they learn about others in their daily 
encounters. They can encourage students to reflect on 
how understandings develop between partners in dialogue 
and on how these understandings serve as bases for 
further dialogue. 
In receiving this truth of the other, a person discovers 
as well new truths about him or herself. 
Therefore, educators should see the self as a 
legitimate object of learning. They should encourage on¬ 
going introspection and reflection on what is revealed 
about the self in encounters with others. In emphasizing 
the importance of self-understanding, educators will 
communicate to students that each of them is a unique, 
worthwhile individual. Also, as the student engages in 
on-going self-exploration, the student will be helped to 
discover that he or she, like others, is not merely an 
empirical being, but also a free, choosing, emergent, 
self-actualizing being. 
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In dialogue, partners relate to each other in their 
Respective singularity with trust, openness, respect, and 
concern. 
Therefore, to facilitate the occurrence of dialogue 
and dialogical relationships, educators must de-emphasize 
conformity as a predominating value in favor of emphasis 
on the value of uniqueness and individual diversity. 
This facilitates development of the trust, openness, 
respect, and concern that characterize dialogical interac¬ 
tions. This atmosphere supports the possibility of 
dialogue, in which the potential inheres for extending 
interpersonal respect, trust and concern. [1] 
Concomitantly, as educators emphasize the value of 
individual differences, educators are helping students to 
realize that they should neither allow others to obstruct 
their self-actualization nor obstruct the self- 
actualization of others. For this to occur, cooperative 
and collaborative modes of interaction should predominate. 
In dialogue, neither partner can relate to the other with 
an attitude of superiority or inferiority, dominance or 
submission. 
Therefore, authoritarianism must be avoided in 
education. Teachers cannot expect nor coerce students to 
conform to the teacher's presuppositions about them as 
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members of the collectivity "students." Students cannot 
be perceived as "vessels" into which knowledge is "poured" 
by a teacher acting as a "dispenser" of knowledge. 
Rather, teachers and students should perceive themselves 
as co-inquirers and co-learners. In their interactions 
as co-learners, they will recognize and should value the 
fact that what each will learn will be different and its 
meaningfulness will be personal. Thus, they will also be 
co-creators of meaning. 
In dialogical interactions, new meanings and understand¬ 
ings emerge. 
Therefore, education should be characterized by 
many opportunities for dialogue. While time can be spent 
in group discussion, time should also be allocated for 
dyadic dialogue. Since new understanding and meaning 
will be emerging, time must be available for thinking 
(internal dialogue). Time for reflection, grappling with 
new thoughts, making new connections, and clarifying new 
perspectives is necessary and fundamental for establishing 
possibilities for continuing dialogue. 
Moreover, because new meanings and understandings 
are emerging, the process of dialogue is risky. Confusion 
and discomfort can arise as presuppositions and preconcep¬ 
tions are challenged. Students may try to resist learning 
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when they feel themselves to be "at risk" as their 
learning involves self-confrontation. [2] This can be a 
particular problem in dialogical teaching-learning because 
of the kind of relationship in which the learner engages 
with content and other people and because its primary 
goals are related to the learner's process of self- 
actualization. Constant self-confrontation inheres in 
dialogical education because the learner is expected to 
remain "in touch" with who he or she is, has been and 
wishes to be. The student has to assess how this 
influences his or her dialogical interactions and to 
consider his or her understandings, choices and actions 
in terms of self-understanding and self-actualization 
(which are continuous processes). Frequent self¬ 
confrontation and re-integration are required if authenti¬ 
city is to remain a possibility. Therefore, educators, 
building on the trusting relationships they have 
established with students, must be prepared to try to 
help students tolerate and cope with the resultant 
ambiguity. They can share with students their own 
experiences of the processes of risking and testing their 
perspectives and engaging in self-confrontation. They 
can try to reaassure students of the fruitfulness of 
these experiences. They can select content that deals 
with these issues and arrange to provide much time for 
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discussion. They can be sensitive to students' feelings 
of confusion, discomfort and resistance (as well as of 
joy, accomplishment and achievement) and to their "mood 
swings." As they listen to students' concerns and 
expressions of feelings, they can try to help students to 
clarify feelings and perceive possibilities for attempting 
to resolve discomfort in on-going thought and learning. 
It is in this respect that educators can manifest a 
counseling orientation that attempts to help the student 
accept, understand and use ambiguity for further self- 
actualization. They can help students perceive ambiguity 
and discomfort as productive rather than as something 
from which to escape by clinging more rigidly to 
"comfortable" presuppositions, preconceptions and patterns 
of thought and action. This process cannot be rushed so 
it is vital that educators provide plenty of time and 
opportunity for its occurrence. 
New meanings and understandings that emerge are sources 
for on-going dialogue. 
Because new meanings and understandings are sources 
for additional dialogue, students should be encouraged to 
persist in perceiving their new insights as posing 
further questions and problems for consideration. They 
should be helped to realize the legitimacy of seeking the 
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questlonableness of every question, meaning and insight; 
this should stimulate students to continue learning 
(rather than to rest satisfied with their learning at any 
given point). Students can be encouraged to understand 
this unending process of seeking further understanding as 
ontologically part of authentic human being. They can be 
encouraged to learn to maintain the orientation of 
openness that attempts to bring out the sense and 
strengths of the contents of dialogue (rather than a 
debate orientation that seeks to logically achieve 
"victory" or finality by maintaining the correctness of a 
fixed proposition or position). In this process, the 
students will come to recognize a definition of reason 
that may be new to them and that is fundamental to living 
dialogically and authentically. 
The contents of dialogue are part of what constitutes the 
dialogical interactions in which new meaning emerges. 
Because all understanding is a form of self¬ 
understanding (as well as understanding of otherness), a 
variety of content can be a personally meaningful basis 
for dialogue. Therefore, content selection in education 
should be broadly inclusive. Educators should attempt to 
stimulate students to explore many subject-matter domains, 
to seek problems and questions in a variety of 
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perspectives and to relate content to the circumstances 
of their own lives. Because meanings and understandings 
emerge in dialogue, educators should try to engage 
students in dialogue in all the content domains and 
stimulate them to reflect on how dialogue enhances 
learning in that domain as well as in every other. 
No topic or perspective should be excluded from the range 
of possibilities about which dialogue can occur. 
A kind of dialogue, analogous with that of interhuman 
dialogue, is possible with non-human entities if they are 
related to in their expressive uniqueness. 
This is the essence of philosophical hermeneutic 
methodology, which educators can and should teach. Since 
it can be taught directly only to a limited extent, 
teachers should also model a dialectical-dialogical 
Socratic method of content interaction. They can do so 
by themselves overtly seeking the question to which 
educative material is an answer; they can seek also the 
area of openness that remains in the original question 
and in the text as an answer. They also can overtly 
consider the questions that are constituted by the 
relation of the contemporary world and the textual 
material (i.e., questions that emerge in the fusing and 
merging of horizons although they would not necessarily 
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emerge if the text were considered only as an historical 
work). Teachers can encourage students to think of 
themselves as being "in conversation" with materials as 
if they were in conversation with another person. 
Students can be helped to reflect on their experience of 
the "give and take" and "back and forth movement" of 
dialogue with other people and then to generalize these 
reflections and insights to the attempt to engage in 
dialogue with texts and analogues. Students can be 
helped to reflect on how in interpersonal dialogical 
communication the partners mutually merge their individual 
contexts (or world-views) so that new perspectives 
emerge. They can be encouraged to experiment with 
achieving this with texts and analogues by interacting as 
if they and the material were concentrating on and 
conversing about a topic in order to gain additional 
insights about it. 
In this kind of dialogue, meanings can emerge, truths can 
be expressed and understandings can happen, analogous to 
this possibility in interhuman dialogue. 
Therefore, the same strictures apply as in the 
instance of interhuman dialogue (see above). Educators 
should make the same kinds of provisions for time to 
engage in dialogue with other people about the insights, 
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questions and problems that arise from dialogical herme¬ 
neutic encounters. They must be alert to the potential 
for these encounters to be disturbing to students and 
they must be sensitive to the need for helping students 
to come to terms with their experiences. Since students 
may be using a diversity of materials, teachers will have 
to provide opportunities for dyadic dialogue between the 
teacher and each individual student and between any two 
students who may be using the same materials. This 
implies that teachers are familiar with whatever materials 
students are using or are prepared to become familiar 
with materials that are unknown to them. These dialogues 
will serve as a basis for further dialogue and may or may 
not be a basis for group work at another time. Teachers 
must also refer students back to the texts and analogues 
for "validation" of their understandings. 
The meanings, understandings and truths that emerge in 
dialogical interactions are perspectival because they 
arise between unique, emergent individuals in a 
particular, emergent context or situation. 
The meanings, understandings and truths have no 
inherent, coercive, normative status because they are 
both perspectival and personal. If students are to 
understand this (which is essential if they are to 
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self-actualize as authentic, responsive and responsible 
persons), there are several implications for education. 
First, students must be taught to be consciously 
aware of their biases, presuppositions, premises, and 
perspectives. They must learn to consider how these 
affect their interactions. They must also come to 
realize that their perspectives are not absolute; there 
are other legitimate perspectives held by others. These 
perspectives exist among an infinite array of possibili¬ 
ties open to each person. 
Second, because different methodologies yield 
diverse perspectives, students can and should be taught a 
variety of methods of inquiry. They should learn to 
recognize the strengths and limitations of each. Students 
can be encouraged (and expected) to employ a variety of 
methods, to be aware of the methods they are using and to 
compare the perspectives derived from the use of each. 
Thus, they can recognize that no cumulative totality of 
knowledge can be attained that is not perspectival. They 
can be encouraged to seek additional perspectives and 
understandings even in acknowledgement of the impossibili¬ 
ty of attaining total knowledge or understanding. 
Third, by using dialogical methods, teachers can 
help students to realize that, because knowledge and 
understandings are perspectival, a point of view may be 
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accepted by and appropriate for one person while it is 
not necessarily held by others. in this way, students 
can learn to maintain their own indivuality while concur¬ 
rently maintaining respect for the diversity of dissenting 
perspectives expressed by others. 
Fourth, because a person is always emergent and 
self-actualizing, a person's perspectives are always 
changing. Teachers can deliberately structure opportuni¬ 
ties for students to reconsider materials and themes they 
have previously studied and perspectives they have held 
in regard to these. By this kind of "recycling," teachers 
can help students to become aware of and reflect on 
differences and similarities between their previous and 
present interactions. In this experience, students will 
find new understandings both about content and about 
themselves. They will gain insights also into the 
facticity of others as emergent beings. 
Self-actualization is enacted in both dialogue and 
action. In order to enact being and self-being, a person 
must engage dialogically with others and act in the world. 
Therefore, education must be characterized by 
praxis. Education is not for the purpose of accumulating 
(inert) facts or ideas nor for merely developing technical 
competences. Rather, it is for helping a person to live 
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authentically. Educators can and should emphasize 
content as related to students' lives. Content can both 
be selected and taught in relation to its potential for 
enhancing students' self-actualization as authentic 
persons, shaping the world they live in and helping 
others to do so. In this sense, education is "activist," 
not in terms of any particular ideological stance, but in 
terms of its role of urging students toward active 
involvement in choosing, making commitments and living as 
creative, constituting participants in human tradition. 
Because of the perspectivity of knowledge and understand¬ 
ing and because of the historicity of each person's 
existence, a self-actualizing person acts in the world on 
the basis of existential commitment. 
Dialogically-oriented education brings students to 
awareness of the existential reality that decisions and 
actions are not and cannot be predicated on total 
knowledge or understanding. Rather, decisions and 
actions are predicated on and expressive of values and 
judgments about significance, which is cogent and compel¬ 
ling in a personal sense "for me" (but not necessarily 
for others). While intellect and reason can guide 
decisions, choices and actions, these are both expressions 
and enactments of self-being. As education brings 
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students to this awareness, it must also furnish bodies 
of knowledge and methods that students can use to enhance 
their development of judgment, i.e., their ability to 
think about and assess situations from more than one 
perspective. Educators should also attempt to develop 
students faith in their ability to exercise judgment by 
providing them with many opportunities to do so in 
educational contexts. Faith in their abilities will 
develop as students exercise their freedom and judgment 
in choosing and acting in the relatively safe environment 
of the classroom. In this environment, they can be 
helped to reflect on their choices and actions and on 
other possible options that they might have considered. 
In dialogical living, a person is called on to be 
responsive and responsible. Choosing and acting on the 
basis of one's own expression of self-being and that of 
others manifests existential meaning, understanding, 
truth, and authenticity. 
In this respect, persons act on the basis of their 
historicity and are responsible for their responses, 
choices and actions as they are responsible for their 
self-being. Education can and should help students to be 
both responsive and responsible. Interpersonal relations, 
content and methodology can demonstrate to students that 
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they exist in and act into a network of relationships, 
and that their existence and actions have effects. 
Although these effects cannot be totally foreseen, 
students are responsible for them. By being held 
responsible, students learn to accept responsibility for 
both who they are and what is set into motion by their 
self-being. In helping students to understand this, 
educators simultaneously help students to become more 
responsive. For this to occur, education must be 
structured to preserve students' existential freedom 
since only a person who is acting within a realm of 
freedom can be deemed to be responsible. Educators must 
help students to be aware of and to increase their realm 
of personal freedom; they must also help students to 
discover that freedom is not only negative freedom from 
(coercion) but more importantly positive freedom for 
(responsiveness, responsibility, self-actualization, and 
self-being). To do this, educators will have to provide 
many opportunities to experience freedom and to reflect 
on these experiences in relation to concepts of freedom 
and responsibility. Educators, in providing for 
dialogical interactions and reflection on these interac¬ 
tions, can work toward the objective of helping students 
to discover that their actions are a major part of their 
(processual) self-actualization. Self-actualization in 
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responsibility and responsiveness to the uniqueness of 
every situation calls for both action and reflection on 
action as they are related to a person's evolving self¬ 
understanding and understanding of others. 
In choosing and acting responsibly and responsively, a 
person enacts a "We-sphere" of community in dialogical 
encounters. 
Dialogically-oriented education provides opportuni¬ 
ties for students to observe that their choices and 
actions constitute a "life-world" for themselves and 
others. The fact that participants in a situation 
mutually create that situation is demonstrated in all 
aspects of the education environment. If the educative 
setting is fundamentally characterized by dialogical 
interactions, each person is able to exercise, and can be 
observed to be exercising, possibilities for self- 
actualization and for impelling the self-actualization of 
others. Since this is the essence of community, students 
will experience both the nature of participation in 
community and themselves as constituting members of 
community. Simultaneously, students will come to realize 
that since it is in the interdependence of dialogical 
relationships and community that possibilities for self- 
actualization inhere, it is important for them to 
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participate in maintaining the possibility of community. 
In order to do so, they must eschew unresponsiveness, 
closed-mindedness and manipulation of others for their 
own ends. 
As being is emergent, dialogical relationships and the 
"We" community are also emergent. They are continually 
being enacted in dialogical encounters. 
The daily experience of community in the educative 
setting will demonstrate to the student that community, 
like self-being, is always emergent and is being enacted 
in dialogical encounters. Because of their experience of 
community as ever in-process, students will realize that 
a dialogical orientation is not simply a method or 
philosophy of education. Rather,it is an orientation and 
commitment toward a mode of living that can and does 
generalize beyond the educational setting. Since they 
will be aware of their part in creating the educational 
community, they will understand how they can help to 
constitute community in any context. If they have judged 
their educational experience to be satisfying and 
productive, they will be likely to choose to undertake 
while understanding its difficulty. this endeavor even 
A Final Thought 
Dialogue, in a narrow sense, is a method; in a 
broader sense, it is an approach that encompasses the use 
of many methods. in the broadest sense, it is an approach 
and commitment to a mode of living. Dialogically-oriented 
education consistently reflects the integration of long- 
and short-term goals pertaining to self-actualizing 
living with a congruent methodological orientation that 
facilitates students" attempts to attain them. It is in 
this sense an internally-consistent system, but not a 
closed or restrictive system. Rather, dialogical 
education is consistent in maintaining openness, flexibi¬ 
lity and provision for personal needs, freedom and 
choice. While it demands personal acceptance of responsi¬ 
bility and defines responsibility in terms of responsive¬ 
ness, it simultaneously defines responsibility in terms 
of both negative and positive freedom. Its ultimate goal 
of authentic, self-actualizing living is inherent in and 
explicitly demonstrated in its process. The goal is, 
thus, encompassed in the process as that process 
facilitates increased progress toward ever-greater 
realization of the goal. The best means, so to speak, of 
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learning self-actualizing living is to live each moment 
authentically. The cliche that students learn what they 
live is given new meaning by the integration of past, 
present and future in each moment as the student is 
increasingly enabled to be a self-actualizing person by 
presently experiencing being self-actualizing. The 
dialogical orientation is not only congruent with the 
goals, directions and basic elements of confluent 
education, but is also a necessary condition for their 
realization. 
Endnotes 
1* This position is clearly articulated and supported by 
Patricia Barnes-McConnel1 (in Milton et al., 1978, pp. 62- 
100). She writes: 
[C]oming to grips with diverse traditions and 
values is essential in the teaching-learning 
process if students are to (1) fully comprehend 
their own values and beliefs, (2) critically 
evaluate what is necessary for their further 
development, and (3) ultimately make a conscious 
commitment to their expression . . . Trust, self- 
confidence and eagerness to participate evolve 
from an atmosphere of overt caring, respect, and 
fairness in student-faculty interactions. From 
the outset, the instructor must set the tone for 
the establishment of this atmosphere. [Barnes- 
McConnell, in Milton, 1978, p. 78] 
She continues, in a reference to minority students that I 
think is generalizable to almost all students: "Being 
acknowledged, respected, and appreciated is new for many 
students. It is without doubt an important step in 
individual growth and development and the initiation of 
personal and social change" (Barnes-McConnel1, in Milton, 
1978, p. 81). The issue of taking the risk of trusting 
may be a particularly difficult one for female students, 
who often still find themselves taken less seriously than 
their male counterparts: 
The lack of equal academic opportunity for women 
means not just benign chauvinism but a destructive 
lack of access to the supportive academic "good 
life" that renews the motivation of discouraged 
males to continue their struggle toward greater 
academic achievement. The opportunity for 
working in a supportive atmosphere of mutual 
inquiry has usually been available to male 
students who could frequently study quite closely 
with a same-sex, role-modeling mentor available 
more or less constantly to support their academic 
and sometimes even personal growth. Their 
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professional collegiality and support is what has 
been denied female students who have the added 
burden of trying to define their own identities 
through a personal reconciliation of their 
professional and feminine roles in society. 
[Barnes-McConnellf in Milton, 1978, p. 82] 
2. For example, when a person feels unable to master a 
concept that is being taught, it is easier to say, "This 
is poppycock" or "I hate math" than to say, "I can't seem 
to learn this; maybe I'm not as smart as I thought." It 
may be even more difficult to realize that if a new 
understanding or insight is meaningful, significant re¬ 
thinking and re-integration may be necessary. It is 
difficult to say, "If this is true, and it may be, then 
I'm going to have to re-think my ideas and beliefs all 
over again and I'm going to have to change how I've been 
acting." 
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